Category Archives: Afghanistan

Mother of Lance Corporal James Ashworth ‘so very, very proud’ after receiving his Victoria Cross – Telegraph

Kerry Ashworth said the award of Britain’s highest medal for bravery in the face of the enemy had helped her make sense of her son’s death on operations in Afghanistan last year.

Lance Corporal James Ashworth, 23, of 1st Battalion The Grenadier Guards died as he led his team to storm a Taliban position in Helmand province.

She said: “I don’t think there are any words to describe how it feels, but I’m so very, very proud.

“I won’t say it’s made it more bearable, but it gives a sense to it. He died doing a job which he loved to do.”

She added: “It helps in a way because James is gone, but he will never ever be forgotten. He is part of the regimental history, he is part of history now, for what he achieved.”

via Mother of Lance Corporal James Ashworth ‘so very, very proud’ after receiving his Victoria Cross – Telegraph.

Rest in Peace, Lance Corporal.

And do take note, it took Britain less than a year from the date of action to present the award.

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The Rifle Squad as the Decisive Force

A year or two ago, in discussing small infantry units, Esli mentioned that the current doctrinal emphasis of the Maneuver Center of Excellence (formerly, the Infantry School) was on making the rifle squad more lethal, more effective, more of an overmatch to the enemy equivalent.

The current US Army 9 man rifle squad* versus an enemy of comparable size has several significant advantages, and yet also faces serious disadvantages.

First, US squads tend to be better educated and better trained in infantry combat, in both the technical and tactical aspects.  They are virtually never without some type of supporting fires on call, from machine gun teams and anti-armor weapons at the squad level, company and battalion level mortar fire, through brigade and higher level artillery, and even close air support.

The soldiers of the rifle squad have body armor, clothing and load bearing equipment that is far better than their opponents. Their food is healthier, and less likely to lead to illness. Their communications are generally better. His night vision devices are almost always far more capable than the enemy’s.

But the US rifle squad also has its problems…

That body armor and load bearing equipment leads to soldiers carrying loads that severely limit the mobility and agility of the squad. These same heavy loads also lead to an increase in sports type injuries.  Rules of engagement often delay or prevent supporting fires from higher echelons from joining the fight in a timely manner. That healthful and nutritious food is heavy, further increasing the soldier’s load, and tying him to a logistical chain. His communications and night vision devices all require large amounts of battery power, all of which has to be manpacked.

As to weapons, frankly small arms are small arms. We can spend the next fifty years debating the relative merits of the M16/M4 family versus the AK family that have spent the last fifty years fighting one another.  But neither weapon so overmatches the other as to be decisive. The same is true for any other weapons found in the rifle squad or the threat squad.

So, today we find ourselves in a situation where a US squad can pretty much hold its own with any similar sized threat. And generally, it will come out better than the enemy.

But that isn’t the goal. The goal, the desire is to be confident that virtually any time a US squad encounters an enemy formation of similar size, the US squad can fix it, fight it, finish it, hunting it down and destroying it. Today, most squad on squad engagements are not decisive- either one or the other force breaks contact and lives to fight another day.

Comes now news that the Army commissioned a study by the National Research Council, who came to the conclusion that the problem is, the squad isn’t well equipped.

Now, in the context I just shared with you, that sounds kinda nuts. One of the primary problems the dismounted infantry squad faces is the crushing burden of carrying the stuff they already have.

But the report does make some sense. The Army has spent untold billions designing network centric warfare capabilities the give commanders unprecedented ability to “see” the battlefield.  A commander can know almost instantly where his forces are, and with support from UAVs and other intel assets, very often where enemy forces are, even before the battle is joined.

But once a squad leaves its vehicles, it is cut off from this network. Its only data stream, if you will, is voice radio. And the “bandwidth” of voice radio is awfully narrow. It is very, very difficult to transmit a clear tactical picture through words alone, especially absent the non-verbal cues humans routinely use in face to face communications.  Even with standardized formats, the limits to how much information can pass from the squad to higher, or from higher down to the squad is very limited.

In the past, we’ve mentioned the possibility of using smart phones on the battlefield to increase the dismount squad’s ability to access data, rather than just voice. And there’s some hope for that. But smart phones aren’t exactly set up to run on Army tactical radio networks. Further, a smart phone is not the most ergonomic way to present information. You know it is foolhardy to text and drive. How much more foolhardy is it to text and shoot? So a more “heads up” method of presenting the information in an intuitive manner will eventually be needed.

And whatever technology comes along, it will have to weigh less than the current state of the art. And not only will it have to weigh less, its batteries will have to weigh much less.

Further, for all the advantages technology may in the future give the squad, it is not without its own burdens, even beyond simple weight. Every piece of equipment calls for maintenance and training, both of which take time. And time available for training is limited. What other training should the squad sacrifice to achieve competency in these new technologies?

Do we sacrifice time spent on marksmanship? Fire and movement? First aid? Weapons maintenance? Map reading? Sexual assault awareness and prevention training? Language and cultural training for upcoming deployments? It isn’t like there isn’t enough on the plate already.

The report also pings Big Army for spending far more money and attention on big ticket acquisition programs than on the bread and butter of everyday stuff used at the squad level.  The Program Executive Officer for Command and Control technologies is a Major General. The PEO for small arms is a Colonel, who, judging by the fact he’s been there for several years, ain’t a “comer” for stars.

So what do we do?  I don’t know. I’m not entirely sure, absent a far greater willingness to take casualties, we can make the rifle squad capable of decisively defeating a threat squad.

And I’m not even sure that should be the goal. The great strength of the Army, and indeed all our services, has long, long been not so much our technology, but our ability to “systemize our systems.”

In an artillery duel, the US doesn’t fight gun against gun. It pits US target acquisition, communications, fire control, guns and ammunition (as well as soldiers, doctrine, and training) against the foe. And no other nation has shown the talent for tying together these elements to effectively produce a whole  far greater than the sum of their parts. I’ve used artillery here as an example, but the general rule applies across the entire armed forces.  The challenge is to continue to understand that technology is a tool that enables this synchronization, and not a substitute for it.

http://img42.imageshack.us/img42/836/53805940489aa77d4f09b.jpg

*Marine rifle squads have thirteen members. Basically, they add an extra fire team to each squad.

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Filed under Afghanistan, army, ARMY TRAINING, Artillery, infantry, war

Release the Kraken!

A centralized remote sensor/surveillance system for combat outposts (largely as a result of the battle of COP Keating) has been test deployed to Afghanistan. And it’s name is The Kraken.

The Combat Outpost Surveillance and Force Protection System, nicknamed “Kraken” after the mythological sea monster because of its many tentacle-like technological extensions, is the latest. Combining tower-mounted cameras, radar, sonic shot-detection and remote-controlled guns and deployable in a single shipping container, the first operational Kraken was recently installed at Forward Operation Base Pashmul South in Zari district, near Kandahar in southern Afghanistan.

Technology and surveillance equipment is good, but it is never a replacement for an alert, well trained guard force. Never, ever place your unit’s security at the mercy of technology. But then again, don’t shun a tool that can help.

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Filed under Afghanistan, ARMY TRAINING

Charter Cargo B747 Crash At Bagram

No sign of enemy action, in spite of what the Taliban may claim. Some reports of a load shift changing the center of gravity. That fits the video, but it is hardly conclusive. Other issues could include a faulty configuration for take-off or crew error.  The B747-400F normally has an operating crew of 2, but this aircraft has 7 souls on board. All were lost.

[Update: Welcome, Ace of Spades Morons- Poke around a bit.]

[Update 2- Welcome Hot Air readers]

Here’s the Aviation Safety Network post with some background on the incident aircraft, carrier, airport and the incident itself.

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Bagram Batman

One of the annoyances of being stationed overseas was Armed Forces Networks, the provider of pretty much the only English language television available back in the late 80s/early 90s. It wasn’t so much that the programming was bad and out of date. The problem was, unlike regular commercial television, the “commercials” were in fact public service announcements from the Army reminding you of such weighty matters as “don’t bounce checks at the PX,” and “don’t beat your wife and kids,” and the ever popular “don’t abandon your privately owned vehicle when you rotate back to the states.” All delivered with the charm and panache one expects out of a government run entity.

AFN still runs overseas networks, particularly in fun places like Afghanistan, home to the sprawling Bagram Airbase. And while I’m certain most of the AFN produced content is as lame as it ever was, at least one campaign has shown someone, somewhere, screwed up and let a little humor into the system.

Meet Bagram Batman.

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Filed under Afghanistan, Air Force, ARMY TRAINING, Around the web

Call Me Maybe

I’m pretty sure I posted this somewhere a couple months ago when it first came out, but it is making the rounds again, and I can’t be sure if I posted it here or not.

So, a couple years ago, Canadian pop singer made the wildly popular ditty “Call Me, Maybe” with a rather uninspired video. Then the Miami Dolphins Cheerleaders last year made their own video of it, which, let’s face it, was awesome. So awesome, some US troops deployed overseas did a scene by scene cover. So call it a two-fer. Guys, watch the right hand side, ladies, watch the left hand side.

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Filed under Afghanistan, ARMY TRAINING

Bronco at PAX

So, after Congress shut down the Navy’s plan to lease and operate four A-29B Super Tucanos in Afghanistan, it looks like the Navy has decided to try another tack.

Several OV-10 Broncos are still operational outside the DoD. Now comes word that the Navy has snagged one that NASA has been using and is apparently going to retrofit it to a combat capable role.

I’m stealing some info from a forum for veterans of VAL-4, the Navy squadron that operated the Bronco in Vietnam.

[redacted by XBrad] had the privilege of attending the first public showing of the updated OV-10G+ being operated by the Nay’s RCU-1, as a “Black Pony.” They are preparing a second airplane for light attack, battle field management and communications roles or as the unit calls it; “Find-Fix-Finish.” The airplanes are flown by Navy pilots with Marne WSO’s in the back seat. The ground crews include both Navy and Air Force personnel. This is not a Boeing project, it is a Navy program. The attached pictures and video were taken at NAS PAX river on March 22nd.

  If all goes well, this airplane will be joined by a second one. Both airplanes came from NASA and pervious to that were used by the State Department as spray airplanes. Before that, they belonged to the Marine Corps. If everything works out right, both airplanes will be here in Fort Worth for BroncoFest May 3 to 5, 2013.

  At present this project is proof of concept and is only funded through October. After that is anybody’s guess.

  You will notice there are no sponsons on the airplane. Those will be added soon. The normal configuration for the missions will be centerline and with external fuel and four seven shot pods for laser guided 2,75″ rockets.

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Funded through October means to the end of the current fiscal year. We’ll see what the FY14 budget has. I presume the impetus for this is coming from the special operations side of the house more than the NavAir side, and the fact that is as far along as it is says SPECWAR finds it pretty important. It wouldn’t suprise me a bit if they got money for next year, and maybe even another couple aircraft. There’s still quite a few Broncos out at the Boneyard.

And while they’ll eventually add the sponsons, I wouldn’t be surprised if they just forego installing the M60D guns in them. Mostly they’ll want the sponsons for holding the rocket pods.

As a long time fan of the OV-10, I’m as giddy as a schoolgirl. Why the heck didn’t we do this a decade ago?

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Filed under Afghanistan, Around the web, navy, planes

Aviation Week on LAS

We’ve written several times about the ongoing effort by the USAF to buy an off the shelf light attack aircraft. We’ve always pretty much preferred the A-29B Super Tucano over the proposed AT-6. Mind you, we think either aircraft would be essentially suitable. Mainly our frustration is that such a simple, low cost program should be taking so long to move forward. It’s not quite a poster child for paralysis by analysis, but it’s pretty close. It also shows the costs of allowing contractors to protest competition results with impunity.

Fred George at Aviation Week has a nice little post about why he thinks the Super Tucano is clearly the better choice.

For a second time, W.W. “Bill” Boisture, the CEO of Beechcraft Corp. (formerly Hawker Beechcraft), is challenging the U.S. Air Force’s decision to award a contract to Sierra Nevada Corp. to supply 20 Embraer A-29B Super Tucano aircraft for the Light Air Support (LAS) program for use by the Afghan military.

Boisture claims the Defense Department is spending significantly more for the A-29B than it would for Beechcraft’s AT-6, its proposed LAS variant of the T-6 Texan II turboprop primary trainer. The T-6 is a well-proven platform, and the AT-6 shares about 80% of its parts.

I could see Boisture’s point if lowest cost were the only criterion for awarding a contract and if the AT-6 and A-29B offered equivalent capabilities. But neither point is the case.

I have flown both aircraft and there are significant differences. The AT-6 is a trainer that has been adapted for the LAS role with a 1,600-shp engine, a beefed-up wing with hard points, plus twin external gun pods, an electro-optical/infrared camera sensor ball and a network-centric C2ISR communications suite, among other significant improvements. On paper, that gives the AT-6 virtually the same capabilities as the A-29B Super Tucano.

Walk around the two aircraft, though, and obvious differences emerge. Built from the ground up for the light attack role, the Brazilian contender is considerably larger than the Beechcraft. The relatively small five-blade propeller offers 5 in. more ground clearance than the AT-6′s four-blade prop, and its oil cooler intake is much higher, for protection against foreign object damage. These features make the Super Tucano better suited to rough-field operations.

The A-29B’s wingspan is 4 ft. wider than the AT-6′s and the lateral distance between the landing gear is 50% greater, making the aircraft easier to handle on runways in stiff crosswinds. The A-29B’s main landing gear rolling stock is larger, featuring low-pressure 6.5-10 tires that are better suited to unimproved runway operations than the AT-6′s high-pressure, 4.4-20 tires that are designed for smooth pavement. The A-29B’s fuselage is 3 ft. longer and its vertical stabilizer is 2.3 ft. higher, providing more aerodynamic stability to handle the 1,600-shp engine.

Of course, my real first choice would be an updated OV-10.

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Our Political Navy: A Global Force for Far-Left Proclamations

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Nothing says “ready for combat in the service of our nation” like an Earth Day message in which our Sea Services “leadership” admonishes us to believe in the pseudo-science of Al Gore and the radical Left environmentalists.  Behold ALNAV 018/13:

3. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY LEADERSHIP IS KEENLY AWARE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES AHEAD. CLIMATE CHANGE IS LEADING TO RISING SEA LEVELS AND LESS PREDICTABLE WEATHER PATTERNS IN THE AREAS WHERE WE TRAIN AND OPERATE. THE RAPID MELTING OF THE ARCTIC ICE CAP IS DRIVING NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES AND PRESSING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS. WE WILL CONTINUE ANALYZING THESE TRENDS AND WORKING TO ENSURE OUR FORCES ARE CAPABLE OF MEETING MISSION REQUIREMENTS. ONLY THROUGH A COLLECTIVE EFFORT CAN MILITARY AND OUR NATION PREPARE FOR THE CHANGES THAT MAY COME. WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT OUR LOCAL ACTIONS CAN IMPACT THE SEVERITY OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES AND WILL DETERMINE OUR FUTURE READINESS.

But wait, there’s more.

4. FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY IS ON EVERYONE’S MIND THIS YEAR. LUCKILY, THE EASIEST AND MOST
EFFECTIVE EARTH DAY PROGRAMS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED AT LITTLE OR NO EXPENSE. PICKING UP TRASH AT A LOCAL PARK, CLEARING DEBRIS FROM A BEACH, OR VOLUNTEERING WITH A LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECT CAN ALL BE DONE ON A SHOESTRING BUDGET. BRING YOUR COWORKERS, FRIENDS, SHIPMATES, AND FELLOW MARINES AND INCREASE YOUR IMPACT EXPONENTIALLY AT NO EXTRA COST.

“Fiscal responsibility”?  Oh please.  Does that include not sending messages out that are blatant political indoctrination about “climate change” and how it has more of an impact on readiness than neglecting maintenance of our Navy’s warships, or cutting back on the training and education of our Sailors to perform their missions?  So that we might instead have ad nauseum lectures and training about sexual assault, human trafficking, breathalyzers, cultural sensitivity, and all politically-sensitive things non-warfighting, and idiotic messages that waste everyone’s time like the above example?   What really riles. however,  is the last line of the message text.

MAKE A DIFFERENCE THIS YEAR.

We have a Navy and Marine Corps with tens of thousands of combat veterans from OIF and OEF.  Many have been decorated for heroism in action against the enemy.  Thousands have lost comrades and shipmates (not frigging CO-WORKERS, jackwagon!).  Yet, we have a man who never served a single day in uniform directing us to make a difference.  As if he would know what that really means.  Despicable.  Absolutely unconscionable.

I have a much more fiscally responsible suggestion.   How about the Department of the Navy eliminate the position of “Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Environment)”.  How about SECNAV Ray Mabus show Donald Schregardus and his $200,000+ salary to the door, along with everyone assigned to his likely considerable staff, and use the money instead to maintain and train a Navy for war?  Just a thought.  And if Ray Mabus isn’t capable of that, he needs to follow Schregardus off the taxpayer dole, post-haste.  Perhaps we then can get someone who can provide a modicum of leadership worthy of our Navy and our nation.   That’d be a switch.


							

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Filed under Afghanistan, iraq, marines, navy, obama, Politics, stupid, Uncategorized, veterans, war

General Barry McCaffrey: Lauds “Marines’ Aversion to BS” On Women in Infantry

Soldiers with the US Army's 6-4 Cavalry walk down a mountain path during a patrol near Combat Outpost Keating in eastern Afghanistan

Time Magazine (of all places) carries General McCaffrey’s missive.  Well worth the read (which contains a link to Marine General Newbold’s superb “Seven Myths about ‘Women in Combat’”).

The argument for women at rifle battalion team level is unsound. Makes as much sense as mandating women on all-male professional contact sports teams.

Life in a rifle company is still incredibly brutal, filthy, requires enormous physical energy and upper body strength, and calls for a spirit of personal violence. There is zero personal privacy. Bodily functions take place in close proximity.

Troops are constantly injured from carrying heavy loads and crashing down hills in the dark. They dig like moles to stay alive.

Infantry units live like wild animals during periods of extended combat. Mostly it is a business of self-selected young men.  Most of these combat soldiers end up in these units because they actually want to fight.

One might think there would be some additional recognition of such opinions expressed by long-time practitioners of the craft of ground combat.   But alas.   Objective analysis gives way to activism and some other “isms” all too often.

As General Newbold rightly asserts:

Pity the truthful leader who attempts to hold to standards based on realistic combat factors, and tells truth to power. Most won’t, and the others won’t survive.

(H/T to Battleland)

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Filed under Afghanistan, army, Artillery, girls, guns, history, infantry, iraq, marines, navy, obama, Politics, recruiting, SIR!, stupid, Uncategorized, veterans, war

Getting your money’s worth

In 1952, Boeing, using its own money, began development of a jet transport prototype. From its first flight in July 1954, Boeing knew it had a winner, and proceeded to develop two new aircraft based on this 367-80 design.

A larger, longer variant went on to become the world famous Boeing 707. But a smaller, shorter plane, very similar to the Dash Eighty, would also go on to a remarkable career.

In the mid-1950s, the Air Force Strategic Air Command was shedding its piston powered B-29, B-50, and B-36 fleet in favor of jet bombers such as the Boeing B-47, and B-52. As fantastic as those two jets were, they still needed in flight refueling to meet the range requirements to hold at risk targets deep inside the Soviet Union. Existing tanker aircraft, based on the B-29, and its cousin the B-50,* simply couldn’t provide enough fuel, nor fly fast enough, to fulfill the mission.

So it came to pass, in the mid 1950s, the Air Force, wanting a jet tanker for Strategic Air Command, held a competition to build one. And as we all know, the winner was… Lockheed? Yep. Lockheed. They had proposed a jet with a configuration similar to the later VC-10. But since it would take some time before Lockheed could get around to building any tankers, the Air Force gave an interim order to Boeing to build 28 tankers based on its Dash Eighty prototype. That order soon grew to 250 tankers. And pretty soon, the Air Force it would be silly to support two separate tanker fleets, and cancelled the Lockheed program. Boeing’s order book continued to grow, and in addition to tankers, “vanilla” transport versions without the refueling equipment were ordered.  The basic designation for the design was the C-135. Tanker variants were known as the KC-135 Stratotanker.  From 1957 to 1965, Boeing delivered 820 tanker and transport C-135 Stratolifter aircraft, the vast majority of them as KC-135A tankers.

http://www.vr-24.org/SquadronScrapbook/B52_KC135.jpg

Originally intended primarily to support the Strategic Air Command’s bombers, the KC-135A tanker fleet found itself more and more involved in supporting tactical aircraft in Vietnam. The F-105s and F-4s based in Thailand would have been unable to strike the heart of North Vietnam without the support of the Stratotankers. Since that time, the fleet has been deeply involved in virtually all use of tactical airpower, and increasingly has supported US Navy carrier operations, particularly the very long flights in Afghanistan and Iraq.

From first delivery to the early 1980s, the KC-135s underwent very few modifications.  That’s a testament to the basic soundness of the design. But engine design in those years lead to far more powerful engines, with much better fuel efficiency, and lower noise levels. As commercial 707s began to retire, some KC-135s assigned to the Air National Guard were re-egined with their surplus TF-33 turbofan engines. More powerful engines meant a shorter take off roll. More fuel efficiency meant more of the fuel onboard could be transferred to other aircraft.  These converted jets were known as KC-135E’s.

Fifty-six KC-135A’s were specially modified to support the SR-71A. Since the SR-71A uses a special fuel (JP-7) that normal jets can’t use, these modified tankers had to be able to segregate their own fuel from that intended for offload. Designated KC-135Qs, several tankers could be expected to support every operational SR-71 sortie.

Eventually, the remaining KC-135A fleet was re-engined with the CFM56 high bypass turbofan engine, essentially identical to what a modern civilian airliner would use. Twice as powerful as the original J57 engine, far more fuel efficient and much quieter, it has given the fleet much lower operational costs, lower maintenance requirements, and better available fuel offload.  With the new engines, they were redesignated KC-135R.  With the retirement of the SR-71, the KC-135Q’s were also re-engined, and designated KC-135T, and used alongside the “R” fleet.

Finally, from 1999 to 2002, the fleet, now down to about 365 jets, underwent a modernization program known as Pacer CRAG (Compass, Radios, Avionics, and GPS), which completely updated the flight deck to modern standards. With the new engines and flight deck, navigator position could be eliminated, and crew costs reduced, all while improving aircraft efficiency and reducing operating costs.

Today, the KC-135 still forms the backbone of the US tanker fleet.

Almost as soon as the first of the C-135 family entered service, the Air Force recognized that such a sound airplane could be used for other roles.

One of the very first “off label” uses was to remove the refueling boom at the rear of the jet, and replace the operator station with a battery of panoramic cameras. These RC-135As were used for photomapping and topographical survey.

They also spawned a bewildering array of modified C-135 airframes for a variety of specialized reconnaissance roles, most in the Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) missions.

The Air Force tends to give programs a two word code name, generally with the first word being the “umbrella” for a particular genre of programs, and the second one being a specific designator. For instance, virtually all programs that begin with “Pave” have to do with electro-optical and infrared sensors to improve night flying or targeting.

The two major programs that most recon and special mission C-135s fell under were “RIVET” and “COBRA.” RIVET was usually a SIGINT or ELINT program, while COBRA usually meant gathering intelligence on Soviet ballistic missile tests.

Several times, a single KC-135 or C-135 would be specially modified for a particular purpose, receiving both a new designation, and a new code name. One example would be the C-135B modified in 1960 to RC-135E RIVET AMBER, equipped with a special phased array radar to track ballistic missile warheads. With the stupendous cost of $35,000,000 for the radar alone, it was at that time probably the most expensive plane in the Air Force.   Only one was modified. After it was lost in an accident in 1969, it was not replaced.

Quite a few aircraft would see their original mission change, undergo further modification, and receive yet another new designation and code name. Keeping track of all the variants is beyond the scope of this post, but suffice to say that the number of variants has used up almost all the available letters for designations.

The major RC variant is the RC-135V/W RIVET Joint, used both for strategic and tactical SIGINT and ELINT. Even today, RIVET Joint supports the war in Afghanistan.

File:RC-135 Rivet Joint 2008.jpg

That doesn’t count the various EC-135 variants, most (but not all) of which served as airborne command posts. Per wiki:

  • EC-135A – KC-135A modified for airborne national command post role
  • EC-135B – C-135B modified with large nose for ARIA mission
  • EC-135C – purpose built C-135 variant for airborne command post role, “Looking Glass”
  • EC-135E – re-engined EC-135N
  • EC-135G – KC-135A modified for airborne national command post role
  • EC-135H – KC-135A modified for airborne national command post role, “Silk Purse”
  • EC-135J – KC-135B modified for airborne national command post role, “Nightwatch”
  • EC-135K – KC-135A modified for deployment control duties
  • EC-135L – KC-135A modified for radio relay and amplitude modulation dropout capability “Cover All”
  • EC-135N – ARIA aircraft with “Snoopy Nose”
  • EC-135J/P – KC-135A modified for airborne command post role, “Blue Eagle” and “Scope Light”
  • EC-135Y – NKC-135 reconfigured as C3 aircraft for Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command

Then there are the “weather reconnaissance” WC-135s.  The only “weather” the WC-135C and WC-135W ever looked for were radioactive clouds produced by nuclear explosions. They use special air sampling equipment to retrieve particulate matter to analyze the results of foreign atomic testing (and they’re still in service).

Various C-135s permanently converted to specialized test aircraft were designated NKC-135s, most being one of a kind modifications.

Finally, there is the OC-135B. Under the Open Skies treaty, the US and other signatory nations (including Russia) have the right to conduct scheduled aerial reconnaissance missions over any other signatory nation on a reciprocal basis (that is, for each overflight we make, the Russians can overfly the US).  There are limits to the equipment used (any recon equipment an Open Sky plane uses must be made available to any other signatory nation).  The US operates two OC-135Bs, and maintains one in storage.

This doesn’t even count the several Air Force jets that actually used the Boeing 707 airframe, such as the E-3 Sentry AWACS, the E-8 JSTARS, or the E-6 Mercury TACAMO.

For well over half a century, the C-135 family has served the United States well, and current projections have it serving until, at a minimum, 2040.  I guess when it hits 80 years old, it will have earned its retirement.

*The B-50 was essentially a B-29 with the R-3350 engines replaced by the R-4360- a radial engine of 4,360 cubic inches of displacement. The other major piston powered tanker of the time, the KC-97, used the wings and powerplant of the B-50 with a new, much larger fuselage to form the C-97 transport, which was further modified to the KC-97 tanker.  The KC-97L would actually continue to serve for a long, long time, with the last one retired from the Texas Air National Guard in 1978.

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Filed under Afghanistan, Air Force, history, planes

General Dunford: Karzai “may… issue orders that put our forces at risk”

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NBC News carries the story of the leaked memo.

General Joe Dunford is as fine a combat leader as the Marine Corps has produced, and that includes Mattis and Conway.   While it is unfortunate that the confidential memo was leaked, it is heartening to know that General Dunford has a realistic assessment of the situation, is aware of the corrupt unreliability of our Afghan “allies”, and has the lives of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines in his command at the fore.

Karzai’s threat to “seize Bagram” is such an instance of putting US servicemen at risk.   Should he order that, I would hope we would have the guts to kill the attackers in massive numbers, and then put a round in Karzai’s head.   And then leave, with a note on the door that reminds them that the half-life of Plutonium 239 is 24,000 years.

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Filed under Afghanistan, guns, history, infantry, islam, marines, stupid, Uncategorized, war

Danny and Peachy

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Of course, I am referring to Danny Dravot and Peachy Carnehan, the two former Sergeants of Her Majesty’s Fore and Fit, who set out to rule Kafiristan, and in the process become the richest men in the Empire.

Among the treasure trove of goodies from Moe Delaun that I referred to in a previous post was the magnificent epic film The Man Who Would be King, the John Huston-directed adaptation of the Kipling tale.   The spectacular cinematography and beautiful (and authentic!) Edith Head costumes add to a brilliant performance by Michael Caine (Peachy) and Sean Connery (Danny), and an equally brilliant portrayal of Kipling himself by Christopher Plummer.   Saeed Jaffrey plays a long-lost Gurkha trooper, the lone survivor of a survey expedition killed in an avalanche some years before.

The Man Who Would be King was the first offering last evening in the new DVD player.   I last saw this movie some 35 years ago on network television, when, as a callow youth I knew Kipling only for Just So Stories, and The Jungle Book, and Rikki Tikki Tavi. But the film stayed with me, and very much was a factor in my adult appreciation of the brilliant work of that man.  And last evening, I enjoyed the movie immensely, once again.

While very much faithful to the original Kipling short story, The Man Who Would Be King has a few minor changes from the written tale.   All in all, though, I imagine Brother Kipling would be most pleased at the results of Huston’s direction and the performances of the cast. 

If you have never seen it, or it has been a number of years, The Man Who Would Be King is must viewing.   A poignant epic, with touches of charm and humor, and a revealing vision of the Empire of Victorian Britain.

The Son of God goes forth to war,
a kingly crown to gain;
his blood red banner streams afar:
who follows in his train?
Who best can drink his cup of woe,
triumphant over pain,
who patient bears his cross below,
he follows in his train.

Thanks again, Moe!!

****************************

And a wonderful insight from Billy Fish!

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Filed under Afghanistan, army, guns, history, islam, SIR!, Uncategorized, veterans, war

About that Air Force Chaplain getting the Bronze Star…

So, some folks are pretty upset to learn that an Air Force chaplain was awarded the Bronze Star Medal (BSM) for writing a power point presentation in the wake of a Koran burning incident in Afghanistan.

After the accidental burning last year of Qurans by U.S. troops in Afghanistan sparked deadly rioting, an Air National Guard chaplain from Springfield stepped in and potentially saved countless American lives.
For his effort, Lt. Col. Jon Trainer received the prestigious Bronze Star — a medal given for heroic or meritorious achievement in connection with operations against an armed enemy.

 

And he did it with a PowerPoint presentation. . . .

Within 48 hours, Trainer developed a PowerPoint presentation on the proper handling and disposal of Islamic religious material that was seen by every American — military and civilian alike — in Afghanistan. The presentation then was distributed to the U.S. for use in all pre-deployment training.

Well, that would certainly seem to be rather insulting to  the large numbers of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines (and the odd Coastie) who have served in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other theaters in the Global War on Terror, and not received a Bronze Star.

It seems particularly frustrating as the news comes today that another chaplain will finally be recognized for his valor and intrepidity more than 60 years later.

But here’s the thing…

First, LTC Trainer is in no way the bad guy here. Lot’s of people saw the article at NRO and are ready to let their outrage meters max out. He actually felt the need to step into the comment section:

Hey folks. Lt Col Trainer here. I am an almost daily frequenter to “The Corner.” Imagine my surprise when a friend pointed out I was actually on the corner!

This is an end of tour award. Standard fair for the rank, position, and responsibility I held during this tour–Training Chaplain for all the of the chaplains in Afghanistan and Garrison Chaplain at New Kabul Compound in Kabul. Events of serious consequence occurred while in theater; the article highlights those. The way the original article is written implies the BSM was given for writing a PPT presentation. This does not represent the facts nor the bullet points in the BSM write-up.

I am quite disappointed that NRO didn’t bother to look into this situation a bit deeper before posting an article that seems to undermine my six month deployment in service of our great nation and the troops I am proud to serve.

He is quite correct. Such an award to a field grade officer at the conclusion of a tour overseas (known as an EoT or End of Tour award) is typical, and would normally only be remarkable by its absence. That is, if LTC Trainer had not received an award, people would wonder how he screwed up.

And this kerfuffle shows up one of the great problems with the Bronze Star Medal.

Created in 1944, it was an conceived as roughly analogous to the Air Medal for meritorious service or valor, less than that worthy of the Silver Star, but still worthy of recognition.  The requirements were:

(a) while engaged in an action against an enemy of the United States;
(b) while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force; or
(c) while serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in an armed conflict against an opposing armed force in which the United States is not a belligerent party.

But there’s the rub. It is awarded either for meritorious service, or for valor. Those Bronze Stars awarded for valor are marked with a metallic “V” device. But it is entirely possible to earn the BSM without ever hearing a shot fired in anger, so long as you are deployed within a theater of operations. Worse yet, those medals that would normally recognize meritorious service, such as the Meritorious Service Medal, may not be awarded for service in a combat theater.

As a rule of thumb, when I see a Bronze Star without a “V” device, I automatically assume it is in the nature of an “I was there” award. Some people do earn them for one especially meritorious achievement during a tour, but most are simply EoTs.  But a BSM with the “V” device is an entirely different matter. Theoretically, all valorous awards of the BSM are roughly the same. I, and many others, tend to suspect that in reality, the award of a BSM(V) is a little easier for a senior NCO or officer than it is for a junior enlisted troop.  Further, there is a very strong feeling that the likelihood of a BSM award varies greatly between the services. The Marines especially, but also the Navy, are notoriously stingy with them, while the Army and especially the Air Force are seen as generous with them.

Personally, I favor a fairly generous policy for awards for valor. And indeed, I’ve no real problem with a fairly generous policy for awards in general. Heck, for a guy with a grand total of four days of combat time, I’ve got a fruit salad that makes me look like I defeated the Republican Guard singlehandedly armed only with a P-38 can opener. I never went hunting for awards, but I never turned one down, either. So I’d be a bit hypocritical if I started bitching about it now.

But so long as the Bronze Star remains an award both for doing your job well, and as an award for great personal valor, it will be especially controversial. To a lesser extent so will the services Commendation medals. The Department of Defense should take this opportunity to overhaul its awards program, and make the BSM strictly an award for valor. Lifting the restriction of awarding “peacetime” medals while deployed to a combat zone will still give the services ample opportunity to recognize merit, and restore some of the  prestige to its awards.

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Counterinsurgency Words of Wisdom from Pete Ellis***

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There is a saying among historians that the best place to find a new idea is in an old book.   Time and again over the years, I have cracked open long-forgotten volumes to find gems of timeless and timely wisdom, astute commentary, and unimpeachable good sense.  Contained on those yellowed pages are answers to problems and challenges not at all different from contemporary times, and appreciations of conditions and factors that are surprising for their sophistication and insight.

In the March 1921 edition of The Marine Corps Gazette, then-Major Earl H. “Pete” Ellis penned an article entitled “Bush Brigades”, which dealt with the deployment of US Marine forces into areas in the Western Hemisphere in which instability and violence threatened US interests and the safety of the native populace.  These interventions, known collectively as the “Banana Wars”, were the basis for the seminal 1940 Small Wars Manual.  Interestingly, nearly two decades before SWM was published, Major Ellis struck upon a number of maxims that fairly leap off the page, and would have been excellent counsel for US commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan.

At the minimum, Ellis’s words would have permitted today’s Officers and NCOs (and politicians!) to understand that the challenges and issues faced in the decade-long counter-insurgency fights were not new or unprecedented, but rather something with which US military thinkers had had to wrestle and solve for a significant portion of the previous century.  And in those words and the words of others might have been lessons and cautions that aided in success on the battlefield and in the newspapers.

The mercurial Major Ellis expounded upon a number of topics from large to small, that military thinkers would find highly relevant today.   I will attempt to do justice to the more salient of those topics below:

  • The character of enemy operations:

a)      A somewhat disorganized attempt to prevent landings.

b)      More or less resistance in cities followed by a race to the jungle.

c)       The organization and operation of armed bands, at first risking open battle and finally waging guerilla warfare.

d)      The operation of outlaw bands (bandits, ladrones, cacos) who murder members of the forces of occupation and their own people indiscriminately.

In general, enemy operations will be those of irregular forces or guerilla bands with the usual series of surprise raids, ambushes, and assassinations.  The enemy will have moral support from most of his own people, material support from many, and will operate in their midst. 

Replace “landings” in a) with “invasion”, and “jungle” in b) with “desert”, and you have a pretty accurate description of the course of things in Iraq and Afghanistan.

  • The role of the press/media and the “peculiar attitude of the American people themselves”:

The Marines are down in Jungleland!- and killed a man in a war!

And the oft-forgotten fact that

…the Marines are only doing their job as ordered by the people of the United States.

  • The usefulness of cash payoffs to the locals:

…it must be emphatically stated that a flying column should never be sent into the bush unless amply provided with CASH.  With it can be purchased knowledge of the terrain and movement of the enemy, and food.  It is safe to say that at least 50 percent of the so-called harsh measures used in bush warfare could be eliminated by providing troops with adequate information money.

  • Considerations in the location of a fortified  post:

The site of the post should have, if possible, the following characteristics:

a)      Be capable of defense by a small detachment.

b)      Be of sufficient extent to permit the bivouac of … one hundred men, with mounted detachment.

c)       Permit control of any town in the vicinity and all approaches, especially roads and ravines.

d)      Have sufficient elevation to generally observe the surrounding country.

e)      Permit control of a landing field for aeroplanes.

The main requirement for a fortified post, garrisoned as it will be by only a few men, is that it cannot be rushed.

The above would have been a helpful guide to the Officers who decided to emplace COP Kahler Keating in Wanat.

  • What is now termed “Lawfare”:

To enforce one’s will upon an enemy of the nature depicted without subjecting one’s self to undue criticism is one of the most difficult tasks that can confront a soldier.   The “Rules of Land Warfare” lay down certain rules which are to be followed, subject to military necessity during hostilities between regular forces of civilized nations.  The “Rules of Land Warfare” for the guidance of regular forces engaged in hostilities with irregular or guerilla forces have never been written; and it is doubtful if they ever will be written…

  • “Phase Four” operations and “Information Dominance”:

It is the final phase which is difficult because, owing to the policy pursued, the following conditions will prevail to a greater or lesser extent:

a)      Bands of murderers and other criminals base in thick, difficult country, and prey indiscriminately on the peaceful people in the production areas.

b)      These bandits have no property other than that which they carry with them or keep in hiding.

c)       Many bandits, having been captured and turned over to proper authority, have been permitted to escape and have rejoined their bands.

d)      The inhabitants of localities frequented by bandits keep them informed of the movement of the force of occupation

e)      The forces of occupation are at a minimum.

Major Ellis’ article was never officially published by the Marine Corps (the Gazette is as then an MCA publication), but nonetheless provides context and narrative which our current generation of Officers and NCOs would find startlingly familiar a century hence.   As it would be to Napoleon’s veterans of the Peninsula War a century previous.

Most famous for his prescient divination of the character and requirements of the Pacific War yet to come, Ellis was no stranger to the counterinsurgency efforts of the Marine Corps in the early 20th Century, nor was he unversed in conventional war.  He had been plucked from Quantico by General Lejeune and was a key planner for the successful Meuse-Argonne Offensive in France in 1918.   Ponder.

*** Milblog writer/reader/commentor “Moe DeLaun” was most gracious in his gift to me of the March 1921 Marine Corps Gazette (along with a wonderful collection of Kipling by Somerset Maugham and the DVD of The Man Who Would Be King!)  There is much more in that March of 1921 edition that I will be sharing and commenting on over the next several months, including articles on Russia, American Marines in Nicaragua, and the Aisne-Marne Offensive of the late war.  THANKS MOE!

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Filed under Afghanistan, armor, army, Artillery, guns, history, infantry, iraq, marines, navy, planes, Uncategorized, war

Chinook

(Repost from 2009)

We’ve covered helicopters here before, such as the Huey, the Blackhawk, the OH-58 Kiowa and of course, Cobra and Apache gunships. Let’s talk about the big boy on the block. The Chinook. Or as it became known almost instantly in the Army, the Shithook. The CH-47 is the Army’s largest helicopter, used to transport critical logistical items, troops and artillery around the battlefield.

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The Chinook has been around for a long time. It’s first flight was in 1961. But the issues surrounding its development deserve a little attention. In the late 1950s, the Army and helicopter designers began to realize that piston engines would never become a very efficient way of powering helicopters. Gas turbines (jet engines that provided power through a driveshaft, rather than thrust) were finally becoming a practical option for military use. With the advent of these new engines, the Army took a long look at what the next generation of helicopters should look like. Just how big should they be? At the same time, the concept of “air assault” or landing troops directly on the battlefied started to form. What was the best way to move troop unit? Should you use a smaller helicopter that could lift a squad? Or would the better bet be to use somewhat larger helicopters that could lift 15-20 men?  Smaller helicopters would cost more in the long run, but losing one helicopter in the assault wouldn’t result in as many casualties. The Army first decided to go with the larger helicopter, of about 20 men. The Vertol Company (later bought by Boeing) provided the Model 107. But the debate in the Army over helicopter size raged on. Some thought that the new UH-1B Huey could be scaled up to carry a full squad. That would handle most air assualt requirements, and still have a relatively cheap helicopter. The Model 107 would be larger than was needed. The other half of the problem was moving artillery and supplies. The Model 107 was just a bit too small for that job. The ideal was to move a 105mm howitzer, its crew, and a load of ammunition all in one lift by one helicopter. Boeing went back to the drawing board. The Model 114 was the result, and was soon bought by the Army as the CH-47 Chinook. And it wasn’t very long before the Chinook found itself in Vietnam, as part of the airmobile 1st Cavalry Division.  With Hueys to conduct the initial assualt, and Chinooks bringing in the follow-on elements and moving artillery, the Army’s pattern of air assault missions was set so soundly that it is relatively unchanged 40-odd years later.

But don’t feel bad for the Model 107. Even though it wasn’t selected by the Army, its development continued. Largely because the Marines didn’t have a lot of space on the Navy’s helicopter carriers, they were forced to go with  a somewhat larger helicopter. And the Model 107 fit the bill perfectly. They bought it as the CH-46 and operate it to this day.

Early Chinooks had engines of about 2,200 horsepower each. This was very quickly upgraded to about 2,600hp each. And improvements didn’t stop there. The rotor blades, rear pylon design, and transmission were all upgraded through the A, B, and C models to improve performance.  In the 1980s, the design was again refreshed, with attention focusing again on more horsepower, but also greatly improved avionics and better reliability, resulting in the CH-47D. Many “D” models were conversions from older models, but there were also quite a few new built airframes. These were delivered up until 2002.  And right about the time the last “D” model was delivered, the work on the latest model moved into high gear.

The newest model, the CH-47F is really an old model. While there will be some newbuild airframes, most will be remanufactured CH-47Ds. And since most of the “D” models were remanufactured earlier models, there will be some airframes well over 30 years old that will be expected to soldier on for another 20. Because of this, a large part of the program will be rebuilding them to make them easier to maintain, reducing vibration, making sure the components don’t have any fatigue issues, and making any issues easier to detect. Improvements in the avionics will include updating the instruments to the latest common “glass cockpit” standard, as well as building in the cabapility of operating in the Force XXI digital environment, which is the Army’s version of a battlefield internet.  Not surprisingly, the Army is going with more powerful engines as well. The latest version of the Chinook engines put out almost 4,900 hp each. The Chinook has gone from a useful load of 7,000 pounds in its early days, to over 21,000 pounds in the “F” modeland the new models are faster. Think about that. How many of us are faster and stronger now that we’re over 40?

By now, you ought to have figured out that the ‘hook is a pretty capable helicopter. Lots of other folks have reached that conclusion as well. Very few other nations have the same air assault capability that we do, but having a few heavy lift helicopters around is handy for them as well. Several other nations, notable Great Britain, the Dutch, and the Japanese have bought various versions of the Chinook. When Great Britain attacked to recapture the Falklands in 1982, they lost several Chinooks aboard the Atlantic Conveyor. Their one remaining Chinook was put to work, doing the job of several helicopters. In one instance, instead of carrying its normal load of 55 troops, the sole Chinook lifted 105 fully loaded troops. There are several tales of Chinooks in the Vietnam war carrying over 100 people (though usually lightly loaded Vietnamese civilians). I’ve been in a Chinook with about 40 other people- I can’t imagine just how crowded it was with over 100.

It wouldn’t be much of a stretch to say that without  the Chinook, the Army in Afghanistan would be crippled. Many of the smaller outposts can only be reached by helicopter. Given the high elevations and hot weather there, Blackhawks, normally very capable birds, struggle to carry a useful load. The Chinook, with its greater power, is able to support these high/hot outposts.

With the new “F’ models just beginning to come into service, we can expect this long serving veteran to serve for as much as 30 more years.

Mind you, we’ve scrimped on discussing the gunship version, or the several special operations versions. But here’s  a last look at the bird for you.

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The Drone Medal and The People’s Defense Commissariat

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MOTHAX talks about all of it over at The Burn Pit.  Worth the read.

It’s been a pretty wild last couple of months for the Pentagon, especially for our outgoing Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta.  First he drops the bomb about the women’s combat unit exclusion policy going away.  Then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs says that maybe the standard will have to be lowered so we can have more women in those units.  Dire predictions flow every day from the puzzle palace about the effect of sequestration on the ability to fight and win wars.  Then comes the suggestion that we lower troops pay.  But while we’re doing that, we’re also expanding benefits to the spouses of same sex couples, even though that might violate the Defense of Marriage Act.  Congress jumps in with hearings about what happened (or more accurately didn’t happen) to on the ground support of the Ambassador in Libya, and why the DOD didn’t have anything in place to help those men out.  We may, or may not, be setting up a drone base in western Africa, and the drones may or may not be used to kill Americans who are working with Al Qaeda based on the legal papers that were leaked by the DOJ.  And the nomination for Panetta’s replacement, Senator Chuck Hagel, is currently being filibustered. In April 170,000 retirees are being pushed out of Tricare Prime in the western States, and we’re still passing out flyers in Afghanistan discussing how being courteous to the locals will stop them from shooting at us.

Somehow this all added up to it being a good time to anger just about everyone not angered by the preceding by creating a medal for drone pilots that is actually higher up in the hierarchy of medals than things like the Combat Infantryman’s Badge and the Bronze Star….

He adds some excellent commentary from Fehrenbach circa 1950 and the problem with this whole idea of the “changing nature of combat”.

Americans in 1950 rediscovered something that since Hiroshima they had forgotten: you may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life—but if you desire to defend it, protect it and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men in the mud.

I doubt anybody will be awarded the Drone Medal posthumously, unless it is from blood clots due to sitting too long.  Like I said, worth the read.   And a nice H/T to B5.

 

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Filed under Afghanistan, Air Force, infantry, iraq, stupid, Uncategorized, war

More About Awards

Since there is no horse too dead, nor any cat too flat, let me suggest the following modifications to our Armed Forces awards chart:

Awards edits

Let’s have a look at the ones I would can, and why:

Defense Distinguished Service Medal- The same as the Distinguished Service Medal, except GOFOs get a separate one for doing something “joint”.  Rescind it, and either replace with the DSM, or the star for additional awards of DSM.

Defense Superior Service Medal- The “joint” equivalent to the Legion of Merit.  Another 0-6/GOFO bauble.  Get rid of it.  Award the Legion of Merit, or stars for additional awards.

Defense Meritorious Service Medal- You got it, the “joint” MSM.  Rescind.  Award MSM or stars for additional awards.

Joint Service Commendation Medal- Notice a trend here?  You have a service branch, presumably.  Make the Joint HQ convince your service branch that you rate your service branch’s Commendation Medal.  If they can’t, maybe you shouldn’t have one.   Certainly not some “joint” equivalent.  Rescind.

Joint Meritorious Unit Award- Precisely the same rationale as the JSCM above.  Except for the collective.  If your outfit was that good, your service branch should award as appropriate.

Global War on Terror Expeditionary Medal- Never understood creating an expeditionary medal for wars in which campaign medals were sure to be minted.  I might be able to see it for guys in the Philippines and elsewhere, not in IRQ or AFG.  BUT, we have the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal for that.  Rescind, and replace it with the AFEM.

Global War on Terror Service Medal- This formerly held the position of “Dumbest New Award”, but has been overtaken by the Drone Medal.  Get rid of it.  They already have the National Defense Service Medal for those who didn’t deploy.  (Formerly known as the CNN Medal.  As in “You saw Desert Storm on CNN?  Me too!”)  Rescind without replacement with a current equivalent.

Armed Forces Service Medal- “Significant activity”?  Are you kidding me?  Rescind without replacement.

Humanitarian Service Medal- Another non-warfighter feel-good award.  Get rid of it.  After Hugo ripped through South Carolina, Marines from MCB helped out cutting and clearing trees, and delivering water, etc.  The base CSTAFF spent a formation droning (!) on and on about how they worked twelve hour days for two weeks to help out.   Meanwhile, the Drill Instructors continued their 140-hour work weeks for the entire two year tour.  So the Sgt from base motors was awarded this thing while my Sgt Senior Drill Instructor got zilch, and had his NCM downgraded to a NAM.

Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal- Makes the Humanitarian Service Medal look like the Iron Cross.  Away with it.

Overseas Service Ribbon- Another “everybody gets one” trinket.  You were PCS overseas, with all the concomitant bennies that the UDP bubbas pumping to WESTPAC didn’t have.   Want a ribbon for being OCONUS?  Ride a gator freighter for 200 days.  Or do Camp Hansen unaccompanied.

Recruiting/Drill Instructor/Marine Security Guard Ribbons- Wrong, wrong, wrong.  No “special duty” ribbons on a Marine uniform.  Lousy idea from jump street, let’s get rid of them most rikki tik.

These are, of course, in addition to the Distinguished Warfare Medal, hereby unofficially known as the “Stays in Vegas” Medal.

Before you ask, yes, at least three of these are ones I am authorized.   By comparison, my Dad came home from the Pacific, after eleven landings and almost three years, with four ribbons.  One was a Navy Good Cookie, and another was the Asiatic-Pacific Theater Ribbon with four battle stars.   Along with a PUC.  He got a WWII Victory Medal on his way out in ’46.  In 1991, we had people sit at Al Jubayl for two weeks and come home with five.

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It would do us well to have senior Officers that look like warriors instead of Idi Amin, or BG McSoulpatch.   Just sayin’.  Any others I failed to mention that should go?

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Filed under Afghanistan, Air Force, army, history, iraq, marines, navy, SIR!, stolen valor, stupid, Uncategorized, war

AC-130

A little 105mm to delouse a ridgeline.

Timber!

H/T: Weasel Zippers

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Filed under Afghanistan, Air Force, army, ARMY TRAINING, Artillery

SSG Romesha, MoH, in his own words

H/T to This Ain’t Hell.

Esli and Outlaw gotta be lovin’ the Stetson.

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Filed under Afghanistan, army

A Medal of Honor, and a sad farewell.

I’ve spent most of my day having fun in the comments of today’s Load HEAT, but I’m fully cognizant that two events took place today, both of which remind us of the honor and courage, and yes, sacrifice that so many of our citizens display.

Former Staff Sergeant Clinton Romesha was presented the Medal of Honor today for his actions during the battle at Combat Outpost Keating.

Saluting Clinton Romesha for embodying the soldier’s creed of never leaving behind a fallen comrade, President Obama on Monday bestowed the Medal of Honor on him for courageously defending a remote American outpost in eastern Afghanistan from a ferocious attack by more than 300 Taliban fighters.

During the daylong attack on Combat Outpost Keating, the president said, Mr. Romesha, a 31-year-old Army staff sergeant, now retired, showed “conspicuous gallantry” in taking out an enemy machine-gun position, calling in airstrikes that killed 30 Taliban fighters, laying down covering fire to allow three soldiers to run to safety, and scrambling through a fusillade of enemy fire to recover the bodies of fallen American soldiers.

His bravery, Mr. Obama said, helped prevent the outpost from being overrun by Taliban fighters. He was wounded in the neck, shoulder and arms by shrapnel after a rocket-propelled grenade hit a generator he was hiding behind. Eight American service members were killed in the October 2009 battle, one of the most intense of the war.

The citation for his award reads as follows:

Staff Sergeant Clinton L. Romesha distinguished himself by acts of gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Section Leader with Bravo Troop, 3d Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, during combat operations against an armed enemy at Combat Outpost Keating, Kamdesh District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan on October 3, 2009. On that morning, Staff Sergeant Romesha and his comrades awakened to an attack by an estimated 300 enemy fighters occupying the high ground on all four sides of the complex, employing concentrated fire from recoilless rifles, rocket propelled grenades, anti-aircraft machine guns, mortars and small arms fire. Staff Sergeant Romesha moved uncovered under intense enemy fire to conduct a reconnaissance of the battlefield and seek reinforcements from the barracks before returning to action with the support of an assistant gunner. Staff Sergeant Romesha took out an enemy machine gun team and, while engaging a second, the generator he was using for cover was struck by a rocket-propelled grenade, inflicting him with shrapnel wounds. Undeterred by his injuries, Staff Sergeant Romesha continued to fight and upon the arrival of another soldier to aid him and the assistant gunner, he again rushed through the exposed avenue to assemble additional soldiers. Staff Sergeant Romesha then mobilized a five-man team and returned to the fight equipped with a sniper rifle. With complete disregard for his own safety, Staff Sergeant Romesha continually exposed himself to heavy enemy fire, as he moved confidently about the battlefield engaging and destroying multiple enemy targets, including three Taliban fighters who had breached the combat outpost’s perimeter. While orchestrating a successful plan to secure and reinforce key points of the battlefield, Staff Sergeant Romesha maintained radio communication with the tactical operations center. As the enemy forces attacked with even greater ferocity, unleashing a barrage of rocket-propelled grenades and recoilless rifle rounds, Staff Sergeant Romesha identified the point of attack and directed air support to destroy over 30 enemy fighters. After receiving reports that seriously injured Soldiers were at a distant battle position, Staff Sergeant Romesha and his team provided covering fire to allow the injured Soldiers to safely reach the aid station. Upon receipt of orders to proceed to the next objective, his team pushed forward 100 meters under overwhelming enemy fire to recover and prevent the enemy fighters from taking the bodies of their fallen comrades. Staff Sergeant Romesha’s heroic actions throughout the day-long battle were critical in suppressing an enemy that had far greater numbers. His extraordinary efforts gave Bravo Troop the opportunity to regroup, reorganize and prepare for the counterattack that allowed the Troop to account for its personnel and secure Combat Outpost Keating. Staff Sergeant Romesha’s discipline and extraordinary heroism above and beyond the call of duty reflect great credit upon himself, Bravo Troop, 3d Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division and the United States Army.

Sadly, today was also a time to mourn the loss of former Navy SEAL Chris Kyle, gunned down by a man he had extended the hand of friendship and brotherhood to.  Thousands turned out to Cowboys Stadium to say farewell to a man many had never met. Would that we could remember all our fallen in such a manner.

Thousands of well-wishers, including dozens of Navy SEALS, descended on Cowboys Stadium in Arlington, Texas, on Monday to remember the life of a famed Navy SEAL sniper killed at a nearby gun range on Feb. 2.

The body of Chris Kyle, author of “American Sniper: The Autobiography of the Most Lethal Sniper in U.S. Military History” — an account of Kyle’s four tours in Iraq, where he said he killed at least 160 enemy combatants — lay in state on the Cowboys’ silver and blue star logo at the 50-yard line, with an American flag draped over his coffin.

The stadium, designed for the fidgety loudness of an NFL game day, instead swallowed the echoes of tributes, scripture readings and country songs dedicated to Kyle, as well as the mournful silences between.

An estimated 7,000 people attended, and Texas Gov. Rick Perry issued a statement that said, in part, “Chris Kyle was the public face of an anonymous breed of American warrior who are handed the hardest missions and assume the largest risks. Chris was among the very best at what he did, and he saved countless American lives in the process. Our state and our nation suffered a profound loss with his passing.”

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Filed under Afghanistan, army, history, navy

KMax

Kaman  Helicopters has a long history of taking an… unconventional approach to solving the challenges of rotary winged flight. A few years ago, they looked at the issue of helicopters with external loads, and decided that what was needed was something smaller than the enormous CH-54 Skycrane. But to maximize the external load, as little helicopter as possible would be used. And rather than the traditional crew of two, it would only use one pilot. Little helicopter, big load.

Taking the idea even further, and teaming up with LockMart, they decided no pilot was an even better option. Pretty soon, they’d paired up with the Marines to test this unmanned helicopter for delivering supplies to remote outposts in Afghanistan. Flying in supplies by helo reduces the number of ground convoys needed, reducing their vulnerability to IEDs. And by using an unmanned helicopter, that reduces the risk to aircrews, and frees up conventional helicopters for troop movements or evac missions or other uses.

I’m not entirely sold that this is an especially cost effective program, but it is pretty interesting to watch.

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Filed under Afghanistan, helicopters, marines

My Take On The White House Memo

The fact of the matter is, there are people bearing arms against the nation,  and its people. And among those wishing us ill are several who hold American citizenship. This is hardly new. It has happened before, and it will happen in the future. Members of the German and Italian (and probably, the Japanese) Armies fought against the US. The big example is the Confederate States, whose legitimacy the United States never acknowledged.

The current topic is, of course, radical Islamists who have joined, supported or otherwise aligned themselves with Al Qaeda or the Taliban or a handful of other terrorist organizations.  We are at war with Al Qaeda. If Al Qaeda was a nation state, and its forces wore uniforms and otherwise fought in accordance to the rule of law, not an eye would be blinked at the efforts to kill their leadership, even those who held American citizenship.

The problem arises in that Al Qaeda isn’t, of course, a nation state. And membership is a little more amorphous than we might like. They don’t issue Geneva Convention cards to their fighters (which, for you civilians out there, our military ID cards are in fact also Geneva Convention cards).

URR will disagree with me, and argue that these persons are being denied Constitutional protections. Let me steal a comment from Rob Crawford at Tom Maguire’s excellent Just One Minute blog:

The president has the authority to prosecute wars, and like it or lump it, Congress did the modern equivalent of declaring war against al’Qaeda.

The requirements, as I understand them, are:

1) Threat must be imminent,
2) Capture must not be feasible,
3) The strike is otherwise in accordance with the laws of war.

A US citizen who leaves the country and starts working with al’Qaeada is no different than a US citizen who left the US and took up arms with Hitler’s Germany. They existed, and no one was declared a war criminal when they died during allied air strikes, shelling, rifle fire, or bayonet charges.

And what’s the alternative? That any military operation where there MAY be a US citizen on the receiving end must pass judicial review? How would that work?

Let’s take the three bullet points. The first, that the threat must be imminent. I’m not sure that’s the best description. Rather, I’d say that the target’s participation should be ongoing, rather than some past act with no future role.

Second, Capture must not be feasible. I’m sure if we moved heaven and earth, some targets would be captured. But possible and feasible are two different things.

Third, the strike has to be what would otherwise be within the bounds of the law of war.  For instance, you can’t use a nuke to kill just one guy. That violates the law of war.

URR will argue that the memo is evidence of the denial of due process for persons accused of treason. But in fact, they aren’t accused of treason. The are currently actively engaged as unlawful combatants against the US. The courts have shown no interest in interfering with the actions of the armed forces against unlawful combatants until such time as those persons come into the custody of the US. Their silence can only be taken as consent. And such is right and proper, by the way, as under Article I of the Constitution, Congress is responsible for the regulation of the armed forces, and of course, the President has Article II powers enumerated. Nowhere does the Constitution state a role for the courts in the prosecution of war.

For any that might be captured or otherwise taken into custody, there’s no real evidence they would even be charged with treason. They might be charged with any number of other terrorism related charges.

As to treason in the Constitution, let’s look at a little history. Much of our criminal law comes lock, stock and barrel from English common law. But under that common law, treason was arguably just about anything that annoyed the Crown. It was to avoid that ambiguity that treason, and treason alone, was so specifically mentioned in the Constitution. Of course, so much criminal law was also held to be a matter for the states, and not the federal government, but that’s a rant of a different color.

URR argues:

And just where is this jurisdiction for the authorization of the use of force?  Why, it is anywhere at all where the Government perceives an enemy to be.   As the Memo informs us, there are no geographic limits.   Which implies no battlefield, or perhaps, that everywhere is a battlefield.

First, elsewhere the memo clearly states that the decisions under consideration are for operations outside the United States. The vagueness of the wording he showed:

Memo 3

is deliberate, no doubt. But as we’ve seen, the enemy doesn’t feel any particular need to constrain it’s efforts to any one nation or theater of war. This vagueness preserves freedom of action against the enemy, but is still constrained by the guidance that capture must not be feasible.

After years and years of conservatives decrying treating terrorism as a law enforcement problem (and still decrying the President’s attempts to do so) I find it odd that URR turns around and complains that the President, with the authority of the Authorization of the Use of Force of September 14, 2001, is doing what conservatives have long sought- to treat terrorism as a war.

I fully share URR’s distrust of this administration in particular, and an over powerful government in general. But the fact is, the US has the right, and indeed, a moral obligation to wage war against terrorist enemies. And in waging war, we are under no obligation to attempt to capture the enemy (we are, however required to accept a surrender).  Yes, there is real room for abuse of the process by which persons are designated as enemy combatants. But common sense goes a long way to answering the question of just who those persons are.  And that is the root question. If URR is comfortable with Alwaki and Kahn being killed by troops on the ground, he should be just as comfortable with them being killed by any other method. And should their contemporaries be captured, I too am all for them at the gibbet. After due process.

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Filed under Afghanistan, ARMY TRAINING

Justice Department Memo on Killing Americans

Gold Lady Justice, in Brugge, Belgium.

NBC has obtained the Justice Department memo used as justification for the September 2011 killing of Anwar Al Awlaki and Samir Khan, two US Citizens, by means of a drone strike.   “Due Process”, the memo asserts, can and should be transmogrified from what our Constitution defines under the 4th, 5th, and 6th Amendments, into an  allegation that “an informed, high-level official has determined”, well out of the light of public scrutiny.

Note that the language is very similar in character to that which Attorney General Thornburgh used during the George H. W. Bush Administration to justify greatly expanding the seizure provisions of the RICO act (1990).   The War on Drugs was too dangerous, and Law Enforcement didn’t have time for Due Process, so it wasn’t practical.  The very dangerous precedent was set, and Due Process has been a consistent casualty in the eroding of individual liberties since that day.

This Justice Department Memo represents another, very dangerous precedent.  That of the closed deliberations of a Government star chamber replacing the legal processes and requirements for charging American citizens with treason under Article III of our Constitution.  That article requires:

Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.

No longer is any of that required for the US Government to pronounce and carry out a capital sentence against an American citizen.

Memo 1

  As for “two witnesses to the same overt act”, or to “a confession in open court”, it would seem that those requirements are also dispensed with.

Memo 2

And just where is this jurisdiction for the authorization of the use of force?  Why, it is anywhere at all where the Government perceives an enemy to be.   As the Memo informs us, there are no geographic limits.   Which implies no battlefield, or perhaps, that everywhere is a battlefield.

Memo 3

Read the whole memo.  It is enlightening and disturbing.  Especially in light of the fact that this same Administration wished to try illegal combatants (subject under the Geneva Convention of 1949 to summary execution) captured in Iraq and Afghanistan in US civilian courts, giving them all the rights of an American citizen in a capital crime, including the government requirement for presentation of classified evidence.

Look, I have no love lost for men like Awlaki and Khan.  If they are killed in an exchange of gunfire with US troops, let them rot in hell.  With bellies full of pork rinds.   And if they are captured in that fight,  the post or the gibbet is good enough for them.  But that is hardly the point.    And this Administration knows it.  The precedent here is not some bold statement of American willingness to fight its enemies wherever the find them.  Rather, it is that the US Government now has codified quasi-legal justification to kill an American citizen that a group of people, out of the public eye, have deemed a “threat”.  No evidence, no proof, no sworn testimony, and in fact, damned little other than the determination itself.

Attorney General Eric Holder has a massive integrity problem, ranging from the refusal to prosecute because of skin color, to his demands for new laws punishing people who “put guns in the hands of dangerous criminals”, he of Fast and Furious.   This Administration as a whole, with the shameful complicity of senior military leadership, has played very loose with the Constitution and has consistently sought to portray political opponents as dangerous national enemies.  From FBI memos to “full-spectrum” military training scenarios that intentionally portray law-abiding Americans as dangerous threats, in the wake of the Newtown tragedy, the collective guilt by association and the demonization of law-abiding citizens continues apace.

The new language for America’s enemies, “violent extremists” (replacing “Islamic extremists” in 2009) has been invoked to describe those who believe differently from what the radical Left who holds the levers of power believes.  Schumer, Boxer, Napolitano, Feinstein, have all described lawful American citizens using precisely these words in the last several months.

So then, these becomes the questions.  With the precedent set by the Justice memo to justify killing Americans without due process, how soon until this precedent reaches American soil?  After all, will not “imminence” be even greater here?  How easily will the claim be made that capture is “infeasible”?  And  will the Grand Jury indictment, the rights of the accused, the Government burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt, all disappear in the expedient of a puff of smoke and the impact of a bullet or a missile?

After all, in light of the Justice Memo, what’s to prevent it?

Despite my admitted distaste for this Administration and the people with whom our President surrounds himself and takes counsel, I do not wish ANY Administration to have such extra-Constitutional “authority”.    Never, ever give this government unbridled power that is only restrained by the civility of those who hold that power.  Ever.  No matter who they may be.  Our Constitution forbade it.   By the time those reasons become clear once again, it will be too late.

***************

I must say I believed there scant chance that I would agree to something that MSNBC/NBC considered headline material.  But, a scant chance is still a chance.  Behold:

Legal experts fear implications of White House drone memo

And, frankly, I thought there would be less of a chance that I would agree with someone from Columbia.   Surprise, surprise, surprise, as Gomer might say.

“We should be concerned when the White House is acting as judge, jury and executioner,” she said. “And there’s no one outside of the White House who has real oversight over that process. What’s put forward here is there’s no role for the courts, not even after the fact.”

The fact that virtually nothing in the Justice Memo is a surprise, and none of this criticism was leveled before, say, the 2012 election, leads one to believe that these people felt compelled to say SOMETHING for the record, even as they perhaps hope that nobody quite remembers that they waited so long to say what they said.

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Filed under Afghanistan, guns, history, iraq, islam, obama, Politics, Uncategorized, war

Women in Combat Arms: The Perspective of a Warrior

The Late General Robert H. Barrow, former Commandant of the Marine Corps, winner of the Navy Cross, Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star, Bronze Star, Veteran of three wars, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, speaks on the notion of women in ground combat units.  Thirteen and a half minutes.  (The last three are dark screen.) Listen to it all.

Those who would dismiss General Barrow as hidebound, sexist, closed-minded, or any other of the various derogatory labels that tend to be employed by the feminists who push such agendas should feel a tinge of shame.  If they are capable of such, which I doubt.

Those who comprise the Joint Chiefs of Staff, particularly CJCS Dempsey, CSA Ordierno, and Marine Commandant Amos, should be ashamed of themselves.  They must know deep down that what a man like General Barrow asserts is the brutal truth.  Yet they have nodded their heads in enthusiastic agreement with their political masters as a sop to the feminists and progressives who despise our military and everything it stands for.  Gentlemen, you must do some serious soul searching.    You KNOW that General Barrow speaks an unvarnished truth honed by 41 years of wartime service and leadership of men in some of the most bitter combat of the 20th Century.   Are your current assignments and your careers so much more important than the lives of those you will unnecessarily risk to implement this corrosive policy?

The Commandant’s assertion that “we will maintain our high standards while ensuring maximum success for every Marine” smacks of the dishonesty of the “everyone gets a trophy” Left.   War, we damned well should know, knows no such considerations.   If we didn’t have such morally and intellectually bankrupt leadership spending so much time and money painting the Potemkin Village instead of training to win our nation’s wars, we would not find ourselves in the current fix.

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Filed under Afghanistan, Air Force, armor, army, Artillery, girls, history, infantry, iraq, marines, navy, obama, Politics, recruiting, SIR!, stupid, Uncategorized, war