Category Archives: helicopters

by | June 17, 2013 · 10:40 am

Operation End Sweep (part 1)

CH-53 MK-105 Sled

AN HM-12 CH-53D tows a MK 105 sled during Operation End Sweep

On 8 May 1972, as part of Operation Pocket Money (itself a part of Operation Rolling Thunder), 3 A-6 Intruders (from VMA(AW)-224) and 6 A-7 Corsairs (from VA-22 and VA-94) launched from the USS Coral Sea (CV-43) to deploy mines within the vicinity of Haiphong Harbor in North Vietnam.

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An illustration of the Southeast Asia are of Operations.

The A-6 flight led by the CAG (Commander, Carrier Air Wing), Commander Roger Sheets, was composed of USMC aircraft from VMA-224 and headed for the inner channel. The A-7Es, led by Commander Len Giuliani and made up of aircraft from VA-94 and VA-22, were designated to mine the outer segment of the channel. Each aircraft carried four MK 52-2 mines. Captain William Carr, USMC, the bombardier navigator in the lead plane established the critical attack azimuth and timed the mine releases. The first mine was dropped at 090859H and the last of the field of 36 mines at 090901H.

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A-6A Intruder from VMA(AW)-224.

Twelve mines were placed in the inner segment and the remaining 24 in the outer segment. All MK 52-2 mines were set with 72-hour arming delays, thus permitting merchant ships time for departure or a change in destination consistent with the President’s public warning. It was the beginning of a mining campaign that planted over 11,000 MK 36 type destructor and 108 special MK 52-2 mines over the next eight months. It is considered to have played a significant role in bringing about an eventual peace arrangement, particularly since it so hampered the enemy’s ability to continue receiving war supplies.

Operation Rolling Thunder itself served as a way to get the North Vietnamese back to the negotiating table in Paris. Prior to Operation Pocket Money, the US Navy planning offices had studied minesweeping operations off Haiphong but the assets to conduct minesweeping were not properly maintained.  However some sweeping had taken place off Saigon in preparation for a non-combatant evacuation. Most of the minesweeping assets in theatre were devoted to Operation Market Time in South Vietnam. Most of the minesweeping equipment dated from the Korean War era. In 1970 the US Navy had made a decision to place more emphasis of minesweeping from helicopters due to the increasing cost of MSO (ocean-going minesweepers).

There were about 8 months between the time that CINCPAC (Commander-In-Chief Pacific) had received orders to begin minesweeping and the time the task force remained on-station to conduct sweeping operations. This allowed time for development of equipment, tactics and training.

Between the dates of May 9-11 of 1972, as assessment of problems was conducted. There were no oceanographic charts of the operational area off Haiphong, there was no data to give accurate predictions of equipment losses that could occur during operations, there was a lack of specialized personnel and training (both in the officer and enlisted ranks).

In 1972 mine countermeasures for both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets were combined was under one type commander – Commander Mine Warfare Force, based in Charleston, South Carolina. What follows is a list of operational resources that were in this organization:

-One Mobile Mine Countermeasures Command (MOMCOM). This was the command structure to provide worldwide airborne and other support of minesweeping operations.

-Three Mine Flotillas. Each Flotilla was composed of a number of MSOs.

-One Helicopter minesweeping squadron. Helicopter Minesweeping Squadron 12 (HM-12) was the airborne component to the task force.

-One squadron of minesweeping boats (MSB and MSL).

-One Mine Force Support Group. They were responsible for training and equipping personnel for minesweeping operations.

HM-12 was equipped with 12 CH-53Ds. 2 of the helos were in use at the Naval Coastal Systems Laboratory. The CH-53Ds were on loan from the USMC and were configured with towing strong points required for mine countermeasures towing.

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HM-12 patch

These helos towed the MK-103 gear for sweeping moored mines, the MK-104 gear for acoustic mines and MK-105 hydrofoil for sweeping magnetic mines.

mk-105 minesweeping sled

Schematic drawing of the MK-105 minesweeping sled, showing the major components of the device.

Other airborne assets that didn’t necessarily belong to MOMCOM but were tasked to them were USAF C-5A Galaxies that were used to airlift the CH-53Ds to the theatre.

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An example of an MSO used during Operation End Sweep, the USS Constant (MSO-427).

Most of the surface born mine sweeping assets were the 172 ocean minesweeper (MSOs). By 1972 most of these ships were 13 to 19 years of age with 5 in the Western Pacific, 17 on the west coast and 11 on the east coast another 17 were in the Naval Reserve Forces and 13 were in an inactive status.  14 of these MSOs had received new engines to improve their useful lives and decrease the maintenance necessary for effective operation. Other vessels were the eleven 144 foot coastal minesweepers and nineteen 57-foot minesweeping boats.

The minefields off Haiphong were too shallow for sweeping operations by any of these types of vessels. However sensors towed by these vessels like the AN\SQO-14 sonar gave these vessels the ability to map the bottom of the ocean at sufficient resolution to detect mines. The only capability these vessels had to dispose of the mines were EOD divers.

The Naval Scientific Assistance Program (NASP), provided solutions to problems of immediate concern. For example, the NASP developed simulators for use in training and automated minesweeping planning software. As a side note, the NASP expressed a concern of solar flare activity in August of 1972. NASP thought these flares caused a large number of mine detonations of Destructor mines in US minefields off North Vietnam.

There were other problems concerning preparation for Operation End Sweep. Among them being a general lack of funds for training and equipment (which admittedly was a problem throughout all US forces at the time. Problems specific to minesweeping forces detailed to Operation End Sweep were reliability problems for degaussing, sonar (AN/SQO-14), and engines on the MSOs. There was no equipment for precision navigation and mapping of minefields. There was no oceanographic data for sea floor in the vicinity of Haiphong. The was no protection for the CH-53Ds that were involved in minesweeping.

HM-12 conducted training from May to November 1972 off of Charleston, South Carolina. The CH-53Ds operated from an LPD (Landing Platform Dock) and crews learned how to rig the minesweeping equipment to the helo. LCVPs (Land Craft Vehicle and Personnel or “Higgins Boat”) carried the MK-105 sleds to the waiting hovering helos. The sleds were then attached to the towing strong points on the aircraft.

Training of both surface and air forces for Operation End Sweep as done off of Panama City, Florida. Most of these tests were to test the accuracy of the Raydist. EOD teams also conducted training with surface minesweeping forces.

On 6 November 1972, Task Force 78 deployed to Subic Bay in the Philippines. Forces kept a low profile on base because TF-78 was being used as a bargaining chip in the Paris peace talks. The CH-53Ds were deployed to Subic via USAF C-5 Galaxy.

In January 1973 the Paris Peace Treaty was about to be signed and TF-78 forces ramped up training. Crews from HMM-165 trained with HM-12 aboard the USS Ogden and USS Dubuque. MSOs USS Fortify, USS Force, USS Impervious and USS Engage began sweeping the anchorage for the TF, some approaches to Haiphong. Operations were being monitored by the Soviet Intelligence Collection Ship, Protractor.

By 26 February, airborne units from HM-12 were ready to be deployed aboard ships. HM-12 was divided into 4 detachments, each aboard 4 ships in the task group. Dets Alpha and Bravo embarked aboard the USS Ogden, USS Dubuque, and USS New Orleans. Dets Charlie and Delta embarked aboard the USS Inchon (LPD-12) and USS Cleveland (LPH-7).

General planning for sweeping operations in Haiphong actually started in 1972 as part of general contigency planning on the part of JCS. By mid-1972 however clearing the mines in Haiphong become a diplomatic issue at the Paris Peace Talks. The initial planning for End Sweep were known as Formation Sentry I and Formation Sentry II. These plans differed from End Sweep through the numbers and assets to be used. The Sentry plans were completed by 1972 but held ready by CINCPACFLT (Commander-In-Chief Pacific Fleet).

Imputes to expand Formation Sentry I into Formation II occurred because of what became known as the Warrington incident in June and July 1972. While conducting naval bombardment 10 to 20 miles northeast of Dong Hoi, the USS Warrington was damaged by an underwater explosion that was determined to have been possibly caused by a Destructor mine laid as a result of an aircraft navigation error.

This incident led the JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) to determine that MSOs were particularly suited to ocean-sweeping operations in this area and prompted a danger zone to be established in the area. The area was never swept because a Naval Oceanographic team was trying to survey the area and was fired on by shore batteries. The area was never cleared (except for the self-destruction of the mine). The Warrington incident did bring increased interest of Minesweeping to the JCS and the appropriate planning offices were notified.

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Ships of Task Force 78 at anchor in the Gulf of Tonkin.

By 24 November 1972 Task Force 78 (TF-78) was activated. TF-78 consisted of the following:

-Surface Support Group (Task Group 78.0) consisting of LPH and LPD types to serve as helicopter platforms and supporting ships such as the fleet ocean tug and salvage ship. Five helicopter platforms were available plus a flagship-maintenance platform. An amphibious squadron commander led the Surface Support Group.

-Mobile Mine Countermeasures Group (Task Group 78.1) the airborne group, contained the 4 airborne units (A,B,C,D), the special minesweeper Washtenaw County and various other units. Commander TG-78.1 was in overall command of sweeping in coastal and port areas.

-Surface Mine Countermeasures Group (Task Group 78.2) consisted of the 10 MSOs assigned to End Sweep. TG-78.2 acted as control ships for the helo minesweeping operations.

-Advanced Base Mine Countermeasures Group (Task Group 78.3) was stationed at Subic Bay. This group provided maintenance, repair and supply to the entire task group; trained Marines in MCM and coordinated installation of sweeping kits and the Swept Mine Locator Camera System on the helicopters. Civilian technical representative from the various contractors were also part of this group.

-Contingency Mine Countermeasures Group (Task Group 78.4) was activated later and primarily responsible for sweeping the inland waterways in North Vietnam. They were also primarily responsible for supervising North Vietnamese sweep personnel.

-Salvage Group (Task Group 78.5) was responsible for finding and disposing buried mines in the Haiphong Channel.

On 27 January, MSOs began sweeping the anchorages of Haiphong where the main ship in TF-78 would be operating. On the 29th, the Paris Peace Agreement was formally signed by representatives from the United States, The Republic of Vietnam, The Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front.

By May of 1972, the largest mine countermeasures force the world had ever seen, up to that time, had assembled and was ready for action.

In the next part of this series we’ll get into the minesweeping equipment used in Operation End Sweep and the operation itself.

This was my first attempt to tell some “non-aviation” history that I felt needed to be told.  If I’ve missed something or said something in error as usual you feedback is more than welcome.

 

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by | June 3, 2013 · 4:48 pm

2000th Apache?

AH-64-Apache

The Dew Line does some math on exactly how many Boeing (initially Hughes, then McDonnell Douglas) AH-64 Apaches have been produced.

Turns out maybe the they’re counting the number they’ve rebuilt too?

Anyone wanna run the numbers or know how Boeing came up with the 2000? According to the Wikipedia page as of February 2010 the number world-wide is 1,070 aircraft.

Anyway Boeing recently released a video in commemoration.

There’s also a video from a Boeing retired test pilot of the Apache.

Btw, they’re up to the E model, called the Apache Guardian.

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Filed under army, Around the web, helicopters

by | May 21, 2013 · 6:24 am

First Attack!

The 1st Battalion, 227 Aviation Regiment has a long proud history.  Former member, and long time friend of the blog, Outlaw 13 collaborated with several others, and international film and television star Nick Searcy, to produce a great tribute to the unit.  It’s well worth your time.

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by | March 21, 2013 · 5:08 pm

Is the Supercarrier Dead?

So, is the supercarrier dead? Jerry Hendrix wrote a thought provoking piece titled “At What Cost A Carrier?” Normally, we think Hendrix is pretty sharp, but this piece was not up to his usual standards. First, comparing the roughly $7bn cost of the last in class CVN-77, to the first in class CVN-78 (roughly $14 bn) is a bit misleading. The last in class benefits from the entire learning curve of a production run. The first in class always suffers cost issues because of the same learning curve issues. Further, as much as $5bn of the cost of the new class is in non-recurring research and development costs. So while the cost of the next-gen carrier is still rather appalling, it’s not terribly out of line with recent trends in comparable shipbuilding.

So let’s take a look at some of the alternatives the Wired article I linked explores.

1. Using the new America class or a derivative as baby carriers.

First, the America class are not baby carriers. They are amphibious warships. Sure, they look a lot like carriers, and have better ability to operate larger numbers of AV-8B or F-35B jets than the existing LHD class big deck amphibs. But they are still amphibious warfare ships, designed to carry and land the hear of a Marine Expeditionary Unit, the Battalion Landing Team, and host the majority of its Air Combat Element (ACE), a reinforced medium helicopter unit.

The biggest drawback of using an LHD/LHA as a carrier is the fact that it cannot operate either the E-2 Hawkeye, or the EF-18G. One of the key lessons of the Falklands War was that while carrier airpower can be decisive, operating carriers without airborne early warning and electronic warfare in range of shore based air is fraught with risk.

LHD/LHA are also quite a bit slower than carriers. That reduces their mobility quite a bit. One of the key strengths of carriers in the power projection role is their ability to close with a coast, launch strikes, and retire before the enemy can mount a coherent counterstrike. But you have to move pretty quick to do that. Even a relatively modest decrease in speed has a significant negative effect on that ability. That reduced speed also makes an LHD/LHA quite a bit more vulnerable to submarine attack.

Further, all of the vulnerabilities that supposedly make the modern supercarrier obsolete are there in any LHD/LHA, only magnified.

2. The “everything’s a carrier” approach.

Not a bad idea, to some extent.

That is, between helicopters and UAVs, more and more ships are capable of deploying at least some form of their own, organic air support.  UAVs obviously extend the sensor envelope for ships. And helicopters not only extend the sensor envelope, but often give much greater reach to the ships weapons, either by carrying their own, or providing much better targeting for ship launched weapons.

But the fantasy that unmanned combat air vehicles can replace the manned strike aircraft is just that- fantasy. For at least the next generation, manned aircraft will continue to be the only viable option.

As for converting merchant hulls to carrier like roles, that too faces severe handicaps. Virtually every challenge an LHD/LHA faces, so to any converted merchantman. Worse, not being built to warship standards, they are far less capable of withstanding battle damage or fire.

The linked article notes for the cost of a carrier, you could buy several smaller ships, but that doesn’t necessarily mean you’d be buying equal effectiveness for your money, nor does it even mean the results would be cheaper in the long run.  Don’t forget, the big cost in operating a ship isn’t fuel, but manpower. And the manpower for several smaller ships would likely be greater than one supercarrier.

3. Submarine Strike

Yes, the converted Ohio class SSGNs are handy. And adding a few more tubes to later flight Virginia class SSNs is probably a good idea. But that’s hardly a substitute for airpower. First, right now, the only viable weapon is the Tomahawk cruise missile. While it is a good weapon, it is both slow, and only very modestly stealthy. It is quite vulnerable to air defense. It also has a rather paltry 1000lb warhead, far too small to hold at risk any number of critical targets in almost any campaign.

Worse, it has only the most limited utility against any target that isn’t a fixed installation. Latest versions can be retargeted in flight, but requires a data-link with an airborne assets. Which implies you can be flying over enemy territory. Which raises the question, if you can fly over territory long enough and far enough to retarget a Tomahawk, why not just use that aircraft as a strike platform anyway?

Submarine launched cruise missile attacks also suffer from “shallow magazines.”  An Ohio SSGN with full magazines only carries 154 missiles. That sounds like a lot (and at roughly a million dollars a pop, it’s a lot of money) but in terms of warheads on foreheads, that’s a day’s work for a carrier.  And the carrier can launch several days of strikes before having to retire to rearm.  Whereas a carrier can rearm at sea, an SSGN has to return to a friendly port to reload.  Such lack of sustained firepower is why URR refers to the SSGN as able to deliver a “strike”, rather than “fires.”

Since Billy Mitchell first bombed captured German warships in Chesapeake Bay, people have been sounding the death knell of the carrier. And yet, it continues to prove itself again and again as not only a viable weapon of war, but a crucial tool of warfighting and diplomacy.

That’s not to say Naval Aviation doesn’t face challenges. The short striking range of today’s air wing, the astonishing cost of the F-35C program (and limited capabilities it provides) and the short-sighted decision to jettison dedicated tanker, ASW and long range strike (as opposed to strike-fighter) assets have lead to the construction of ever more capable carriers, with arguably ever diminishing capability in the main battery of the carrier, its air wing.

If carriers are such obsolete and vulnerable warships, why are so many other countries striving today to build their own carrier capbability?

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by | March 20, 2013 · 5:53 am

Fire Support In Vietnam

Most of the video is just run of the mill artillery stuff, and thus not terribly interesting, but check out the three-shot grenade launcher at 6:10. What the heck is that thing?

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by | March 9, 2013 · 6:47 am

Everything I Needed to Know in Life, I Learned as a Helicopter Pilot in Vietnam

1. Once you are in the fight, it is way too late to wonder if this is a good idea.

2. It is a fact that helicopter tail rotors are instinctively drawn toward trees, stumps, rocks, etc. While it may be possible to ward off this natural event some of the time, it cannot, despite the best efforts of the crew, always be prevented. It’s just what they do.

3. NEVER get into a fight without more ammunition than the other guy.

4. The engine RPM and the rotor RPM must BOTH be kept in the GREEN. Failure to heed this commandment can affect the morale of the crew.

5. Cover your Buddy, so he can be around to cover for you.

6. Decisions made by someone above you in the chain-of-command will seldom be in your best interest.

7. The terms Protective Armor and Helicopter are mutually exclusive.

8. Sometimes, being good and lucky is still is not enough.

9. “Chicken Plates” are not something you order in a restaurant

10. If everything is as clear as a bell, and everything is going exactly as planned, you’re about to be surprised.

11. Loud, sudden noises in a helicopter WILL get your undivided attention.

12. The BSR (Bang Stare Red) Theory states that the louder the sudden bang in the helicopter, the quicker your eyes will be drawn to the gauges. The longer you stare at the gauges the less time it takes them to move from green to red.

13. No matter what you do, the bullet with your name on it will get you. So, too, can the ones addressed “To Whom It May Concern”.

14. If the rear echelon troops are really happy, the front line troops probably do not have what they need.

15. If you are wearing body armor, they will probably miss that part.

16. Happiness is a belt-fed weapon.

17. Having all your body parts intact and functioning at the end of the day beats the alternative.

18. If you are allergic to lead, it is best to avoid a war zone.

19. It is a bad thing to run out of airspeed, altitude, and ideas all at the same time.

20. Hot garrison chow is better than hot C-rations which, in turn, is better than cold C-rations which, in turn, is better than no food at all. All of These, however, are preferable to cold rice balls, even if they do have the little pieces of fish in them.

21. Everybody’s a hero…On the ground…In the club…After the fourth drink.

22. A free fire zone has nothing to do with economics.

23. The further you fly into the mountains, the louder the strange engine noises become.

24. Medals are OK, but having your body and all your friends in one piece at the end of the day is better.

25. Being shot hurts.

26. “Pucker Factor” is the formal name of the equation that states the more hairy the situation is, the more of the seat cushion will be sucked up your ass . It can be expressed in its mathematical formula of S (suction) + H (height above ground ) + I (interest in staying alive) + T ( # of tracers coming your way)

27.Thus the term ‘SHIT!’ can also be used to denote a situation where high Pucker Factor is being encountered.

28. Thousands of Vietnam Veterans earned medals for bravery every day. A few were even awarded.

29. Running out of pedal, fore or aft cyclic, or collective are all bad ideas. Any combination of these can be deadly.

30. There is only one rule in war: When you win, you get to make up the rules.

31. C-4 can make a dull day fun.

32. There is no such thing as a fair fight – only ones where you win or lose.

33. If you win the battle you are entitled to the spoils. If you lose you don’t care.

34. Nobody cares what you did yesterday or what you are going to do tomorrow. What is important is what you are doing – NOW – to solve our problem.

35. Always make sure someone has a P-38. Uh, that’s a can opener for those of you who aren’t military.

36. Prayer may not help…but it can’t hurt.

37. Flying is better than walking. Walking is better than running. Running is better than crawling. All of these, however, are better than extraction by Medivac, even if it is technically, a form of flying.

38. If everyone does not come home, none of the rest of us can ever fully come home either.

39. Do not fear the enemy, for your enemy can only take your life. It is far better that you fear the media, for they will steal your HONOR.

40. A grunt is the true reason for the existence of the helicopter. Every helicopter flying in Vietnam had one real purpose: To help the grunt. It is unfortunate that many helicopters never had the opportunity to fulfill their one true mission in life, simply because someone forgot this fact.

41. If you have not been there and done that you probably will not understand most of these.

(h/t Rick Collins, via Scott Ruch)

My personal favorites are #4 and #31.

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by | February 14, 2013 · 4:48 am

OpFor Vismods

The National Training Center at Ft. Irwin, CA originally had a fairly simple purpose. Units tagged to deploy to Germany in case of a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe would face an incredibly steep learning curve. By putting them through their paces at NTC, that curve could be flattened somewhat. It was very similar to the Air Force’s paradigm of Red Flag operations that would give squadrons their “first 10 wartime missions.”

At the time, one of the more radical concepts of NTC was the use of a full time Opposing Force* to model the size, tactics, and visual representation of a Soviet Motorized Rifle Regiment. Traditionally, units training in the field would face off against a sister unit. Not surprisingly, those units tended to use American tactics.  Worse, American units were equipped with American equipment, and distinguishing friend from foe on the battlefield was virtually impossible. One of the goals of NTC might be to sow confusion in the unit being trained, but that was taking it a bit far.

The OpFor at NTC went to great lengths to model themselves as the vanguard of the Evil Empire, going so far as to wear uniforms resembling the Soviets.

But equipping an entire Motorized Rifle Regiment (roughly equivalent to a US mechanized brigade) posed a bit of a challenge. When NTC opened in the late 70s, there wasn’t a lot of surplus Soviet equipment available on the market. What there were plenty of was M551 Sheridan Armored Reconnaissance Vehicles.  Less than satisfactory as light armor or recon vehicles, there were plenty of them available to equip the OpFor. Unfortunately, they didn’t look very Russian.

But by adding various plastic, fiberglass and other panels, a Sheridan could be given the rough visual outline of either a Soviet tank or BMP fighting vehicle.   Not surprisingly, these visual modifications quickly became known as VISMODS.

http://a2.ec-images.myspacecdn.com/images02/133/c746f12db5db4986ac9bab503d703260/l.jpg

M551 Sheridan pretending to be a BMP-1 IFV

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/72/M551_Sheridan_vismod_T-80.jpg

M551 masquerading as a T-80 tank

Now, even on the best of days, a Sheridan with with plastic wasn’t a dead ringer for any Soviet vehicle. But that’s kind of beside the point. It was sufficient that it was visually distinctive from American vehicles, and that the US unit under training could distinguish between tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and a few other types. That was important because the type and number of vehicles you see on any given spot on the battlefield can tell you a lot about what the enemy intentions.

And it didn’t really matter if the Sheridan’s weapon systems were very different from the vehicles they were portraying. Since the force on force gunnery at NTC was done via the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES), switching out the control box would allow a Sheridan to replicate virtually any direct fire weapon system, from machine guns, to tank guns to guided missiles.

So the Sheridan served the OpFor well through the 80s and into the 1990s.

But, you say, by the early 1990s, there was a ton of surplus Soviet armored vehicles available for dirt cheap. Why didn’t the Army just use those instead of modified American tracks?

We could have easily brought back enough Soviet (and Chinese) armor from Desert Storm to equip the OpFor with real vehicles. The problem would have been spare parts.  As reliable and rugged as Soviet designs were, they still needed a lot of spare parts. Providing a pipeline for those parts, training mechanics to repair  new vehicles, and training drivers and crews for them would have been prohibitively expensive.

By the mid 1990s, the Sheridan fleet was getting pretty tired. The supply of spare parts was pretty close to exhausted as well, and keeping the vehicles running was becoming more and more expensive. A replacement was needed, but there wasn’t a huge budget for one.

What the Army needed was a vehicle that was in plentiful supply, with a large, established spares pipeline. Buying new vehicles was out. What was there in the fleet that would be suitable?

The trusty M113 filled the bill. No longer in front line use as an infantry carrier, thousands of them still serve in various support roles. But having been replaced in mechanized infantry battalions left plenty of them to equip the OpFor.  But the square squat M113 didn’t look much like any Soviet vehicle.

A quick, relatively low cost program actually rebuilt about 120 M113s by adding some visual panels, but more importantly a power driven turret. Known as the M113 OSV (OpFor Surrogate Vehicle) these tracks form the backbone of the OpFor’s armored vehicle fleet.  The basic M113 hull and powerplant were identical to those in service. Most of the components of the turret were from the M2/M3 Bradley, so service, operation and spares were relatively low cost. Changing some outside fiberglass panels allows OSV’s to represent either tanks or the BMP-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle.

http://www.downloadmunkey.net/images3/opfor-01.jpg

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_98-24_osv2.gif

While the OSV isn’t the only presentation of Soviet vehicles the good guys are likely to see.  BRDM recon vehicles are represented by modified Humvees.

http://www.downloadmunkey.net/images3/opfor-02.jpg

The OpFor at NTC isn’t the only OpFor. There are also full time opposing forces at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Ft. Polk, LA (geared primarily to light forces), and the Combat Maneuver Training Center at Hoehenfels, Germany. And while the VisMods form the main body of the OpFor, the Army does have a limited number of captured vehicles either for familiarization or occasionally to act as OpFor.

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The top frame of the pic is your humble scribe setting a Dragon missile simulator for the next mission.

Helicopters are also represented by the OpFor.

OPFOR-1

800px-UH-1H_disguised_as_Mi-24_Fort_Irwin_1985

Often times, the permanent OpFor needs to be augmented by “normal” forces. To differentiate these interim OpFor from the friendly forces, some minimal modifications are usually made.  In my days in Germany, we’d strap a painted 55 gallon drum on the top deck of our M113s. Tanks often carried drums on their rear deck, simulating the common Soviet Practice of carrying spare fuel there.  Since the full time OpFor at NTC has morphed into a real Combat Brigade Team, in addition to its OpFor duties, it also has access to the normal complement of combat vehicles of the Army. These can also be used to simulate a Soviet equipped force, though with considerably less fidelity.

http://farm7.staticflickr.com/6188/6067891136_16c54dd526_o.jpg

M1 KVT (Krasnovian Variant Tank) Krasnovia is the notional nation the OpFor represents.

In tight budget times, Opposing Forces are an attractive target for budget cutters. From a wide array squadrons, the Air Force, Navy and Marines have had their aggressor strength greatly diminished. But the effect of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have actually worked to expand and diversify the Army’s OpFor , and while some cutbacks are inevitable, the Army will fight tooth and nail to maintain the core of its capability to present a realistic threat scenario to maneuver forces under training.

*Technically, now it is the Contemporary Operating Environment Force or COEFOR, but everyone still calls it the OpFor.

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by | February 10, 2013 · 11:32 am

227th @ 50!

Outlaw 13, of Threedonia fame, gave us the heads up on this. The 227th Aviation Regiment will be celebrating its 50th anniversary on the 13th. Now, in an army that’s over 230 years old, that may not seem so old. But aviation units, of course, didn’t get started in earnest until the Vietnam War.  But in that war, and subsequent ones, some units, such as the 227th Aviation Regiment, have accumulated histories any unit would be proud of.

Outlaw13, Nick Searcy*, and film maker  Kenn Christenson have collaborated to produce this film celebrating half  a century of service. Enjoy!

*Yes, that Nick Searcy, my close personal friend, Peabody Award Winner, and International Film and Television Star, and host of Acting School with Nick Searcy.

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by | February 9, 2013 · 1:01 pm

KMax

Kaman  Helicopters has a long history of taking an… unconventional approach to solving the challenges of rotary winged flight. A few years ago, they looked at the issue of helicopters with external loads, and decided that what was needed was something smaller than the enormous CH-54 Skycrane. But to maximize the external load, as little helicopter as possible would be used. And rather than the traditional crew of two, it would only use one pilot. Little helicopter, big load.

Taking the idea even further, and teaming up with LockMart, they decided no pilot was an even better option. Pretty soon, they’d paired up with the Marines to test this unmanned helicopter for delivering supplies to remote outposts in Afghanistan. Flying in supplies by helo reduces the number of ground convoys needed, reducing their vulnerability to IEDs. And by using an unmanned helicopter, that reduces the risk to aircrews, and frees up conventional helicopters for troop movements or evac missions or other uses.

I’m not entirely sold that this is an especially cost effective program, but it is pretty interesting to watch.

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Filed under Afghanistan, helicopters, marines

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by | January 27, 2013 · 10:26 pm

NightStalkers invade Miami

From looking at the video, the birds appear to be MH-60s and A

H/MH-6 Little Birds, which would almost certainly make them part of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, The Nightstalkers.

Now, I’m not upset that they’d practice flying in a civilian urban environment. They fight in them, so they need to train in them. But the passion for secrecy in special operations means they apparently never even alerted the local media or filed a Notice to Airmen for the region. Scaring the crap out of the population (and furthering conspiracy theories among the nutty) are not mission enablers. And if there had been a mid-air with a civilian light plane, the Army would come out looking pretty stupid.

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Filed under girls, guns, helicopters

by | December 20, 2012 · 2:59 pm

Reducing Helicopter Weight through Design Optimization

This is a little too much an ad for Altair, but Mr. RFH has been working on this, and I’d like to brag on him a bit. Weight savings on a helicopter might not be as critical as for space (or for infantry), but 12.7-pound weight savings is nothing to sneeze at. I’m betting more ammo or a little better fuel economy would be welcome. More to come with weight savings for the Common Missile Warning System dispenser mount and a Composite Universal Weapons Pylon.

kiowa door

Case Study: Reducing Helicopter Weight through Design Optimization | Altair Enlighten.

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by | December 5, 2012 · 7:28 pm

TIME: Admiral Mullen Possible Target of Foreign Cyber Intrusion

GST207

Something to keep an eye on, reported by the lovely and talented Susan Katz Keating, Military contributor for TIME magazine.

“Admiral Mullen, now a private citizen, has responded to very specific requests and is cooperating with an ongoing cyber investigation he has been informed is focused overseas,” Mullen’s office said in an e-mailed statement. Mullen is a member of two governmental advisory boards, one at the CIA, and is a member of the State Department’s investigation into the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi.

One cannot be sure that the events of September 11th, 2012 are in any way related to this investigation.  But one cannot be sure they are not.    Bears watching for sure.   H/T B5
ak47Mug
SKK is NOT a Soviet Weapon!
(The mug makes the perfect Christmas gift!!!)

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Filed under Around the web, girls, guns, helicopters, navy, Uncategorized, war

by | October 24, 2012 · 4:00 am

Roamy’s roundup

Yesterday morning a Soyuz rocket carrying astronaut Kevin Ford and cosmonauts Oleg Novitskiy and Evgeny Tarelkin launched successfully from Baikonur. They will join Sunita Williams, Akihiko Hoshide, and Yuri Malenchenko as part of Expedition 33 when they dock with the International Space Station on Thursday. Ford will become commander of Expedition 34 when Williams, Hoshide, and Malenchenko return to Earth next month.

The Dragon commercial resupply capsule will undock and return to Earth on Sunday October 28.

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Hubble, eat your heart out. One of seven mirrors for the Giant Magellan Telescope has been completed – a 27.5-foot diameter monstrosity cast from 20 tons of glass and polished to 19 nanometers precision. They were aiming for 25 nanometers or better, or 1/20th of the wavelength of visible light. The optics I usually deal with are 1/10th wave precise and a lot smaller, so I’m impressed.

The Giant Magellan Telescope is being constructed in northern Chile, high in the Andes and away from light pollution. It will be part of the Las Campanas Observatory in the Atacama Desert. The seven segments form a 82-foot diameter mirror.

University of Arizona hopes to cast the second segment mirror in January and hopes to cast the third segment next year. (corrected)

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Mr. RFH says it’s a UH-60M. I just know that’s some serious planking.

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Filed under helicopters, space

by | September 10, 2012 · 7:33 am

The USMC Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS)

In February of 2011, the USMC Expeditionary Fire Support System was employed in combat in support of Battalion Landing Team 3/8 (26th MEU) in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.   The combat deployment was more than a decade in the making, the culmination of development which began in the late 1990s.  The requirement EFSS was intended to fill goes back at least another decade, to the final retirement of the venerable M101A1 105mm Light Howitzer from the USMC inventory, a cannon that had first entered service before World War II.

Concept of Employment

EFSS, along with the HIMARS rocket system and the M777A1 155mm Towed Howitzer, is intended to be part of the “triad” of ground fire support systems for the United States Marine Corps.   EFSS is conceived to be a part of the assault echelon of ship-to-shore movement, and provide maneuver forces with close ground fires until tube artillery comes ashore in the on-call waves, perhaps as much as 24-48 hours after H-hour.

The EFSS is being fielded in the Artillery Regiment of the Marine Division, which is a bit of a paradigm shift from more recent previous heavy mortar efforts by the USMC, but not unprecedented, as will be discussed below.

System Components

The EFSS is built around the RT120/M327 rifled 120mm mortar.    The mortar, carriage, and baseplate weigh 1,780 pounds, and has a crew of four.  Range with standard munitions is 8.5km.  GPS-guided Precision Extended Range Munitions (PERM) are capable of ranges of 17km, with a reported circular error probable (CEP) of 20m.  Projectiles vary in weight from approximately 36 to 42 lbs.

The prime mover for the RT120 is the Growler Internally Transportable Vehicle (ITV), based on a modified M151 Jeep concept, but with a sophisticated variable suspension system and dimensions tailored for internal transport, as the name implies, in the V-22 Osprey.  The Growler has a four-cylinder turbocharged diesel engine that generates 180 horsepower, is equipped with four-wheel drive (with a selection for rear-wheel drive only), and is capable of towing 2,000 pounds cross country.

The EFSS consists of the above-mentioned mortar, two ITVs, with each respectively towing the mortar tube, and an ammunition trailer which has a bustle rack for 36 ready rounds.  Tactical and vertical mobility have been emphasized, in order to ensure equal mobility to the maneuver force being supported.

Criticisms

The EFSS has not been without controversy.  Much of it surrounds the Growler prime mover, which has been specifically designed to fit into the very restricted internal cargo area of the V-22 Osprey.    The cost per unit is estimated to be over $200,000.   With a narrow wheelbase and limited ground clearance, true cross country capability is in question.   The vehicle is prone to rolling in turns, and may have trouble navigating the rugged terrain in undeveloped areas in which employment is possible.   Additionally, the Growler offers no ballistic protection for its crew.  Open on three sides, it is vulnerable to small arms, fragmentation, and the IED threats that have become so familiar in the last decade.   All valid criticisms, and requiring of the assumption of significant risk in employment.

For my part, the EFSS is at best a hybrid and therefore suboptimal solution.  This is not the first foray for the Marine Corps into the idea that a heavy mortar might replace a light howitzer capability.  In the early 1960s, the M30 4.2-in (107mm) chemical mortar was mounted on a surplus 75mm pack howitzer carriage, and mated with a recoil system to ease emplacement and increase range.

The M98 Howtar*** was the result, and was briefly fielded in Vietnam with Marine Artillery units.  However, with its still limited range when compared to the howitzer, and with similar mobility requirements, the M98 proved significantly less suitable than the 105mm howitzers already in service, and not a substantial upgrade from the standard “four-deuce” in service with Marine Infantry units.

The EFSS has similar limitations.

First, the weapon is a mortar, and incapable of low-angle fire or direct fire.   High angle fire is a significant challenge in fire support coordination with fixed and rotary wing air assets that comprise fully half  of the USMC combined-arms team and will be of critical importance in supporting operations ashore before tube artillery and HIMARS can be landed.

Second, unless the preponderance of ammunition is of the PERM variety, which is a doubtful proposition due to costs, EFSS has limitations in range (8.5km)  that require it to be well inside the range fans of a host of threat weapons systems in order to successfully prosecute targets.

Third, the rate of fire of the RT120/M327 is around 6 to 8 rounds per minute, relatively low for a mortar system, which limits the volume and weight of fire that EFSS can provide.

A more appropriate solution to light and mobile fire support would seem to be that of a lightweight 105mm howitzer, using similar weight-saving materials (titanium) and designs that allowed the M777A1 155mm towed howitzer to weigh slightly over half (8,800 lbs) what the M198 155mm (15,780 lbs) system tipped the scales at.    A 105mm howitzer weighing 3,000-3,500 pounds, capable of firing more lethal and extended range modern munitions, equipped with course-correcting fuses, would be a great enhancement to the Landing Force Commander, providing a much more robust and capable fire support system for minimal additional logistic and mobility requirements.

That said, the EFSS is infinitely better as a fire support system than what existed for that niche previously, which was nothing.   It is a recognition that, despite our recent low-intensity conflict/COIN experience, the modern battlefield will see an increased emphasis on ground fires.  This  is already true of those areas in the littoral where our adversaries are building Anti-Access/Access Denial (A2AD) capabilities with an eye towards thwarting US power projection options.

(***Note, the above photo of the M98 Howtar was taken on the quarterdeck of 10th Marines HQ at Camp Lejeune.   The Notre Dame Leprechaun is undoubtedly the work of Col Chris Mayette USMC, who commanded the regiment at the time the picture was taken.   There is no substantiation to the rumor that the Howtar disappeared when he turned over command, or that a similar one now adorns his living room in his current location…)

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Filed under 120mm, ARMY TRAINING, Artillery, guns, helicopters, history, marines, war

by | July 30, 2012 · 10:23 pm

What *is* that thing?

Working on an Army base, I’m used to seeing all kinds of airplanes and helicopters and now drones. But seeing this thing flying around made me wish for a pair of binoculars.

The Huntsville Times obliged with a nice article about this Siamese twin of an aircraft. It’s a Eurocopter X3, with the VTOL of a helicopter and a maximum speed of 232 knots so far.

Interesting with the twin rudders as opposed to a tail rotor. The rudders have some funny styling, too, kind of a sawtooth pattern in front of the flap.

There’s a video at the link, too, that I couldn’t successfully copy here. That video is better in my opinion than the ones on Youtube in that you can see and hear it in flight, and it’s not just a pretty ad for EADS.

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Filed under army, helicopters, planes

by | March 8, 2012 · 7:36 am

Kiowa Warriors over A’stan

Kiowa Warriors flight

Kiowa Warriors flight
Two Task Force Saber, 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade OH-58D Kiowa Warriors fly toward a training range near Jalalabad, Afghanistan March 2, 2012. Saber’s Kiowas lead the 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade in OH-58 hours, helping the brigade set flight-hour records in Afghanistan. The 82nd CAB has flown more than 65,000 hours since taking over in mid-October. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Eric Pahon, Task Force Poseidon Public Affairs)

Call it Bill Gunston’s Law of Airframe Dynamics – the longer an aircraft type is in service, the more “stuff” is hung off it.

 

Test flight

Test flight
An OH-58D Kiowa Warrior from Task Force Saber, 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade, fires a 2.75-inch rocket at a mountainside during a test flight in eastern Afghanistan, Mar. 2, 2012. The Kiowa warrior is the Army’s scout and reconnaissance aircraft, which often provides close support for ground troops on the battlefield. Saber’s Kiowas lead the 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade, which has flown more than 65,000 hours across all airframes since October 2011. U.S. Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Eric Pahon, Task Force Poseidon Public Affairs.

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Filed under Afghanistan, army, ARMY TRAINING, helicopters

by | March 4, 2012 · 7:31 pm

Daily Dose of Hoo-ah!

The Navy SEALs have been getting a lot of good press lately, between Act of Valor, rescuing hostages in Somalia, killing Bin Laden, and rescuing Americans held by pirates. Good for them.

But let’s not forget Special Forces Operational Detachment Delta, better known to the public as “Delta Force.”

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by | February 8, 2012 · 8:31 am

MUM-T

I saw this article on Manned-to-Unmanned Teaming this morning and thought it was worth sharing.

Boeing is taking many of the Army’s AH-64D Longbow Apaches and modifying them so much, packing them full of so many performance upgrades and new features, they are practically new, next-generation aircraft.

Among the new tools the Apache “Block III” gives Army crews is the ability to operate an unmanned aircraft and use its sensors and weapons at the same time they are flying their helicopter. That’s called Manned-to-Unmanned Teaming or MUM-T, and it’s been compared to putting a hunting dog out in front of the hunter – only in this case the dog can roam 10-to-15 kilometers away, has incredible eyes and can carry its own guns.

Nice work by the local university students, too.

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