Category Archives: Artillery

by | June 16, 2013 · 8:09 pm

Artillery Organization

When the Marines defend their huge investment in Close Air Support, it’s largely because they need it. They simply don’t have a lot of tube artillery available for support. Why? Because they will never have enough amphibious shipping to move it.

The Army, on the other hand, has since the middle of the 19th Century had a long tradition of excellence in artillery, and accordingly places a lot of faith in a lot of guns.

Let’s compare some of the fire support available to a division. Organic to the Marine division is an artillery regiment. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, this regiment had three battalions of light artillery, 105mm tubes, and one battalion of 155mm artillery. All four battalions had towed pieces.

At first glance, Army artillery seems quite comparable.  A light division had “Division Artillery”~ effectively a brigade, with three battalions of 105mm guns, and one battalion of 155mm guns, all towed.   Seems pretty comparable.

But if we leave the light divisions, and look at the Army’s heavy divisions, we see a somewhat more robust organization. Each mechanized or armored division had a similar organization, but different armament.

Heavy divisional DivArty had three battalions of self-propelled 155mm guns (each with a self-propelled ammo carrier). It also had a battalion of self-propelled 203mm (8”) guns. Eventually, the 8” battalion would be replaced by a single battery of MLRS 270mm rocket launchers.

But the story doesn’t end there. Army divisions in Europe were intended to fight as a part of a corps, and indeed, as a part of a field army. And a great deal of the combat power of a corps or field army is located in units outside of the divisions. Each heavy corps typically had two separate artillery brigades, each with four battalions, usually three of 155mm and one battalion of MLRS, as they phased out the 8” tubes.

One of the key precepts behind US Army artillery doctrine has always been concentration. If it’s worth shooting at, it’s worth shooting at a lot. So it would be typical for the main effort of a corps operation to receive the support of both corps artillery brigades. And within that main effort  division, it would be typical for the maneuver brigade forming the main effort to receive the support of all the guns of both the division and the corps artillery, or at least a priority claim to their fires.* Conceivably, one maneuver brigade of three battalions would have the support of 12, or even more, battalions of artillery. That’s a level of fire support a Marine regiment commander could only dream of. And that doesn’t count the attack helicopter and Air Force tac air support our notional Army brigade might receive.  And because all these heavy artillery brigades were self-propelled, they could rapidly shift support from one area to another.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Army no longer faces the spectre of a single division having to stem the onslaught of an entire Russian tank army. And the past decade of limited warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan has seen a much smaller need for massed artillery fires.

Instead, today’s artillery has shifted emphasis from massing fires to longer ranges and greater precision, via such tools as rocket assisted projectiles, guided unitary warhead MLRS rockets, and guidance kits for conventional 155mm artillery that permits a limited “boost/glide” profile.  The battlefield a single maneuver brigade occupies is much larger than in years past, even as little as 20 years ago. And simply to cover that area, the supporting artillery either needs a longer range, or the greater lethality of guided rounds (that way, smaller units of artillery, such as a battery or even just a platoon can disperse over a wider area to support more units and cover more battlespace).

*I’ll leave it to URR or Esli to explain the doctrinal niceties of attached, OPCON, Direct Support, General Support, or General Support Reinforcing.

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by | June 10, 2013 · 2:56 pm

CHINFO Uses the “F-word”

Old-Ironsides

Frigate.  Over at Information Dissemination.  He calls LCS a “light frigate, a corvette”, noting ”I never understood why we didn’t just call it that in the first place”.  Neither did many of the rest of us.

In fact, stridently denying that LCS was to replace the FFG-7s at the lower end of the “hi-lo” mix when it was obvious to everyone that was almost certainly the role it would fill, didn’t do anything for the credibility of the US Navy nor those pushing LCS.

Admiral Kirby makes a number of historical references to unproven ship design, including the Six Frigates, and USS Monitor.  Whatever else those “experimental” vessels were, they were powerfully-armed and were well-protected.   Those are precisely the areas LCS is found most wanting.  Both designs are fragile and woefully under-armed.

Anyway, read Admiral Kirby’s assertions.  He makes some valid points, but you can be the judge of just how many, and just how valid.

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by | June 6, 2013 · 8:03 am

Leadership and Responsibility on the Longest Day

failure-message

Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was based upon the best information available. The troops, the air and the Navy did all that Bravery and devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone.

The troops did not fail.  More than 140,000 Allied soldiers came ashore at Normandy, on this day 69 years ago.   The Second Front so long in the coming was established.  The cost was more than ten thousand casualties, of which approximately 4,000 were killed.  The same number that died in Iraq in eight years, died on the French coast in a single morning.   Tens of thousands more would die before Nazi Germany surrendered unconditionally eleven months and one day later.

General Dwight Eisenhower’s famous note hearkens to a brand of leadership seemingly all but extinct today.   People in positions of great responsibility shouldering the burden for their decisions and everything that is done or fails to be done by those in their charge.    What difference does it make?   The difference between victory and defeat, liberty and subjugation, existence and extinction.

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by | June 5, 2013 · 3:08 pm

What Might Have Been… Broncos and 106mm RCLs.

On the heels of our recent post about the M40 106mm Recoilless Rifle, a reader, Dave, sends in this little morsel about a plan to mount the 106 on the OV-10.

http://www.volanteaircraft.com/images/ov-10-recoilless-rifle.jpg

The primary weapon for the Bronco was usually the Zuni 5” folding fin rocket. It packed a good punch, but it wasn’t terribly accurate, and each rocket weighed a good deal.  While mounting a 106 on an airplane would have its own weight penalty, each round of ammunition would weigh less. And the recoilless rifle would be a good deal more accurate than any rocket. And there was a plan for an autoloading weapon.

Found here, which is an interesting piece all on its own.

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by | May 26, 2013 · 7:50 am

May 26th, 1940 Operation DYNAMO; The Evacuation of Dunkirk Begins

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As the Allied Dyle-Breda Plan collapsed under the pressure of the Wehrmacht’s Blitzkrieg, most of the British Expeditionary Force of more than 320,000 men fell back against the French coast around Calais and Dunkirk.   Germany’s Fall Gelb (Case Yellow) had been radically modified in early 1940 from a plan looking nearly identical to that of 1914, to one which included a decisive armored thrust through the Ardennes Forest that would break the Allied armies in two and trap the preponderance of Allied combat power in a pocket north of Paris.   The Blitzkrieg which began in 10 May 1940 had shattered the Dutch, Belgian, and French armies.

The Wehrmacht employment of auftragstaktik allowed German commanders at all levels to consistently defeat Allied tempo of decision-making, which led to countless occasions where German units slammed into French and British formations who were de-training or still in road march formation and unready for battle.   Speed, both in tactical mobility and command and control, was as decisive as any other single factor in the Battle of France.

Sixteen days into office, Prime Minister Winston Churchill had known since 15 May that the French were finished.   Despite attempts to reinforce his French allies, by 21 May the objective of the BEF was to conduct a fighting withdrawal to a Channel port, from where it might, if extremely fortunate and able to gain local air superiority, be evacuated back to Britain.

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Operation DYNAMO, which would include a massive commitment of the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force, and thousands of small ships and craft, began on 26 May 1940.   With two French divisions holding against German pressure, British units began to move toward the beaches and piers, the ships and craft (in the surf line) which would shuttle them both to larger ships and to England itself.  That German pressure was not nearly as heavy as it might have been, thankfully for the British.  Reichsmarshall Goering had promised Hitler that his Luftwaffe would destroy the Allied evacuation efforts without having to risk von Küchler’s Panzer and Panzergrenadier units in coastal sand unsuitable for their deployment.

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In the end, German commanders convinced Hitler to launch concerted attacks on Dunkirk, but it would come too late.  Dunkirk was finally captured on 4 June 1940, but by that time, 198,000 British and 123,000 French troops had been evacuated.   The RAF had paid a heavy price for the furious defense of the skies over Operation DYNAMO, losing 177 precious fighter aircraft that had been jealously hoarded for the battle over the skies of England that was sure to come.   The Royal Navy lost six modern destroyers, and several hundred small craft.   Virtually all of the BEF’s heavy equipment, tanks and trucks, artillery pieces, and more than 70,000 tons of ammunition was left on the beach.  And nearly 15% of the BEF’s soldiers were dead, wounded, or prisoner.

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But the vast preponderance of British manpower had been saved.  German intelligence reports in preparation for SEELÖWE noted the toughness and high quality of the British Soldiers, including the Territorials.  Most of them were back safely on British soil, and the Wehrmacht would have to deal with them in the near future under far less favorable circumstances.  Those plucked from the Dunkirk docks and surf included the British Commander of II Corps, Lieutenant General Sir Alan Brooke, later Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Major General Bernard Law Montgomery, in command of the 3rd Infantry Division.   Dunkirk had been a miracle indeed.  And the Germans would pay dearly for their mistake.

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Churchill’s admonition that “wars are not won by evacuations” not withstanding, the successful evacuation of the bulk of the BEF from Dunkirk allowed England to survive until the Soviet Union and the United States entered the war.   Lost on the 73 years since the evacuation of Dunkirk was the fact that there was a considerable body of opinion in Parliament that desired a negotiated peace with Germany.  With the loss of the BEF, such a body of opinion might have been strong enough to have blocked Churchill’s desires to fight Hitler to the bitter end.   DYNAMO signaled what Churchill told the British people, that “the Battle of France is over, the Battle of Britain is about to begin”.    Defending the Island Nation was the force evacuated from France.

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by | May 12, 2013 · 5:23 am

The Rifle Squad as the Decisive Force

A year or two ago, in discussing small infantry units, Esli mentioned that the current doctrinal emphasis of the Maneuver Center of Excellence (formerly, the Infantry School) was on making the rifle squad more lethal, more effective, more of an overmatch to the enemy equivalent.

The current US Army 9 man rifle squad* versus an enemy of comparable size has several significant advantages, and yet also faces serious disadvantages.

First, US squads tend to be better educated and better trained in infantry combat, in both the technical and tactical aspects.  They are virtually never without some type of supporting fires on call, from machine gun teams and anti-armor weapons at the squad level, company and battalion level mortar fire, through brigade and higher level artillery, and even close air support.

The soldiers of the rifle squad have body armor, clothing and load bearing equipment that is far better than their opponents. Their food is healthier, and less likely to lead to illness. Their communications are generally better. His night vision devices are almost always far more capable than the enemy’s.

But the US rifle squad also has its problems…

That body armor and load bearing equipment leads to soldiers carrying loads that severely limit the mobility and agility of the squad. These same heavy loads also lead to an increase in sports type injuries.  Rules of engagement often delay or prevent supporting fires from higher echelons from joining the fight in a timely manner. That healthful and nutritious food is heavy, further increasing the soldier’s load, and tying him to a logistical chain. His communications and night vision devices all require large amounts of battery power, all of which has to be manpacked.

As to weapons, frankly small arms are small arms. We can spend the next fifty years debating the relative merits of the M16/M4 family versus the AK family that have spent the last fifty years fighting one another.  But neither weapon so overmatches the other as to be decisive. The same is true for any other weapons found in the rifle squad or the threat squad.

So, today we find ourselves in a situation where a US squad can pretty much hold its own with any similar sized threat. And generally, it will come out better than the enemy.

But that isn’t the goal. The goal, the desire is to be confident that virtually any time a US squad encounters an enemy formation of similar size, the US squad can fix it, fight it, finish it, hunting it down and destroying it. Today, most squad on squad engagements are not decisive- either one or the other force breaks contact and lives to fight another day.

Comes now news that the Army commissioned a study by the National Research Council, who came to the conclusion that the problem is, the squad isn’t well equipped.

Now, in the context I just shared with you, that sounds kinda nuts. One of the primary problems the dismounted infantry squad faces is the crushing burden of carrying the stuff they already have.

But the report does make some sense. The Army has spent untold billions designing network centric warfare capabilities the give commanders unprecedented ability to “see” the battlefield.  A commander can know almost instantly where his forces are, and with support from UAVs and other intel assets, very often where enemy forces are, even before the battle is joined.

But once a squad leaves its vehicles, it is cut off from this network. Its only data stream, if you will, is voice radio. And the “bandwidth” of voice radio is awfully narrow. It is very, very difficult to transmit a clear tactical picture through words alone, especially absent the non-verbal cues humans routinely use in face to face communications.  Even with standardized formats, the limits to how much information can pass from the squad to higher, or from higher down to the squad is very limited.

In the past, we’ve mentioned the possibility of using smart phones on the battlefield to increase the dismount squad’s ability to access data, rather than just voice. And there’s some hope for that. But smart phones aren’t exactly set up to run on Army tactical radio networks. Further, a smart phone is not the most ergonomic way to present information. You know it is foolhardy to text and drive. How much more foolhardy is it to text and shoot? So a more “heads up” method of presenting the information in an intuitive manner will eventually be needed.

And whatever technology comes along, it will have to weigh less than the current state of the art. And not only will it have to weigh less, its batteries will have to weigh much less.

Further, for all the advantages technology may in the future give the squad, it is not without its own burdens, even beyond simple weight. Every piece of equipment calls for maintenance and training, both of which take time. And time available for training is limited. What other training should the squad sacrifice to achieve competency in these new technologies?

Do we sacrifice time spent on marksmanship? Fire and movement? First aid? Weapons maintenance? Map reading? Sexual assault awareness and prevention training? Language and cultural training for upcoming deployments? It isn’t like there isn’t enough on the plate already.

The report also pings Big Army for spending far more money and attention on big ticket acquisition programs than on the bread and butter of everyday stuff used at the squad level.  The Program Executive Officer for Command and Control technologies is a Major General. The PEO for small arms is a Colonel, who, judging by the fact he’s been there for several years, ain’t a “comer” for stars.

So what do we do?  I don’t know. I’m not entirely sure, absent a far greater willingness to take casualties, we can make the rifle squad capable of decisively defeating a threat squad.

And I’m not even sure that should be the goal. The great strength of the Army, and indeed all our services, has long, long been not so much our technology, but our ability to “systemize our systems.”

In an artillery duel, the US doesn’t fight gun against gun. It pits US target acquisition, communications, fire control, guns and ammunition (as well as soldiers, doctrine, and training) against the foe. And no other nation has shown the talent for tying together these elements to effectively produce a whole  far greater than the sum of their parts. I’ve used artillery here as an example, but the general rule applies across the entire armed forces.  The challenge is to continue to understand that technology is a tool that enables this synchronization, and not a substitute for it.

http://img42.imageshack.us/img42/836/53805940489aa77d4f09b.jpg

*Marine rifle squads have thirteen members. Basically, they add an extra fire team to each squad.

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by | May 11, 2013 · 8:25 am

Battle for Berlin, 1945

This week marks VE Day, commemorating the Victory in Europe over Hitler’s Third Reich.  The last and perhaps the most savage battle was for the German capital of Berlin.   This from the Battlefield series, which was aired weekly on Far East Network (“Forced Entertainment Network”) when I had an artillery battery in Okinawa in 1996.   The entire series is superb, and if you look, you can find most of them on line.  They are also available on DVD.   They contain a pretty good description of the higher tactical through the strategic picture, and have enough detail and technical stuff, but not too much.

Since the series was made, Russian archives have been explored more completely, and the number of Soviet casualties have been scaled up more than two-fold, from the 305,000 quoted in this episode, to nearly 700,000.   Note the ever-present use of artillery and mortars, rockets, and field guns, even in an urban environment.   The episode is 116 minutes, roughly the time one spends clicking on all of Mav’s aviation links and cool pictures and videos and stuff.   So get your Eastern Front geek on, and watch it.  You know you wanna.

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by | May 3, 2013 · 4:11 pm

150 Years Ago: Chancellorsville, May 3rd, 1863

Union soldiers waiting to advance, Chancellorsville

An interesting post over at Op-For by the redoubtable LtCol P commemorating the 150th anniversary of the famous Stonewall Jackson flank attack in the middle of the week-long battle.

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While the Battle of Chancellorsville was a stunning Southern victory, and the end of General Joe Hooker’s time at the head of the Army of the Potomac, the battle was not all disaster for the Federals, nor did their soldiers fail to fight.   Some fought extraordinarily well.  The 240-odd Officers and men of the 115th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, fighting under Dan Sickles’ Third Corps, held the western wall of the Federal position just west of Wilderness Church, in and around Hazel Grove.  The Regimental History for the 115th PA Vol. Inf. tells the story:

At daylight on the 3rd, the first line was attacked.  After holding its position for an hour, it fell back on its supports.  The Second line was then ordered to advance.  With alacrity it sprang forward, driving the enemy, when Colonel Lancaster fell, pierced through the temple with a minie-ball, [sic] the command devolving on Major Dunne.  Without faltering, the line pressed forward, recapturing the breastworks, taking four hundred prisoners and two stands of colors…  The position was held against the desperate efforts to carry it…

The price, including the desperate fighting withdrawal on the 6th, was high.

The Regiment entered the battle with fourteen Officers and two-hundred thirty men; of these, Colonel Lancaster, and Captains John J. Donnelly and George Cromley were killed,  and Captains Richard Dillon and Wm. A. Reilly, and Lieutenants William J. Ashe, James Malloy, and Evan Davis were wounded, the two latter mortally.  Captain Dillon lost his left arm.   Eight men were killed, seventy-three wounded, and twenty-two missing; an aggregate loss of one-hundred eleven.

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One of those seventy-three wounded was Private C. A. Warner of D Co., who was struck in the chest by a Rebel musket ball.

Warner, C.A. Private Wounded at Chancellorsville, Va., May 3, 1863 (Pa. Archives); Tr. to Co. D, 110th Regiment, P.V., June 22, 1864 D

Surgeons could not remove it, so it remained in his chest for the remainder of his life, which was all too short.   Just weeks before his son, my grandfather, was born in 1885, Christopher A. Warner died of complications from his wound.   He was 43.

One of the most incredibly moving experiences I ever had was walking through the Chancellorsville Battlefield in 1986 while at the Basic School.  Our 25-mile MCCRES hike was conducted there, and while 25 miles in 8 hours with a full march order is no leisure stroll, the venue was inspired.  On our breaks, Park Rangers would conduct impromptu lecture on the course of the battle.  I asked a Ranger at one point where the 115th PA Volunteers had fought, and he informed me that we were standing on the spot.

Knowing that I was within yards of where one of my ancestors had been wounded in the Civil War was both a thrill and a strongly compelling experience.   Even after the nearly thirty years, I remember every detail of the spot, and of the few minutes spent in thought, before shouldering MY pack again and falling into the long column of men being trained for war.  It is something I shall never forget.

[Update-XBrad]- Of course, for ALL your American Civil War blogging needs, be sure to check out Craig’s blog To The Sound Of The Guns. He’s devoted considerable space to Chancellorsville.

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by | May 2, 2013 · 9:04 am

Precision Guidance Kit

Artillery, the King of Battle, has long produced more casualties on the battlefield than any other weapon system. Since World War I, the massive barrages of artillery have been used to suppress, disrupt, delay and destroy enemy formations.  Areas from an acre to several square miles have been pounded into submission.

But until very recently, artillery has been an area weapon. Only last year we wrote with wonder at the revolution made possible by precision guided artillery shells such as the XM892 Excalibur.  In effect, gunners now have a “sniper rifle” with a 20 mile range.

Here’s the Excalibur Wiki.

But the Excalibur ain’t cheap. It is in effect, a gun launched guided missile. And while fewer Excaliburs are needed to prosecute a target than traditional 155mm shells, there are only so many that can be carried in a basic load. Guns still need to carry conventional rounds in their caissons for missions that don’t require precision.

What the Army really wanted was a “bolt on” kit that could be added to a conventional 155mm HE round, much as laser guided bombs and JDAMS are simply guidance kits strapped onto conventional dumb bombs.

ATK Systems has finally fielded such a system. The Precision Guidance Kit is a self contained fuze kit that simply screws into the fuze well of a conventional High Explosive 155mm round. This keeps production costs, shipping costs and training costs down. No special handling for the round is required, and there’s no need to carry additional types of ammunition, just additional fuzes.

Recently, active Army fielding of PGK has begun.  April 16 saw the arrival in Afghanistan of the fielding teams, and deployment with direct support artillery.

Fewer rounds to destroy a target, less collateral damage, better first round accuracy, and a relatively low cost. This is one quiet little program that has delivered.

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by | April 14, 2013 · 12:33 am

Bomb North Korea?

Hardly a day goes by where I don’t find myself in disagreement with at least something from the Op-Ed pages of the NYT. Today is no exception. It’s far more rare that I find myself in agreement with the left leaning blog Lawyers, Guns, and Money. Today is an exception.

University of Texas Professor of History Jeremi Suri argues that the US should preemptively strike North Korea’s ballistic missile capability.

The Korean crisis has now become a strategic threat to America’s core national interests. The best option is to destroy the North Korean missile on the ground before it is launched. The United States should use a precise airstrike to render the missile and its mobile launcher inoperable.

President Obama should state clearly and forthrightly that this is an act of self-defense in response to explicit threats from North Korea and clear evidence of a prepared weapon. He should give the leaders of South Korea, Japan, China and Taiwan advance notice before acting. And he should explain that this is a limited defensive strike on a military target — an operation that poses no threat to civilians — and that America does not intend to bring about regime change. The purpose is to neutralize a clear and present danger. That is all.

Erik Loomis at LGM notes:

China’s role in a potential war on the Korean Peninsula is hard to predict. Well then. Might as well just bomb North Korea and see what happens!

For that matter, we might just want to consult our South Korean allies on the matter, rather than just giving them advanced notice since, after all, the inevitably resulting war would take place on their turf. Seoul, the capital of South Korea, and one of the densest metroplexes on Earth, lies within easy artillery range of North Korea. I’m not entirely convinced they’d relish being plastered by thousands and thousands of artillery rounds and rockets just based on a hunch that North Korea was doing more than its usual sabre-rattling-for-aid routine.

That’s not to say I don’t take the threat of a nuclear armed North Korea seriously. Just that any serious (or even the most amateur)  student of strategy  in the nuclear era* knows there are more options on the table than shoot/don’t shoot, today, at this moment in time.  I tend to agree with URR that willfully lying to ourselves that China is a strategic partner with a shared interest in maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula is foolish. But that doesn’t mean we can’t point out to China that a full scale crisis holds greater risks to them economically and politically than it does to us, and maybe dialing it back a bit might help.  A steadfast refusal to submit to North Korean extortion for aid might be a good idea as well. And finally, if historians must weigh in on the matter, perhaps they should stick to reminding the Obama/Kerry foreign policy team of the parlous rates of returns that investing North Korean promises of good behavior in the past, when previous tantrums have been rewarded with food, fuel oil, and nuclear reactors.

*As opposed to nuclear strategy. Nuclear strategy is how to fight a nuclear war. Strategy in the nuclear era is how to avoid a nuclear war.

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by | April 7, 2013 · 12:04 pm

BIG! Mortars

We’ve written before about mortars being the infantry commander’s “hip pocket artillery.”* And in our Army, mortars are infantry weapons, separate from the Field Artillery.  Currently, our Army fields 60mm, 81mm, and 120mm mortars.

But that doesn’t mean there aren’t larger mortars.  Israel and several other countries use 160mm mortars. And the current largest mortar in service is the Russian 240mm mortar.

That’s a pretty hefty tube.

It’s odd to see a weapon that has a rotary magazine and power loading and yet the each round has to have its primary and booster charges hand applied. I mean, really? Tying the “cheeses” on with string?

Looks like some guided and rocket assisted shells in there too.

*well, Infantry, Armor and Cavalry- basically each ground maneuver battalion has its own mortars.

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by | April 6, 2013 · 3:08 pm

China’s North Korea Rhetoric: Once Again, We Are Eating it With a Spoon

NKPRC

The People’s Republic of China is once again disseminating its ever-predictable rhetoric to make it seem as if this time, for sure, they are “losing patience with North Korea”.    Just as predictably, current and former State Department officials in this Administration are gobbling it up hopefully and eagerly.     From the Telegraph:

There are clear signs that China is losing patience with North Korea, America’s former top diplomat in Asia has said.

“There is a subtle shift in Chinese foreign policy. Over the short to medium term, that has the potential to affect the calculus in north east Asia,” Mr Campbell said at a forum at John Hopkins university.

“You have seen it at the United Nations (Security Council). We have seen it in our private discussions and you see it in statements in Beijing,” he added.

No, you haven’t.  You have HEARD it.  What we have SEEN is a People’s Republic of China that backs the DPRK unequivocally.  If they did not, the DPRK and Kim Jong Un, like his father and grandfather before him, would stand down from their provocations post-haste.  But, we continue to hear how “this time China is warning North Korea”.    We heard it with the starting of the nuclear program.  And again with the nuclear tests.  Each one of them.  We heard such with the testing of theater ballistic missiles.  And with the sinking of a ROK Navy frigate.  And the unprovoked artillery attack against ROK soldiers and civilians.

But there was no real warning.  And often, quite the opposite.  The warning has been issued instead to the South and to the United States about “restraint” and the need for “stability”.    Yet, the naively hopeful straw-grasping continues.

Earlier, Mr Campbell told the Wall Street Journal that China “cannot be happy” and that he expected a tougher line to emerge from Beijing.

Au contraire.  The PRC is ecstatic watching US attempts to garner both deterrent force and potential combat power from a shrinking pool of assets as the self-inflicted slashing of America’s military narrows options and limits US presence in the region.   But State is not the only entity hopelessly out of touch with China, her relationship with the DPRK, and her intentions to displace the US and dominate the region.

However, Daniel Pinkston, a North Korea expert at the International Crisis Group, said Beijing was “fed up” at the distractions being created by Pyongyang while it tries to focus its energies on other problems. “They need to address issues in the South China Sea, they have a corruption campaign going on at home, North Korea is giving them a headache,” said Mr Pinkston.

It would seem Mr. Pinkston doesn’t quite understand whose headache the situation has become.  But China does.  As does Iran. And every other of America’s adversaries.  And our allies, too.

The notion that China disapproves of the actions of the DPRK to the point of “changing the calculus” in the region, or simply tolerates the North because it is “the devil you know” is absurdly naive.  Reflective, unfortunately, of an arrogant, clumsy, and amateurish US State Department, whose lack of acumen and and diplomatic skill is paraded yet again across the world stage.  The PRC is keenly aware of the value of an unpredictable and well-armed North Korea as a constant thorn in the side of the US, especially as the PLAN grows and the USN shrinks.

If we want to know what China’s role is, do not watch what they say, especially not what is intended for our consumption.  Watch what they do.  And don’t do.

Acta non verba.

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by | · 3:50 am

The Care and Feeding of Co-authors.

Normally, I like to make fun of Marines. And I like to make fun of
Artillerymen. I especially like making fun of Marine Artillerymen.

But if I pick on URR too much, he pouts and doesn’t post much. Which means, I would have to, and what’s the point of having co-authors, but to pick up my slack?

And Roamy, bless her, likes some splodey/shooty. It’s not like I pay them for content, so once in a while, I have to be nice to URR and Roamy. Here, I’mma kill two birds with one stone.

The Marines will never have anything approaching the numbers of guns Army artillery has. Yes, in Iraq and Afghanistan, the need for tube artillery has been fairly sparse. But in a near-peer conflict, a war of maneuver, artillery will be as key as it always has been. One of the linchpins of a strategy of maneuver is denying that very maneuver to your enemy. And artillery fire is a key component of that. The old definition of maneuver was “fire and movement” and artillery provides the “fire” while infantry/armor provides the movement.

It’s not so much that the Marines are dim and not smart enough to buy a lot of artillery. They are. But they face two important constraints on the amount of artillery they can field. First, all their artillery pretty much has to be air transportable by helicopter. And given the very limited number of CH-53E’s available, if at all possible, they want systems that can be lifted by the smaller, more numerous MV-22B. Second, the Marines are an amphibious force, which means they have to travel on the amphibious shipping provided to them by the Navy. As big as those ships are, there aren’t a lot of them, and further, there is a fixed, finite space available for equipment. Finding a balance between tanks, artillery, amphibious assault vehicles, logistical trucks, Humvees and all the other stuff a Marine Expeditionary Unit needs to take along is one of the headaches Marine planners face on a regular basis. So finding an artillery system that uses less space, and weighs less and, in a perfect world, takes a smaller crew, is a key priority. So the Marines are buying the EFSS 120mm mortar system, in lieu of the traditional 105mm gun howitzer.

In the Army, all mortars, even the 120mm, are Infantry weapons, organic to Infantry and Armor/Cav organizations. But for the Marines, if you’re going to use a mortar as your primary direct support system, having the artillery man it makes sense.

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Filed under 120mm, Artillery, infantry, marines, navy

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by | April 4, 2013 · 5:30 am

Blogs. Why We Write ‘Em, Why We Read ‘Em.

milblogs2a

Those of us in this somewhat focused community of MilBlog writers and readers are often asked by people who haven’t any exposure to MilBlogs, “Why do you do it?  You put in a lot of time and work.  What’s the point?”

It’s a fair question.   Thinking of ideas, and putting together a cogent discussion starter, or historical summary, takes more time than people think.  Knowing that, and being somewhat of an analysis geek (which may turn out to be a very good thing soon), I have my list of half a dozen daily reads, at least.  This’n here.  Salamander’s Front Porch.  Ray’s Information Dissemination.  OP-FOR, The Castle, and a number of other places make the list, blended with traditional news sources domestic and foreign, plus policy and analysis outfits.

Why?  Well, my gracious host here gives me an outlet for expression.  Like anyone with a fair-sized ego, I believe just a little bit that everyone is entitled to my opinion.  But there is also the great opportunity for feedback.  To hear from a mostly very educated crowd, their opinions and takes on events and occurrences domestically and in foreign affairs.  But it extends into culture, literary works, certainly history, and other aspects that spark discussion.

But one of the most valuable reasons to read and write in the Military Blogosphere is to hear from people who are truly experts in their fields, who possess great wisdom, are extensively experienced, and are considered and well-spoken people.  I do miss terribly reading the thoughts and musings of Lex, which was a morning staple and often provided several day-long trains of thought.  And this is true of not just Bloggers, but commenters.  Byron, the ugly old shipfitter, could wax authoritative about steel, and aluminum, and hull flex, and do it in a way that, perhaps over beer, I am sure I could listen intently to for hours.     Grandpa Bluewater’s urbane sophistication and eloquent dissertation always is worth the consideration, whether one agrees or not.    And there are others who add insight and humor, and are enjoyable to read.

Another such commenter is Steeljaw Scribe, shepherd of a superb blog of his own.   I did something the last two days that I rarely do, which is to go back and re-read a comment he made in Salamander’s post of the IG investigation of Admiral Gaouette.  His explanation of the dynamics of the bridge of a CVN, and the personalities and cultures that must blend and not clash if the mission is to be accomplished.

The bridge of a CVN is a unique environment that brings together two communities that normally opt to keep their distances from one another – SWOs and Aviators. That the three senior officers that regularly spend time up there (CO, XO and Navigator) are also aviators can at times, exacerbate that standoffish environment. This clash of cultures evolves from one group that is brought up in a dynamic environment and is used to rapidly changing events, making intuitive decisions and being cognizant that their butt and that of the x-number of NFOs or aircrew with them will suffer the consequences of those decisions. SWOs that typically (and note I said *typically* – there are always exceptions) come to the carrier do not come from the CRUDES environment, but from amphibs and auxiliaries and tend to be methodical if somewhat conservative and deliberative in their decision-making and watchstanding. At least that was my experience as a CVN nav. My challenge was working across that divide – to show the aviators (from watchstanders up to the XO who would go on to his first deep draft after this tour) on the one hand, how a series of events can unfold where little things not readily apparent to the eyeball can bite you (case history of the Eisenhower hitting the Spanish freighter at anchor in Hampton Roads being one of my teaching points). The flip side of that was getting the SWOs to be more anticipatory (e.g., looking to the next 2x cycles for managing sea space for downwind repositioning) as well as coming to grips with the immediacy of fixed wing operations at sea.

I know of no other vehicle by which an audience can learn, and share the insights of men and women with such experience.   It is the gaining of understanding, at the end of the day, that makes all this effort worthwhile.   Brad’s rules here do not include “write only what I agree with” or “water it down so it couldn’t possibly offend”.   He trusts us to understand and abide by propriety, and we seem to, as do the commenters,  on the whole.  And that is appreciated.

So in the end, despite the trolls, and my own alarming tendency to follow links and wind up pissing away two hours looking at cool stuff, reading and writing is worth the effort.   Even if the pay isn’t great.

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Filed under Air Force, army, Around the web, Artillery, guns, history, infantry, iraq, marines, navy, Personal, SIR!, Uncategorized, veterans

by | April 1, 2013 · 9:08 am

1 April 1945: Love Day

B23487.83161428_std

Today is the 68th anniversary of L-Day, known as “Love Day” to the half a million Allied soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines whose mission was the conquest of the island of Okinawa.    An armada of 1,300 ships included 40 CVs, CVLs, and CVEs, and close to 400 amphibious vessels carrying 187,000 troops, thousands of trucks, artillery tubes, mortars, tanks, amtraks, and many thousands of tons of ammunition and all classes of supply to sustain the landing force of the XXIV Corps and the Marine III Amphibious Corps in the fighting ashore.

Battle_of_Okinawa_1

The Japanese, to the surprise and immense relief of the invasion force, barely contested the beaches.  Almost every unit came ashore without opposition, as the first night saw more than 60,000 ashore.   The Japanese 32nd Army’s 100,000 defenders and the locally recruited militia of Okinawan men would instead meet their American enemy inland, in expertly-prepared and defended positions on key terrain.   But all of that, the massive kikusui of the kamikaze aircraft, the drenching rains that turned the island into a reprise of the horrors of the Western Front in the Great War, the savage fighting for Naha and the Shuri line, the Half-Moon, Sugar Loaf, the sacrifice of the Yamato battle squadron in Operation Ten-Gō, the massed suicides of civilians, was yet to come.   On this day, casualties were negligible, and a lodgment established.   The question became not if, but when, Okinawa would fall.

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by | March 26, 2013 · 5:53 am

At Long Last, a Supreme Commander

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Ninety-five years ago, on 26 March 1918, at a conference in Doullens, the Allies, the French, British, and now the Americans, finally agree to appoint an Allied Supreme Commander for the Western Front.   For three and a half years, neither the British nor the French were willing to countenance placing their forces under command of a General from the other respective nation for any but the most local and temporary situations.   Differences in philosophy, national pride, individual ego, and centuries-old mutual distrust (exacerbated by the very lack of coordination such a situation made inevitable) created an environment where the alliance became, at times, highly contentious and all but hostile.   The result was most often a stunning lack of coordination of effort and vision that played into the hands of the Imperial German commanders, allowing them to defeat in detail discordant Allied offensive efforts that might have otherwise seriously pressed the Germans.

The Great War on the Western Front is a grim and maddening exposition of military incompetence with the most tragic of consequences.   There are myriad reasons for this seemingly endless phantasm which wasted an entire generation.  Elderly, ossified commanders who had neither the energy or mental flexibility to wage modern war.   Weapons technology that rendered a generation of tactics (and tacticians) dangerously obsolete.

To these shortcomings and failures must be added the lack of a single overall commander to coordinate strategy, impart mediation, and provide the vision for fighting the armies of the Western Front.   Unity of Command, one of the nine principles of war,  did not come until very late in the day, and that under extreme and compelling conditions as the German Spring Offensive threatened to break the British 5th Army and capture Paris.

So it would be Ferdinand Foch, erstwhile Chief of Staff for Marshall Petain, who would finally, at long last, command in the West.

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Filed under army, Artillery, guns, history, infantry, planes, Politics, SIR!, Uncategorized, veterans, war

by | March 20, 2013 · 5:53 am

Fire Support In Vietnam

Most of the video is just run of the mill artillery stuff, and thus not terribly interesting, but check out the three-shot grenade launcher at 6:10. What the heck is that thing?

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by | March 19, 2013 · 7:51 am

General Barry McCaffrey: Lauds “Marines’ Aversion to BS” On Women in Infantry

Soldiers with the US Army's 6-4 Cavalry walk down a mountain path during a patrol near Combat Outpost Keating in eastern Afghanistan

Time Magazine (of all places) carries General McCaffrey’s missive.  Well worth the read (which contains a link to Marine General Newbold’s superb “Seven Myths about ‘Women in Combat’”).

The argument for women at rifle battalion team level is unsound. Makes as much sense as mandating women on all-male professional contact sports teams.

Life in a rifle company is still incredibly brutal, filthy, requires enormous physical energy and upper body strength, and calls for a spirit of personal violence. There is zero personal privacy. Bodily functions take place in close proximity.

Troops are constantly injured from carrying heavy loads and crashing down hills in the dark. They dig like moles to stay alive.

Infantry units live like wild animals during periods of extended combat. Mostly it is a business of self-selected young men.  Most of these combat soldiers end up in these units because they actually want to fight.

One might think there would be some additional recognition of such opinions expressed by long-time practitioners of the craft of ground combat.   But alas.   Objective analysis gives way to activism and some other “isms” all too often.

As General Newbold rightly asserts:

Pity the truthful leader who attempts to hold to standards based on realistic combat factors, and tells truth to power. Most won’t, and the others won’t survive.

(H/T to Battleland)

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Filed under Afghanistan, army, Artillery, girls, guns, history, infantry, iraq, marines, navy, obama, Politics, recruiting, SIR!, stupid, Uncategorized, veterans, war

by | March 14, 2013 · 9:47 am

14 March 1943; Kharkov Miracle

Russland-Nord, Erich von Manstein, Brandenberger

Today is the 70th anniversary of the accomplishment of one of the most impressive feats of arms in the history of warfare.  On the heels of a disastrous defeat in the Ukraine, German General Erich Manstein’s counterstroke against the Red Army regained the tactical initiative just two weeks after the situation, and perhaps the war itself, seemed irretrievably lost.   On 14 March 1943, I SS Panzerkorps recaptured Kharkov after a savage fight.  For those who had endured the loss of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad, it seemed a miracle.

Historical examination of the Eastern Front tends to identify the catastrophe at Stalingrad as the beginning of the end of the Wehrmacht in the East.  Certainly, with the loss of more than 300,000 men, including 92,000 prisoners, and the virtual annihilation of the Italian, Hungarian, and Rumanian forces north and south of Stalingrad on the Volga, Stalingrad was an unmitigated disaster.  And worse looked likely, as the forces of Vatutin’s (Southwest) and Golikov’s (Voronesh) Fronts pushed south down the Don River basin aimed at Rostov.  The loss of Rostov would effectively pin the remaining German forces (Army Group A and the remnants of Army Group B) against the Sea of Azov and the Dniepr bend, almost guaranteeing their destruction.

But in their efforts to destroy the German forces deep inside Soviet territory, Vatutin’s Sixth Army and First Guards’ Army (along with Mobile Group Popov), and Golikov’s Sixty-Ninth and Third Tank Armies became badly overextended.  In addition, Soviet intelligence on German force disposition was almost non-existent.   When most of the Wehrmacht forces slipped out of the bottleneck through Rostov, and Hausser’s I SS Panzerkorps abandoned Kharkov (counter to orders, on 15 February 1943), what seemed like another major Soviet victory was actually a precursor to near-disaster.

Third_Battle_of_Kharkov_sector

On 18 February 1943, Manstein’s reconstituted Army Group South received permission for a counterstroke.  Led by 4th Panzerarmee (XLVIII Panzerkorps and I SS Panzerkorps), Army Group South struck on 19 February, and the poorly-disposed Soviet forces were thrown into panic.  When on 20 February 1st Panzerarmee and XL Panzerkorps began the destruction of Mobile Group Popov, a full-fledge disaster was in the making for the Soviets.

The counterstroke was a microcosm of the entire war in the East.  In open country, the German Army proved still infinitely superior to its Soviet opponent, even when significantly outnumbered. (Indeed, Manstein’s Army Group South was on the small end of a 1:1.2 force ratio when he launched his counterstroke.)  But in the defense, particularly within the built-up city of Kharkov, the Russian soldier’s toughness and determination made the fighting there a bloody affair.   Of 30,000 German casualties in this counterstroke, almost 12,000 were in the fight for Kharkov.

Kharkov-3-02

Nevertheless, Manstein accomplished a seemingly impossible victory, pushing the Red Army virtually back to their starting points before the attacks to encircle Army Group South.   It was a pattern that the Soviet Stavka would become all too familiar with.  The Wehrmacht retained until the last days of the war the capability to counterattack and retrieve what seemed to be hopelessly lost situations, while inflicting heavy losses.  In the weeks between 19 February and 15 March, Soviet casualties were enormous, with the loss of more than 100,000 men (including about 40,000 prisoners), some 1,100 tanks, and 3,000 guns.  Much of Vatutin’s and Gorlikov’s armies were shredded, and would not be combat effective again for several months.

battle_2kharkov7

To both the Germans and the Soviets, Manstein’s counteroffensive must have seemed like old times.  But, of course, they weren’t.  The Wehrmacht in the East, while still powerful and dangerous, was not the same as it had been in 1941 or even 1942.  And neither was the Red Army.

The squandering of the last significant German armored reserves against the Soviet defenses in the Kursk Salient in July of 1943 was followed by a devastating counteroffensive from Red Army forces staged to strike once the German Ninth Army and 4th Panzer Army had run out of steam at Kursk.  This counteroffensive was not the costly, awkward affair that had been evident in the wake of Stalingrad.  This was to be the model of the Soviet way of war until Berlin fell in 1945, and indeed, was the blueprint for Warsaw Pact tactics until the 1990s.   Massed artillery, attack aircraft, and highly mobile and powerful mechanized and tank formations would turn the Blitzkrieg tables on the inventors of the art.   Kharkov fell to the Soviets for good in August of 1943, and Army Group South would never again have any except very local initiative as it was pushed back inexorably toward the borders of the Reich.

But all that was yet to come, for on this date in 1943, impossible as it seemed, the Wehrmacht had regained the initiative, and had stopped, then routed, a massive Soviet offensive just six weeks after the surrender at Stalingrad.

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by | March 11, 2013 · 6:09 pm

Question for the Gang: What is the Most Beautiful Warship Ever?

indiana bb58

One of the great things about being able to write for this or any other blog is the ability to ask questions with the purpose of drawing out opinions and generating discussion amongst knowledgeable readers.

The question I pose today is the following:

In your opinion, what was the most beautiful warship ever built?

Defining “beauty” in an instrument of war may seem a contradiction, but to the denizens here and elsewhere who are either Naval enthusiasts or have been to sea on a warship, there is an instinctive reaction to the sight of a graceful and well-balanced vessel that exudes power and strength.

Beauty, also being in the eye of the beholder, still has some qualifiers on this first offering:

  • The ship (for this round, at least) must be a capital ship, a fleet carrier, battleship, battle cruiser, armored cruiser, guided missile cruiser, or heavy cruiser.
  • The ship must be primarily steam-powered and of steel/iron construction.

Note that neither design success nor combat record is a part of any consideration.   This is not about the most effective fighting vessel, but rather the most aesthetically pleasing.

My offerings below are not at all exhaustive, and I encourage any additional input for which class or one-off ship strikes your sense of beauty.  That said, one can likely easily spot some of my biases in my selections.  The “clipper” or “Atlantic” bow.  Funnel caps.  I could think of no pre-Dreadnoughts that were beautiful ships.  Amphibs, either.  I offer only a single aircraft carrier class, as well.  I heavily favored guns, but not exclusively.  And there are a few selections that either precede or follow major rebuilds which make the vessels all but unrecognizable from their original design.  Which is good in one case, bad in another.

And I selected no French battleships.  They tend to be ugly affairs, with tumble-home sides and oddly-spaced machinery and funnels.  Even the Dunkerques and Richeleius, while significant improvements, suffer from the truncated appearance that plagued Nelson and Rodney, which are also not on my list.

Without further ado, grouped by country, below are my considerations for the most beautiful warships ever built.  Select from them, if you like, or offer your own choices.

Germany

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Bismarck-class Battleships

scharnhorst1

Gneisenau-class Battlecruisers**

helgoland

Helgoland-class Second Generation Dreadnoughts

SMS_Derfflinger-ptqtr-top

Derfflinger-class Battlecruisers

Kriegsmarine-Cruiser-KMS-Prinz-Eugen-07

Hipper-class Heavy Cruisers**

Great Britain

04_hms_tiger

Battlecruiser Tiger

hms_qe_speed

Queen Elizabeth-class Super Dreadnoughts (As built)

hms-renown

Renown-class Battlecruisers

HMS_Hood_March_17_19241

Battlecruiser Hood

hms-vanguard-23_8

Battleship Vanguard

Japan

ijn_yamato_trials

Yamato-class Superbattleships

mogami_trials

Mikuma-class Heavy Cruisers

heavycruisermayacustomdy4

Maya-class Heavy Cruisers

Italy

Italian_battleship_Andrea_Doria

Andrea Doria-class Battleships (post-rebuild)

Italian_battleship_Roma_(1940)_starboard_bow_view

Vittorio Veneto-class Battleships

zara_heavy_cruiser

Zara-class Heavy Cruisers

The United States

saratoga cv3

Lexington-class Fleet Aircraft Carriers

BB-57_SouthDakota

South Dakota-class Battleships

alaska

Alaska-class Battlecruisers

Battleship-U.S.S.-Missouri

Iowa-class Battleships

des moines

Des Moines-class Heavy Cruisers

cg36california_01

California-class Nuclear Guided Missile Cruisers

France

duquesne4

Duquesne-class Heavy Cruisers

Suffren

Suffern-class Heavy Cruisers

Soviet Union/Russia

sverdlov-cut

Project-68 (Sverdlov)-class Heavy Cruisers

Kirov

Kirov-class Battlecruisers

So there you are, some suggestions for the most beautiful warships ever built.  Fire away, either with the ones I provided, or offer your own ideas.

(Next round will be Light Cruisers and Destroyers.)

** Both Gneisenaus and cruiser Hipper were completed with straight stem and no funnel cap.  The addition of the “clipper bow” and capped funnel was not considered a significant rebuild in either class/unit.

UPDATE and BUMPED: Now with a poll added. I’ll have to teach URR how to make one before the next round. Vote!

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by | March 3, 2013 · 12:59 pm

Counterinsurgency Words of Wisdom from Pete Ellis***

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There is a saying among historians that the best place to find a new idea is in an old book.   Time and again over the years, I have cracked open long-forgotten volumes to find gems of timeless and timely wisdom, astute commentary, and unimpeachable good sense.  Contained on those yellowed pages are answers to problems and challenges not at all different from contemporary times, and appreciations of conditions and factors that are surprising for their sophistication and insight.

In the March 1921 edition of The Marine Corps Gazette, then-Major Earl H. “Pete” Ellis penned an article entitled “Bush Brigades”, which dealt with the deployment of US Marine forces into areas in the Western Hemisphere in which instability and violence threatened US interests and the safety of the native populace.  These interventions, known collectively as the “Banana Wars”, were the basis for the seminal 1940 Small Wars Manual.  Interestingly, nearly two decades before SWM was published, Major Ellis struck upon a number of maxims that fairly leap off the page, and would have been excellent counsel for US commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan.

At the minimum, Ellis’s words would have permitted today’s Officers and NCOs (and politicians!) to understand that the challenges and issues faced in the decade-long counter-insurgency fights were not new or unprecedented, but rather something with which US military thinkers had had to wrestle and solve for a significant portion of the previous century.  And in those words and the words of others might have been lessons and cautions that aided in success on the battlefield and in the newspapers.

The mercurial Major Ellis expounded upon a number of topics from large to small, that military thinkers would find highly relevant today.   I will attempt to do justice to the more salient of those topics below:

  • The character of enemy operations:

a)      A somewhat disorganized attempt to prevent landings.

b)      More or less resistance in cities followed by a race to the jungle.

c)       The organization and operation of armed bands, at first risking open battle and finally waging guerilla warfare.

d)      The operation of outlaw bands (bandits, ladrones, cacos) who murder members of the forces of occupation and their own people indiscriminately.

In general, enemy operations will be those of irregular forces or guerilla bands with the usual series of surprise raids, ambushes, and assassinations.  The enemy will have moral support from most of his own people, material support from many, and will operate in their midst. 

Replace “landings” in a) with “invasion”, and “jungle” in b) with “desert”, and you have a pretty accurate description of the course of things in Iraq and Afghanistan.

  • The role of the press/media and the “peculiar attitude of the American people themselves”:

The Marines are down in Jungleland!- and killed a man in a war!

And the oft-forgotten fact that

…the Marines are only doing their job as ordered by the people of the United States.

  • The usefulness of cash payoffs to the locals:

…it must be emphatically stated that a flying column should never be sent into the bush unless amply provided with CASH.  With it can be purchased knowledge of the terrain and movement of the enemy, and food.  It is safe to say that at least 50 percent of the so-called harsh measures used in bush warfare could be eliminated by providing troops with adequate information money.

  • Considerations in the location of a fortified  post:

The site of the post should have, if possible, the following characteristics:

a)      Be capable of defense by a small detachment.

b)      Be of sufficient extent to permit the bivouac of … one hundred men, with mounted detachment.

c)       Permit control of any town in the vicinity and all approaches, especially roads and ravines.

d)      Have sufficient elevation to generally observe the surrounding country.

e)      Permit control of a landing field for aeroplanes.

The main requirement for a fortified post, garrisoned as it will be by only a few men, is that it cannot be rushed.

The above would have been a helpful guide to the Officers who decided to emplace COP Kahler Keating in Wanat.

  • What is now termed “Lawfare”:

To enforce one’s will upon an enemy of the nature depicted without subjecting one’s self to undue criticism is one of the most difficult tasks that can confront a soldier.   The “Rules of Land Warfare” lay down certain rules which are to be followed, subject to military necessity during hostilities between regular forces of civilized nations.  The “Rules of Land Warfare” for the guidance of regular forces engaged in hostilities with irregular or guerilla forces have never been written; and it is doubtful if they ever will be written…

  • “Phase Four” operations and “Information Dominance”:

It is the final phase which is difficult because, owing to the policy pursued, the following conditions will prevail to a greater or lesser extent:

a)      Bands of murderers and other criminals base in thick, difficult country, and prey indiscriminately on the peaceful people in the production areas.

b)      These bandits have no property other than that which they carry with them or keep in hiding.

c)       Many bandits, having been captured and turned over to proper authority, have been permitted to escape and have rejoined their bands.

d)      The inhabitants of localities frequented by bandits keep them informed of the movement of the force of occupation

e)      The forces of occupation are at a minimum.

Major Ellis’ article was never officially published by the Marine Corps (the Gazette is as then an MCA publication), but nonetheless provides context and narrative which our current generation of Officers and NCOs would find startlingly familiar a century hence.   As it would be to Napoleon’s veterans of the Peninsula War a century previous.

Most famous for his prescient divination of the character and requirements of the Pacific War yet to come, Ellis was no stranger to the counterinsurgency efforts of the Marine Corps in the early 20th Century, nor was he unversed in conventional war.  He had been plucked from Quantico by General Lejeune and was a key planner for the successful Meuse-Argonne Offensive in France in 1918.   Ponder.

*** Milblog writer/reader/commentor “Moe DeLaun” was most gracious in his gift to me of the March 1921 Marine Corps Gazette (along with a wonderful collection of Kipling by Somerset Maugham and the DVD of The Man Who Would Be King!)  There is much more in that March of 1921 edition that I will be sharing and commenting on over the next several months, including articles on Russia, American Marines in Nicaragua, and the Aisne-Marne Offensive of the late war.  THANKS MOE!

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by | · 11:45 am

Barrage Rockets

Multiple Launch Rocket Systems are pretty handy. Our current MLRS and HIMARS have evolved from area suppression weapons into long range precision weapons with the Guided MLR round, and the ATACM long range guided missile. But for most of their history, rockets have been relatively short ranged, area fire weapons. They offer a massive barrage, but at the expense of long reloading times, and relatively poor accuracy.

During World War II, the Army used large numbers of 4.5” barrage rockets. At the very tail end of the war, the spin stabilized rocket was introduced to improve on the poor accuracy of the earlier fin stabilized rockets. The M16 rocket was fired from the T-66 launcher.

Shortly after the end of the Korean War, the US pretty much got out of the barrage rocket business. But the Soviet Union, who’d had great success with theirs in World War II (and were always big fans of artillery), used the 122mm Grad rocket launcher, primarily as a counter-battery weapon, but also for suppressive fires. The BM-21 is much longer than contemporary US rockets, giving it much greater range.  Simple, cheap, and easy to use, the BM-21 Grad is mostly gone from Russian service, but is still used by a lot of former client states.

Since the 122mm rocket is still so popular, some folks are even now making launchers for it. And this might be the ultimate evolution of that concept.

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by | February 12, 2013 · 12:47 pm

AC-130

A little 105mm to delouse a ridgeline.

Timber!

H/T: Weasel Zippers

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by | · 7:14 am

A Nuclear North Korea and Its Benevolent Protector: China

North-Korea-conducted-third-nuclear-test

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News today that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has successfully tested a nuclear device.  This third test, again using plutonium, employed a smaller and lighter device than in previous iterations, yet it produced a yield roughly twice that of the 2009 test.  It is increasingly obvious that the DPRK is closing in on a warhead-sized weapon that can be melded with the long-range ICBM program that is developing apace under Kim Jong-Un.

The bright side would seem to be the universal condemnation of the DPRK nuclear test, and seemingly strong diplomatic language, even from China, regarding the most recent test.   However, with closer scrutiny, I am exceedingly skeptical of China’s supposedly sincere denunciation of the North Korea test.  When the history of China’s benevolent protection of North Korea is examined in detail, it becomes strikingly clear that such protection includes both encouragement and material and technical assistance.

Peking has deliberately and unabashedly thwarted each and every opportunity to contain North Korea.  The Chinese refused outright to live by UNSC Resolutions 1718 and 1874.  China continues her arms sales to Pyongyang, and her large economic (read: financial) aid to Kim’s government.   China aided materially in the testing of long-range ballistic missiles, even as Chinese officials publicly condemned the tests.  China provided launch platforms, and likely technical assistance, to include guidance technology (thank you LORAL, Bill Clinton, and Ron Brown).    The People’s Republic of China undoubtedly provided technical assistance to North Korea for a series of cyber intrusions in the United States and the Republic of Korea.  China publicly rebuffed US Secretary of State Clinton while ignoring the evidence of North Korean guilt in the sinking of the ROK corvette Cheonan, with the loss of 46 ROK sailors.   A short time later, China refused to condemn DPRK for the unprovoked artillery strike inside ROK sovereign territory which killed four and wounded 50.   China’s only comment was a demand for ROK “restraint”, and the condemnation of “escalation”, which Chinese comments clearly indicated would be blamed on the South and the US.

This latest nuclear test is no surprise to China.  China’s faux-outrage and seemingly strong reproof of the Kim Jong-Un regime is pure dinner theater, crafted and promulgated for the consumption of her Asia neighbors, the United States, and the world community.  But believe none of it, not a single word, nor a drop of the sentiment it supposedly conveys.   China has for sixty years understood the strategic value of an abjectly hostile and militarily capable North Korea behaving in a seemingly unpredictable manner.  This is especially true in the last four years, as US military power shrinks, and the US Navy in particular finds itself in an increasingly less favorable combat ratio in the western Pacific.

Platitudes about Peking wanting to be partners in maintaining stability in Asia are so much diplomatic flattery.  As of this moment and in this region, China is unquestionably an adversary, providing assistance,  diplomatic cover, and military protection for a sworn and aggressive enemy with nascent nuclear capability and seemingly little restraint.  The DPRK is a criminal regime, brutally oppressive, engaged in narcotics and currency counterfeit activity, responsible for shipments of arms and WMD technology to Hamas and Hezbollah, and possibly Iran.  But North Korea is what it is, and acts as it does, because China gives it a free hand to do so.  If we are going to deal meaningfully with North Korea in defense of our ally in the South, we must acknowledge that fact.     

If we hope to counter China’s not-so benevolent rise in the Pacific, we must not just acknowledge China’s ambitions, but plan and act accordingly.   Sequestration, which embraces the gutting of American military power for the symbolic but miniscule impact on rampant national debt, is the foolhardy artifice of bumbling foreign policy and national security amateurs.  But that is fodder for another post.

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by | January 28, 2013 · 11:23 am

Women in Combat Arms: The Perspective of a Warrior

The Late General Robert H. Barrow, former Commandant of the Marine Corps, winner of the Navy Cross, Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star, Bronze Star, Veteran of three wars, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, speaks on the notion of women in ground combat units.  Thirteen and a half minutes.  (The last three are dark screen.) Listen to it all.

Those who would dismiss General Barrow as hidebound, sexist, closed-minded, or any other of the various derogatory labels that tend to be employed by the feminists who push such agendas should feel a tinge of shame.  If they are capable of such, which I doubt.

Those who comprise the Joint Chiefs of Staff, particularly CJCS Dempsey, CSA Ordierno, and Marine Commandant Amos, should be ashamed of themselves.  They must know deep down that what a man like General Barrow asserts is the brutal truth.  Yet they have nodded their heads in enthusiastic agreement with their political masters as a sop to the feminists and progressives who despise our military and everything it stands for.  Gentlemen, you must do some serious soul searching.    You KNOW that General Barrow speaks an unvarnished truth honed by 41 years of wartime service and leadership of men in some of the most bitter combat of the 20th Century.   Are your current assignments and your careers so much more important than the lives of those you will unnecessarily risk to implement this corrosive policy?

The Commandant’s assertion that “we will maintain our high standards while ensuring maximum success for every Marine” smacks of the dishonesty of the “everyone gets a trophy” Left.   War, we damned well should know, knows no such considerations.   If we didn’t have such morally and intellectually bankrupt leadership spending so much time and money painting the Potemkin Village instead of training to win our nation’s wars, we would not find ourselves in the current fix.

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