Category Archives: infantry

by xbradtc | May 12, 2013 · 5:23 am

The Rifle Squad as the Decisive Force

A year or two ago, in discussing small infantry units, Esli mentioned that the current doctrinal emphasis of the Maneuver Center of Excellence (formerly, the Infantry School) was on making the rifle squad more lethal, more effective, more of an overmatch to the enemy equivalent.

The current US Army 9 man rifle squad* versus an enemy of comparable size has several significant advantages, and yet also faces serious disadvantages.

First, US squads tend to be better educated and better trained in infantry combat, in both the technical and tactical aspects. They are virtually never without some type of supporting fires on call, from machine gun teams and anti-armor weapons at the squad level, company and battalion level mortar fire, through brigade and higher level artillery, and even close air support.

The soldiers of the rifle squad have body armor, clothing and load bearing equipment that is far better than their opponents. Their food is healthier, and less likely to lead to illness. Their communications are generally better. His night vision devices are almost always far more capable than the enemy’s.

But the US rifle squad also has its problems…

That body armor and load bearing equipment leads to soldiers carrying loads that severely limit the mobility and agility of the squad. These same heavy loads also lead to an increase in sports type injuries. Rules of engagement often delay or prevent supporting fires from higher echelons from joining the fight in a timely manner. That healthful and nutritious food is heavy, further increasing the soldier’s load, and tying him to a logistical chain. His communications and night vision devices all require large amounts of battery power, all of which has to be manpacked.

As to weapons, frankly small arms are small arms. We can spend the next fifty years debating the relative merits of the M16/M4 family versus the AK family that have spent the last fifty years fighting one another. But neither weapon so overmatches the other as to be decisive. The same is true for any other weapons found in the rifle squad or the threat squad.

So, today we find ourselves in a situation where a US squad can pretty much hold its own with any similar sized threat. And generally, it will come out better than the enemy.

But that isn’t the goal. The goal, the desire is to be confident that virtually any time a US squad encounters an enemy formation of similar size, the US squad can fix it, fight it, finish it, hunting it down and destroying it. Today, most squad on squad engagements are not decisive- either one or the other force breaks contact and lives to fight another day.

Comes now news that the Army commissioned a study by the National Research Council, who came to the conclusion that the problem is, the squad isn’t well equipped.

Now, in the context I just shared with you, that sounds kinda nuts. One of the primary problems the dismounted infantry squad faces is the crushing burden of carrying the stuff they already have.

But the report does make some sense. The Army has spent untold billions designing network centric warfare capabilities the give commanders unprecedented ability to “see” the battlefield. A commander can know almost instantly where his forces are, and with support from UAVs and other intel assets, very often where enemy forces are, even before the battle is joined.

But once a squad leaves its vehicles, it is cut off from this network. Its only data stream, if you will, is voice radio. And the “bandwidth” of voice radio is awfully narrow. It is very, very difficult to transmit a clear tactical picture through words alone, especially absent the non-verbal cues humans routinely use in face to face communications. Even with standardized formats, the limits to how much information can pass from the squad to higher, or from higher down to the squad is very limited.

In the past, we’ve mentioned the possibility of using smart phones on the battlefield to increase the dismount squad’s ability to access data, rather than just voice. And there’s some hope for that. But smart phones aren’t exactly set up to run on Army tactical radio networks. Further, a smart phone is not the most ergonomic way to present information. You know it is foolhardy to text and drive. How much more foolhardy is it to text and shoot? So a more “heads up” method of presenting the information in an intuitive manner will eventually be needed.

And whatever technology comes along, it will have to weigh less than the current state of the art. And not only will it have to weigh less, its batteries will have to weigh much less.

Further, for all the advantages technology may in the future give the squad, it is not without its own burdens, even beyond simple weight. Every piece of equipment calls for maintenance and training, both of which take time. And time available for training is limited. What other training should the squad sacrifice to achieve competency in these new technologies?

Do we sacrifice time spent on marksmanship? Fire and movement? First aid? Weapons maintenance? Map reading? Sexual assault awareness and prevention training? Language and cultural training for upcoming deployments? It isn’t like there isn’t enough on the plate already.

The report also pings Big Army for spending far more money and attention on big ticket acquisition programs than on the bread and butter of everyday stuff used at the squad level. The Program Executive Officer for Command and Control technologies is a Major General. The PEO for small arms is a Colonel, who, judging by the fact he’s been there for several years, ain’t a “comer” for stars.

So what do we do? I don’t know. I’m not entirely sure, absent a far greater willingness to take casualties, we can make the rifle squad capable of decisively defeating a threat squad.

And I’m not even sure that should be the goal. The great strength of the Army, and indeed all our services, has long, long been not so much our technology, but our ability to “systemize our systems.”

In an artillery duel, the US doesn’t fight gun against gun. It pits US target acquisition, communications, fire control, guns and ammunition (as well as soldiers, doctrine, and training) against the foe. And no other nation has shown the talent for tying together these elements to effectively produce a whole far greater than the sum of their parts. I’ve used artillery here as an example, but the general rule applies across the entire armed forces. The challenge is to continue to understand that technology is a tool that enables this synchronization, and not a substitute for it.

*Marine rifle squads have thirteen members. Basically, they add an extra fire team to each squad.

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Filed under Afghanistan, army, ARMY TRAINING, Artillery, infantry, war

Tagged as Afghanistan, army, Fort Benning, infantry, rifle squad, Squad, United States

by ultimaratioregis | May 11, 2013 · 8:25 am

Battle for Berlin, 1945

This week marks VE Day, commemorating the Victory in Europe over Hitler’s Third Reich. The last and perhaps the most savage battle was for the German capital of Berlin. This from the Battlefield series, which was aired weekly on Far East Network (“Forced Entertainment Network”) when I had an artillery battery in Okinawa in 1996. The entire series is superb, and if you look, you can find most of them on line. They are also available on DVD. They contain a pretty good description of the higher tactical through the strategic picture, and have enough detail and technical stuff, but not too much.

Since the series was made, Russian archives have been explored more completely, and the number of Soviet casualties have been scaled up more than two-fold, from the 305,000 quoted in this episode, to nearly 700,000. Note the ever-present use of artillery and mortars, rockets, and field guns, even in an urban environment. The episode is 116 minutes, roughly the time one spends clicking on all of Mav’s aviation links and cool pictures and videos and stuff. So get your Eastern Front geek on, and watch it. You know you wanna.

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Filed under 120mm, Air Force, armor, army, Around the web, Artillery, guns, history, infantry, planes, Splodey, Uncategorized, veterans, war

by ultimaratioregis | April 25, 2013 · 5:14 pm

Bringing the Raiders Home from Makin

The events of this video occurred in 1999-2000. I remember the story then, but I did not know the most amazing part of the story. That the Butaritari people of that island had buried the Marine dead, had given them a warriors’ burial, is astounding and incredibly moving.

The August 1942 Makin Raid by Carlson’s 2nd Raider Bn killed a large number of Japanese on the island, but the raid was not really a success. as no prisoners were taken, and no Japanese forces diverted from the Solomons to the Gilberts. Nonetheless, the Butaritari people honored the sacrifice of those Marines, and protected their slain comrades from the hated Japanese until they were liberated in November of 1943.

(Among those on the Makin Raid was 2nd Lt Oscar Peatross, who would win a Navy Cross there. I had the honor of meeting him when I was stationed at Parris Island in the early 90s.)

Don’t be surprised to get dust in your eye while watching the video. Nineteen brave young Marines, honored by the people they died to free, and again by those they died to keep free. Semper Fidelis.

H/T to Dennis

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by ultimaratioregis | April 15, 2013 · 11:40 am

Political Officers of the People’s Defense Commissariat

Over on the Front Porch, the ever-thoughtful Commander Salamander has some very good thoughts on an initiative by which commanders and General/Flag Officers would be subject to evaluation above and beyond what should be the considered judgment of their reporting seniors and reviewing officers. Salamander calls it “Outsourcing Leadership”, and so it is. He makes good arguments as to why such a thing should be anathema to anyone who considers him/herself worthy of high command.

While I agree with everything Sal says, I do believe very strongly that the implications are far more destructive than he points out. What this new “review” is setting the conditions for is nothing less than an evaluation of Officers in the US Armed Forces for their political and social reliability. We have had a long tradition of political non-alignment among especially our senior commanders, but also among Officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, which has largely protected us from the scourge of a military that is a social force that has its say in national politics. No Kurt Schleicher or Francisco Franco here. Our military leaders who have held office have been retired from the Armed Forces before doing so. Any test of political and social reliability was in the obverse, in that propriety was maintained by refraining from expressing personal opinions or political views in uniform, especially as a part of official duties of office.

The landscape changed dramatically in 2009, when CJCS Admiral Mike Mullen indulged in telling Congress and the American people, unsolicited, his personally-held views on repeal of DADT and open service for homosexuals in America’s military. At the time I warned of the damage of that unprofessional, arrogant, and selfish act. Soon, Mullen informed our service men and women that, unless they held the same personal beliefs he did, they were not fit to serve, and should “vote with their feet”. We were on our way down the well-greased slope.

This Administration, many of whose principles have openly and loudly expressed their disdain for our military (Hillary Clinton conspicuously among them), has spared no effort to co-opt military leadership into conforming to a political stance. Even when Stanley McChrystal was justifiably relieved, he blithely informed the American public that he had indeed personally voted for Obama, and such a revelation garnered scant attention. One has to imagine that, had he mentioned he had voted for John McCain, the howls of the Administration and its complicit “free press” would have been deafening. Rightly. But because McChrystal voted “correctly”, not a peep of of objection was heard.

The push to allow Commanding Generals to order confiscation of lawfully-owned firearms from service members in private residences has far less to do with any kind of prevention, and much more to do with General Officers falling in behind a gun control agenda that anyone in DoD is willing to admit. Violation of due process and Constitutional liberties of those who defend our freedom is scant cost for active advocating of a Leftist crusade.

In the midst of escalation of rhetoric and sabre-rattling of a nuclear North Korea and a China bullying our allies over two sets of disputed islands, the Commander of the Seventh Fleet informs us that he believes the biggest security threat in his assigned Area of Operations is…. global warming. Someone in Locklear’s position who says something so patently absurd and politically pandering should be relieved forthwith as someone who lacks the judgment and/or integrity to lead. If he doesn’t believe his own words, he is disingenuous and untrustworthy. If he does, he is an imbecile. In either event, he does not belong where he is. But, of course, he remains. He toes the line of political agenda.

Navy Secretary Ray Mabus, a political appointee, volunteers the US Navy to be a beta-tester of biofuels, at enormous expense, not least of which is the up-front cost of the fuel itself, but as yet undetermined is the cost of the damage that the corrosion and water will do to extremely expensive systems in ships and aircraft in the medium-long term. While Mabus doesn’t wear a uniform, I would speculate that nobody who does raised a single objection to SECNAV in any way, or told him how inappropriate such measures were, that it amounted to incestuous political pandering at the expense of readiness and warfighting. Not one.

When outgoing Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta fired his parting political broadside and removed the exclusion of putting women in combat arms units (the issue is NOT women in combat, and anyone honestly evaluating the situation knows that), there were loud promises from every corner that standards would not be lowered. Until CJCS General Dempsey quickly said that the would be, to accommodate making women successfully pass the training requirements.

To anyone who watches what is said and not said, all these occurrences are signposts that point in the direction of travel. This “review process” is another waypoint on that journey of the destruction of the fiber of our Armed Forces and its leadership. That same CJCS, General Marty Dempsey, is now mandating that the review program will include inspections.

The inspections will not be punitive, but will provide a “periodic opportunity for general officers and flag officers to understand whether, from an institutional perspective, we think they are inside or outside the white lines,” he said. In addition, new programs will be instituted to ensure that a commander’s staff, and a spouse, are fully aware of military regulations.

This is the Marty Dempsey who violated his oath to our Constitution on two occasions, actively criticizing the legal free expression of private citizens in direct violation of that Constitution he is sworn to support and defend against all enemies. In the Benghazi incident, Dempsey’s admonitions amounted to a deliberate falsehood, a lie, to perpetuate the lies told us by our State Department (and Hillary Clinton) that the attack on the embassy was a spontaneous one stemming from a demonstration regarding an online anti-Muslim video, when both he and SecState knew good and well their words were false. He readily and easily forfeited his integrity for his bosses. Are we now expected to believe that those “white lines” reflect the traditional role of the non-political military officer? The traditional tenets of leadership, technical and tactical proficiency, integrity, judgment, courage, decisiveness, and the others, will be pre-empted and eventually superceded by assurance of political reliability and the “correct” beliefs regarding social and political issues, and a willingness to set aside one’s honor at the behest of military and political seniors.

Why ever would we expect any different? Men (and women) in uniform who behave as political sycophants should not be trusted to lead. Certainly, Martin Dempsey has proven on several occasions not to be worthy of my trust, nor yours. Except to use these new standards of performance as a tool to remake the senior officers of our military in his image, that of a pliant servant of political masters, whose oath to the Constitution is a mere gesture. Those who conform to that mold will not be worthy of our trust, either. When the choice is between obedience to our Constitution or obedience to political bosses, why, it won’t be a choice at all.

Alles klar, Herr Kommisar?

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by xbradtc | April 6, 2013 · 3:50 am

The Care and Feeding of Co-authors.

Normally, I like to make fun of Marines. And I like to make fun of
Artillerymen. I especially like making fun of Marine Artillerymen.

But if I pick on URR too much, he pouts and doesn’t post much. Which means, I would have to, and what’s the point of having co-authors, but to pick up my slack?

And Roamy, bless her, likes some splodey/shooty. It’s not like I pay them for content, so once in a while, I have to be nice to URR and Roamy. Here, I’mma kill two birds with one stone.

The Marines will never have anything approaching the numbers of guns Army artillery has. Yes, in Iraq and Afghanistan, the need for tube artillery has been fairly sparse. But in a near-peer conflict, a war of maneuver, artillery will be as key as it always has been. One of the linchpins of a strategy of maneuver is denying that very maneuver to your enemy. And artillery fire is a key component of that. The old definition of maneuver was “fire and movement” and artillery provides the “fire” while infantry/armor provides the movement.

It’s not so much that the Marines are dim and not smart enough to buy a lot of artillery. They are. But they face two important constraints on the amount of artillery they can field. First, all their artillery pretty much has to be air transportable by helicopter. And given the very limited number of CH-53E’s available, if at all possible, they want systems that can be lifted by the smaller, more numerous MV-22B. Second, the Marines are an amphibious force, which means they have to travel on the amphibious shipping provided to them by the Navy. As big as those ships are, there aren’t a lot of them, and further, there is a fixed, finite space available for equipment. Finding a balance between tanks, artillery, amphibious assault vehicles, logistical trucks, Humvees and all the other stuff a Marine Expeditionary Unit needs to take along is one of the headaches Marine planners face on a regular basis. So finding an artillery system that uses less space, and weighs less and, in a perfect world, takes a smaller crew, is a key priority. So the Marines are buying the EFSS 120mm mortar system, in lieu of the traditional 105mm gun howitzer.

In the Army, all mortars, even the 120mm, are Infantry weapons, organic to Infantry and Armor/Cav organizations. But for the Marines, if you’re going to use a mortar as your primary direct support system, having the artillery man it makes sense.

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Filed under 120mm, Artillery, infantry, marines, navy

Tagged as artillery, Marine, Marine Expeditionary Unit, United States Marine Corps

by ultimaratioregis | April 4, 2013 · 5:30 am

Blogs. Why We Write ‘Em, Why We Read ‘Em.

Those of us in this somewhat focused community of MilBlog writers and readers are often asked by people who haven’t any exposure to MilBlogs, “Why do you do it? You put in a lot of time and work. What’s the point?”

It’s a fair question. Thinking of ideas, and putting together a cogent discussion starter, or historical summary, takes more time than people think. Knowing that, and being somewhat of an analysis geek (which may turn out to be a very good thing soon), I have my list of half a dozen daily reads, at least. This’n here. Salamander’s Front Porch. Ray’s Information Dissemination. OP-FOR, The Castle, and a number of other places make the list, blended with traditional news sources domestic and foreign, plus policy and analysis outfits.

Why? Well, my gracious host here gives me an outlet for expression. Like anyone with a fair-sized ego, I believe just a little bit that everyone is entitled to my opinion. But there is also the great opportunity for feedback. To hear from a mostly very educated crowd, their opinions and takes on events and occurrences domestically and in foreign affairs. But it extends into culture, literary works, certainly history, and other aspects that spark discussion.

But one of the most valuable reasons to read and write in the Military Blogosphere is to hear from people who are truly experts in their fields, who possess great wisdom, are extensively experienced, and are considered and well-spoken people. I do miss terribly reading the thoughts and musings of Lex, which was a morning staple and often provided several day-long trains of thought. And this is true of not just Bloggers, but commenters. Byron, the ugly old shipfitter, could wax authoritative about steel, and aluminum, and hull flex, and do it in a way that, perhaps over beer, I am sure I could listen intently to for hours. Grandpa Bluewater’s urbane sophistication and eloquent dissertation always is worth the consideration, whether one agrees or not. And there are others who add insight and humor, and are enjoyable to read.

Another such commenter is Steeljaw Scribe, shepherd of a superb blog of his own. I did something the last two days that I rarely do, which is to go back and re-read a comment he made in Salamander’s post of the IG investigation of Admiral Gaouette. His explanation of the dynamics of the bridge of a CVN, and the personalities and cultures that must blend and not clash if the mission is to be accomplished.

The bridge of a CVN is a unique environment that brings together two communities that normally opt to keep their distances from one another – SWOs and Aviators. That the three senior officers that regularly spend time up there (CO, XO and Navigator) are also aviators can at times, exacerbate that standoffish environment. This clash of cultures evolves from one group that is brought up in a dynamic environment and is used to rapidly changing events, making intuitive decisions and being cognizant that their butt and that of the x-number of NFOs or aircrew with them will suffer the consequences of those decisions. SWOs that typically (and note I said *typically* – there are always exceptions) come to the carrier do not come from the CRUDES environment, but from amphibs and auxiliaries and tend to be methodical if somewhat conservative and deliberative in their decision-making and watchstanding. At least that was my experience as a CVN nav. My challenge was working across that divide – to show the aviators (from watchstanders up to the XO who would go on to his first deep draft after this tour) on the one hand, how a series of events can unfold where little things not readily apparent to the eyeball can bite you (case history of the Eisenhower hitting the Spanish freighter at anchor in Hampton Roads being one of my teaching points). The flip side of that was getting the SWOs to be more anticipatory (e.g., looking to the next 2x cycles for managing sea space for downwind repositioning) as well as coming to grips with the immediacy of fixed wing operations at sea.

I know of no other vehicle by which an audience can learn, and share the insights of men and women with such experience. It is the gaining of understanding, at the end of the day, that makes all this effort worthwhile. Brad’s rules here do not include “write only what I agree with” or “water it down so it couldn’t possibly offend”. He trusts us to understand and abide by propriety, and we seem to, as do the commenters, on the whole. And that is appreciated.

So in the end, despite the trolls, and my own alarming tendency to follow links and wind up pissing away two hours looking at cool stuff, reading and writing is worth the effort. Even if the pay isn’t great.

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Filed under Air Force, army, Around the web, Artillery, guns, history, infantry, iraq, marines, navy, Personal, SIR!, Uncategorized, veterans

by ultimaratioregis | April 1, 2013 · 9:08 am

1 April 1945: Love Day

Today is the 68th anniversary of L-Day, known as “Love Day” to the half a million Allied soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines whose mission was the conquest of the island of Okinawa. An armada of 1,300 ships included 40 CVs, CVLs, and CVEs, and close to 400 amphibious vessels carrying 187,000 troops, thousands of trucks, artillery tubes, mortars, tanks, amtraks, and many thousands of tons of ammunition and all classes of supply to sustain the landing force of the XXIV Corps and the Marine III Amphibious Corps in the fighting ashore.

The Japanese, to the surprise and immense relief of the invasion force, barely contested the beaches. Almost every unit came ashore without opposition, as the first night saw more than 60,000 ashore. The Japanese 32nd Army’s 100,000 defenders and the locally recruited militia of Okinawan men would instead meet their American enemy inland, in expertly-prepared and defended positions on key terrain. But all of that, the massive kikusui of the kamikaze aircraft, the drenching rains that turned the island into a reprise of the horrors of the Western Front in the Great War, the savage fighting for Naha and the Shuri line, the Half-Moon, Sugar Loaf, the sacrifice of the Yamato battle squadron in Operation Ten-Gō, the massed suicides of civilians, was yet to come. On this day, casualties were negligible, and a lodgment established. The question became not if, but when, Okinawa would fall.

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by ultimaratioregis | March 26, 2013 · 5:53 am

At Long Last, a Supreme Commander

Ninety-five years ago, on 26 March 1918, at a conference in Doullens, the Allies, the French, British, and now the Americans, finally agree to appoint an Allied Supreme Commander for the Western Front. For three and a half years, neither the British nor the French were willing to countenance placing their forces under command of a General from the other respective nation for any but the most local and temporary situations. Differences in philosophy, national pride, individual ego, and centuries-old mutual distrust (exacerbated by the very lack of coordination such a situation made inevitable) created an environment where the alliance became, at times, highly contentious and all but hostile. The result was most often a stunning lack of coordination of effort and vision that played into the hands of the Imperial German commanders, allowing them to defeat in detail discordant Allied offensive efforts that might have otherwise seriously pressed the Germans.

The Great War on the Western Front is a grim and maddening exposition of military incompetence with the most tragic of consequences. There are myriad reasons for this seemingly endless phantasm which wasted an entire generation. Elderly, ossified commanders who had neither the energy or mental flexibility to wage modern war. Weapons technology that rendered a generation of tactics (and tacticians) dangerously obsolete.

To these shortcomings and failures must be added the lack of a single overall commander to coordinate strategy, impart mediation, and provide the vision for fighting the armies of the Western Front. Unity of Command, one of the nine principles of war, did not come until very late in the day, and that under extreme and compelling conditions as the German Spring Offensive threatened to break the British 5th Army and capture Paris.

So it would be Ferdinand Foch, erstwhile Chief of Staff for Marshall Petain, who would finally, at long last, command in the West.

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by ultimaratioregis | March 19, 2013 · 7:51 am

General Barry McCaffrey: Lauds “Marines’ Aversion to BS” On Women in Infantry

Time Magazine (of all places) carries General McCaffrey’s missive. Well worth the read (which contains a link to Marine General Newbold’s superb “Seven Myths about ‘Women in Combat’”).

The argument for women at rifle battalion team level is unsound. Makes as much sense as mandating women on all-male professional contact sports teams.

Life in a rifle company is still incredibly brutal, filthy, requires enormous physical energy and upper body strength, and calls for a spirit of personal violence. There is zero personal privacy. Bodily functions take place in close proximity.

Troops are constantly injured from carrying heavy loads and crashing down hills in the dark. They dig like moles to stay alive.

Infantry units live like wild animals during periods of extended combat. Mostly it is a business of self-selected young men. Most of these combat soldiers end up in these units because they actually want to fight.

One might think there would be some additional recognition of such opinions expressed by long-time practitioners of the craft of ground combat. But alas. Objective analysis gives way to activism and some other “isms” all too often.

As General Newbold rightly asserts:

Pity the truthful leader who attempts to hold to standards based on realistic combat factors, and tells truth to power. Most won’t, and the others won’t survive.

(H/T to Battleland)

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by ultimaratioregis | March 14, 2013 · 12:58 pm

General Dunford: Karzai “may… issue orders that put our forces at risk”

NBC News carries the story of the leaked memo.

General Joe Dunford is as fine a combat leader as the Marine Corps has produced, and that includes Mattis and Conway. While it is unfortunate that the confidential memo was leaked, it is heartening to know that General Dunford has a realistic assessment of the situation, is aware of the corrupt unreliability of our Afghan “allies”, and has the lives of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines in his command at the fore.

Karzai’s threat to “seize Bagram” is such an instance of putting US servicemen at risk. Should he order that, I would hope we would have the guts to kill the attackers in massive numbers, and then put a round in Karzai’s head. And then leave, with a note on the door that reminds them that the half-life of Plutonium 239 is 24,000 years.

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by ultimaratioregis | · 9:47 am

14 March 1943; Kharkov Miracle

Today is the 70^th anniversary of the accomplishment of one of the most impressive feats of arms in the history of warfare. On the heels of a disastrous defeat in the Ukraine, German General Erich Manstein’s counterstroke against the Red Army regained the tactical initiative just two weeks after the situation, and perhaps the war itself, seemed irretrievably lost. On 14 March 1943, I SS Panzerkorps recaptured Kharkov after a savage fight. For those who had endured the loss of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad, it seemed a miracle.

Historical examination of the Eastern Front tends to identify the catastrophe at Stalingrad as the beginning of the end of the Wehrmacht in the East. Certainly, with the loss of more than 300,000 men, including 92,000 prisoners, and the virtual annihilation of the Italian, Hungarian, and Rumanian forces north and south of Stalingrad on the Volga, Stalingrad was an unmitigated disaster. And worse looked likely, as the forces of Vatutin’s (Southwest) and Golikov’s (Voronesh) Fronts pushed south down the Don River basin aimed at Rostov. The loss of Rostov would effectively pin the remaining German forces (Army Group A and the remnants of Army Group B) against the Sea of Azov and the Dniepr bend, almost guaranteeing their destruction.

But in their efforts to destroy the German forces deep inside Soviet territory, Vatutin’s Sixth Army and First Guards’ Army (along with Mobile Group Popov), and Golikov’s Sixty-Ninth and Third Tank Armies became badly overextended. In addition, Soviet intelligence on German force disposition was almost non-existent. When most of the Wehrmacht forces slipped out of the bottleneck through Rostov, and Hausser’s I SS Panzerkorps abandoned Kharkov (counter to orders, on 15 February 1943), what seemed like another major Soviet victory was actually a precursor to near-disaster.

On 18 February 1943, Manstein’s reconstituted Army Group South received permission for a counterstroke. Led by 4^th Panzerarmee (XLVIII Panzerkorps and I SS Panzerkorps), Army Group South struck on 19 February, and the poorly-disposed Soviet forces were thrown into panic. When on 20 February 1^st Panzerarmee and XL Panzerkorps began the destruction of Mobile Group Popov, a full-fledge disaster was in the making for the Soviets.

The counterstroke was a microcosm of the entire war in the East. In open country, the German Army proved still infinitely superior to its Soviet opponent, even when significantly outnumbered. (Indeed, Manstein’s Army Group South was on the small end of a 1:1.2 force ratio when he launched his counterstroke.) But in the defense, particularly within the built-up city of Kharkov, the Russian soldier’s toughness and determination made the fighting there a bloody affair. Of 30,000 German casualties in this counterstroke, almost 12,000 were in the fight for Kharkov.

Nevertheless, Manstein accomplished a seemingly impossible victory, pushing the Red Army virtually back to their starting points before the attacks to encircle Army Group South. It was a pattern that the Soviet Stavka would become all too familiar with. The Wehrmacht retained until the last days of the war the capability to counterattack and retrieve what seemed to be hopelessly lost situations, while inflicting heavy losses. In the weeks between 19 February and 15 March, Soviet casualties were enormous, with the loss of more than 100,000 men (including about 40,000 prisoners), some 1,100 tanks, and 3,000 guns. Much of Vatutin’s and Gorlikov’s armies were shredded, and would not be combat effective again for several months.

To both the Germans and the Soviets, Manstein’s counteroffensive must have seemed like old times. But, of course, they weren’t. The Wehrmacht in the East, while still powerful and dangerous, was not the same as it had been in 1941 or even 1942. And neither was the Red Army.

The squandering of the last significant German armored reserves against the Soviet defenses in the Kursk Salient in July of 1943 was followed by a devastating counteroffensive from Red Army forces staged to strike once the German Ninth Army and 4^th Panzer Army had run out of steam at Kursk. This counteroffensive was not the costly, awkward affair that had been evident in the wake of Stalingrad. This was to be the model of the Soviet way of war until Berlin fell in 1945, and indeed, was the blueprint for Warsaw Pact tactics until the 1990s. Massed artillery, attack aircraft, and highly mobile and powerful mechanized and tank formations would turn the Blitzkrieg tables on the inventors of the art. Kharkov fell to the Soviets for good in August of 1943, and Army Group South would never again have any except very local initiative as it was pushed back inexorably toward the borders of the Reich.

But all that was yet to come, for on this date in 1943, impossible as it seemed, the Wehrmacht had regained the initiative, and had stopped, then routed, a massive Soviet offensive just six weeks after the surrender at Stalingrad.

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by ultimaratioregis | March 3, 2013 · 12:59 pm

Counterinsurgency Words of Wisdom from Pete Ellis***

There is a saying among historians that the best place to find a new idea is in an old book. Time and again over the years, I have cracked open long-forgotten volumes to find gems of timeless and timely wisdom, astute commentary, and unimpeachable good sense. Contained on those yellowed pages are answers to problems and challenges not at all different from contemporary times, and appreciations of conditions and factors that are surprising for their sophistication and insight.

In the March 1921 edition of The Marine Corps Gazette, then-Major Earl H. “Pete” Ellis penned an article entitled “Bush Brigades”, which dealt with the deployment of US Marine forces into areas in the Western Hemisphere in which instability and violence threatened US interests and the safety of the native populace. These interventions, known collectively as the “Banana Wars”, were the basis for the seminal 1940 Small Wars Manual. Interestingly, nearly two decades before SWM was published, Major Ellis struck upon a number of maxims that fairly leap off the page, and would have been excellent counsel for US commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan.

At the minimum, Ellis’s words would have permitted today’s Officers and NCOs (and politicians!) to understand that the challenges and issues faced in the decade-long counter-insurgency fights were not new or unprecedented, but rather something with which US military thinkers had had to wrestle and solve for a significant portion of the previous century. And in those words and the words of others might have been lessons and cautions that aided in success on the battlefield and in the newspapers.

The mercurial Major Ellis expounded upon a number of topics from large to small, that military thinkers would find highly relevant today. I will attempt to do justice to the more salient of those topics below:

The character of enemy operations:

a)      A somewhat disorganized attempt to prevent landings.

b)      More or less resistance in cities followed by a race to the jungle.

c)       The organization and operation of armed bands, at first risking open battle and finally waging guerilla warfare.

d)      The operation of outlaw bands (bandits, ladrones, cacos) who murder members of the forces of occupation and their own people indiscriminately.

In general, enemy operations will be those of irregular forces or guerilla bands with the usual series of surprise raids, ambushes, and assassinations. The enemy will have moral support from most of his own people, material support from many, and will operate in their midst.

Replace “landings” in a) with “invasion”, and “jungle” in b) with “desert”, and you have a pretty accurate description of the course of things in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The role of the press/media and the “peculiar attitude of the American people themselves”:

The Marines are down in Jungleland!- and killed a man in a war!

And the oft-forgotten fact that

…the Marines are only doing their job as ordered by the people of the United States.

The usefulness of cash payoffs to the locals:

…it must be emphatically stated that a flying column should never be sent into the bush unless amply provided with CASH. With it can be purchased knowledge of the terrain and movement of the enemy, and food. It is safe to say that at least 50 percent of the so-called harsh measures used in bush warfare could be eliminated by providing troops with adequate information money.

Considerations in the location of a fortified post:

The site of the post should have, if possible, the following characteristics:

a)      Be capable of defense by a small detachment.

b)      Be of sufficient extent to permit the bivouac of … one hundred men, with mounted detachment.

c)       Permit control of any town in the vicinity and all approaches, especially roads and ravines.

d)      Have sufficient elevation to generally observe the surrounding country.

e) Permit control of a landing field for aeroplanes.

The main requirement for a fortified post, garrisoned as it will be by only a few men, is that it cannot be rushed.

The above would have been a helpful guide to the Officers who decided to emplace COP ~~Kahler~~ Keating in Wanat.

What is now termed “Lawfare”:

To enforce one’s will upon an enemy of the nature depicted without subjecting one’s self to undue criticism is one of the most difficult tasks that can confront a soldier. The “Rules of Land Warfare” lay down certain rules which are to be followed, subject to military necessity during hostilities between regular forces of civilized nations. The “Rules of Land Warfare” for the guidance of regular forces engaged in hostilities with irregular or guerilla forces have never been written; and it is doubtful if they ever will be written…

“Phase Four” operations and “Information Dominance”:

It is the final phase which is difficult because, owing to the policy pursued, the following conditions will prevail to a greater or lesser extent:

a)      Bands of murderers and other criminals base in thick, difficult country, and prey indiscriminately on the peaceful people in the production areas.

b)      These bandits have no property other than that which they carry with them or keep in hiding.

c)       Many bandits, having been captured and turned over to proper authority, have been permitted to escape and have rejoined their bands.

d)      The inhabitants of localities frequented by bandits keep them informed of the movement of the force of occupation

e)      The forces of occupation are at a minimum.

Major Ellis’ article was never officially published by the Marine Corps (the Gazette is as then an MCA publication), but nonetheless provides context and narrative which our current generation of Officers and NCOs would find startlingly familiar a century hence. As it would be to Napoleon’s veterans of the Peninsula War a century previous.

Most famous for his prescient divination of the character and requirements of the Pacific War yet to come, Ellis was no stranger to the counterinsurgency efforts of the Marine Corps in the early 20th Century, nor was he unversed in conventional war. He had been plucked from Quantico by General Lejeune and was a key planner for the successful Meuse-Argonne Offensive in France in 1918. Ponder.

*** Milblog writer/reader/commentor “Moe DeLaun” was most gracious in his gift to me of the March 1921 Marine Corps Gazette (along with a wonderful collection of Kipling by Somerset Maugham and the DVD of The Man Who Would Be King!) There is much more in that March of 1921 edition that I will be sharing and commenting on over the next several months, including articles on Russia, American Marines in Nicaragua, and the Aisne-Marne Offensive of the late war. THANKS MOE!

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Filed under Afghanistan, armor, army, Artillery, guns, history, infantry, iraq, marines, navy, planes, Uncategorized, war

by xbradtc | March 2, 2013 · 9:47 am

Chinook

(Repost from 2009)

We’ve covered helicopters here before, such as the Huey, the Blackhawk, the OH-58 Kiowa and of course, Cobra and Apache gunships. Let’s talk about the big boy on the block. The Chinook. Or as it became known almost instantly in the Army, the Shithook. The CH-47 is the Army’s largest helicopter, used to transport critical logistical items, troops and artillery around the battlefield.

The Chinook has been around for a long time. It’s first flight was in 1961. But the issues surrounding its development deserve a little attention. In the late 1950s, the Army and helicopter designers began to realize that piston engines would never become a very efficient way of powering helicopters. Gas turbines (jet engines that provided power through a driveshaft, rather than thrust) were finally becoming a practical option for military use. With the advent of these new engines, the Army took a long look at what the next generation of helicopters should look like. Just how big should they be? At the same time, the concept of “air assault” or landing troops directly on the battlefied started to form. What was the best way to move troop unit? Should you use a smaller helicopter that could lift a squad? Or would the better bet be to use somewhat larger helicopters that could lift 15-20 men? Smaller helicopters would cost more in the long run, but losing one helicopter in the assault wouldn’t result in as many casualties. The Army first decided to go with the larger helicopter, of about 20 men. The Vertol Company (later bought by Boeing) provided the Model 107. But the debate in the Army over helicopter size raged on. Some thought that the new UH-1B Huey could be scaled up to carry a full squad. That would handle most air assualt requirements, and still have a relatively cheap helicopter. The Model 107 would be larger than was needed. The other half of the problem was moving artillery and supplies. The Model 107 was just a bit too small for that job. The ideal was to move a 105mm howitzer, its crew, and a load of ammunition all in one lift by one helicopter. Boeing went back to the drawing board. The Model 114 was the result, and was soon bought by the Army as the CH-47 Chinook. And it wasn’t very long before the Chinook found itself in Vietnam, as part of the airmobile 1st Cavalry Division. With Hueys to conduct the initial assualt, and Chinooks bringing in the follow-on elements and moving artillery, the Army’s pattern of air assault missions was set so soundly that it is relatively unchanged 40-odd years later.

But don’t feel bad for the Model 107. Even though it wasn’t selected by the Army, its development continued. Largely because the Marines didn’t have a lot of space on the Navy’s helicopter carriers, they were forced to go with a somewhat larger helicopter. And the Model 107 fit the bill perfectly. They bought it as the CH-46 and operate it to this day.

Early Chinooks had engines of about 2,200 horsepower each. This was very quickly upgraded to about 2,600hp each. And improvements didn’t stop there. The rotor blades, rear pylon design, and transmission were all upgraded through the A, B, and C models to improve performance. In the 1980s, the design was again refreshed, with attention focusing again on more horsepower, but also greatly improved avionics and better reliability, resulting in the CH-47D. Many “D” models were conversions from older models, but there were also quite a few new built airframes. These were delivered up until 2002. And right about the time the last “D” model was delivered, the work on the latest model moved into high gear.

The newest model, the CH-47F is really an old model. While there will be some newbuild airframes, most will be remanufactured CH-47Ds. And since most of the “D” models were remanufactured earlier models, there will be some airframes well over 30 years old that will be expected to soldier on for another 20. Because of this, a large part of the program will be rebuilding them to make them easier to maintain, reducing vibration, making sure the components don’t have any fatigue issues, and making any issues easier to detect. Improvements in the avionics will include updating the instruments to the latest common “glass cockpit” standard, as well as building in the cabapility of operating in the Force XXI digital environment, which is the Army’s version of a battlefield internet. Not surprisingly, the Army is going with more powerful engines as well. The latest version of the Chinook engines put out almost 4,900 hp each. The Chinook has gone from a useful load of 7,000 pounds in its early days, to over 21,000 pounds in the “F” modeland the new models are faster. Think about that. How many of us are faster and stronger now that we’re over 40?

By now, you ought to have figured out that the ‘hook is a pretty capable helicopter. Lots of other folks have reached that conclusion as well. Very few other nations have the same air assault capability that we do, but having a few heavy lift helicopters around is handy for them as well. Several other nations, notable Great Britain, the Dutch, and the Japanese have bought various versions of the Chinook. When Great Britain attacked to recapture the Falklands in 1982, they lost several Chinooks aboard the Atlantic Conveyor. Their one remaining Chinook was put to work, doing the job of several helicopters. In one instance, instead of carrying its normal load of 55 troops, the sole Chinook lifted 105 fully loaded troops. There are several tales of Chinooks in the Vietnam war carrying over 100 people (though usually lightly loaded Vietnamese civilians). I’ve been in a Chinook with about 40 other people- I can’t imagine just how crowded it was with over 100.

It wouldn’t be much of a stretch to say that without the Chinook, the Army in Afghanistan would be crippled. Many of the smaller outposts can only be reached by helicopter. Given the high elevations and hot weather there, Blackhawks, normally very capable birds, struggle to carry a useful load. The Chinook, with its greater power, is able to support these high/hot outposts.

With the new “F’ models just beginning to come into service, we can expect this long serving veteran to serve for as much as 30 more years.

Mind you, we’ve scrimped on discussing the gunship version, or the several special operations versions. But here’s a last look at the bird for you.

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Filed under Afghanistan, army, ARMY TRAINING, infantry, iraq

Tagged as Afghanistan, army, army life, ARMY TRAINING, artillery, ch-47, chinook, guns, infantry, iraq, war

by ultimaratioregis | February 28, 2013 · 9:22 am

Army PFC Roosevelt Clark Laid to Rest after 62 Years

The Bakersfield Californian tells the tale.

“My aunt and uncle are up in heaven, ecstatic that their son is home now,” said Leticia Maiden Carter, Clark’s cousin. “It’s a blessing from God.”

PFC Clark died when his company of the 35th Infantry was overrun by Chinese Communist Forces near Unsan in November of 1950. His remains were identified in December, 2012. Now, he is home and has been laid to rest with the honors befitting an American hero. Most importantly, his family has closure, upon which no price can be placed.

You were not forgotten, and now your sacrifice can again inspire.

Hand Salute.

Ready TWO!

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Filed under army, Around the web, history, infantry, veterans, war

by ultimaratioregis | February 25, 2013 · 9:24 am

Fort Douaumont

Ninety-seven years ago today, on 25 February, 1916, a company-sized patrol of the 24^th Brandenbergers of the German 6^th Infantry Division captured Fort Douaumont, the strongest of the Verdun forts. Fort Douaumont sat atop the dominant high ground in the sector of the Western Front that German Chief of Staff Falkenhayn had chosen for an offensive which he rightly anticipated the French to respond to aggressively. Just four days into the German offensive, the most important objective had been secured. The French would endure an especially ghastly kind of hell in retaking it.

Verdun carried great national significance for the French, being the last of the fortifications to hold out in 1871, and had been reinforced throughout the late 19^th and early 20^th centuries. But with the destruction of the Belgian forts in 1914 by the German 42cm super-heavy gun-mortars, it was estimated by the French High Command that the Verdun forts were vulnerable to such bombardment. The decision was made to strip these fortifications of most of their defensive cannon and a large number of machine guns, which were distributed in support of the French sectors elsewhere on the Western Front.

So when the Verdun offensive began on 21 February 1916, the fortifications there were skeletons of their true capabilities, and the initial German push by Kronprinz Wilhelm’s Fifth Army captured some 25 square miles, including Fort Douaumont, in the initial four days.

Falkenhayn knew the French would fight for Verdun, and justified his offensive in these terms:

“Our precise problem is how to inflict heavy damage on the enemy at critical points at relatively small cost to ourselves. But we must not overlook the fact that previous experience of mass attacks in this war offers little inducement to imitate them.”

He would induce the French Army into the killing fields, and “bleed them white”.

The study of the First World War, especially examination of the Western Front, is for me a most difficult task. The quest to understand what the Great War did physically and emotionally to Western civilization has been a lifelong one. As a student of military history (which I do fancy myself), the conduct of the war on the Western Front by the respective high commands fills me with a seething anger and revulsion.

Especially at Verdun, one of the two great bloodbaths of that most terrible year of 1916 (the other being Picardy and the Somme madness under Haig), those whose duty it was to provide a tactical and operational purpose to the expenditure of lives abjectly failed to do so. Falkenhayn, with his ill-considered plan whose cost was supposed to be “relatively small”, and the criminal stupidity of Joffre, and Nivelle, who replaced the much more sensible Petain, and the arrogant and stubborn Mangin (nicknamed “the Butcher” by his men), all played their respective and reprehensible parts in the appalling losses at Verdun.

Douaumont was not recaptured again until October, and the line not restored entirely until December 1916, by which time Falkenhayn had been replaced by Hindenburg, and Joffre by Robert Nivelle. The latter was an exceedingly unfortunate choice. The French High Command’s indifference to the terrible conditions and calamitous casualties at Verdun was a direct cause of the mutinies in the French Armies in May of 1917, when Nivelle’s disastrous offensives (enthusiastically supported by Mangin) spent the remainder of the flower of French youth against the teeth of German defenses.

When the fighting in the Verdun sector petered out in late 1916, more than 300,000 French Poilus lay dead, and an equal number had been wounded. German casualties totaled almost 450,000, of which almost 200,000 had been killed. More than a million men, including half a million dead, for 75 square miles of shell-pocked wasteland, an area not much larger than the City of Boston. The effects of the slaughter on the psyche of Western Democracies is still being felt.

I have visited a small number of Great War battlefields, Vimy Ridge and the trench lines in Flanders. Unlike the battlefields of the American Civil War, or World War II, there is little of the palpable feeling of reverence for the skill and heroism which accompanied the feats of arms there. Rather, the overwhelming emotion is one of oppressive sadness and melancholy, much more similar to that which seems to permeate Dachau. Though I have not been to Verdun, I strongly suspect that the young men on both sides whose lives were thrown away there would make it so, as well. The profligate effusion of blood, especially on the part of the Allies, and the French at Verdun, is a crime for which the sentence is still being served.

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Filed under guns, history, infantry, Uncategorized, veterans, war

by ultimaratioregis | February 21, 2013 · 6:52 am

The Drone Medal and The People’s Defense Commissariat

MOTHAX talks about all of it over at The Burn Pit. Worth the read.

It’s been a pretty wild last couple of months for the Pentagon, especially for our outgoing Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta. First he drops the bomb about the women’s combat unit exclusion policy going away. Then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs says that maybe the standard will have to be lowered so we can have more women in those units. Dire predictions flow every day from the puzzle palace about the effect of sequestration on the ability to fight and win wars. Then comes the suggestion that we lower troops pay. But while we’re doing that, we’re also expanding benefits to the spouses of same sex couples, even though that might violate the Defense of Marriage Act. Congress jumps in with hearings about what happened (or more accurately didn’t happen) to on the ground support of the Ambassador in Libya, and why the DOD didn’t have anything in place to help those men out. We may, or may not, be setting up a drone base in western Africa, and the drones may or may not be used to kill Americans who are working with Al Qaeda based on the legal papers that were leaked by the DOJ. And the nomination for Panetta’s replacement, Senator Chuck Hagel, is currently being filibustered. In April 170,000 retirees are being pushed out of Tricare Prime in the western States, and we’re still passing out flyers in Afghanistan discussing how being courteous to the locals will stop them from shooting at us.

Somehow this all added up to it being a good time to anger just about everyone not angered by the preceding by creating a medal for drone pilots that is actually higher up in the hierarchy of medals than things like the Combat Infantryman’s Badge and the Bronze Star….

He adds some excellent commentary from Fehrenbach circa 1950 and the problem with this whole idea of the “changing nature of combat”.

Americans in 1950 rediscovered something that since Hiroshima they had forgotten: you may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life—but if you desire to defend it, protect it and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men in the mud.

I doubt anybody will be awarded the Drone Medal posthumously, unless it is from blood clots due to sitting too long. Like I said, worth the read. And a nice H/T to B5.

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Filed under Afghanistan, Air Force, infantry, iraq, stupid, Uncategorized, war

by xbradtc | February 14, 2013 · 4:48 am

OpFor Vismods

The National Training Center at Ft. Irwin, CA originally had a fairly simple purpose. Units tagged to deploy to Germany in case of a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe would face an incredibly steep learning curve. By putting them through their paces at NTC, that curve could be flattened somewhat. It was very similar to the Air Force’s paradigm of Red Flag operations that would give squadrons their “first 10 wartime missions.”

At the time, one of the more radical concepts of NTC was the use of a full time Opposing Force* to model the size, tactics, and visual representation of a Soviet Motorized Rifle Regiment. Traditionally, units training in the field would face off against a sister unit. Not surprisingly, those units tended to use American tactics. Worse, American units were equipped with American equipment, and distinguishing friend from foe on the battlefield was virtually impossible. One of the goals of NTC might be to sow confusion in the unit being trained, but that was taking it a bit far.

The OpFor at NTC went to great lengths to model themselves as the vanguard of the Evil Empire, going so far as to wear uniforms resembling the Soviets.

But equipping an entire Motorized Rifle Regiment (roughly equivalent to a US mechanized brigade) posed a bit of a challenge. When NTC opened in the late 70s, there wasn’t a lot of surplus Soviet equipment available on the market. What there were plenty of was M551 Sheridan Armored Reconnaissance Vehicles. Less than satisfactory as light armor or recon vehicles, there were plenty of them available to equip the OpFor. Unfortunately, they didn’t look very Russian.

But by adding various plastic, fiberglass and other panels, a Sheridan could be given the rough visual outline of either a Soviet tank or BMP fighting vehicle. Not surprisingly, these visual modifications quickly became known as VISMODS.

M551 Sheridan pretending to be a BMP-1 IFV

M551 masquerading as a T-80 tank

Now, even on the best of days, a Sheridan with with plastic wasn’t a dead ringer for any Soviet vehicle. But that’s kind of beside the point. It was sufficient that it was visually distinctive from American vehicles, and that the US unit under training could distinguish between tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and a few other types. That was important because the type and number of vehicles you see on any given spot on the battlefield can tell you a lot about what the enemy intentions.

And it didn’t really matter if the Sheridan’s weapon systems were very different from the vehicles they were portraying. Since the force on force gunnery at NTC was done via the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES), switching out the control box would allow a Sheridan to replicate virtually any direct fire weapon system, from machine guns, to tank guns to guided missiles.

So the Sheridan served the OpFor well through the 80s and into the 1990s.

But, you say, by the early 1990s, there was a ton of surplus Soviet armored vehicles available for dirt cheap. Why didn’t the Army just use those instead of modified American tracks?

We could have easily brought back enough Soviet (and Chinese) armor from Desert Storm to equip the OpFor with real vehicles. The problem would have been spare parts. As reliable and rugged as Soviet designs were, they still needed a lot of spare parts. Providing a pipeline for those parts, training mechanics to repair new vehicles, and training drivers and crews for them would have been prohibitively expensive.

By the mid 1990s, the Sheridan fleet was getting pretty tired. The supply of spare parts was pretty close to exhausted as well, and keeping the vehicles running was becoming more and more expensive. A replacement was needed, but there wasn’t a huge budget for one.

What the Army needed was a vehicle that was in plentiful supply, with a large, established spares pipeline. Buying new vehicles was out. What was there in the fleet that would be suitable?

The trusty M113 filled the bill. No longer in front line use as an infantry carrier, thousands of them still serve in various support roles. But having been replaced in mechanized infantry battalions left plenty of them to equip the OpFor. But the square squat M113 didn’t look much like any Soviet vehicle.

A quick, relatively low cost program actually rebuilt about 120 M113s by adding some visual panels, but more importantly a power driven turret. Known as the M113 OSV (OpFor Surrogate Vehicle) these tracks form the backbone of the OpFor’s armored vehicle fleet. The basic M113 hull and powerplant were identical to those in service. Most of the components of the turret were from the M2/M3 Bradley, so service, operation and spares were relatively low cost. Changing some outside fiberglass panels allows OSV’s to represent either tanks or the BMP-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle.

While the OSV isn’t the only presentation of Soviet vehicles the good guys are likely to see. BRDM recon vehicles are represented by modified Humvees.

The OpFor at NTC isn’t the only OpFor. There are also full time opposing forces at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Ft. Polk, LA (geared primarily to light forces), and the Combat Maneuver Training Center at Hoehenfels, Germany. And while the VisMods form the main body of the OpFor, the Army does have a limited number of captured vehicles either for familiarization or occasionally to act as OpFor.

The top frame of the pic is your humble scribe setting a Dragon missile simulator for the next mission.

Helicopters are also represented by the OpFor.

Often times, the permanent OpFor needs to be augmented by “normal” forces. To differentiate these interim OpFor from the friendly forces, some minimal modifications are usually made. In my days in Germany, we’d strap a painted 55 gallon drum on the top deck of our M113s. Tanks often carried drums on their rear deck, simulating the common Soviet Practice of carrying spare fuel there. Since the full time OpFor at NTC has morphed into a real Combat Brigade Team, in addition to its OpFor duties, it also has access to the normal complement of combat vehicles of the Army. These can also be used to simulate a Soviet equipped force, though with considerably less fidelity.

M1 KVT (Krasnovian Variant Tank) Krasnovia is the notional nation the OpFor represents.

In tight budget times, Opposing Forces are an attractive target for budget cutters. From a wide array squadrons, the Air Force, Navy and Marines have had their aggressor strength greatly diminished. But the effect of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have actually worked to expand and diversify the Army’s OpFor , and while some cutbacks are inevitable, the Army will fight tooth and nail to maintain the core of its capability to present a realistic threat scenario to maneuver forces under training.

*Technically, now it is the Contemporary Operating Environment Force or COEFOR, but everyone still calls it the OpFor.

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Filed under armor, ARMY TRAINING, helicopters, history, infantry

Tagged as Fort Irwin Military Reservation, Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System, NTC, Opposing force

by ultimaratioregis | January 28, 2013 · 11:23 am

Women in Combat Arms: The Perspective of a Warrior

The Late General Robert H. Barrow, former Commandant of the Marine Corps, winner of the Navy Cross, Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star, Bronze Star, Veteran of three wars, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, speaks on the notion of women in ground combat units. Thirteen and a half minutes. (The last three are dark screen.) Listen to it all.

Those who would dismiss General Barrow as hidebound, sexist, closed-minded, or any other of the various derogatory labels that tend to be employed by the feminists who push such agendas should feel a tinge of shame. If they are capable of such, which I doubt.

Those who comprise the Joint Chiefs of Staff, particularly CJCS Dempsey, CSA Ordierno, and Marine Commandant Amos, should be ashamed of themselves. They must know deep down that what a man like General Barrow asserts is the brutal truth. Yet they have nodded their heads in enthusiastic agreement with their political masters as a sop to the feminists and progressives who despise our military and everything it stands for. Gentlemen, you must do some serious soul searching. You KNOW that General Barrow speaks an unvarnished truth honed by 41 years of wartime service and leadership of men in some of the most bitter combat of the 20th Century. Are your current assignments and your careers so much more important than the lives of those you will unnecessarily risk to implement this corrosive policy?

The Commandant’s assertion that “we will maintain our high standards while ensuring maximum success for every Marine” smacks of the dishonesty of the “everyone gets a trophy” Left. War, we damned well should know, knows no such considerations. If we didn’t have such morally and intellectually bankrupt leadership spending so much time and money painting the Potemkin Village instead of training to win our nation’s wars, we would not find ourselves in the current fix.

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Filed under Afghanistan, Air Force, armor, army, Artillery, girls, history, infantry, iraq, marines, navy, obama, Politics, recruiting, SIR!, stupid, Uncategorized, war

by xbradtc | January 26, 2013 · 12:33 pm

Orders

Believe it or not, during operations in the field, Army men don’t just run around willy-nilly doing whatever they want. They all actually are working according to a plan. It may be a good plan, or a bad one, but it is a plan nonetheless.

After 237 years, the Army has come up with a few ways of organizing the chaos of battle. Orders are one of the primary methods of doing that.

When a civilian hears the word “orders” they tend to think of an NCO telling a Private to drop and give him 20 or take out the trash or something. In an administrative sense, to “come down on orders” means to be transferred to another posting. But in organizing and controlling operations in theater, “field orders” are the commanders method of control. Cribbing from other armies, using its institutional knowledge, and a smidgen of common sense, the Army has set up a template for orders to ensure that units have the information needed, no important information is left out, and that errors in communication are minimized. These templates, these field orders, control the lives of soldiers.

There are three primary types of field orders:

Warning order
Operations Order
Fragmentary Order

Let’s take a brief look at each one.

—————————————————————————————————The Warning Order

The Warning Order (WARNO) is just that- a warning to subordinate units that an operation is forthcoming, and preparations must be made. A brief description of the current tactical situation is given. Then the mission to be ordered is announced. For instance, 3/8 CAV attacks along Axis Anvil to destroy enemy reinforced mech infantry co. vic. Hill 781 NLT 031545Z NOV 12 to ensure passage of 3BCT/1CAV. Any special preparations the unit needs to make should be listed, and the time and place where the actual operations order will be issued is given.

—————————————————————————————————

The Operations Order

The Operations Order is the meat and potatoes of planning in the Army. It’s the way a leader tells subordinates what is is he wants them to do. From a squad leader planning a patrol, to Eisenhower invading France, every operation in the Army is planned using the Operations Order or OPORD. To make sure leaders hit all the high points, a standard template of the OPORD has evolved, a 5-paragraph format that the lowliest Private and the 4-star General both understand.

Situation
Mission
Execution
Sustainment
Command and Control

Let’s take a slightly more in-depth look at the OPORD

1. Situation

Paragraph 1, Situation gives an overview of what the current tactical situation is.

First off is Task Organization. For any given mission, most units will have teams or units attached or detached. Task Organization spells out just who will be attached or detached.

Next up is Enemy Situation. Who is the enemy? What is their strength? What operations do they have planned? What are they trying to accomplish?

Next is Friendly Forces- What is the mission of the next higher headquarters? For instance, 3/8 CAV, a part of the 3rd BCT of the 1st CAV Division, needs to know what brigade is up to. What is brigade trying to accomplish? An overview of the situation of the other units of the brigade also follows (and if the units alongside are from another brigade or division, you need to know what they’re up to also, if only to avoid running into them).Lastly, what units are providing fire support? Is it just the organic mortars in the battalion, or is the Direct Support Artillery battalion available? Or are there even more artillery units available? How about close air support? We’re not talking yet about the specifics of what they’ll provide, just which players are in the game.

2. Mission

The mission paragraph of an OPORD is the 5W’s. The who, what, when, where, and why of the order. Remember this sentence above?

3/8 CAV attacks along Axis Anvil to destroy enemy reinforced mech infantry co. vic. Hill 781 NLT 031545Z NOV 12 to ensure passage of 3BCT/1CAV

Let’s break that down into English for the civilians and folks like URR that struggle with jargon.

Who? 3/8 CAV -The 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division.

What? attacks along Axis Anvil to destroy enemy reinforced mech infantry co. vic. Hill 781 – The phrasing “to destroy” tells the unit that there objective isn’t Hill 781. By saying “to destroy” that says the key element is the enemy force, not the terrain. Had the order said “to seize Hill 781” that would mean the objective was to gain terrain. Here, our unit needs to key off the enemy force, rather than the terrain.

Where? Along Axis Anvil.**

When? NLT 031545Z NOV 12 . “No Later Than 3:45pm (Greenwich Mean Time) on the 3rd of November, 2012. Other units are on a timeline as well. 3/8 CAV has to launch its attack on time.

Why? to ensure passage of 3BCT/1CAV- The who, what, where, and when only tell a commander what he must do. The why tells the commander what he must accomplish. There’s a little reading behind the lines involved here. While the commander of 3/8 CAV has been assigned the mission of destroying an enemy mech infantry company, the whole point is, the brigade commander is trying to pass the rest of the formation through an area. If 3/8 CAV destroys the company, but there is still an enemy unit or other reason that the brigade can’t pass, that tells the 3/8 commander his work isn’t done. If 3/8 CAV seizes Hill 781, but there’s no enemy company, the work isn’t done. The mission is to destroy that company. Conversely, if he can’t destroy the company, but can suppress it enough to allow passage of the brigade, well, that’s good enough. 3/8 CAV wasn’t assigned the mission of destroying the enemy company just to be bloody minded. The whole point is to allow the brigade to pass.

3. Execution

Paragraph 3, Execution, is the “how” of the order. The first part of paragraph three is the Commander’s Intent. The CI is unscripted, but is basically the end-state the commander desires, and explains the whole point of the operation and his vision for how the mission will be accomplished.

a. Concept of operations.

This is where the order actually describes how the mission will be conducted. The concept is detailed through each of seven providers of combat power.
(1) Maneuver

The direct fires and movements of a units organic and attached assets have to be synchronized in time and space. This subparagraph is often lavishly detailed via maps and graphics, to help visualize how the operation will unfold.

(2) Fires

Planning for indirect organic and supporting mortar, artillery and air support fires is a key element for any operation. Planning includes preplanned missions, prioritizing which subordinate units will get support, and listing the priority of unplanned targets. There are almost always more potential targets than tubes to support a mission, so prioritizing helps ensure the most critical targets are hit, and support isn’t wasted on non-essential targets. URR will get around to writing in depth on the planning process one day. At my level, it was generally quite simple. At the battalion and above echelons, it becomes quite complex.

(3) Reconnaissance and Surveillance

Virtually every debacle on the battlefield the Army has ever suffered has been a result of poor reconnaissance/surveillance, and its partner intelligence. There’s an old German saying: “Time spent on reconnaissance is never time wasted.” In fact, while R&S is detailed in the actual order, usually, almost as soon as the Warning Order has been received, the Scout Platoon is put to work. The battalion may augment that effort with additional platoons from the maneuver companies, or with support from the Brigade Combat Team’s cavalry squadron, or UAV support. The most obvious goal of any R&S plan is to locate the enemy forces. But that’s only a portion of the job. R&S also has to determine if the maps of the area are accurate. Are the roads trafficable by the unit’s vehicles? Are bridges still standing? Will they hold the weight of the unit vehicles? Are there any roads washed out? Has the enemy emplaced obstacles or minefields? The R&S effort is the reality check that the Operations Order relies on to ensure the plan is based on the real world.

(4) Intelligence

Intelligence is a two way street. Higher echelons will provide information and support (such as communications intercept teams) to our notional battalion. But our unit commander and higher echelons also use combat to generate intelligence. In addition to detailing what support the unit will receive, this sub-paragraph details the specific information units need to gather.

(5) Engineer

Engineer support is always critically short. There are always more tasks than engineers. By prioritizing which mobility, counter-mobility and force protection measures are critical, the limited engineer support can be prioritized to best support the mission. For instance, in our notional attack, engineer support would likely be focused on breaching any minefields or anti-tank ditches encountered.

(6) Air Defense

Obviously, in the two wars of the 21st century, our troops haven’t had to focus much on AD. But if we didn’t have air superiority, this sub-paragraph would describe passive measures, such as camouflage, and active measures, such as Stinger missile teams, to limit the ability of enemy airpower to inhibit our own operations.

(7) Information Operations

To be honest, we never had to deal with information operations in my day.

b. Tasks to maneuver units.

While the concept of operations described the overall scheme of maneuver, this tasking gives specific tasks to each of the subordinate companies and any independent maneuver platoons. For instance, Company A may be tasked to seize a hilltop short of the objective, and attack by direct fire, while Companies B and C are tasked to conduct the actual assault on Hill 781.

c. Tasks to combat support units.
(1) Intelligence (2) Engineer (3) Fire Support (4) Air Defense (5) Signal (6) NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) (7) Provost Marshal (8) PSYOP (9) Civil military.

Similarly, specific jobs for each of these areas are detailed. Some will be routine, and addressed by the unit’s Standard Operating Procedure, but other taskings, particularly in engineering and fire support will be detailed every time.

d. Coordinating instructions.
(1) Time or condition when a plan or order becomes effective

(2) CCIR (Commander’s Critical Information Requirements)

(3) Risk reduction control measures

(4) Rules of engagement

(5) Environmental considerations

(6) Force protection

Much of this will be under the unit SOP, but for successful operations, the devil is often in the details.

4. SUSTAINMENT

Sustainment is the term to cover all the logistical and administrative needs to keep the force in the field. Some are obvious issues, like getting fuel, food and ammo to the force. Others are less immediately obvious, like how to recover vehicles that are damaged or broken down. At the battalion level, much of this is standard operating procedure. But at higher echelons, where operations tend to be planned for a longer period of time, the plan has to be crafted in somewhat greater detail. For instance, a theater commander will have to concern himself with things like providing laundry and shower services, as well as replacement uniforms. Even providing support for payroll services has to be addressed. Troops may not have a lot of options for spending money, but they still want to be paid.

a. Support concept.

b. Materiel and services.

c. Medical evacuation and hospitalization.

d. Personnel.

e. Civil military.

5. COMMAND AND CONTROL (formerly Command and Signal)

Command is an art. Much as a painter can be taught to a certain level of competence, so to with command. But superlative command takes an innate, native ability. Fortunately, in most instances, the average level of competence is sufficient. Control is a science. It is the set of tools a commander uses to effectively conduct command.

a. Command.

Where will the commander be during the operation? Where will the other key leaders be? If there are casualties in the command group, what is the line of succession?

b. Control.

A large part of this section comes from the Signal Operating Instructions, which lists the frequencies to be used by each unit. A heavy battalion has several radio networks. The command net, the admin/logistics net, and the intel net. Further, the battalion also communicates with higher headquarters on their nets. Each subordinate company has its own radio net, as well as each platoon. This doesn’t even address the data networks that all units use now. Other control measures can also be used, such as pyrotechnic smoke and flares. Graphical control measures on the map are also, by used.

The Five Paragraph Operations order is “scaleable.” The basic format is used from the rifle squad to the highest echelons. Obviously, the higher you go, the more detailed the order. At platoon and squad level, the order is often given verbally (though every evaluator in the Army wants to see EVERY soldier write down, at a minimum, the mission statement and commanders intent).

The order is also something of a matroyshka doll. From our notional battalion operations order, each company commander will extract his mission and specific tasks, and write his own operations order for his company. His platoon leaders will then take that order, and write their own. In theory, so would each squad leader, but as a practical matter, platoon and squad orders tend to be repeats of the company order.

One great example of this series of orders coming from on high down to the lowest level is the invasion of Normandy. Every level of command, from the Allied Expeditionary Headquarters down to individual squads had their own, specific orders, with the lower orders all acting like a series of bricks to build the structure of the entire allied operation.

Since each subordinate needs to craft his own order, the rule of thumb is that a leader should use one third of the available time to craft his order, leaving two thirds of the time for his subordinate echelons to craft theirs, and prepare for the operation. Sadly, this is often honored more in the breach. But good staffs know to get as much information as possible to lower echelons as soon as possible to let them prepare as much as possible.

The final order format is the FRAGO, or Fragmentary Order. When a change of mission occurs, or the situation on the ground changes, and the time doesn’t allow for the full order planning process, a fragmentary order is issued. It has no set format, though commanders are encouraged to use as much of the Operations Order format as feasible. It may be verbal or it may be written. At a minimum, it should contain the 5 W’s of the mission statement, and if at all possible, a commander’s intent.

*as opposed to other possible missions such as defend, or occupy, or conduct a movement to contact

**”Axis Anvil” is an example of a “graphical control measure.” Units are given areas marked by boundaries, within which they can move. To control the movement of units, routes, axes, objectives and other arbitrary lines are drawn on the map. These measures are then given arbitrary code names. Axis Anvil might be the general flow of a valley, for instance. “Route Cinnamon” would be a specific road or pathway. They’re “graphical” in that in the age of paper maps, they were drawn on the map with grease pencils. Today, they’re computer graphics overlaid on a computer map.

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Filed under ARMY TRAINING, infantry

Tagged as ARMY TRAINING, orders

by xbradtc | · 12:01 pm

Heavy Hauler

This fellow is a Canadian, but the weights are pretty representative. And while C9 (the Canadian designation for a SAW) gunners have a heavy load, they don’t carry the heaviest load in an infantry company.

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Filed under infantry

by ultimaratioregis | January 3, 2013 · 8:22 pm

The Ordeal of USS Hugh W. Hadley

As US Army and Marine forces reduced the island of Okinawa in the spring of 1945, the Japanese unleashed a desperate storm of suicide attacks, the infamous kamikaze, on the massed armada of supporting allied warships offshore. It did not take the Japanese long to understand the significance of the line of destroyers that ringed the island, their air search radars detecting and warning of the approach of Japanese aircraft from Formosa, Kyushu, and other locations to attack the US 5th (later 3rd) Fleet.

Soon, duty on the Radar Pickets became among the most deadly and dangerous of the entire war. “Roger Peter” stations were subject to withering attacks, as the Japanese sought to blind the Americans and strike the carriers and transports that supported operations ashore. A grimly high number of US ships were sunk, with heavy loss of life, in order to maintain the ring of warning radars that shielded the invasion fleet. Drexler, Bush, Emmons, Little, Morrison, Luce, Pringle, all were sacrificed to alert the fleet of the impending kamikaze strikes. And Mannert L. Abele, smashed by two massive precision-guided missiles that portended a coming age. Many other ships were savagely mauled, Aaron Ward, Hazelwood, the famous Laffey, Cassin Young. Damaged so severely that their survival astonished those who witnessed their suffering.

On the morning of the 11th of May, 1945, USS Hugh W. Hadley DD-774, took up station at Roger Peter Station 15. When the fateful hours had passed, Hugh W. Hadley had been struck by three suicide aircraft, and had lost 28 killed and 67 wounded. Though her guns had downed more than twenty enemy aircraft, damage to Hadley was severe and extensive. One of those aircraft which struck the destroyer was a piloted rocket bomb, the infamous Okha (“Cherry Blossom”) that had spelled doom for Abele. (And referred to in the below report as “Baka”.) With a warhead three times that of modern ASCMs and a dive speed of Mach .85, an Okha presented an incredibly formidable challenge.

From here, I will let the Captain of that magnificent ship tell the story. The following is Commander Mullaney’s Battle Report in full:

DD774/A16/a1
Serial O66
U.S.S. HUGH W. HADLEY (DD774)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

15 May 1945

From:                        The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. HUGH W. HADLEY (DD774)

To:                             The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Via:                            (1) Commander, Task Group 51.5
(2) Commander, Task Force 51
(3) Commander, Fifth Fleet
(4) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Subject:                    ACTION REPORT – Action against enemy aircraft attacking
this ship, while on Radar Picket Station
Number Fifteen, off Okinawa, Nansei
Shoto, 11 May 1945.
Enclosure:                (A) Executive Officer’s Report.
(B) Fighter Director’s Report.
(C) Battle Damage Report.

                                      Because of the large number of planes involved, in this extended engagement, the Commanding Officer appointed a Board of Officers to receive statements from key witnesses, verify all reports, prevent duplications and establish the facts of the action in order to assist the Commanding Officer in making an accurate report. On this basis the below report has been submitted.

                                                                                               Part I

            1. The U.S.S. HUGH W. HADLEY (DD774) was assigned duty as RADAR PICKET SHIP AND FIGHTER DIRECTOR SHIP on Station #15 of Okinawa, Nansei Shoto, 10 May 1945. Ships in company were the U.S.S. EVANS (DD552), LCS 82, LCS(L) 83, LCS(L) 84, and LSM(R) 193 as support ships. The Evans turned over duties as Tactical Command to the Hadley.

            2. The MISSION of this group of ships was to detect and report approaching enemy aircraft, to control the assigned Combat Air Patrol, and to prevent enemy planes from reaching the transport area at Okinawa.

            3. On the night of 10 May, an enemy plane attacked our formation at 1935 and was taken under fire by both. The Evans reported seeing it destroyed. Throughout the night the ship was at General Quarters due to the threatening movements and a few attacks by enemy planes in the immediate vicinity of the formation.

            4. On the morning of 11 May, at 0605, the Combat Air Patrol of twelve planes reported on station. At about 0740, bogies were reported to the north-east. At 0745, a large enemy float plane appeared through the mist and was taken under fire by both ships. Soon, this plane headed away from the Evans and came directly for the Hadley which was about one and a half miles from the Evans. This plane was shot down by the Hadley at the range of 1200 yards. .

            5. At about 0755, numerous enemy planes were contacted by our instruments as coming towards the ship (and Okinawa) from the north, distance about 55 miles. One division of CAP was ordered out to intercept. Shortly thereafter, several enemy formations were detected, and the entire CAP was ordered out to intercept. Our Fighter Director Officer in CIC has estimated that the total number of enemy planes were 156 coming in at different heights in groups as follows: Raid ONE 36, Raid TWO 50, Raid THREE 2O, Raid FOUR 20 to 30, Raid FIVE 20, Total 156 planes.

            6. At about 0755 the entire Combat Air Patrol was ordered out in different formations to intercept and engage the hordes of enemy planes closing us and shortly we received reports from them that they had destroyed twelve planes. Then they were so busy that they could not send us reports but we intercepted their communications to learn about forty to fifty planes were destroyed them. CIC reported that there were no friendly planes within ten miles of this ship.

            7. From this time on the Hadley and the Evans were attacked continuously by numerous enemy aircraft coming at us in groups of four to six planes on each ship. During the early period, enemy aircraft were sighted trying to pass our formation headed for Okinawa. These were flying extremely low on both bows and seemingly ignoring us. The Hadley shot down four of these.

            8. The tempo of the engagement and the maneuver of the two destroyers at high speed was such as to cause the Hadley and the Evans to be separated by distances as much as two and three miles. This resulted in individual action by both ships. Three times the Hadley suggested to the Evans to close for mutual support and efforts were made to achieve his but each time the attacks prevented the ships from closing each other. The Hadley closed the four small ships several times during the engagement.

             9. From 0830 to 0900 the Hadley was attacked by groups of planes coming in on both bows. Twelve enemy planes were shot down by the Hadley’s guns during this period, at times firing all guns in various directions. The Evans which, at this time, was a distance of about three miles to the northward, was seen fighting off a number of planes by herself, several of which were seen to be destroyed. At 0900 the Evans was hit and put out of action. At one time toward the close of the battle friendly planes were closing in to assist us, the four support ships were prevented from shooting down two friendlies whom they they had taken under fire. One plane was seen to splash inside their formation due to their own gunfire. however, I am not able to give an accurate account of their action. They were very helpful in picking up my crew who were in the water, in coming alongside and removing wounded and in helping to pump.

            10. From this time on, the Hadley received the bulk of the attacks and action became furious with all guns firing at planes on all sides of the ship. CIC reported that the SUGAR GEORGE radar scope was filled with enemy planes. The Commanding Officer saw that the situation was becoming too much for one ship to handle and he ordered the Combat Air Patrol to close the formation and assist us. With outstanding courage, our planes fearlessly closed the ships and attacked enemy planes. They achieved great results and when the Hadley was finally helpless in the water our crew was sparked with renewed courage by the sight of airmen driving off the remaining enemy aircraft.

             11. For 20 minutes, the Hadley fought off the enemy single-handed being separated from the Evans, which was out of action, by three miles and the four small support ships by two miles. Finally, at 0920, ten enemy planes which had surrounded the Hadley, four on the starboard bow under fire by the main battery and machine guns, four on the port bow under fire by the forward machine guns, and two astern under fire by the aft machine guns, attacked the ship simultaneously. All ten planes were destroyed in a remarkable fight and each plane was definitely accounted for. As a result of this attack, the Hadley was: (1) Hit by a bomb aft (2) By a BAKA bomb seen to be released from a low flying BETTY (3) Was struck by a suicide plane aft (4) Hit by a suicide plane in rigging.

              12. The ship was badly holed and immediately both engine rooms and one fireroom were flooded and the ship settled down and listed rapidly. All five-inch guns were out of action, a fire was raging aft of number two stack, ammunition was exploding, and the entire ship was engulfed in a thick black smoke which forced the crew to seek safety, some by jumping over the side, others by crowding forward and awaiting orders. The ship was helpless to defend herself and at this time the situation appeared hopeless. The Commanding Officer received reports from the Chief Engineer and the Damage Control Officer which indicated that the main spaces were flooded and that the ship was rapidly developing into a condition which would capsize her. The exploding ammunition and the raging fire appeared to be extremely dangerous. The engineers were securing the forward boilers to prevent them from blowing up. The order to “prepare to abandon Ship” was given and life rafts and floats were put over the side. A party of about fifty men and officers were being organized to make a last fight to save the ship and the remainder of the crew and the wounded were put over into the water.

              13. From this point on, a truly amazing, courageous and efficient group of men and officers with utter disregard for their own personal safety approached the explosions and the fire with hoses and for fifteen minutes kept up this work. The torpedoes were jettisoned, weights removed from the starboard side and, finally the fire was extinguished and the list and flooding controlled and the ship was saved. Although the ship was still in an extremely dangerous condition, one fireroom bulkhead held and she was finally towed safely to the IE SHIMA anchorage.

               14. The total number of enemy planes destroyed by the Hadley in this period, of one hour and thirty-five minute of continual firing was twenty-three. This number includes twenty shot down to the water and three suicide hits.

               15. Our mission was accomplished. The transports at the Okinawa anchorage were saved from attack by one hundred and fifty sixty enemy planes by the action of our ships. We bore the brunt of the enemy action and absorbed what they threw at us. It was a proud day for Destroyer men.

PART II

                 The U.S.S. HUGH W. HADLEY (DD774) was OTC of a force consisting of two destroyers, three LCSs and one LSM. In order to achieve maneuverability and concentrated gunfire the following formation was ordered: the four support ships to a diamond formation on a circle one thousand yards in diameter, speed ten knots, reversing course every half hour; the destroyers in a column distance fifteen hundred yards, speed fifteen knots. When attacks commenced both destroyers increased speed to twenty seven knots and maneuvered in vicinity of supports to concentrate gunfire.

PART III

                  WEATHER: Wind and sea calm, visibility to the north and east unlimited, visibility to the west cloudy and mist haze. During the attack the force maneuvered to the east and south to get out of the misty haze in order to see the enemy planes more clearly. The haze to the west would not have prevented the enemy planes from seeing us.

                  Communications: Communications were satisfactory in all respects during the battle except that gunfire caused the jacks to pop out of the receiver panel in the radio central feeding radio to CIC.

                                                                                                 PART IV

                   ORDNANCE: A. The performance of ordnance material and equipment was excellent. The fire discipline was strict, gunnery communications rapid and effective. Ammunition expended:

   509 rounds 5″ 38 Caliber VT

   292 rounds 5″ 38 Caliber AA

8950 rounds 40MM HET

3980 rounds 20MM HEI

2010 rounds 20MM HEIT

   801 charges smokeless power

                    B. The first bomb estimated to be a medium bomb, exploded with considerable flash killing a defense personnel topside aft.

                       2. The suicide plane hit aft number two stack and plunged to the deck below. There was a tremendous explosion from this crash which result in a raging fire with ammunition exploding. The topside compartments in this area were all completely wrecked.

                       3. BAKA BOMB this is the bomb which put the ship out of action. It was led in a raging fire with ammunition exploding. It was released from a large lumbering BETTY which came in from astern during the final attack, altitude about 600 feet. The bomb appeared to be about one and one half times as large as a 21″ torpedo. On each side were very short stubby wings about one third the usual wing length of a lane. There was no engine. The bomb struck the ship on the starboard side at frame number 105, which is the bulkhead between forward engine room and after fireroom. The explosion from this bomb terrific and some decks were lifted about twenty inches causing ankles and knees to be broken or strained. Three large engineering spaces were immediately flooded and the ship settled in the water rapidly. Another result of this explosion was to put all equipment including the 5″ guns out of action.

                                                                                            PART V

                      A. Damage to our own ship -see Battle Damage Report.

                      B. Battle damage to enemy units: Twenty-three enemy planes destroyed as follows:

Time ( approximate) Relative Bearing    Distance    Number

0745    090 1500 yards            1

0800    270 6000 yards closing         2

0810    050 4000 yards closing         2

0825    060 4000 yards closing         2

0835    060 4000 yards closing         2

0835    270 Dive         1

0845    060 3-4000 yards closing         2

0845    225 Dive         1

0905-0920    045 Dive         4

   270 Dive         4

   180 Dive         2

                                                                                               PART VI

                      ENEMY TACTICS: The enemy planes employed no special tactics except during the final attack to surround the ship and dive simultaneously.

                      OWN TACTICS: The ship was maneuvered at twenty-seven knots constantly using the rudder to present the maximum guns to the enemy. One dive bomber at 0835 was missed by putting hard rudder over when the plane was 1000 yards above us coming in. The stern was swung away from his point of aim and he crashed twenty feet from the ship’s stern.

                                                                                                PART VII

                      PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES:

                      1. Killed in action twenty-eight; wounded in action sixty-seven; missing in action none.

                      2. No Captain of a man of war ever had a crew who fought more valiantly against such overwhelming odds. Who can measure the degree of courage of men, who stand up to their guns in the face of diving planes that destroy them? Who can measure the loyalty of a crew who risked death to save the ship from sinking when all seemed lost?   I desire to record that the history of our Navy was enhanced on 11 May 1945. I am proud to record that I know no record of a Destroyer’s crew fighting for one hour and thirty five minutes against overwhelming enemy aircraft attacks and destroying twenty three planes. My crew accomplished their mission and displayed outstanding fighting abilities. I am recommending awards for the few men who displayed outstanding bravery above the deeds of their shipmates in separate correspondence. Destroyer men are good men and my officers and crew were good destroyer men..

                     3. It can be recorded that the aviators who comprised the Combat Air Patrol assigned to the Hadley gave battle to the enemy that rank with the highest traditions of our Navy’s history. When the leader was asked to close and assist us, he replied, “I am out of ammunition but I am sticking with you”. He then proceeded to fly his plane at enemy planes attacking in attempt to head them off. toward the end of the battle, I witnessed one Marine pilot attempting to ride off a suicide plane. This plane hit us but not vitally. I am willing to take my ship to the shores of Japan if I could have these Marines with me.

                                                                                                PART VIII

                      LESSONS LEARNED, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

                      1. It must be impressed that constant daily drills in damage control using all personnel on the ship and especially those who are not in the regular damage control parties will prove of value when emergencies occur. The various emergency pumps which were on board were used effectively to put out fires. Damage control schools proved their great value and every member of the crew is now praising this training.

                      2. I was amazed at the performance of the 40 and 20 guns. Contrary to my expectation, those smaller guns shot down the bulk of the enemy planes. Daily the crews had dinned into their minds the following order “LEAD THAT PLANE”. Signs were painted at the gun stations as follows “LEAD THAT PLANE”. It worked, they led and the planes flew right through our projectiles.

                      3. The Commanding Officer recommends that the torpedoes be removed from ships which are assigned Amphibious and Radar Picket duties. He believes that what is left of the enemy fleet will be taken care of by other Task Forces, or the Air. Replace the heavy weights of torpedo mounts with larger CIC, more RADAR and 40mm gun mounts. In order to function properly, Radar Picket Ships must be loaded with special equipment. In other words, he believes that amphibious ships who are to be assigned to this duty should be specially equipped for this duty and not just generally equipped for regular destroyer duty.

cc: ComDesRon66
ComDesPac

There is much discussion these days regarding many things Navy. The nature of combat in the littorals. The necessary firepower to defeat a saturation attack. Networking a force. The level of training and proficiency of ships’ crews, the size of those crews, the necessity to operate, fight, and perform damage control simultaneously. The imbuing of a spirit of courage and sacrifice, and a warrior ethos necessary to endure the furnace of combat. And the value of a tough, powerful, sturdy, versatile warship that can dish out and take the punishment, and bring her crew home.

The Captain’s touching tribute to his Sailors should be learned verbatim by every Sailor in our Navy. And his praise of pilots of the CAP show that integrated operations were not invented after Goldwater-Nichols.

I am in awe of the Sailors and Officers of Hugh W. Hadley. Should there be any still with us today, they would tell you that they are not heroes. But I can think of no better definition of the word.

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Filed under Air Force, army, Artillery, guns, history, infantry, marines, navy, planes, SIR!, war

by ultimaratioregis | December 22, 2012 · 6:29 am

An Open Letter to the Commandant Regarding the “Alcohol Policy”

General Amos,

You are the senior Marine in our beloved Corps, holding a position entrusted to just 34 other men over the glorious history of our Sea Service. You are not the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, or of the Army. Nor are you Chief of Naval Operations. You are the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Your Marines have shed their blood and wrapped themselves in glory on battlefields in two wars. Look out among the faces of your junior NCOs, your junior Officers, SNCOs, and Field Grade Officers, and you will see Combat Action Ribbons aplenty. Purple Hearts. Sprinklings of Bronze Stars and Silver Stars, and even a Navy Cross here and there. Living Marines wear Medals of Honor from these wars. More have been presented posthumously to parents of fallen heroes who displayed conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of [his] life above and beyond the call of duty, and whom gallantly gave his life for his country.

And then we, YOU, subject them to this:

The Washington Times reported earlier this week that the Corps sent a Dec. 12 message to commanders officially beginning mandatory breath tests for all 197,000 Marines twice each year.

A reading of just .01 percent subjects a Marine to counseling. A Marine who registers a .04 must be examined by medical staff for fitness for duty.

The Marine memo calls a “positive test result” a reading of .01 or greater, which results in automatic “screening and treatment as appropriate.”

They write with their blood and courage another glorious chapter in the long and storied combat history of the Marine Corps, and you treat them like children. Under a teetotaling and stiff-necked schoolmaster. Now, I don’t think you thought of this folly on your own. Secretary of the Navy Mabus has been pushing this horrendously ill-advised plan for some time in the Navy. Somewhere along the line, you or those who advise you, including your SgtMaj, decided that the Corps does things tougher and stricter than everyone else. Someone forgot to tell you (and them) that when it comes to stupidity, that is not such a good idea.

“It’s possible if a Marine goes to a bar and is drinking a substantial amount of alcohol over the course of an evening, and he gets himself to a BAC of 1.5 or 2.0, if they are tested first thing in the morning when they report to duty, they may still have some alcohol in their blood and test positive,” he added.

General Amos, that scenario will encompass a great majority of your Marines from time to time, and will have included yourself and most of your General Officers at one time or another. That is, if you are honest with yourselves. These are MARINES, warriors, MEN (and WOMEN), who work hard, fight hard, and play hard. You should know that. If not, take those aviator wings off and hump a 60mm mortar plate around with 2/6 for a while to remind yourself. Bring your SgtMaj, too. And bring your Kipling.

An’ if sometimes our conduck isn’t all your fancy paints,

Why, single men in barricks don’t grow into plaster saints;

Leaders understand that sentiment, leaders of Marines, especially. You had a choice, General.

You could have put your rank on the table and told SecNav, “Not in MY Corps! Not while I am Commandant! I will treat my Marines like the combat-hardened veteran men and women they are, not like schoolchildren!”, and taken your chances with the personal repercussions. You would have earned the eternal respect and gratitude of the 197,000 marvelous Marines you are supposed to lead.

Or, you could have said “three bags full!” and put in place nonsensical, unfair, and insulting measures that display openly your lack of trust in your Marines. Sadly, that is the course you chose. And it will earn you the resentment and mistrust of your Marines. Because that trust thing is still a two-way street, even when you wear four stars.

Marines who have problems have plenty of avenues for help, and good leadership at the NCO and junior Officer level suffices to get them on the straight and narrow, or to face the consequences of not doing so. Just as it always has. For the most senior of our leadership to demand treating everyone as offenders speaks volumes about that senior leadership, none of it good.

I have served under Marine Commandants since General Barrow. I do believe few or none of them would have made the choice you did. And that is telling. The magnificent Marines of our Corps, Officer and Enlisted, deserve leadership that displays moral and physical courage. Lord knows, they have shown you ample amounts and then some. Show them the same, or find another job.

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Filed under Afghanistan, Air Force, army, history, infantry, iraq, marines, navy, Personal, Uncategorized, war

by ultimaratioregis | December 12, 2012 · 4:50 pm

Bill’s “Smelly”

S. M. L. E., actually. Short Magazine, Lee-Enfield, Number 1 Mark III, to be precise. With the Pattern of 1903 sword-bayonet. It is the rifle, and not the magazine, by the way, that makes the weapon “short”, being some 4.5″ shorter than the Magazine, Lee-Enfield, Mark I, which it replaced in service starting in 1907.

This is the rifle Bill asked me to have a look at and clean up a bit. For which he was most generous and grateful. She was pretty humble when brought to me, caked with rust, dirt, and residue in the crannies of long-ago applied cosmoline. The stock, while beautifully showing years of oiling, cleaning, and handling (in a good way), had major damage on the fore-end portion. Got the new piece in from Numrich last night, and with a little bit of fitting (a SHARP chisel beats all) got her back together and ready for use. As soon as I figured out how to properly re-assemble the safety latch, thanks to some online help! Some oiling of the untreated wood of the new stock followed. I used almond oil, of all things. It is used on guitar necks and is thin enough to soak into the wood and not leave a greasy surface to handle. Three coats, and that stock fore-end looked like it had been on there for decades.

She is a wonderfully balanced piece, with a pivoting V-cut rear sight and a barleycorn front sight. The distinctive snout (nosecap, technically) took considerable work to get passable. And there is still some that should be done. CLP will help dissolve some of the oxidation, and a brass chamber brush will help. The bayonet, while rusty, was razor-sharp, and in perfect condition. A good soaking in solvent, and then CLP, did the trick.

The first photo is the rifle itself. The second shows the bolt, bolt handle, action, and guide bridge. One of the business end, muzzle and nosecap, and one of the business end with the sword-bayonet attached. The last shot is Bill’s Great War veteran with my No 4 Mk I from the Second World War above it. Mine was made in Canada and was much more of a cleanup project than Bill’s. I paid $15 for it at Rose’s Department Store on Lejeune Boulevard in Jacksonville NC. It was so rusty I had to use a rubber mallet to get the bolt open. But once cleaned up, has been an incredibly enjoyable (and accurate!) shooter.

Now that I have had a chance to work with Bill’s wonderful rifle, I will be seeking one of my own. Need it? Nope. Want it. A smooth and handy rifle, and a piece of history to be sure.

15 Comments

Filed under army, guns, history, infantry, iraq, Personal, Uncategorized, war

by ultimaratioregis | November 16, 2012 · 6:11 am

Paper-thin super material stops flying bullets

Great article about bulletproofing efforts at MIT and Rice University. One has to wonder how much such material can lighten up the body armor our folks wear into combat, including the helmet, while increasing ballistic protection. Especially if they can keep the cost below a jillion dollars per Marine.

The material will have to be extensively tested, obviously. This includes the crucial “Lance Corporal Using the Helmet to Hammer in Engineer Stakes” test. But Marines have been begging for a helmet that is ballistic proof against 7.62×39, without excessive weight that makes extended wear a problem.

4 Comments

Filed under Afghanistan, armor, Around the web, guns, infantry, iraq, marines, war

by xbradtc | November 11, 2012 · 9:17 am

Veterans Day

So today is Veterans Day. Today, dear friends, is not a day for mourning, but rather a day to remember the service of American veterans of all wars. Come Memorial Day we shall mourn our dead. Today, let us celebrate life instead.

Veterans Day is a relatively new observance. The holiday started out as Armistice Day, first observed in 1926 to commemorate the end of WWI. It wasn’t until 1954 that the observance was extended to veterans of all wars. For a brief time, 1971-1975, Veterans Day was observed on the closest Monday to November 11th, but thankfully, that foolishness went by the wayside and we now observe this day on the proper calendar date.

I don’t have any big plans for the holiday. I’ll celebrate the way I usually do, with quiet thanks for the opportunity to have served this great nation. Interestingly, while I was serving, I never did get Veterans Day off.

As you go about your day, either at work or leisure, take a moment to thank any veterans you know.

Update: As I’m currently sick as a dog, this is a repost of the first Veterans Day post on the blog, from 2008.

3 Comments

Filed under armor, army, ARMY TRAINING, infantry, iraq, Personal, Politics

Tagged as army, army life, ARMY TRAINING

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