Category Archives: navy

by xbradtc | March 21, 2013 · 5:08 pm

Is the Supercarrier Dead?

So, is the supercarrier dead? Jerry Hendrix wrote a thought provoking piece titled “At What Cost A Carrier?” Normally, we think Hendrix is pretty sharp, but this piece was not up to his usual standards. First, comparing the roughly $7bn cost of the last in class CVN-77, to the first in class CVN-78 (roughly $14 bn) is a bit misleading. The last in class benefits from the entire learning curve of a production run. The first in class always suffers cost issues because of the same learning curve issues. Further, as much as $5bn of the cost of the new class is in non-recurring research and development costs. So while the cost of the next-gen carrier is still rather appalling, it’s not terribly out of line with recent trends in comparable shipbuilding.

So let’s take a look at some of the alternatives the Wired article I linked explores.

1. Using the new America class or a derivative as baby carriers.

First, the America class are not baby carriers. They are amphibious warships. Sure, they look a lot like carriers, and have better ability to operate larger numbers of AV-8B or F-35B jets than the existing LHD class big deck amphibs. But they are still amphibious warfare ships, designed to carry and land the hear of a Marine Expeditionary Unit, the Battalion Landing Team, and host the majority of its Air Combat Element (ACE), a reinforced medium helicopter unit.

The biggest drawback of using an LHD/LHA as a carrier is the fact that it cannot operate either the E-2 Hawkeye, or the EF-18G. One of the key lessons of the Falklands War was that while carrier airpower can be decisive, operating carriers without airborne early warning and electronic warfare in range of shore based air is fraught with risk.

LHD/LHA are also quite a bit slower than carriers. That reduces their mobility quite a bit. One of the key strengths of carriers in the power projection role is their ability to close with a coast, launch strikes, and retire before the enemy can mount a coherent counterstrike. But you have to move pretty quick to do that. Even a relatively modest decrease in speed has a significant negative effect on that ability. That reduced speed also makes an LHD/LHA quite a bit more vulnerable to submarine attack.

Further, all of the vulnerabilities that supposedly make the modern supercarrier obsolete are there in any LHD/LHA, only magnified.

2. The “everything’s a carrier” approach.

Not a bad idea, to some extent.

That is, between helicopters and UAVs, more and more ships are capable of deploying at least some form of their own, organic air support. UAVs obviously extend the sensor envelope for ships. And helicopters not only extend the sensor envelope, but often give much greater reach to the ships weapons, either by carrying their own, or providing much better targeting for ship launched weapons.

But the fantasy that unmanned combat air vehicles can replace the manned strike aircraft is just that- fantasy. For at least the next generation, manned aircraft will continue to be the only viable option.

As for converting merchant hulls to carrier like roles, that too faces severe handicaps. Virtually every challenge an LHD/LHA faces, so to any converted merchantman. Worse, not being built to warship standards, they are far less capable of withstanding battle damage or fire.

The linked article notes for the cost of a carrier, you could buy several smaller ships, but that doesn’t necessarily mean you’d be buying equal effectiveness for your money, nor does it even mean the results would be cheaper in the long run. Don’t forget, the big cost in operating a ship isn’t fuel, but manpower. And the manpower for several smaller ships would likely be greater than one supercarrier.

3. Submarine Strike

Yes, the converted Ohio class SSGNs are handy. And adding a few more tubes to later flight Virginia class SSNs is probably a good idea. But that’s hardly a substitute for airpower. First, right now, the only viable weapon is the Tomahawk cruise missile. While it is a good weapon, it is both slow, and only very modestly stealthy. It is quite vulnerable to air defense. It also has a rather paltry 1000lb warhead, far too small to hold at risk any number of critical targets in almost any campaign.

Worse, it has only the most limited utility against any target that isn’t a fixed installation. Latest versions can be retargeted in flight, but requires a data-link with an airborne assets. Which implies you can be flying over enemy territory. Which raises the question, if you can fly over territory long enough and far enough to retarget a Tomahawk, why not just use that aircraft as a strike platform anyway?

Submarine launched cruise missile attacks also suffer from “shallow magazines.” An Ohio SSGN with full magazines only carries 154 missiles. That sounds like a lot (and at roughly a million dollars a pop, it’s a lot of money) but in terms of warheads on foreheads, that’s a day’s work for a carrier. And the carrier can launch several days of strikes before having to retire to rearm. Whereas a carrier can rearm at sea, an SSGN has to return to a friendly port to reload. Such lack of sustained firepower is why URR refers to the SSGN as able to deliver a “strike”, rather than “fires.”

Since Billy Mitchell first bombed captured German warships in Chesapeake Bay, people have been sounding the death knell of the carrier. And yet, it continues to prove itself again and again as not only a viable weapon of war, but a crucial tool of warfighting and diplomacy.

That’s not to say Naval Aviation doesn’t face challenges. The short striking range of today’s air wing, the astonishing cost of the F-35C program (and limited capabilities it provides) and the short-sighted decision to jettison dedicated tanker, ASW and long range strike (as opposed to strike-fighter) assets have lead to the construction of ever more capable carriers, with arguably ever diminishing capability in the main battery of the carrier, its air wing.

If carriers are such obsolete and vulnerable warships, why are so many other countries striving today to build their own carrier capbability?

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14 Comments

Filed under helicopters, navy, Politics

Tagged as carrier, Cruise missile submarine, Falklands War, navy, Tomahawk, Virginia-class submarine

by ultimaratioregis | · 8:07 am

Happy Birthday, Dad! And Thanks!

Dad would have been 88 today. He passed away in 2008, having lived an astonishing life that he naturally didn’t see as such. Nor, should one have had the honor of meeting him, would one have guessed at all Dad had accomplished or the disadvantages he overcame to do so.

Born of first-generation immigrant parents into an extremely modest situation, he lost his mother from complications from the birth of his youngest brother when he was ten, leaving him with five siblings and a father struggling to feed them in the grip of the Great Depression. Dad was very untypical in that he never, ever let on about the true extent of the extreme poverty and difficulty of his upbringing. It is only as an adult, and through piecing together stories of my uncles and aunts, and a handful of people who’d grown up with Dad, that I came to understand just how dreadful his childhood had been. (There was an old gentleman who lived near the high school I attended, whom Dad directed that we give utmost respect to and do anything he or his wife might ask. I found out later that Mr. Gorman was the bread delivery man, and had ensured Dad’s family got a loaf of day-old bread every day whether they could pay or not. At my dad’s funeral, I related the story, and Uncle Frank informed me that the bread Mr. Gorman delivered kept them from starving more than a few times.)

Like so many of his generation, Dad quit school at 14 to work to earn money to help feed his brothers and sisters. He became a qualified mechanic by age 16, and found steady employment at a local service station. When war came, Dad enlisted in the US Navy on his 17th birthday, March 21st, 1942. He would serve aboard a landing craft, LCT-172, in the South Pacific in Admiral Barbey’s 7th Amphibious Force, in New Guinea, New Britain, and the Admiralties. He was a MM2 at age 20 when the war ended, training for landings on Kyushu.

Dad met Mom and they were married in 1952, producing an older sister, two older brothers, saving the best for last with the youngest. He was a strict but loving father, a natural at it, despite having no example of his own to draw from. He and Mom instilled the values of honesty, hard work, and an appreciation of the value of education in us that has made their kids all happy and successful adults. (Despite the more than occasional indicators that made him ask “What am I raising for kids, idiots?”)

Dad went on to work as a pattern maker and machinist (I found his Machinists’ Union card when we were cleaning out the house), but my Mom encouraged him to go back to school. So, working a full time job AND while raising a young family, Dad went back to night school and obtained his High School Diploma, and amazingly, a Mechanical Engineering degree. An indifferent student in his youth, he was by all accounts an excellent one in his second go-around. Indeed, his innate understanding of mathematics and his passion for mechanical engineering problems helped me and my brother countless times, and remain some of the most amazing discussions I can recall.

Despite a serious heart attack in 1967, Dad went on to a long and productive working career. He invented a machine to shred old tires, a design that is still in use. He adapted that design to the machines in your grocery store that accept and shred plastic bottles, an invention that made his company millions. He retired in 1995, and as he aged, the usual health problems began to take their toll. He lost his wife of 49 years in 2002. (Their last anniversary together was September 12th, 2001, which makes me hate the jihadis even more. )

Dad never talked in detail about his experiences in the war, not until I came back from Iraq. Then, I think, he needed to. The places he’d been, and the things he saw in his almost 3 years in the Pacific are enough to make any combat veteran swallow hard. I didn’t know until later in my Mother’s life that Dad had nightmares every night for 60 years from the war. When she passed, one of the things I most worried about was him awakening alone from those nightmares, with nobody to tell him things were okay.

When Dad’s time came in June of 2008, cancer had ravaged him in a shockingly brief time. But he had already faced death many times. He had been given absolution FOUR TIMES, which has to be some sort of record. An appendicitis in the Pacific in 1944 which almost killed him, his 1967 heart attack, a cardiac arrest on the last day of 2004 (CPR works, folks), and again, on his final day.

Dad was a survivor, and a role model for me whose example still shines. I find myself having problems when I fail to follow the words his voice speaks in my head, and I find success when I heed them. Funny, that. I told him often that I am not sure I ever could have done the things he did, and I meant it. We were so incredibly fortunate to have the parents we did, and that includes a Father whom a man nearing fifty can still look at and apply the word “hero”.

Thanks, Dad. And Happy Birthday. You and Mom enjoy it up there, okay?

10 Comments

Filed under history, navy, Personal, veterans, war

by ultimaratioregis | March 19, 2013 · 7:51 am

General Barry McCaffrey: Lauds “Marines’ Aversion to BS” On Women in Infantry

Time Magazine (of all places) carries General McCaffrey’s missive. Well worth the read (which contains a link to Marine General Newbold’s superb “Seven Myths about ‘Women in Combat’”).

The argument for women at rifle battalion team level is unsound. Makes as much sense as mandating women on all-male professional contact sports teams.

Life in a rifle company is still incredibly brutal, filthy, requires enormous physical energy and upper body strength, and calls for a spirit of personal violence. There is zero personal privacy. Bodily functions take place in close proximity.

Troops are constantly injured from carrying heavy loads and crashing down hills in the dark. They dig like moles to stay alive.

Infantry units live like wild animals during periods of extended combat. Mostly it is a business of self-selected young men. Most of these combat soldiers end up in these units because they actually want to fight.

One might think there would be some additional recognition of such opinions expressed by long-time practitioners of the craft of ground combat. But alas. Objective analysis gives way to activism and some other “isms” all too often.

As General Newbold rightly asserts:

Pity the truthful leader who attempts to hold to standards based on realistic combat factors, and tells truth to power. Most won’t, and the others won’t survive.

(H/T to Battleland)

11 Comments

Filed under Afghanistan, army, Artillery, girls, guns, history, infantry, iraq, marines, navy, obama, Politics, recruiting, SIR!, stupid, Uncategorized, veterans, war

by xbradtc | March 18, 2013 · 10:53 am

Is the Navy finally taking a second look at its insane LCS policy?

Interesting news from Defense News about the future of the surface Navy.

A recommended re-evaluation of the next flights of LCSs — beyond the 24 ships now delivered, under construction, on order or with contract options — is only part of a classified memo, “Vision for the 2025 Surface Fleet,” submitted late last year by the head of Naval Surface Forces, Vice Adm. Tom Copeman, to Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jon Greenert. The Navy’s current plans call for building 52 littoral combat ships, so if the service opted to go in a different direction it would essentially cut the LCS program of record in half.

VADM Copeman, in effect the senior Surface Warfare Officer, has a slew of good ideas.

The entirety of the LCS program is deeply flawed, right from the conception that the Navy really, really needed a ship that was virtually unarmed, yet could sprint at 45-50 knots speed, and yet be large enough (~3000 tons) to self deploy world wide. That mismatch of capabilities drove hull shape choices, power plant choices, limitations on construction standards (which directly influences both damage control ability, and useful ship lifetimes), sensor and weapons suite capability, and multi-role function.

Having chosen a flawed concept, the Navy double down on its insanity. The original idea of prototyping two competing designs, each with different hull forms, combat suites, manufacturing and support efforts and power plants, all pretty much never used before, had a lot to recommend it. The idea was that one or two of each competing design would be built, deployed, tested, and then the design best suited for the Navy would be put into serial production, and the other design shelved.

The problem was, both designs were so awful that the initial ship in each class has been complete for years now, and only this month has one of them even been able to finally depart on its first deployment. No real information on the abilities and liabilities of either design been accumulated.

But the Navy is desperately short on ships, a condition that is only getting worse. So the idea of downselecting to one program was tossed out, and both ships were ordered into production. One suspects a good deal of corporate rentseeking was at work here. Both design teams have spread around contracts to numerous congressional districts with powerful representatives, making it far more difficult to cancel either program. And if the Navy had chose just one design, the almost inevitable contract protest would have tied the Navy in knots for years, with cases winding their way through the courts, at immense expense to the taxpayer, and no benefit to the Navy.

So here we are, with the Navy already contracted for 24 of a planned 52 LCS ships (a dozen of each of the competing designs). VADM Copeman’s document is the first to see the light of day from Big Navy that even raises the possibility that maybe the LCS isn’t what the Navy needs. I’m rather surprised he hasn’t been hung from the yardarm yet.

Is upgunning one of the designs the right way to go? I don’t know. I suspect it isn’t, but it may be quicker than any alternative, which has a merit of its own. Drawing out a shipbuilding program over more years is rarely a way of saving money or improving the product. Personally, I’d probably rather see a “half a Burke” platform, with the powerplant cut in half, a smaller missile battery, and a lightweight SPY-1F/SPY-1K combat system. But the temptation to gold plate such a platform would be almost unbearable, and you’d quickly wind up simply buying more of the regular DDG-51 Burke’s, which, since the whole point is to find a low cost, low end ship, would defeat the purpose.

As to the Flight III Burke, with its Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) to replace the current SPY-1D/Aegis combat system, VADM Copeman is leery of pushing the Burke platform to such fine growth margins. That’s a fair concern. But personally, I’d like to see a short run of Flt III ships shake out the AMDR before we take the next logical step of building a newer, more powerful plant and hull. Built a little, test a lot, learn a lot.

Whatever differences of opinion I may have with VADM Copeman, I certainly am glad to see someone with some rational thought applied to the composition of the surface fleet, and the Navy’s shipbuilding program.

{Update}- Of course, CDR Salamander had his take up first, and more comprehensively.

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Filed under navy, stupid

Tagged as AMDR, LCS, Littoral combat ship, navy, USS Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)

by ultimaratioregis | March 11, 2013 · 6:09 pm

Question for the Gang: What is the Most Beautiful Warship Ever?

One of the great things about being able to write for this or any other blog is the ability to ask questions with the purpose of drawing out opinions and generating discussion amongst knowledgeable readers.

The question I pose today is the following:

In your opinion, what was the most beautiful warship ever built?

Defining “beauty” in an instrument of war may seem a contradiction, but to the denizens here and elsewhere who are either Naval enthusiasts or have been to sea on a warship, there is an instinctive reaction to the sight of a graceful and well-balanced vessel that exudes power and strength.

Beauty, also being in the eye of the beholder, still has some qualifiers on this first offering:

The ship (for this round, at least) must be a capital ship, a fleet carrier, battleship, battle cruiser, armored cruiser, guided missile cruiser, or heavy cruiser.
The ship must be primarily steam-powered and of steel/iron construction.

Note that neither design success nor combat record is a part of any consideration. This is not about the most effective fighting vessel, but rather the most aesthetically pleasing.

My offerings below are not at all exhaustive, and I encourage any additional input for which class or one-off ship strikes your sense of beauty. That said, one can likely easily spot some of my biases in my selections. The “clipper” or “Atlantic” bow. Funnel caps. I could think of no pre-Dreadnoughts that were beautiful ships. Amphibs, either. I offer only a single aircraft carrier class, as well. I heavily favored guns, but not exclusively. And there are a few selections that either precede or follow major rebuilds which make the vessels all but unrecognizable from their original design. Which is good in one case, bad in another.

And I selected no French battleships. They tend to be ugly affairs, with tumble-home sides and oddly-spaced machinery and funnels. Even the Dunkerques and Richeleius, while significant improvements, suffer from the truncated appearance that plagued Nelson and Rodney, which are also not on my list.

Without further ado, grouped by country, below are my considerations for the most beautiful warships ever built. Select from them, if you like, or offer your own choices.

Germany

Bismarck-class Battleships

Gneisenau-class Battlecruisers**

Helgoland-class Second Generation Dreadnoughts

Derfflinger-class Battlecruisers

Hipper-class Heavy Cruisers**

Great Britain

Battlecruiser Tiger

Queen Elizabeth-class Super Dreadnoughts (As built)

Renown-class Battlecruisers

Battlecruiser Hood

Battleship Vanguard

Japan

Yamato-class Superbattleships

Mikuma-class Heavy Cruisers

Maya-class Heavy Cruisers

Italy

Andrea Doria-class Battleships (post-rebuild)

Vittorio Veneto-class Battleships

Zara-class Heavy Cruisers

The United States

Lexington-class Fleet Aircraft Carriers

South Dakota-class Battleships

Alaska-class Battlecruisers

Iowa-class Battleships

Des Moines-class Heavy Cruisers

California-class Nuclear Guided Missile Cruisers

France

Duquesne-class Heavy Cruisers

Suffern-class Heavy Cruisers

Soviet Union/Russia

Project-68 (Sverdlov)-class Heavy Cruisers

Kirov-class Battlecruisers

So there you are, some suggestions for the most beautiful warships ever built. Fire away, either with the ones I provided, or offer your own ideas.

(Next round will be Light Cruisers and Destroyers.)

** Both Gneisenaus and cruiser Hipper were completed with straight stem and no funnel cap. The addition of the “clipper bow” and capped funnel was not considered a significant rebuild in either class/unit.

UPDATE and BUMPED: Now with a poll added. I’ll have to teach URR how to make one before the next round. Vote!

27 Comments

Filed under armor, Artillery, guns, history, navy, Personal, SIR!, Uncategorized, war

Tagged as Bismarck-class battleship, Cruiser, Naval

by ultimaratioregis | March 3, 2013 · 12:59 pm

Counterinsurgency Words of Wisdom from Pete Ellis***

There is a saying among historians that the best place to find a new idea is in an old book. Time and again over the years, I have cracked open long-forgotten volumes to find gems of timeless and timely wisdom, astute commentary, and unimpeachable good sense. Contained on those yellowed pages are answers to problems and challenges not at all different from contemporary times, and appreciations of conditions and factors that are surprising for their sophistication and insight.

In the March 1921 edition of The Marine Corps Gazette, then-Major Earl H. “Pete” Ellis penned an article entitled “Bush Brigades”, which dealt with the deployment of US Marine forces into areas in the Western Hemisphere in which instability and violence threatened US interests and the safety of the native populace. These interventions, known collectively as the “Banana Wars”, were the basis for the seminal 1940 Small Wars Manual. Interestingly, nearly two decades before SWM was published, Major Ellis struck upon a number of maxims that fairly leap off the page, and would have been excellent counsel for US commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan.

At the minimum, Ellis’s words would have permitted today’s Officers and NCOs (and politicians!) to understand that the challenges and issues faced in the decade-long counter-insurgency fights were not new or unprecedented, but rather something with which US military thinkers had had to wrestle and solve for a significant portion of the previous century. And in those words and the words of others might have been lessons and cautions that aided in success on the battlefield and in the newspapers.

The mercurial Major Ellis expounded upon a number of topics from large to small, that military thinkers would find highly relevant today. I will attempt to do justice to the more salient of those topics below:

The character of enemy operations:

a)      A somewhat disorganized attempt to prevent landings.

b)      More or less resistance in cities followed by a race to the jungle.

c)       The organization and operation of armed bands, at first risking open battle and finally waging guerilla warfare.

d)      The operation of outlaw bands (bandits, ladrones, cacos) who murder members of the forces of occupation and their own people indiscriminately.

In general, enemy operations will be those of irregular forces or guerilla bands with the usual series of surprise raids, ambushes, and assassinations. The enemy will have moral support from most of his own people, material support from many, and will operate in their midst.

Replace “landings” in a) with “invasion”, and “jungle” in b) with “desert”, and you have a pretty accurate description of the course of things in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The role of the press/media and the “peculiar attitude of the American people themselves”:

The Marines are down in Jungleland!- and killed a man in a war!

And the oft-forgotten fact that

…the Marines are only doing their job as ordered by the people of the United States.

The usefulness of cash payoffs to the locals:

…it must be emphatically stated that a flying column should never be sent into the bush unless amply provided with CASH. With it can be purchased knowledge of the terrain and movement of the enemy, and food. It is safe to say that at least 50 percent of the so-called harsh measures used in bush warfare could be eliminated by providing troops with adequate information money.

Considerations in the location of a fortified post:

The site of the post should have, if possible, the following characteristics:

a)      Be capable of defense by a small detachment.

b)      Be of sufficient extent to permit the bivouac of … one hundred men, with mounted detachment.

c)       Permit control of any town in the vicinity and all approaches, especially roads and ravines.

d)      Have sufficient elevation to generally observe the surrounding country.

e) Permit control of a landing field for aeroplanes.

The main requirement for a fortified post, garrisoned as it will be by only a few men, is that it cannot be rushed.

The above would have been a helpful guide to the Officers who decided to emplace COP ~~Kahler~~ Keating in Wanat.

What is now termed “Lawfare”:

To enforce one’s will upon an enemy of the nature depicted without subjecting one’s self to undue criticism is one of the most difficult tasks that can confront a soldier. The “Rules of Land Warfare” lay down certain rules which are to be followed, subject to military necessity during hostilities between regular forces of civilized nations. The “Rules of Land Warfare” for the guidance of regular forces engaged in hostilities with irregular or guerilla forces have never been written; and it is doubtful if they ever will be written…

“Phase Four” operations and “Information Dominance”:

It is the final phase which is difficult because, owing to the policy pursued, the following conditions will prevail to a greater or lesser extent:

a)      Bands of murderers and other criminals base in thick, difficult country, and prey indiscriminately on the peaceful people in the production areas.

b)      These bandits have no property other than that which they carry with them or keep in hiding.

c)       Many bandits, having been captured and turned over to proper authority, have been permitted to escape and have rejoined their bands.

d)      The inhabitants of localities frequented by bandits keep them informed of the movement of the force of occupation

e)      The forces of occupation are at a minimum.

Major Ellis’ article was never officially published by the Marine Corps (the Gazette is as then an MCA publication), but nonetheless provides context and narrative which our current generation of Officers and NCOs would find startlingly familiar a century hence. As it would be to Napoleon’s veterans of the Peninsula War a century previous.

Most famous for his prescient divination of the character and requirements of the Pacific War yet to come, Ellis was no stranger to the counterinsurgency efforts of the Marine Corps in the early 20th Century, nor was he unversed in conventional war. He had been plucked from Quantico by General Lejeune and was a key planner for the successful Meuse-Argonne Offensive in France in 1918. Ponder.

*** Milblog writer/reader/commentor “Moe DeLaun” was most gracious in his gift to me of the March 1921 Marine Corps Gazette (along with a wonderful collection of Kipling by Somerset Maugham and the DVD of The Man Who Would Be King!) There is much more in that March of 1921 edition that I will be sharing and commenting on over the next several months, including articles on Russia, American Marines in Nicaragua, and the Aisne-Marne Offensive of the late war. THANKS MOE!

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Filed under Afghanistan, armor, army, Artillery, guns, history, infantry, iraq, marines, navy, planes, Uncategorized, war

by ultimaratioregis | March 1, 2013 · 6:17 am

From the Castle: There are Many Ways to Break an Army

Brilliantly stated. Both the latent but still virulent anti-military sentiment that has been at the core of the Progressive Far Left since before World War II, and the rapidly growing focus on the supposed internal threat which law enforcement has used as justification to become increasingly militarized.

Because, in their heart of hearts, they don’t like the whole concept of an Army, and want to change it into some sort of fluffy-bunny simulacrum. That and because DoD is the one institution they can play with that will just do what it’s told. Oft times reluctantly, but in the end it does what it’s told.

While, ironically, they make domestic law enforcement, especially on the Federal level, more and more like… an Army.

Give it a read. Damned little of the “change” in the “Hope and Change” era has been progress. In fact, the cascading effects downstream will likely be catastrophic, for our Armed Forces and our nation. And if our fervent hopes that things turn out otherwise are dashed, why, there will be internal “threats” aplenty for the army of Law Enforcement to take care of.

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Filed under Air Force, army, Around the web, guns, history, marines, navy, obama, veterans, war

by xbradtc | February 27, 2013 · 10:32 am

Stealing all the good stuff from CDR Salamander

I love stealing from being inspired to post by CDR Salamander.

He’s got a couple of good posts today, a nice mix of the old and the new.

First a link to a great photospread on the HMS Caroline, a Royal Navy cruiser from World War I.

There’s also a half hour video on her.

—

Next up, LCS-1 recently got a new paint job, designed and applied by the crew for their deployment that starts Friday. *

No, a new paint job doesn’t make the Little Crappy Ship** any better, but having painted a boat a time or two, I appreciate the hard work it is. And at least the black patches hide some of the soot from the diesel exhausts.

*I thought sailing on Fridays was bad.

** A term coined over half a decade ago by Byron the shipfitter, and denizen of Sal’s front porch.

4 Comments

Filed under Around the web, history, navy

Tagged as CDR Salamander, HMS Caroline, LCS, Royal Navy, United States Navy, USS Freedom

by xbradtc | February 24, 2013 · 12:51 pm

Mine Warfare- Part II

The first post focused on surface laid, contact fused naval mines.

If only it were that simple. Beginning in the interwar period between World War I and World War II, both the method of delivery, and fusing options for naval mines underwent a revolution that vastly complicated the defense against naval mines.

Let’s take a quick look at delivery options first. Of course, there’s the traditional surface laid mine, delivered over the stern of a minelayer. Variations include other warships with rails installed, or the Mine Planters of the Army, or using almost any other vessel available to drop a couple over the side.

But stealth in the delivery of mines can be a powerful tool. Submarines were an attractive option for delivering mines in enemy waters. Both specialized minelaying subs, and specialized mines to be launched from conventional submarine torpedo tubes were developed. While the specialized submarine minelayer has passed into history, the submarine launched mine is still very much with us.

The other major method of mine delivery, and eventually the all time champ in terms of volume, was the airplane. Airplanes couldn’t carry very many mines compared to a ship, of course, but you could buy a lot more planes than ships for a given amount of money. And over the course of the time it would take a ship to load mines, steam to the target, drop the mines, and return, planes could make quite a few sorties. Medium and heavy bombers were quite well suited for dropping mines.

The problem with moored contact mines was that a ship had to, well, make contact. That limited the depths at which they could be laid, increased the weight of the mine (as the anchor for the mine was quite heavy), and reduced the likelihood of any one mine damaging a ship. If only there was some way to allow mines to trigger without direct contact.

As it turns out, weaponeers eventually designed several mines that responded to the influence of passing vessels to detonate. These influence mines used three primary methods.

Since the mine didn’t have to have contact to detonate, it need not be moored, and instead could be allowed to sink to the bottom of shallow waters. This also allowed for an under the keel gas bubble jet attack, which is devastating to almost any ship. Even if the target ship wasn’t directly overhead, shock, blast and whipping action from a nearby explosion could cause serious damage.

First, the magnetic mine. Steel hulled ships very slightly alter the magnetic field of the waters they transit. Just as a magnet swings a compass needle, this flux in the local magnetic field could be used to trigger a mine.

The second major type of influence mine was the passive acoustic mine. Hydrophones on the mine would listen for the sound of an approaching ship’s propellers. When the sound reached a threshold, the mine would detonate.

The third type was the hydrostatic, or water pressure displacement fused mine. The local change in water pressure caused by a ship’s hull moving through the water was used as the triggering method.

Bottom laid influence mines were particularly well suited for delivery by bombers, and during the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe made strenuous efforts to frequently mine the Thames River estuary, and other major shipping ports of England. The British were first somewhat flummoxed by the new mines, but after a missed drop left one ashore, they quickly devised sweeping countermeasures against them.

German World War II magnetic mine that landed on the ground instead of the water. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

German magnetic mine accidentally dropped ashore in England.

File:Dwi wellington front.jpg

British Vickers Wellington bomber modified with magnetic mine exploder.

As always in warfare, advances in offence are met by advances in defense. And vice versa. As means of sweeping each type of influence mine evolved, so did means of making mines harder to sweep. Fuse functions were modified with “counters” so that, say, the first magnetic field to pass through the trigger mechanism would be ignored. Or maybe the first dozen. Only after a certain number of magnetic fields had influenced the trigger would the mine actually detonate. That meant that suspected minefields would have to be swept multiple times, and even then, there was no real way to assure that all mines had been swept.

Simply telling a mine to wait for a period of time, say 30 days, to activate would complicate sweeping.

Combining multiple influence fuses would also make mines less susceptible to countermeasures.

The British extensively mined waters in the North Sea and the Bay of Biscay to frustrate German shipping and U-boats.

The most effective mining campaign of the war was probably Operation Starvation, the use of B-29s to mine crucial Japanese shipping routes near the end of the war. The Army Air Force was loathe to use its B-29s for anything other than strategic bombing of land targets, but did dedicate one bomb group to the mission. For the loss of 15 bombers over the course of 6 months, and dropping only 12,000 mines, the campaign sank or damaged 670 vessels totaling about one and a quarter million tons of shipping. More importantly, it virtually paralyzed the already decimated Japanese merchant service.

The US would not again use aerial delivered mines until 1967, when A-6A Intruders of VA-35 mined the Red River in Vietnam, and more famously, in 1972, Navy and Marine jets from various squadrons laid the first of what eventually totaled over 11,000 mines in Haiphong and other Vietnamese ports. *

The initial mines were purpose built aerial delivered mines. But magazine space on ships is very limited, and aerial mines are bulky, complex weapons. Eventually, the Navy switched to the Destructor family of modular mine systems.

The Mk82 and Mk84 bombs were modular, in that they could use a variety of tail fin assemblies, and nose and tail fuse assemblies. The bright idea was suggested that using the Mk15 Snakeye high drag tail kit and a specialized fuse would allow any Mk82 or Mk84 to be used as an aerial delivered naval mine. Accordingly, the Mk36 Destructor series mines were invented. No modification to the delivery aircraft were needed, and the ballistics were identical to regular Snakeye bombs, so little extra training was needed. And since the bombs were already the mainstay of the ships magazines, and fuses took up little space, a plentiful supply could be kept on hand.

After the Destructor series of fuses were compromised by their use in North Vietnam, the Quickstrike series was fielded. Externally almost indistinguishable from the Destructor series, they have served for the last 30 years or so. But the general purpose bomb casing is roughly half steel and half explosive by weight. Fragmentation is great for a bomb, but fairly useless for a mine. Accordingly, the current US air delivered mine, the Mk65 Quickstrike, uses the fuse assemblies, but has a traditional bulky mine body maximizing the explosive content.

Quickstrike family of mines.

Submarines are still quite capable of delivering mines as well. Most sub delivered mines are 21” in diameter, to be place by ejecting them from a sub’s torpedo tubes. They tend to be roughly half the length of a torpedo, so for every torpedo offloaded, a sub can carry two mines.

Other sub delivered mines include the Mk67 SLMM or Submarine Launched Mobile Mine. A converted Mk37 torpedo, it is launched like a normal torpedo, navigates from the launch point to its designated target area, then sinks to the bottom, to lie in wait. This standoff allows a sub to mine waters such as river estuaries that the sub might ordinarily be able to attack.

*As part of the Paris Accords that ended US involvement in Vietnam, we also went in and swept all those mines.

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Tagged as Naval mine, navy, Operation Starvation, World War II

by ultimaratioregis | February 14, 2013 · 5:36 pm

More About Awards

Since there is no horse too dead, nor any cat too flat, let me suggest the following modifications to our Armed Forces awards chart:

Let’s have a look at the ones I would can, and why:

Defense Distinguished Service Medal- The same as the Distinguished Service Medal, except GOFOs get a separate one for doing something “joint”. Rescind it, and either replace with the DSM, or the star for additional awards of DSM.

Defense Superior Service Medal- The “joint” equivalent to the Legion of Merit. Another 0-6/GOFO bauble. Get rid of it. Award the Legion of Merit, or stars for additional awards.

Defense Meritorious Service Medal- You got it, the “joint” MSM. Rescind. Award MSM or stars for additional awards.

Joint Service Commendation Medal- Notice a trend here? You have a service branch, presumably. Make the Joint HQ convince your service branch that you rate your service branch’s Commendation Medal. If they can’t, maybe you shouldn’t have one. Certainly not some “joint” equivalent. Rescind.

Joint Meritorious Unit Award- Precisely the same rationale as the JSCM above. Except for the collective. If your outfit was that good, your service branch should award as appropriate.

Global War on Terror Expeditionary Medal- Never understood creating an expeditionary medal for wars in which campaign medals were sure to be minted. I might be able to see it for guys in the Philippines and elsewhere, not in IRQ or AFG. BUT, we have the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal for that. Rescind, and replace it with the AFEM.

Global War on Terror Service Medal- This formerly held the position of “Dumbest New Award”, but has been overtaken by the Drone Medal. Get rid of it. They already have the National Defense Service Medal for those who didn’t deploy. (Formerly known as the CNN Medal. As in “You saw Desert Storm on CNN? Me too!”) Rescind without replacement with a current equivalent.

Armed Forces Service Medal- “Significant activity”? Are you kidding me? Rescind without replacement.

Humanitarian Service Medal- Another non-warfighter feel-good award. Get rid of it. After Hugo ripped through South Carolina, Marines from MCB helped out cutting and clearing trees, and delivering water, etc. The base CSTAFF spent a formation droning (!) on and on about how they worked twelve hour days for two weeks to help out. Meanwhile, the Drill Instructors continued their 140-hour work weeks for the entire two year tour. So the Sgt from base motors was awarded this thing while my Sgt Senior Drill Instructor got zilch, and had his NCM downgraded to a NAM.

Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal- Makes the Humanitarian Service Medal look like the Iron Cross. Away with it.

Overseas Service Ribbon- Another “everybody gets one” trinket. You were PCS overseas, with all the concomitant bennies that the UDP bubbas pumping to WESTPAC didn’t have. Want a ribbon for being OCONUS? Ride a gator freighter for 200 days. Or do Camp Hansen unaccompanied.

Recruiting/Drill Instructor/Marine Security Guard Ribbons- Wrong, wrong, wrong. No “special duty” ribbons on a Marine uniform. Lousy idea from jump street, let’s get rid of them most rikki tik.

These are, of course, in addition to the Distinguished Warfare Medal, hereby unofficially known as the “Stays in Vegas” Medal.

Before you ask, yes, at least three of these are ones I am authorized. By comparison, my Dad came home from the Pacific, after eleven landings and almost three years, with four ribbons. One was a Navy Good Cookie, and another was the Asiatic-Pacific Theater Ribbon with four battle stars. Along with a PUC. He got a WWII Victory Medal on his way out in ’46. In 1991, we had people sit at Al Jubayl for two weeks and come home with five.

It would do us well to have senior Officers that look like warriors instead of Idi Amin, or BG McSoulpatch. Just sayin’. Any others I failed to mention that should go?

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Filed under Afghanistan, Air Force, army, history, iraq, marines, navy, SIR!, stolen valor, stupid, Uncategorized, war

by ultimaratioregis | February 12, 2013 · 7:14 am

A Nuclear North Korea and Its Benevolent Protector: China

News today that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has successfully tested a nuclear device. This third test, again using plutonium, employed a smaller and lighter device than in previous iterations, yet it produced a yield roughly twice that of the 2009 test. It is increasingly obvious that the DPRK is closing in on a warhead-sized weapon that can be melded with the long-range ICBM program that is developing apace under Kim Jong-Un.

The bright side would seem to be the universal condemnation of the DPRK nuclear test, and seemingly strong diplomatic language, even from China, regarding the most recent test. However, with closer scrutiny, I am exceedingly skeptical of China’s supposedly sincere denunciation of the North Korea test. When the history of China’s benevolent protection of North Korea is examined in detail, it becomes strikingly clear that such protection includes both encouragement and material and technical assistance.

Peking has deliberately and unabashedly thwarted each and every opportunity to contain North Korea. The Chinese refused outright to live by UNSC Resolutions 1718 and 1874. China continues her arms sales to Pyongyang, and her large economic (read: financial) aid to Kim’s government. China aided materially in the testing of long-range ballistic missiles, even as Chinese officials publicly condemned the tests. China provided launch platforms, and likely technical assistance, to include guidance technology (thank you LORAL, Bill Clinton, and Ron Brown). The People’s Republic of China undoubtedly provided technical assistance to North Korea for a series of cyber intrusions in the United States and the Republic of Korea. China publicly rebuffed US Secretary of State Clinton while ignoring the evidence of North Korean guilt in the sinking of the ROK corvette Cheonan, with the loss of 46 ROK sailors. A short time later, China refused to condemn DPRK for the unprovoked artillery strike inside ROK sovereign territory which killed four and wounded 50. China’s only comment was a demand for ROK “restraint”, and the condemnation of “escalation”, which Chinese comments clearly indicated would be blamed on the South and the US.

This latest nuclear test is no surprise to China. China’s faux-outrage and seemingly strong reproof of the Kim Jong-Un regime is pure dinner theater, crafted and promulgated for the consumption of her Asia neighbors, the United States, and the world community. But believe none of it, not a single word, nor a drop of the sentiment it supposedly conveys. China has for sixty years understood the strategic value of an abjectly hostile and militarily capable North Korea behaving in a seemingly unpredictable manner. This is especially true in the last four years, as US military power shrinks, and the US Navy in particular finds itself in an increasingly less favorable combat ratio in the western Pacific.

Platitudes about Peking wanting to be partners in maintaining stability in Asia are so much diplomatic flattery. As of this moment and in this region, China is unquestionably an adversary, providing assistance, diplomatic cover, and military protection for a sworn and aggressive enemy with nascent nuclear capability and seemingly little restraint. The DPRK is a criminal regime, brutally oppressive, engaged in narcotics and currency counterfeit activity, responsible for shipments of arms and WMD technology to Hamas and Hezbollah, and possibly Iran. But North Korea is what it is, and acts as it does, because China gives it a free hand to do so. If we are going to deal meaningfully with North Korea in defense of our ally in the South, we must acknowledge that fact.

If we hope to counter China’s not-so benevolent rise in the Pacific, we must not just acknowledge China’s ambitions, but plan and act accordingly. Sequestration, which embraces the gutting of American military power for the symbolic but miniscule impact on rampant national debt, is the foolhardy artifice of bumbling foreign policy and national security amateurs. But that is fodder for another post.

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Filed under Air Force, army, Artillery, history, marines, navy, obama, Politics, space, Uncategorized, war

by xbradtc | February 11, 2013 · 5:58 pm

A Medal of Honor, and a sad farewell.

I’ve spent most of my day having fun in the comments of today’s Load HEAT, but I’m fully cognizant that two events took place today, both of which remind us of the honor and courage, and yes, sacrifice that so many of our citizens display.

Former Staff Sergeant Clinton Romesha was presented the Medal of Honor today for his actions during the battle at Combat Outpost Keating.

Saluting Clinton Romesha for embodying the soldier’s creed of never leaving behind a fallen comrade, President Obama on Monday bestowed the Medal of Honor on him for courageously defending a remote American outpost in eastern Afghanistan from a ferocious attack by more than 300 Taliban fighters.

During the daylong attack on Combat Outpost Keating, the president said, Mr. Romesha, a 31-year-old Army staff sergeant, now retired, showed “conspicuous gallantry” in taking out an enemy machine-gun position, calling in airstrikes that killed 30 Taliban fighters, laying down covering fire to allow three soldiers to run to safety, and scrambling through a fusillade of enemy fire to recover the bodies of fallen American soldiers.

His bravery, Mr. Obama said, helped prevent the outpost from being overrun by Taliban fighters. He was wounded in the neck, shoulder and arms by shrapnel after a rocket-propelled grenade hit a generator he was hiding behind. Eight American service members were killed in the October 2009 battle, one of the most intense of the war.

The citation for his award reads as follows:

Staff Sergeant Clinton L. Romesha distinguished himself by acts of gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Section Leader with Bravo Troop, 3d Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, during combat operations against an armed enemy at Combat Outpost Keating, Kamdesh District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan on October 3, 2009. On that morning, Staff Sergeant Romesha and his comrades awakened to an attack by an estimated 300 enemy fighters occupying the high ground on all four sides of the complex, employing concentrated fire from recoilless rifles, rocket propelled grenades, anti-aircraft machine guns, mortars and small arms fire. Staff Sergeant Romesha moved uncovered under intense enemy fire to conduct a reconnaissance of the battlefield and seek reinforcements from the barracks before returning to action with the support of an assistant gunner. Staff Sergeant Romesha took out an enemy machine gun team and, while engaging a second, the generator he was using for cover was struck by a rocket-propelled grenade, inflicting him with shrapnel wounds. Undeterred by his injuries, Staff Sergeant Romesha continued to fight and upon the arrival of another soldier to aid him and the assistant gunner, he again rushed through the exposed avenue to assemble additional soldiers. Staff Sergeant Romesha then mobilized a five-man team and returned to the fight equipped with a sniper rifle. With complete disregard for his own safety, Staff Sergeant Romesha continually exposed himself to heavy enemy fire, as he moved confidently about the battlefield engaging and destroying multiple enemy targets, including three Taliban fighters who had breached the combat outpost’s perimeter. While orchestrating a successful plan to secure and reinforce key points of the battlefield, Staff Sergeant Romesha maintained radio communication with the tactical operations center. As the enemy forces attacked with even greater ferocity, unleashing a barrage of rocket-propelled grenades and recoilless rifle rounds, Staff Sergeant Romesha identified the point of attack and directed air support to destroy over 30 enemy fighters. After receiving reports that seriously injured Soldiers were at a distant battle position, Staff Sergeant Romesha and his team provided covering fire to allow the injured Soldiers to safely reach the aid station. Upon receipt of orders to proceed to the next objective, his team pushed forward 100 meters under overwhelming enemy fire to recover and prevent the enemy fighters from taking the bodies of their fallen comrades. Staff Sergeant Romesha’s heroic actions throughout the day-long battle were critical in suppressing an enemy that had far greater numbers. His extraordinary efforts gave Bravo Troop the opportunity to regroup, reorganize and prepare for the counterattack that allowed the Troop to account for its personnel and secure Combat Outpost Keating. Staff Sergeant Romesha’s discipline and extraordinary heroism above and beyond the call of duty reflect great credit upon himself, Bravo Troop, 3d Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division and the United States Army.

Sadly, today was also a time to mourn the loss of former Navy SEAL Chris Kyle, gunned down by a man he had extended the hand of friendship and brotherhood to. Thousands turned out to Cowboys Stadium to say farewell to a man many had never met. Would that we could remember all our fallen in such a manner.

Thousands of well-wishers, including dozens of Navy SEALS, descended on Cowboys Stadium in Arlington, Texas, on Monday to remember the life of a famed Navy SEAL sniper killed at a nearby gun range on Feb. 2.

The body of Chris Kyle, author of “American Sniper: The Autobiography of the Most Lethal Sniper in U.S. Military History” — an account of Kyle’s four tours in Iraq, where he said he killed at least 160 enemy combatants — lay in state on the Cowboys’ silver and blue star logo at the 50-yard line, with an American flag draped over his coffin.

The stadium, designed for the fidgety loudness of an NFL game day, instead swallowed the echoes of tributes, scripture readings and country songs dedicated to Kyle, as well as the mournful silences between.

An estimated 7,000 people attended, and Texas Gov. Rick Perry issued a statement that said, in part, “Chris Kyle was the public face of an anonymous breed of American warrior who are handed the hardest missions and assume the largest risks. Chris was among the very best at what he did, and he saved countless American lives in the process. Our state and our nation suffered a profound loss with his passing.”

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Tagged as army, chris kyle, clinton romesha, medal of honor, navy, SEALs

by ultimaratioregis | January 31, 2013 · 3:59 pm

Defense Department Hypocrisy Regarding Uniform Wear?

Well, DoD not only allowed, but encouraged service members to wear their uniforms at Gay/LBGT Pride events following the repeal of DADT. The move was lustily (!) cheered by the Far-Left Progressives in whose ranks the activists and the advocates tend to fall. Despite the regulations (DoDINST 1334.1) that forbid the wearing of the uniform when it “may tend to bring discredit upon the Armed Forces”.

So, we are told, THIS:

is just fine with THIS:

And THIS:

It is encouraged, in fact.

Okie doke. But there seems to be a problem. Apparently some enlisted Sailors wore their dress uniforms to an Adult Entertainment convention in Las Vegas over the weekend. A National Guardsman apparently took and posted several photographs, none of the compromising, showing the men in their uniforms. And Navy Times’ Scoop Deck posts a most pejorative article regarding the incident. Bear in mind that the Adult Entertainment Industry is perfectly legal, and that prostitution is legal in Nevada. Yet, somehow, men in the company of scantily clad women instead of other (scantily clad) men is somehow “bringing discredit” upon the uniform?

So, THIS

should be strictly VERBOTEN.

If there is the slightest condemnation from Navy leadership over the wearing of the uniform to the convention, or any kind of disciplinary or administrative action against these sailors, what little credibility is left among our senior Military leadership, uniformed and civilian, will have evaporated completely. The quite understandable perception of caving into a politically-protected special interest group, and of becoming de facto advocates for such causes in order to gain political favor will be confirmed once and for all.

Whadda ya say, Ray Mabus? I do imagine you are not nodding quite as enthusiastically at pictures of Sailors in uniform at this event…

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Filed under Air Force, army, Around the web, latex, marines, navy, Uncategorized

by ultimaratioregis | · 7:32 am

Sinking the Fleet

No, not the US Navy. Other people are doing that. Sinking the New England fishing fleet. Which is a 350-year old industry, among the oldest in the land. Sinking it not with weapons of war or A2AD technology, but by something far more destructive. Gummint regulation. The Associated Press tells us the story.

The New England Fishery Management Council on Wednesday approved a year-to-year cut of 77 percent on the Gulf of Maine cod limit and 61 percent for Georges Bank cod.

The cuts come on top of a slew of other reductions, ranging from 10 to 71 percent, on the catch of other bottom-dwelling groundfish species, such as haddock and flounder.

Fishermen say now they’re staring at industry collapse because they’ve been left with far too few fish for most boats to make a living.

“We are headed down the wrong course here, of exterminating the inshore fleet, for no good reason,” said David Goethel, a New Hampshire fisherman and council member.

The cuts, in effect May 1, are expected to be backed by federal managers at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. NOAA’s top federal fisheries regulator, John Bullard, acknowledged the reductions will be devastating. But he said the fish stocks are struggling and the industry’s steady, excruciating decline must be reversed.

Another industry damaged to the point of ruin by Government over-regulation. For Mr. Bullard’s part, his is a now-familiar refrain that science has proven beyond question that the Government and the environmentalists who populate it are correct.

“The first thing we have to do is put denial behind us,” he said.

Like Global Warming, perhaps. Which became “Climate Change” when they could no longer hide the evidence that the globe was, in fact, not warming. The climate is changing, of course, and has been for nearly 4.6 billion years, give or take. But it opens up a whole new list of conditions that can be blamed on Capitalism and mankind, and then “proven” with the shoddy and fraudulent pseudo-science of the Environmentalist Far Left. Not a new technique. Just another example of the old terminology bait-and-switch, like substituting “Violent Extremists” for “Muslim Extremists”.

Unfortunately, NOAA has become heavily politicized, the de facto scientific justification mouthpiece for the EPA and other environmentalist groups bent on stifling industry with regulations. In all of its prognostications, here’s betting that neither NOAA nor the New England Fisheries Management Council can answer the most basic and important question:

Fishermen have consistently disputed the accuracy of the science that drives regulation and that indicates the stocks are in bad shape. And they noted the industry has generally fished at or below levels recommended by science in recent years, but the advice has proven wrong.

“I’ve done everything they told me to do, and all of the sudden I come up here to a meeting today, and they’re going to send me in a coffin out of this place,” said New Bedford fisherman Carlos Rafael, who said he may have to sideline half his fleet of 20 groundfish boats.

If NEFMC and NOAA have been so consistently wrong in the past several years, what on earth would give me confidence that they are close to being right now, insisting upon regulations that will eviscerate the centuries-old crucial New England fishing industry and all the economic benefits derived from it? (See: Snail Darter, Red-Cockaded Woodpecker, melting ice caps, Nepalese glacier retreat.)

Never fear, however. Gib Brogan, he (presumably) of the environmental group Oceana, has it all figured out.

Gib Brogan of the environmental group Oceana said too many boats have been chasing too few fish for too long. Industry downsizing will is actually “right-sizing,” he said, and when those fish come back in greater numbers, the industry will figure out how to benefit.

Perhaps Gib and the rest of Oceana can come up with the money to keep the New England seacoast fishing industry from disappearing. But one has to wonder whether they have the same concern for people as they do for cod and haddock.

In other news, the economy shrank last quarter by 0.1%, and unemployment claims shot higher. And we haven’t even begun to see Obamacare’s impact. I can’t wait.

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Filed under navy, obama, Politics, Uncategorized

by ultimaratioregis | January 30, 2013 · 1:55 pm

Eighty Years Ago

On this date eight decades ago, the last gasp of Germany’s post-war Weimar Republic was heard. Assailed from left and right, Communists, Spartacists, Monarchists, and National Socialists, the 14-year Republic fell amidst the torchlight parades in honor of Germany’s new Chancellor, Adolf Hitler. Just three and a half weeks later, the burning of the Reichstag signaled a crisis upon which the new Reich Government would eagerly act. The issue of the so-called “Reichstag Fire Decree”, properly titled Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten zum Schutz von Volk und Staat (“Order of the Reich President for the Protection of People and State”), quickly followed:

On the basis of Article 48 paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the German Reich, the following is ordered in defense against Communist state-endangering acts of violence:

Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153 of the Constitution of the German Reich are suspended until further notice. It is therefore permissible to restrict the rights of personal freedom [habeas corpus], freedom of (opinion) expression, including the freedom of the press, the freedom to organize and assemble, the privacy of postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications. Warrants for House searches, orders for confiscations as well as restrictions on property, are also permissible beyond the legal limits otherwise prescribed.

Next, of course, came the dissolution of the Reichstag under Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, all but cementing Adolf Hitler as dictator of Germany. Signed by the elderly Hindenburg, whose death in August of 1934 allowed Hitler to subsume the title of Reich President, the so-called Enabling Act began twelve years of virtual martial law inside Germany. Hitler, of course, soothed those who were alarmed by promising restraint:

“The government will make use of these powers only insofar as they are essential for carrying out vitally necessary measures…The number of cases in which an internal necessity exists for having recourse to such a law is in itself a limited one.”

A mania to act, to “do something”. Taking advantage of a crisis for political gain. Assigning collective guilt to a segment of society. A state-controlled media eager to help make the case that political opponents represented domestic enemies. An unchecked overreach of government power toward its people and the dissolution of civil liberties. And, finally, in the late summer of the next year, complete subservience of the Army and its leadership, whose oath had previously been to the Constitution of the Republic now dissolved.

Eighty years ago today, it all began in earnest.

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Filed under Air Force, army, history, navy, Politics, Uncategorized, war

by xbradtc | · 1:12 pm

Littoral Combat Ships- How not to buy ships

Lots of LCS news going around the last couple days. First, Undersecretary of the Navy Bob Work released a summary of the development of the program in a Naval War College report:

View this document on Scribd

CDR Salamander takes his usual poke at the bear.

I don’t think one can hang this on Rumsfeld if that is part of this angle; I don’t think it is, but it can be read as such. So, in a word; no.
LCS was and is a product of senior leadership from Admirals Clark, Mullen, and especially Roughead. Without their full-throated advocacy and willing smoke screens, LCS would not have survived – for good or bad.
I enjoy this next bit as, for those who missed it, it catches perfectly the “we are smarter than everyone who came before … all is new, and don’t question by beautiful vision…” vibe that resonated throughout the Chain of Command at the time[,]

And I think he’s right. Go read his whole post, and the comments, especially the one comment about the perils of thinking outside the box.

A fundamental conceptual flaw in the modern construct of “transformation” is its emptiness. Any idiot can “think out of the box,” as many idiots tend to be serial practitioners. But, to achieve useful out-of-box thoughts, one has to thoroughly understand ones “box” in the first place. Historically transformation thinkers, like Mahon, were professionals who had deeply studied, practiced and achieved high levels of expertise. They tend to have thoroughly decomposed and analyzed their profession and craft though broader lenses, so that possibilities were understood in context with real world constraints…

Galrahn at Information Dissemination has a scalding piece on just what a dogs breakfast the development of the LCS program has been.

The OPNAV Report put together by Rear Admiral Samuel Perez was completed early last year and is so brutally honest about the Littoral Combat Ship the Navy can’t even release a declassified version for public consumption because it would, legitimately, be too embarrassing and likely damage the non-existent credibility of the LCS program. The OPNAV Report was exactly what the Navy asked for, an honest assessment of what is needed to fix the Littoral Combat Ship, and it turned out that honesty was also brutally ugly. God bless Rear Admiral Perez for doing a wonderful job that legitimately may actually save the Littoral Combat Ship program. Noteworthy, Rear Admiral Perez got promoted for his good work before he was sent off to the State Department where his career will likely end and no one will ever hear from him for the rest of his career. I’d love to be wrong on that last point, but historically when a Flag Officer gets sent to the State Department, it is like the Russians sending a General to command a remote barracks in Siberia.

Much to my surprise, even as he writes such a devastating post, he still comes to the conclusion that LCS is the way forward. It ain’t, but that’s an argument for another day.

USS Freedom LCS-1

There has been both a historical model for development of ships for the Navy, (cue QM’s rally cry for the return of the General Board) and a current programmatic program, under the DoD 5000 series regulations, for program management.

Prior to the advent of Robert McNamara as SecDef, for the most part, each service pursued its own procurement strategies. If the Army wanted a tank, it designed a tank (or contracted someone to do it for them). The Air Force didn’t feel the need to consult the Army or the Navy when laying out the specifications for a new bomber. And of course, the Navy thought it best knew what characteristics any new ship should have.

McNamara is famous for forcing the services to find commonality across platforms with checkered success. Nudging the Air Force to buy the F-4 Phantom and the A-7 Corsair worked out pretty well. But trying to cram two entirely different mission sets into the TFX led to the F-111 fiasco.

But more than just forcing the services to cooperate on particular platforms, he effectively rescinded service authority to manage weapons systems procurement. If the Air Force wanted to buy a new plane, it had to justify to the Office of SecDef (OSD) the role and mission of the plane, and explain why that role and mission should be an Air Force role. For a notional example, should the Air Force have bought the A-10 as a close air support platform, or would that money have been better spent on tube and rocket artillery or other weapons for the Army? The point being, before any major procurement program began, the services had to explain what role or mission they needed to fulfill, what were the best alternatives to fulfilling that role, what was the best platform needed to fulfill that role, and explain how they intended to do so. Oversight from OSD was there to provide some rationality, and to avoid duplication of effort, and theoretically impose some joint interoperability at the same time. Over the years, this process has been codified into law.

While this leads to a good deal of bureaucratic complexity, it’s not an unalloyed evil, either. The process tends to keep some semblance of rationality in the process. Benchmarks for capability and cost can be reasonably forecast and thus provide feedback on the health of the program.

Sadly, in the case of the Littoral Combat Ship, all this went out the window. Read the embedded article by Under Secretary Work, and you’ll see that the LCS outside the mainstream process took place with little outside “red teaming” of the concept. Originally the LCS concept was sold as almost a technology demonstrator. It was, as such, a very high risk program. Virtually every part of the program was untried. New hull forms, construction standards and techniques, new combat systems, new manning and deployment concepts, new “mission modules” that are being developed concurrently (every one of which appears to be in utter disarray). And yet, somehow, a technology demonstration program suddenly became the centerpiece of the next generation of small(ish) surface combatants.

At the same time, the US Navy is facing block obsolescence of several platforms. The FFG-7 OHP frigates are tired and due for replacement. The Navy’s small (and shrinking) fleet of mine countermeasure ships is increasingly unable to support the needs of the fleet. The small number of Navy PC class ships, designed to support special operations forces, are worn out, and overworked. And so the LCS, which were sold as a new concept in fleet operations, evolved into the replacement for these ships. And it isn’t even a jack of all trades, let alone master of none. It’s more like the 3 of clubs.

CDR Salamander above says not to lay the blame at Rumsfeld’s feet. Well, to be honest, I do, for once, “Blame Bush!” With the Bush Administration focused on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, he and Rumsfeld paid scant attention to the Navy’s shipbuilding program. They gave a generous amount to the Navy’s Shipbuilding Construction and Repair budget, and pretty much left the Navy up to its own devices after that. Little strategic guidance about what fleet numbers, composition, roles, and missions should be. Even less oversight was given to ship characteristics. With little oversight from the normal DoD 5000 process, successive senior uniformed leadership, particularly CNOs, had excessive influence on the development of the LCS program, and were able to shout down complaints and concerns from other folks, particularly the end users of the eventual LCS ships.

Galrahn wants to look forward with the LCS program. And to some extent, yeah, the Navy better figure out what they’ll do with LCS, because like it or not, it’s coming.

But we also need to look back to see how this mess happened to avoid repeating the mistaken process that brought the Navy to this point.

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Filed under history, navy, Politics

Tagged as LCS, Littoral combat ship, navy, United States Navy, USS Freedom

by ultimaratioregis | January 28, 2013 · 11:23 am

Women in Combat Arms: The Perspective of a Warrior

The Late General Robert H. Barrow, former Commandant of the Marine Corps, winner of the Navy Cross, Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star, Bronze Star, Veteran of three wars, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, speaks on the notion of women in ground combat units. Thirteen and a half minutes. (The last three are dark screen.) Listen to it all.

Those who would dismiss General Barrow as hidebound, sexist, closed-minded, or any other of the various derogatory labels that tend to be employed by the feminists who push such agendas should feel a tinge of shame. If they are capable of such, which I doubt.

Those who comprise the Joint Chiefs of Staff, particularly CJCS Dempsey, CSA Ordierno, and Marine Commandant Amos, should be ashamed of themselves. They must know deep down that what a man like General Barrow asserts is the brutal truth. Yet they have nodded their heads in enthusiastic agreement with their political masters as a sop to the feminists and progressives who despise our military and everything it stands for. Gentlemen, you must do some serious soul searching. You KNOW that General Barrow speaks an unvarnished truth honed by 41 years of wartime service and leadership of men in some of the most bitter combat of the 20th Century. Are your current assignments and your careers so much more important than the lives of those you will unnecessarily risk to implement this corrosive policy?

The Commandant’s assertion that “we will maintain our high standards while ensuring maximum success for every Marine” smacks of the dishonesty of the “everyone gets a trophy” Left. War, we damned well should know, knows no such considerations. If we didn’t have such morally and intellectually bankrupt leadership spending so much time and money painting the Potemkin Village instead of training to win our nation’s wars, we would not find ourselves in the current fix.

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Filed under Afghanistan, Air Force, armor, army, Artillery, girls, history, infantry, iraq, marines, navy, obama, Politics, recruiting, SIR!, stupid, Uncategorized, war

by xbradtc | January 24, 2013 · 11:51 am

Griffin Test on US Navy Patrol Craft

Port bow view of the US Navy (USN) Cyclone Class Coastal Defense Ship, USS MONSOON (PC 4) getting underway while exiting Apra Harbor, Guam after completion of Coordination Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) Exercise, while executing the first trans-Pacific cruise of a Patrol Forces boat. Location: APRA HARBOR, GUAM (GU) NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS (MNP) (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

The Griffin short range missile recently udnerwent a test firing from the USS Monsoon (PC-4) patrol craft. The addition of a short range guided missile capability to the PC class would be a big leap in capability for the ships and any successor for dealing with swarm attacks for small craft.

Via Information Dissemination.

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Filed under navy, Splodey

Tagged as missile, Patrol boat, USS Monsoon, Weapons and Equipment

by ultimaratioregis | January 18, 2013 · 3:53 pm

Op-For: Mattis Being Pushed Out?

A network of ruggedly handsome Marine Artillerists keeping an eye on the world is an invaluable commodity. LTCOL P over at Op-For alerted me to Tom Ricks’ post this morning over at FP regarding near-legendary Marine General James N. Mattis. Some telling statements from Ricks, an avowed Obama supporter.

CIVIL-MILITARY SIGNALS: The message the Obama Administration is sending, intentionally or not, is that it doesn’t like tough, smart, skeptical generals who speak candidly to their civilian superiors. In fact, that is exactly what it (and every administration) should want.

And:

SERVICE RELATIONS: The Obamites might not recognize it, but they now have dissed the two Marine generals who are culture heroes in today’s Corps: Mattis and Anthony Zinni. The Marines have long memories. I know some who are still mad at the Navy for steaming away from the Marines left on Guadalcanal.

If Ricks is finally admitting to Obama’s “smartest man in the room” act precluding his desire for informed advice, things have gotten damned bad.

…I am at the point where I don’t trust his national security team. They strike me as politicized, defensive and narrow. These are people who will not recognize it when they screw up, and will treat as enemies anyone who tells them they are doing that. And that is how things like Vietnam get repeated. Harsh words, I know. But I am worried.

The rest of us have been for a while, Tom. ”Three bags full” has been the standard answer from senior military leadership regarding the social experimentation, group punishment knee-jerk overreactions to perceived discipline problems, and US Pol-Mil actions (or non-actions) in Libya. Casey with Fort Hood, Dempsey in any number of situations. Mabus bankrupting the Navy for a green-fuel pat on the head. Why would he think such would not bleed over into strategic decision-making?

I don’t know if military action against Iran is the right course or not, but casting away men like Mattis and Zinni (and driving off Jim Jones) won’t do much to get him informed advice. Coupled with the amateur-hour soup sandwich that is Foggy Bottom, the ship of state is running without charts into the shoals. They may make Johnson-McNamara-Bundy look like a well-oiled machine, and George W. Bush look positively like Metternich.

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Filed under Afghanistan, Air Force, army, Around the web, Artillery, history, Iran, iraq, islam, marines, navy, obama, Politics, SIR!, war

by ultimaratioregis | January 17, 2013 · 6:59 am

US Minesweeper Runs Aground off Philippines

Reuters India gives a brief synopsis.

The ship, with a crew of 80, had just completed a port call at Subic Bay in the Philippines, when the grounding occurred.

No word on any correlation of the above with the grounding incident. “Oh man, I shouldn’ta had all them Red Horses at the Rum Jungle“…..

Nobody was hurt, and if it is a sand bar, let’s hope there is little to no damage. We are desperately short of MIW capability as it is.

6 Comments

Filed under Around the web, Humor, navy, Uncategorized

by ultimaratioregis | January 15, 2013 · 5:18 pm

Mabus and Kipling Discuss Readiness

Despite Federal spending that is almost $1 trillion higher than it was in 2008, with one war ended and another winding down, Secretary of the Navy Mabus informs us that Bread and Circuses are eating into the operating budget for this nation’s sea services, at precisely the time we are told we are executing a “strategic pivot” toward the Pacific. Which, if I remember my geography, is a fairly large body of water.

There is this bit of good news from ALNAV 006/13:

WE WILL ONLY BE ABLE TO SUSTAIN CURRENT FLEET OPERATIONS.  
WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SUFFICIENTLY MAINTAIN AND RESET 
OUR FORCES FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.

The US Navy is buying biofuel at $26/gal when JP-5 is under $4 a gallon. We have untold numbers of senior Officers and Flag Officers obsessed with the metrics of a Diversity industry. SECNAV is demanding hundreds of thousands of hours be spent in sexual assault prevention training with no discernable benefit. Here’s betting the “belt tightening” he warns of encompasses virtually none of the social-political experiments that is Navy and Marine Corps personnel policy.

In the meantime, Rudyard tells us the inevitable result.

Our ships in every harbour
Be neither whole nor sound,
And, when we seek to mend a leak,
No oakum can be found;
Or, if it is, the caulkers,
And carpenters also,
For lack of pay have gone away,
And this the Dutchmen know!

Mere powder, guns, and bullets,
We scarce can get at all;
Their price was spent in merriment
And revel at Whitehall,
While we in tattered doublets
From ship to ship must row,
Beseeching friends for odds and ends -
And this the Dutchmen know!

Not so certain history is dead. Not so certain we aren’t. While SECNAV is long and loud regarding biofuels (“the stakes could not be higher”), he seems to have contracted laryngitis about expressing concerns to the President about his Navy’s short and long-term ability to actually fight if needed, and to push for the resources to meet mission. Because, apparently the stakes aren’t as high as being environmentally friendly.

How do you say “De Ruyter” in Mandarin?

H/T to JPP

8 Comments

Filed under guns, history, marines, navy, obama, Politics, stupid, war

by xbradtc | · 2:31 pm

The OV-10 Bronco pretends it’s a seahorse

Designed to operate from austere, short runways ashore, the OV-10 was actually quite capable of operating at sea from carriers, without using traditional catapults or arresting gear. It was never operationally deployed this way, but the testing did take place.

Later, OV-10s would also conduct suitability trials aboard big deck amphibious ships. Again, it was never deployed, but it was an option.

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Filed under girls, guns, marines, navy, planes

Tagged as girls, guns, North American Rockwell OV-10 Bronco, planes

by ultimaratioregis | January 14, 2013 · 4:31 pm

An Evolving Intellect. More of Us Should Take the Journey

A magnificent missive today over at Bookworm Room. I am an occasional reader and lurker and enjoy her comments quire often. But this one is really astute, some wonderfully insightful comments about the evolution of an intellect. (And a decent little video from Adam Carolla.)

At around the same time, as a child who grew up watching the Vietnam War on the news, as well as all the antiwar protests, I thought the American military was evil, and that Communists weren’t so bad.

When I was 17, and California voters passed Prop. 13, I thought it was outrageous that people should want to keep their own money when it could go to the government, which would spend it for the people’s own good, only it would do it better than the people themselves.

When I was 18, I voted for Jimmy Carter and was deeply saddened when he lost.

When I was a 20-year old student attending U.C. Berkeley, and I heard that Ronald Reagan had been shot, I agreed with my fellow students that he deserved it, a sentiment that earned me a harsh and well-deserved scolding from my parents.

And it gets better from there. Take a few, and have a read.

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Filed under Air Force, army, Around the web, islam, marines, navy, Politics, Uncategorized

by ultimaratioregis | January 13, 2013 · 7:43 pm

The Grim Tale of Savo: Battle Damage Report from Quincy, Astoria, and Vincennes

There are many superbly written and gripping accounts of the disastrous August 1942 engagement known as the Battle of Savo Island. Works that explore the decisions and failures of Allied naval commanders, and sequences of events that led to the annihilation of three US heavy cruisers (and one Australian) in the narrow waters near Guadalcanal. James Hornfischer’s masterpiece Neptune’s Inferno is among the most recent.

However, the document that provides among the most compelling commentary is the Battle Damage Report, filed 13 months after the action, which describes in heartbreaking detail what took place aboard the three doomed vessels. It bears reading and absorbing in its entirety, as it tells both a cautionary tale and one of an incredibly adaptable “learning organization”, to use modern jargon. The report outlines events, without flowery language or hyperbole, but in the solemn professional language of the post-mortem of a catastrophe suffered at the hands of a skillful and determined enemy at a time when control of the Pacific hung in the balance.

Much of the report summarizes the frightful carnage each ship suffered, piecing together eyewitness accounts from ships’ crews who witnessed events on their own ships and on others in the ill-fated Allied cruiser column. Para. 52 tells the tragic tale of Quincy (CA-39):

Events aboard Astoria (CA-34), which had returned the ashes of Japanese Ambassador Saito to Japan just 28 months earlier (commanded by Captain Richmond Kelly Turner), were just as dreadful:

Interesting in the report is Part E, which is Notes and Recommendations by Commanding Officers, and how quickly the wartime Navy took them to heart, and acted upon them. One can only hope we would be so nimble in the present day.

There are twenty-six pages to the Savo Island Damage Report. Every one is worth the read. It was the tragic beginning of the finest hour of the US Navy, and is the unvarnished story behind the stories.

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Filed under armor, Artillery, guns, history, navy, planes, war

by xbradtc | January 10, 2013 · 3:23 am

Not So “Super” Carriers

So, at the deactivation of the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) the Secretary of the Navy announded that the third ship of the Gerald R. Ford class of carriers will also be named Enterprise. Good news. And there are any number of former US carriers that have names that resound through the history of the fleet. Ranger, Constellation, Hornet, Yorktown, and Lexington all have proud heritages.

But not every carrier has a lineage like that. Many of the escort carriers of World War II served in relative obscurity. And then there were the two carriers that are the subject of this post.

If I told you the US Navy once had a carrier fleet on the Great Lakes, would you think I was nuts?

Carrier aviation was important and growing more so even before the attack on Pearl Harbor. After the attack the growth of naval aviation could only be described as explosive. The losses of trained aviators in early campaigns and the expansion of the carrier fleet meant trained aviators were critically needed. A fleet that would grow to over 90 fleet, light fleet*, and escort carriers would require thousands of naval aviators.

Flight school for these aviators was, for the most part, similar to that of pilots of the Army Air Forces. But the key thing distinguishing Naval Aviators from mere pilots was their ability to take off from, and more critically, land aboard a carrier at sea. The problem was, what carriers there were didn’t have time to train fledgling birdmen. They were already locked in battle with the Imperial Japanese Navy, and fighting for their lives. Losses of carriers at Coral Sea, Midway and the Solomon Islands meant that new construction carriers just entering the fleet couldn’t be tasked to training aviators, but instead had to be deployed overseas almost as soon as their paint was dry. Something had to be done, however, to provide those new carriers with aircrew to turn them from transports to fighting warships.

To be sure, as each new carrier was commissioned, it too its “turn in the barrel” serving as a platform for carrier qualification. This helped qualify aviators, but it also helped train each ship’s flight deck crew in its duties. But still, the backlog of aviators needing qualification would grow. Further, using fleet and escort carriers for this job meant they needed heavy escort, particularly in the waters of the Atlantic, where German U-Boats were taking a heavy toll on coastal shipping. No sub skipper in the world would pass at a chance to sink a carrier.

Very early in the war, the idea of a dedicated training carrier on Lake Michigan surfaced. And this idea had a lot going for it. First, the chances of a U-Boat attack on the lake were zero**. Secondly, any such ship would almost by definition have to be a conversion from an existing merchantman. But since it would be strictly a training carrier, other than providing a flight deck and arresting gear, almost no other carrier specific modifications, such as a hangar deck, ammunition magazines, aviation fuel supply, radars, or extensive ready room facilities would be needed. Operating daily from Navy Pier in Chicago, such a ship would be able to leave most functions to the shore side establishment. Navy planes would fly from NAS Glenview (near Chicago) out over the lake, practice landings and takeoffs, and then fly home to NAS Glenview at the end of the day.

Most of the existing merchant ships on the Great Lakes were either desperately needed to support the war effort, or were pressed into service on the open ocean. But the Navy found two ships ill suited for either of those tasks and hence available. Both were coal fired, side-paddlewheeled ships.

The Seeandbee had been built in 1913 to provide passage between Cleveland and Buffalo.

SS Seeandbee before conversion to a training carrier.

In March of 1942, the Navy bought the Seeandbee, began the conversion process by razing her to the main deck and adding a flight deck. By January, 1943, she had been converted, renamed the USS Wolverine (IX-64) and was operating out of Chicago.

USS Wolverine (IX-64) on Lake Michigan, circa 1944.

The other training carrier began life as as the SS Greater Buffalo, providing overnight service between Buffalo and Detroit.

SS Greater Buffalo, as built.

Built in 1924, she was acquired by the Navy a few months after the Seeandbee. During her conversion, she was named and commissioned as USS Sable (IX-81). Unlike the Douglas Fir plank flight deck of Wolverine (and all other US carriers of the time) she was given a steel flight deck. Sable entered service on Lake Michigan in 1943 as well.

USS Sable (IX-81) underway on Lake Michigan.

During the course of World War II, these two ships qualified almost 18,000 Naval Aviators, an astonishing number given their short careers. Future President of the United States, George H.W. Bush qualified aboard the USS Sable.

Both ships had top speeds of 18 knots. But when landing aboard a carrier, the ideal was to have 30 knots of wind across the deck. As long as there was a breeze of 12 knots or more to steam into, there was no problem. But if winds were calm, operations aboard the ships, especially by heavier aircraft such as the TBM or SB2C, could be problematic. And given the neophyte nature of the aviators landing aboard, it’s hardly surprising that accidents happened quite often. Somewhere in the neighborhood of 130 aircraft found their way to the bottom of Lake Michigan during the war. Many others suffered varying degrees of damage while landing aboard. But operating from Lake Michigan was far more benign than the open sea, so while there were deaths, the total loss of life was a quite small.

Spending the war shoveling coal on a converted steamer might not have the elan of a destroyerman, nor the dash of a cruiser or battleship sailor, but apparently, spending almost every night in port, with liberty in downtown Chicago was pretty popular with most of the crew. Today, Navy Pier is a major tourist attraction in downtown Chicago.

As soon as the war ended, the need for aviators fell, and thus the need for the Wolverine and Sable. By 1947, both ships had been decommissioned, struck from the Naval Register, and disposed of.

As for the 130 or so airplanes that sank to the bottom of the lake, that’s something of an ongoing story. These days, restoring warbirds to either museum display or flight is a big business. As it turns out, the cold fresh water of Lake Michigan provided for good preservation of airplanes that sank. But the Navy has long held that they still retain title to those planes, and forbids salvage of them. In recent years, however, the Navy has begun to allow limited salvage of some aircraft, while still claiming title, provided the recovered aircraft are restored and place on display in areas open to the general public. One such salvaged example is an F4F-3 of the type used by CDR Butch O’Hare. It’s displayed at O’Hare Airport, which was named in his honor.

Friend of the blog Jason Camlic passed along a couple of fascinating links. A&T Recovery specializes in salvage operations in the Great Lakes. Over the last thirty years, A&T has worked with the National Naval Aviation Museum to recover lost aircraft from the lake. Click on through to visit their very informative site and see some great pictures of the Wolverine and Sable conducting operations, as well as some neat information on their other discoveries.

Similarly, Jason passed along this link to the Pritzker Military Library’s presentation on the freshwater carriers and the lost aircraft of Lake Michigan.

*Light fleet carriers were nine ships laid down as light cruisers, but converted on the ways into aircraft carriers. They were very much compromise designs, smaller than regular fleet carriers, and with correspondingly smaller airgroups. But they were available, had speed enough to keep up with the fleet, and a compromise carrier beats the heck out of no carrier at all.

**Well, actually, there was one German U-Boat in the Great Lakes, and I’m not talking about U-505.

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Filed under history, navy, planes

Tagged as great lakes, history, naval aviation, navy, planes

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Category Archives: navy

Is the Supercarrier Dead?

Happy Birthday, Dad! And Thanks!

General Barry McCaffrey: Lauds “Marines’ Aversion to BS” On Women in Infantry

Is the Navy finally taking a second look at its insane LCS policy?

Question for the Gang: What is the Most Beautiful Warship Ever?

Counterinsurgency Words of Wisdom from Pete Ellis***

From the Castle: There are Many Ways to Break an Army

Stealing all the good stuff from CDR Salamander

Mine Warfare- Part II

More About Awards

A Nuclear North Korea and Its Benevolent Protector: China

A Medal of Honor, and a sad farewell.

Defense Department Hypocrisy Regarding Uniform Wear?

Sinking the Fleet

Eighty Years Ago

Littoral Combat Ships- How not to buy ships

Women in Combat Arms: The Perspective of a Warrior

Griffin Test on US Navy Patrol Craft

Op-For: Mattis Being Pushed Out?

US Minesweeper Runs Aground off Philippines

Mabus and Kipling Discuss Readiness

The OV-10 Bronco pretends it’s a seahorse

An Evolving Intellect. More of Us Should Take the Journey

The Grim Tale of Savo: Battle Damage Report from Quincy, Astoria, and Vincennes

Not So “Super” Carriers

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