Still Struggling to Define “Information Dominance”


I made my way to the USNI/AFCEA West 2014 Conference because the theme is an important one.  Shaping the Maritime Strategy.  And because I was fairly certain it wouldn’t be snowing in San Diego.  Sure enough, the speakers and panel sessions have not disappointed.  And, there is not a snowbank in sight.

This morning’s keynote event was a roundtable on Information Dominance.  Moderated by Mr. David Wennergren, VP for Enterprise Technologies and Services at CACI, the panel consisted of RADM Paul Becker USN, Director of Intelligence J2 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, RADM Robert Day USCG, Assistant Commandant for C4I for Coast Guard Cyber Command, Mr. Terry Halvorsen, DoN CIO, and BGen Kevin Nally USMC, Marine Corps CIO.

Each spoke eloquently of the need for protecting trusted information networks in an increasingly interconnected military, as well as the complexities of the dependence on trusted networks for myriad systems, capabilities, and decision support of command and control functions.   Not surprisingly, the emphasis of most of the discussion was on countering the threats to our use of the electronic spectrum, which is to say “cyber” security.    Each of the roundtable speakers was insightful in describing the problem of data overload, and how that overload actually stymied efforts to retrieve information.   And each commented in turn that “information dominance” was not synonymous with “cyber”, which merely represented one aspect of the concept.

The discussion amongst the roundtable members did fall disappointingly short in two critical areas.   The first was the focus on technical solutions for managing data and information.   Connectivity and data transfer capability dominated what should have been a cultural discussion about information management.   It is not the lack of sensors, or data feeds, nor connectivity shortfalls which have hampered our attempts to wring the maximum value from our information systems.   We have become so enamored of the colossal capability to access raw data that we have become less than disciplined about what we NEED to know, when we need to know it, from whom we should expect it, what form that data needs to be in, and how it is to be analyzed into information useful for decision support for C2.   Little of that was directly addressed, which was unfortunate, as such lack of acumen about our information and intelligence requirements will render any system to deliver those products far less effective than they should be.

By far, however, the biggest shortcoming of the roundtable discussion was the inability of any of the panel members to actually define the term “Information Dominance” in any meaningful way.  I had submitted precisely that question for the roundtable via the electronic submission system in use at West this year, but someone asked it ahead of me.   The attempts to define “Information Dominance” would have made a junior high English teacher cringe.   We heard what information dominance is similar to, and what the supposed goals of information dominance were, but neither was in any way a real definition.   (This is not a surprise.  Two years ago, the Navy had an “Information Dominance” booth on the “gizmo floor”, staffed alternately by a Captain and two Commanders.  I asked each, separately, over a couple of days, to give me their definition of “information dominance”.  None of theirs were remotely similar, nor any more adequate than what we heard today.)

The problem, of course, is the term itself.   Information cannot be “dominated”, despite assertions to the contrary.  An enemy with a very specific information requirement that he can fulfill reliably and in a timely manner can be said to have information “dominance” over our massive sensor and communications networks that commanders and staffs pore over in attempts to see through the fog of war.  The dust cloud from the dirt bike as the teenager rides from Baghdadi to Hit to tell the insurgents of the Coalition convoy headed their way trumps our networked, data-driven ISR platform links that cannot help prevent the ambush that awaits us.

We have much work ahead of us to make most effective use of our incredibly robust data collection systems and information networks.  The solution to the problems of analytical capacity resident in C2 nodes with which to turn raw data into useful information and intelligence will be far more human than digital.   Commanders have to insist on a philosophy of “Don’t tell me everything, tell me what I need to know”.  And then go about ensuring that those who collect, compile, and analyze data have a very good idea of what they need to know.

And we can start by retiring the troublesome and ill-suited term “Information Dominance”.    As General van Riper is fond of saying, “Words MEAN things!”.  They’re supposed to, anyway.

Cross-posted at USNI.



3 responses to “Still Struggling to Define “Information Dominance”

  1. Esli

    Concur with all except the last couple lines. While CDRs have to be disciplined in what they ask for, staffs have an obligation to cast a much wider net because commanders are fallible and miss things. Staffs must enable commanders’ ability to understand, visualize, describe, and direct. But they must also ensure new, relevant or contrary information / conditions are identified and acted upon as well. But yes, our overtaxed information and knowledge management systems (they are different in the army, but few people can say how) certainly don’t help. Your insurgent on a bike example is dead on.


    • ultimaratioregis

      That “wider net” is still a finite net. And is an infinitessimally small subset of the data available. When I see regimental operations orders for an attack in zone that have seventeen or eighteen CCIRs, I know I have a commander who has either not done his recon in zone, or doesn’t know what to ask for. The result is that his processing power and decision-making cycle, limited by human intellect, will actually slow down. Things like the “Info dominance” assertions encourage that situation.


  2. Esli

    Agreed. Luckily, I still exist at Bn. I am currently at NTC, Watching a fellow Bn CDR struggle right now with the hardware aspect of our information systems in which each staffer patiently waits 20 minutes to upload their slides onto the BCT’s portal because we can’t use CD or heaven forbid a flash drive. Meanwhile the operational timeline is clicking and the OPORD issue is upon us, and now we are stealing any and all time from our subordinates.