Tag Archives: Afghanistan

by | September 15, 2011 · 7:45 am

Buildng Bridges in Afghanistan

Bridge inspection

Caption:

Bridge Inspection

United States Air Force Capt. Jon Polston and Air Force 1st Lt. Scott Adamson, engineers attached to Laghman Provincial Reconstruction Team, inspect the underside of a bridge in Mehtar Lam, Laghman province, while traffic squeezes through the narrow pathway Sept. 7. The civil engineer team from the PRT traveled to the Jugi bridge in Mehtar Lam to asses the structural integrity following its recent completion, ensuring it will withstand the Afghan weather for years to come (Photo by Staff Sgt. Ryan Crane).

The Mehtar Lam PRT is in the Regional Command -East sector of Afghanistan, not far from Kabul.  The road infrastructure in that area reminds me of the “you can’t get there from here” network in West Virginia… “reminds” may be too strong a word though.

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by | September 1, 2011 · 6:20 pm

Wolfhounds in the A-stan

Esli’s been a busy little helper of the blog. He forwarded this picture of a troop from the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, The Wolfhounds* manning a TOW missile system in Afghanistan.

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Staff Sgt. Frankie Berdecia of Alpha Company 2nd battalion 27th infantry
(the Wolfhounds), operates a TOW missile system at Observation Post Mace
in eastern Afghanistan’s Kunar province near the border with Pakistan
August 28. (Photo by U.S. Army)

Now, the TOW system was designed to destroy tanks, but it is pretty handy at popping bunkers and machine gun nests also. More importantly, with the new ITAS thermal imaging sights, the TOW mount makes an excellent surveillance tool. If you can see it, you can hit it, and if you can hit it, you can kill it.

It’s possible to defeat detection by thermal sensors on the battlefield, but it sure ain’t easy.

*I was in the 1st Battalion. We never really acknowledged the guys in 2nd Bn as real Wolfhounds.

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by | June 23, 2011 · 3:31 pm

Thoughts on the Air Force and Close Air Support

We’ve often been frustrated by the Air Force’s grudging provision of Close Air Support (CAS) over the years.  And there’s an institutional perception throughout the Army that the Air Force doesn’t want to do CAS, and perhaps the Army should take over that role.

But it isn’t simply a case of the Air Force being a bunch of assholes, and leaving the Army hanging out to dry. There are real challenges to providing the type and quantity that Army would desire. Indeed, as a practical matter, they could never provide enough, as the Army would only demand more.

Since 1942, US ground commanders have been asking for more and better close air support. Early attempts at CAS in North Africa and Italy were dismal, partly because of technical reasons, partly because there was no established doctrine for how it should be done, and (in North Africa, especially) partly because the Luftwaffe had, if not air superiority, then at least air parity.

But as communications, techniques, and our own air superiority improved, so too did the Army Air Forces ability to provide CAS.  By the time of the invasion of Normandy, the 9th Air Force introduced the TACs, or Tactical Air Commands. Each TAC was designed to operate in direct support of  one of the field armies on the ground in France. And they did a great job. But what they didn’t do was provide a constant umbrella of CAS over each and every unit. In fact, a lot of what they did would later become known as BAI, or Battlefield Air Interdiction. What they DID do that is historically important, however, is to integrate their operations to support and synch up with those of the ground commander.

In Korea, and especially in Vietnam, when we think of CAS, we see it being used essentially as really heavy artillery, available on call when normal tube artillery wasn’t enough.  For the most part, in the permissive environment in South Vietnam, that’s how the Army wanted it to be used, and the Air Force, in spite of its own institutional reservations, provided a great deal of that.

But after Vietnam, just as the Army turned its eyes to Western Europe, so did the Air Force. Just as the Army was facing enormous numbers of tanks and motorized Soviet divisions, the Air Force faced a very similar challenge in terms of the sheer numbers of Soviet Frontal Aviation forces arrayed against them.  The Air Force faced up to the probability that if there was a war in Western Europe, they’d be lucky to maintain air-parity, and unlikely to immediately achieve air superiority. And given that fact, there would be no way they could provide CAS on anything like the scale the Army would want.

And for the most part, the Army understood that. The Air Force wasn’t ducking out on CAS because they didn’t like doing it. They were faced with the age old challenge of too many missions for the resources available. And something had to give. So the Air Force wanted to capitalize on the strengths of airpower, and use it to its maximum effectiveness for each sortie flown.

There came to be three basic types of missions in support of ground forces: Close Air Support, Interdiction, and a new term, Battlefield Air Interdiction, or BAI.

Close Air Support is, roughly, those air missions that are terminally controlled by a Forward Air Controller at the front lines, or in support of troops in contact.

Interdiction missions were deep strikes against ground targets in the enemy’s rear areas that were in general support of the ground forces, such as marshaling yards for railroads, oil refineries, ports and other shipping targets, command and control assets, and other infrastructure targets. 

Battlefield Air Interdiction, however, was a little different. These were strikes in the enemy’s rear that were designed to directly influence the enemy, attrit his forces, and support a ground commander’s specific scheme of maneuver, but were far enough behind the front lines that they were not controlled by a forward air controller on the ground. The air commander and the ground commander worked together to nominate and service targets in this BAI environment. And example might be tasking the Air Force to drop a specific bridge, at a specific time, to disrupt the movement of a Soviet Motor Rifle Division for a predictable period of time (and likely follow up that strike with a series of strikes on the MRD while it is waiting for an alternate bridge to cross).

Airpower’s inherent capability to mass quickly and strike targets of relatively fleeting opportunity made BAI a more lucrative mission that trying to pick off a tank here or there at the front lines.  Two F-16s might kill a couple tanks at the front lines, or they might stall an entire division for a day or more by dropping a bridge. The return on investment argued for the BAI mission, as far as the Air Force was concerned.

And the Air Force put a lot of effort and resources into the mission. Over the course of several decades, the Air Force spent billions and billions of dollars supporting this job. The E-8 JSTARS was designed to help find out where these columns of enemy divisions were. Entire families of bombs were designed to help the Air Force attack columns of Soviet tanks before they deployed into assault formation. Sensors and command and control networks were developed to give the Air Force the ability to find worthy targets, and assign appropriate strike packages to them quickly, all to support the scheme of maneuver on the ground.

The Army and the Air Force, through a series of high level staff conferences, came to a rough agreement on the role of airpower in the Army’s AirLand Battle Doctrine. As a practical matter, the Army understood that anything that was within range of the artillery of a unit on the ground was an Army target, to be attacked with artillery (or attack helicopters), and those targets further out were for the Air Force to attack. Those targets within a tactical corps Area of Interest (that is, enemy units that could reach the front in 48-72 hours, or roughly 100 miles behind the front lines) were generally treated as BAI targets, and the Air Force would work within the ground commander to attack those specific targets the ground commander nominated.  Anything further back from the front lines was generally considered an interdiction target, and the Air Force would attack those based on its own desires, and the priorities of the theater commander.

Nor did the Air Force totally ignore the need for Close Air Support. It did, after all, in the austere budget environment of the 1970s, develop and buy several hundred A-10 Thunderbolt II aircraft, designed specifically for Close Air Support. And every it provided Forward Air Controllers and Air Liaison Officers to every brigade in the Army. So the Air Force would provide some level of CAS to the Army, but the Army would have to prioritize which units on the ground would benefit from the limited available supply of CAS sorties.

The demonstration of this concept was, like so much else of AirLand Battle, the First Gulf War. While the Navy was firing Tomahawk missiles at Baghdad, and the Air Force’s F-117s were going downtown as well, the Air Force focused first on dismantling the Iraqi air defense network, bombing airfields and control nodes throughout the land. But they also quickly began both isolating the battlefield in general, by dropping bridges and cutting communications, and they began supporting the Army’s scheme of maneuver. They atrited Iraqi formations in general, and they attacked to fix, atrit or destroy specific units that the Army nominated for attention. If these attacks weren’t nearly as successful as the Air Force hoped (or claimed) that was more a matter of technical limitations than of a faulty doctrinal basis, or lack of good faith effort on the part of the Air Force. If each tank brigade in Desert Storm didn’t have a flight of A-10s overhead at all times, the Air Force might be forgiven for pointing out that the brigade did have access to at least one, and often three battalions of 155mm artillery, possibly a battalion of 8” artillery, a battalion of MLRS rocket artillery, and a battalion (or more) of AH-64 Apache gunships.  The Army wasn’t exactly hurting for fire support in the close fight…

But now we come to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The low intensity conflict there against terrorist groups means that there really aren’t any BAI target or interdiction targets for the Air Force to attack. The enemy rarely masses and identifies itself until it is actually in contact with our ground forces. Further, the near universal adoption of precision guided munitions such as laser guided bombs, and GPS guided JDAMs means airpower can be used more precisely than conventional unguided artillery fires, with lower collateral damages.  And the ability of strike aircraft to share video of their targeting imagery with forces on the ground via systems like ROVER (which transmits video from their targeting pods to laptops in the hands of troops on the ground) provides an excellent ability to “see over the next hill” or “around the corner” that his highly valued.

So CAS has quickly become the “big gun” of choice for troop units on the ground. After all, few things put an end to a fight like dropping a 2000lb bomb on the other guys head.

But while the Air Force has provided CAS for the Army for almost 10 years now in Afghanistan and Iraq, they still have other missions facing them. They still need to train to fight and win air superiority against a more conventional foe. And they only have a limited amount of money to spend. I strongly suspect the Air Force would be delighted to operated a Light Attack turbo prop plane in support of the Army… except they are convinced that the money would have to do so would inevitably come from the hide of some other program that the Air Force, as an institution, sees as a higher priority in the long term. One suspects also that the Air Force didn’t quite anticipate that it would be called upon to provide an aerial umbrella for a decade or more.

With the adoption of precision ground fires such as the Guided MLRS, the guided Excalibur 155mm projectile, and the newest GPS guided 120mm mortar round, perhaps some of the demand signal for Close Air Support will diminish. But likely not. Even with those tools in his pocket, any commander that thinks he can get air assets overhead is certainly going to ask for them. No commander ever went into a fight thinking he had too many resources.

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by | June 8, 2011 · 1:28 pm

What’s Old is New Again

For almost a decade, the Army has been focused on low intensity conflict (a very relative term!) in Afghanistan and Iraq. Now, there’s no such thing as low intensity to the guy in a firefight, but the fact remains that Afghanistan and post-invasion Iraq were fought primarily against insurgent forces, not near-peer competitors fielding what we tend to think of as modern armies.

But with the reduction of US troops in Iraq, and the possible drawdown of US forces in Afghanistan in the near future, the Army is again looking at the need to train for higher intensity conflict, what they now call “full spectrum operations.”

YAKIMA – Capt. Dan Ferriter is used to facing elusive insurgents on his combat tours of in Iraq and Afghanistan. They’ve been the Army’s main enemy during his six-year career, planting roadside bombs and taking shots at American soldiers from hidden places.

Now the former Ranger is training to fight a different foe, but one just as lethal for American forces who have been emphasizing counterinsurgency warfare for nearly a decade.

Ferriter, a Stryker brigade officer from Joint Base Lewis-McChord, is getting back to basics and preparing to go to war against another military rather than a shadowy network of terrorists.

“This is pre-9/11,” the dirt-covered captain said last week during his company’s drills at the Yakima Training Center. “The guys that were in the Army pre-9/11 are starting to get few and far between.”

Ferriter is in the desert of central Washington this month with the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division. The 4,000-soldier brigade has deployed to Iraq three times since 2003 – it was the first of the Army’s eight Stryker brigades – but it doesn’t have another mission to Iraq or Afghanistan on the horizon.

It’s using this opportunity to build skills for what the Army calls “full-spectrum operations.”

“The hard part is not losing how good we’ve become at (counterinsurgency) and making the right balance,” said Ferriter, 28, of DuPont.

Back in my day, this was meat and potatoes, bread and butter stuff. Mechanized force on force warfare was the focus of much of the Army from the immediate post-Vietnam era through the end of the Cold War. And we were very good at it (see: Storm, Desert).

It wasn’t until the messy and bothersome interventions in such garden spots as Somalia and the Balkans that the Army even began to realize that it might have to fight in ways it didn’t really want to, in urbanized terrain, against non-state actors such as terrorists and insurgents. As an institution, the Army was slow to grasp some of the difficulties of fighting in that environment. Stability and support operations doctrine was slow to evolve, and to say that many troops early in Iraq had only On the Job Training would be accurate.

Faced with the need to deploy large numbers of troops to Iraq and Afghanistan in these counter-insurgency campaigns, the Army tailored the pre-deployment training of its forces to their next deployment, and focused on the roles and missions those units would be tasked with. That’s only right and proper. We call it battle focused training for a reason. And it would be immoral for the Army to not provide the best suited training for its soldiers as they were spun up to deploy.

But while the Army was largely focused on those two theaters, the rest of the world didn’t go away. The possibility of conflict with near-peer nations hasn’t disappeared. And a lot of the skillsets that troops in combat arms units used to practice have withered from disuse. As the article notes, (and as Esli and LTC F note in a pair of excellent comments left at NepLex’s post on this subject) the people who grew up doing “full spectrum” operations are largely gone. The Army, despite excellent retention, has a lot of personnel turnover, and the “tribal knowledge” has been diluted by that.

An armor or “heavy” infantry officer in the days of “AirLand Battle Doctrine” had a fairly predictable career path, much of which allowed the doctrine of maneuver warfare to sink into his bones. A tour as a platoon leader, then either as a company XO or specialty platoon leader, time as a company commander, then as a junior staff officer at battalion or brigade, time for advanced military and civilian schooling, time as a senior staff member or battalion XO, and then on to battalion command. All that time, he’d be using the same basic doctrine, and learning ever more complex ways to utilize the basic tools available to him, and how the various units and staff sections, and supporting arms and services worked hand in hand to achieve victory against a large maneuvering enemy force, usually heavy with armor and motorized infantry.

Today, while our young officer might have many of the same assignments, his focus has been elsewhere. As Esli will attest, not since his days as a company commander has unit training been focused on fighting enemy tanks.

It is about time the Army return to this capability. One of the reasons we have faced insurgent forces is that our enemies realized in the wake of Desert Storm that a stand up fight against us was a good way to get your ass kicked. But as we have focused more on the counter-insurgency fight, some potential enemies may start to feel froggy enough to take us on under certain circumstances. We need to be prepared for that.

A couple of complications lie ahead, not just from the lack of experience throughout the force in maneuver warfare.  One, the Army has transitioned form a division based organizational structure to a brigade centric organization. The Army had 50 years of experience in learning how to fight a division in high intensity warfare. It has almost no practical experience with the new brigade concept. It will learn (and they DO have the practical experience of actually using the brigade organization in the real world for a decade now), but there will certainly be some bumps in the road, and some surprises.

Second, the Army isn’t facing an “either/or” situation, where it gets to choose between a “heavy” fight, or a COIN campaign. The new doctrinal name “full spectrum operations” recognizes that any heavy fight will almost certainly also involve a lot of stuff the Army would prefer not to deal with, such as insurgents, paramilitary forces, the need to perform stability and support operations simultaneously ( or nearly simultaneously) with combat operations, and interfacing with civilian populations, allied forces, and non-governmental organizations, all while trying to fight a fast moving heavy opponent.

The practical effect of that is, they have far more tasks that units simply must train for. And there is only so much time, money and other resources available to train units. Finding the right balance, as CPT Ferriter says, is going to be the hard part.

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by | May 30, 2011 · 5:00 am

Memorial Day

I posted this two years ago, and frankly, I don’t think I can really improve on it-XBradTC

Today is Memorial Day. Today is the day we remember all those who gave their lives in the service of this great nation.

Most of us have seen pictures or film of Arlington National Cemetery, or perhaps the beautiful National Cemetery of the Pacific, better known as The Puchbowl.

Of course, over the last 7 years, we’ve seen servicemembers killed in Afghanistan and Iraq come home to be laid to rest. The older folks among us remember the constant stream of casualties brought home from Vietnam.

Today, if you are killed in action, you will be escorted all the way home, from the battlefield to your final resting place. The Air Force will fly you from the theater of operations to Dover, Delaware. You may well be the only cargo on the entire aircraft. A servicemember will accompany you from Dover to your hometown, or to Arlington, or wherever it is that will be your grave.

But it was not always thus. In WWI and in WWII, thousands of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Coastguardsmen made the ultimate sacrifice far from our shores. Thousands upon thousands of American men died in the fields of Europe. They were usually buried very near where they fell, in crude, makeshift graves, with perhaps a single wooden slab as a marker. After the fighting had moved on, they were disinterred, and moved to more permanent cemeteries. After the war, the US government offered to disinter these heroes again, to bring them home to our native land. Many were brought home. But many families, for many reasons, chose to let them rest where they were. And so, throughout Europe, there are cemeteries.

The American Battle Monuments Commission maintains these tiny patches of American soil, paid for and consecrated with that most precious currency, the blood of patriots. If you find yourself traveling to France, Belgium, Luxembourg, or one of the other nations with an American cemetery, by all means, go visit. It is a moving experience.

And even if you aren’t in Europe today, please, enjoy the day off, enjoy the BBQ and cocktails with friends. Enjoy the sales at the store. By all means, do so.  But take just a moment, please, to remember those who answered their nations call, and gave the last full measure of devotion.

Many thanks to an anonymous reader of Neptunus Lex for the use of the photos.

I would like to add this- when our fallen troops come home, their “other family” the soldiers still fighting, feel a hole where they used to be. It is a small comfort to have a memorial service for them in their unit. I’ve been to a couple. A couple too many. But like everything else in the service, there’s a ceremony that is enshrined in tradition. The same template is used across the Army, and across the years. It gives soldiers a chance to say farewell to comrades in arms, before turning back to their duty. Time Magazine’s Viewpoint column has a post by Rajiv Srinivasan, a former Stryker platoon leader, about this ceremony. 

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by | May 9, 2011 · 7:04 pm

How big should the Army be?

The Army is currently roughly 48 ground combat brigades, with a number of supporting aviation brigades and “fires” brigades (what used to be called field artillery brigades). The strength very roughly equates to 12 divisions, or 4 corps.

Of the ground combat brigades, there are three main types: the Infantry Brigade  Combat Team , the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, and the Heavy Brigade Combat Team. The “Team” part of the name denotes that each of these formations has its own supporting arms and services organic to its design, such as artillery and logistics.  The Infantry BCT is primarily composed of light infantry forces, that is, those not mounted in either Bradley or Stryker armored vehicles. The Airborne and Air Assault units are IBCTs. The Stryker BCTs, are, of course, built around battalions of Stryker armored  vehicles. And lastly, the Heavy BCTs are built around the M-1 Abrams/M-2 Bradley armored vehicle teams.

Heavy BCTs bore the brunt of the fighting in the early days of the war in Iraq, and indeed, were a large part of the fight there, and continue to supply Advise and Assist Brigades to that theater. But Stryker and Infantry BCTs also made large numbers of deployments there.  Afghanistan has mostly been the province of the Infantry BCTs with recent deployments of Stryker BCTs to beef up the numbers there since President Obama took office.

The fighting power of the National Guard is organized along roughly the same lines, and their deployments have been roughly similar to the active components, but they lie outside the main scope of this discussion. It’s not that the Guard isn’t important, it’s that I haven’t really given much consideration to them, and want to digest that later.

Most unit deployments last about a year. And very roughly, about a third of the Army is deployed right now. There’s a rule of thumb that it takes three brigades to deploy one. One brigade deployed, one in training to replace it, and one recovering from its recent deployment.  So the question becomes, is the size of the Army determining the size of deployments, or is the size of the deployments driving the discussion on the size of the Army?

In an ideal world, I’d like to see an Army with roughly twice the number of BCTs that we currently have. But that’s just a fantasy. Almost certainly, given the reduction of operations in Iraq, and the likelihood of a drawdown in Afghanistan soon, we’re going to see calls to drastically reduce the size of the Army. And the Army, rather than cutting into its institutions, will trim that size by reducing the number of BCTs.  It will also resort to  leaning out the manning of those BCTs. For instance, if an Infantry BCT is supposed to have 5000 men, the Army will deliberately only man them at say, 4750, or 4500 men. That short handedness hurts the unit, but it is a lot easier to bulk up a unit in an emergency, than to reconstitute a unit from scratch.

In any event, for 20 years, since the fall of the Berlin wall, we as a nation have deliberately kept the size of the Army quite small. While recruiting to fill the ranks of a half million man active duty seems challenging enough, it wasn’t that long ago we were able to recruit for a much larger Army, albeit with marginally looser standards.  And ironically, as the size of the Army has shrunk, the number of missions it has been called upon to fulfill has grown greatly. While the number of troops stationed in Germany is a shadow of what it once was, we now have deployments throughout the world, not just in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the 90s, the Army found itself deploying brigades to the Balkans to provide stability to that troubled region, and we’re still there.

How far can we safely shrink our Army? What should be the balance between heavy, Stryker, and light formations? What current missions should the Army convince the political leadership to slough off? Where is the Army deployed or stationed that it shouldn’t be? Where should the Army be that it isn’t?

Slightly off topic, if I was Chief of Staff of the Army for one day, the first change I would make? I’d go from a 9 man rifle squad to an 11 man rifle squad.

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by | April 7, 2011 · 9:32 pm

The AC-130 in the early days of Afghanistan

Via WeaselZippers, here’s a quick clip from early in our involvement in Afghanistan showing why the AC-130′s 105mm cannon is a fearsome weapon.

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by | March 14, 2011 · 10:25 pm

“For the Soldiers on the Ground”- a short documentary about Army Aviation

Army Sergeant Robert Ham has made a fine documentary about Army Aviation and posted it on YouTube. Enjoy.

Part I
Part II
Part III
Part IV
Part V

For you non-Army types, if you have any questions, I’ll be happy to address them.

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by | · 9:56 am

Apache Engages Insurgent

Via Weasel Zippers, a nice little clip:

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by | March 12, 2011 · 11:52 am

More on the TOW missile

So, this post showing some excellent ‘splodey was pretty popular. And TOW missile video posts have long been a mainstay here.  But it wasn’t until I started looking in the comments that I realized I have never actually done a post about the history of the TOW, how it works, and its variants. Craig kindly laid the groundwork with a post on missiles in the age before TOW, so lets carry on from there.

The TOW and the older SS10 and SS11 missiles that Craig posted about all shared a couple of characteristics. They were all armed with a HEAT warhead to defeat tanks, and they were all wire guided.

The older missiles used a guidance technique known as Command-to-Line-of-Sight (CLOS). Simply put, The gunner launched the missile, and a flare on the back of the missile showed the gunner where it was. He then steered the missile along his line of sight to the target. As long as he saw the flare heading at the target, all was well. Typically, the missile was controlled by a small joystick, and the guidance corrections the gunner made were sent along a pair of very, very thin copper wires trailed from the missile. While this was pretty nifty at the time, it was awfully low tech, and required very intense training for the gunner to achieve any proficiency.  The gunner had to keep track of both the target and the missile, and “fly” the missile to the target. Hard enough on  a stationary target, but against a moving target like a tank, it was very difficult indeed.

Building on that basic concept, the Army capitalized on its technical know-how and the miniaturization of electronics in the ’60s to introduce a much improved technique: Semi-automatic Command-to-Line-of-Sight (SACLOS).

The big difference between CLOS and SACLOS is the way the missile is commanded. In SACLOS, and optical sensor in the gunner’s sight tracks the missile’s flare (or “beacon”) and measures its deviation from the line of sight, as determined by the crosshairs in the sight. When the missile guidance set senses a deviation, it would send the correction, rather than the gunner having to make a correction. In effect, all the gunner had to do was keep the crosshairs on the target for the time of launch until impact. This was much, much easier than trying to manually fly the missile to the target.

The original TOW missile was the BGM-71A. It was a revolutionary improvement over previous missiles.  The missile was stored and launched from a sealed  fiberglass tube, that protected it from the elements and rough handling.  It was optically tracked from either a ground launch platform or a stabilized sight on a helicopter, and it was guided via copper wires, hence the acronym TOW. The orignally TOW had a 6″ diameter missile body, with a 5″ diameter HEAT warhead, and a range of 3000 meters.

Pretty soon, it was clear that the missile had sufficient energy to fly further than 3000 meters, and by simply adding more wire, the range was increased to 3750 meters.  The next version, I-TOW (Improved TOW)  added a standoff probe to the warhead to make sure it detonated the optimum distance from the target.

Increases in Soviet armor lead to an improved missile, and more importantly, an improved guidance set. This TOW 2 featured a larger 6″ diameter warhead, a slightly modified probe, and critically, added a thermal sight system to the launcher, meaning for the first time, the TOW could be used at night. The TOW 2 incorporated a xenon beacon at the rear of the missile to allow this thermal sight to track it at night or in low visibility.

With the advent of  reactive armor, the TOW2A was designed with tandem warheads. The first warhead would detonate the reactive armor, while the second would punch through the now exposed site.

TOW 2B was a different approach. As mentioned in the linked video, it uses two downward firing EFPs to punch through the thinner top armor of tanks. The TOW2B overflies its target, never actually striking it. The gunner merely keeps the crosshairs on the target, the guidance set handles the “offset” aim for him.  By giving later versions of the TOW2B an aerodynamically improved nose, and increased wire capacity, the TOW2B Aero has increased range to 4500 meters.  This is the current production anti-armor model of the TOW for the US Army, though enormous numbers of earlier TOW2 models are sill in the inventory and issued.

With the current fights in Afghanistan and Iraq facing little in the way of armored threats, the limitations of the HEAT warhead became an issue. While a HEAT warhead is better than none, it has little real anti-personnel capability. This has lead to the development of the BGM-71H, which is similar to the TOW 2A, except the HEAT warheads have been replaced by a blast/fragmentation warhead better suited to killing troops and destroying bunkers.

In addition, a wireless variant of the TOW2B is in production.

Recently, the ITAS (Improved Target Acquisition System) has begun replacing older TOW2 sights in ground mounts. This has a much improved thermal sight, not only improving accuracy, but also serving as  a very handy surveillance tool for infantry units.

TOW missile with ITAS in Afghanistan

The TOW has proven to be a remarkably adaptable weapon system, with a wide range of improvements incorporated over the years. Improvements to both the missile, and the guidance sets have kept it a very viable system on the modern battlefield. But there are some limitations to further growth. Primarily, the fixed diameter and length of the missile imposed by the launch tube size means that there is only so much space to grow. Also, given that limitation, the missile remains fairly slow, meaning the time from launch to impact is quite lengthy, over 3o seconds to maximum range. This can give the enemy time to either shoot back or attempt to flee.

Even with these limitations, the TOW is a very effective system, and there are no current plans to replace it as the heavy anti-armor missile system.

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by | March 2, 2011 · 12:12 pm

What is the Army doing in Iraq these days?

Security Force Assistance:
XBradTC here.  With the end of active combat operations in Iraq by US forces, the news has mostly shifted to the war in Afghanistan. But there are still about 50,000 US troops deployed in Iraq. These troops consist of both a large support echelon to provide logistical support to US forces and to our Iraqi allies, but also several brigades that have been mission tailored to  help train and advise the Iraqi National Army. This is a mission that was normally tasked to the Special Forces community prior to 9/11. Given the huge scale of building a new national army, however, there is no way  Special Forces alone could achieve the mission. Further, the SF community is already stretched thin meeting its commitments in Afghanistan and in all the other places in the world where the US helps train and mentor our allies and friendly nations. So the Army solution is to task a brigade to perform the Security Force Assistance mission, augmenting that brigade with advisors and other assets tailored to fit the new mission.
This is a mission wholly outside the scope of my experience, so I’ve asked a friend of mine, MAJ(P) Esli T. Pitts, an Armor officer of the US Army, to share his insights. Esli has served three tours in Iraq,  one during the initial invasion of Iraq, one during the Petraeus Surge, and served six months in an advise and assist brigade on his third tour. He’s uniquely qualified to comment on this mission.


With the advent of “Operation New Dawn” in Iraq, you may be aware that the mission has changed to one of Security Force Assistance, as opposed to the previous model of Full Spectrum Operations (FSO).  But what has really changed? What exactly is Security Force Assistance (SFA)?
As background, prior to September 1st, 2010 (Operation New Dawn), the army was conducting FSO in Iraq. This meant, on any given day, that units might be conducting offensive, defensive, or stability operations in a Counterinsurgency (COIN) environment.   This operational concept is based on Gen Krulak’s “three block war” model from the 1990s, and was formalized in the army’s 2008 update to FM 3-0 (Operations). 
As a result of the 2008 security agreement between the United States and the government of Iraq, we agreed to drastically scale back US-led combat operations, and  allow Iraqi Security Forces to take the lead.  Security Force Assistance is the natural evolution of that agreement. 
The Army’s FM 3-07.1 (Security Force Assistance) codified this capability within the army, and the recently released Change 1 to FM 3-0 (Operations) has standardized SFA as a primary stability task.  FM 3-07.1 defines SFA as “The unified action to generate, employ and sustain local, host-nation, or regional security forces in support of legitimate authority.”  Practically speaking, what does that mean?  The most obvious part of the answer to this question is that, in New Dawn, the Army does not conduct Full Spectrum Operations anymore, but only the stability mission (in the form of SFA), having dropped the offensive and defensive missions.  (This does not preclude providing security for ourselves.)
I served with one of the early brigades assigned the SFA mission and we wrestled with how to form them and train them.  These brigade combat teams were initially designated as Advise and Assist Brigades.  Having been called an AAB for just long enough to get used to it, the army later changed the designation to Brigade Combat Team-Augmented for Security Force Assistance, or BCT-A for short.  No sooner than we got used to this than we deployed to Iraq and our higher headquarters, and every other brigade insisted on using the original, and probably more appropriate, AAB, which resulted in yet another change for us.  (This changes a lot of letterheads, PowerPoint slides and signature blocks, evaluation and award narratives!)  For now, the army has, at least unofficially, standardized the naming convention by designating AABs as those operating in Iraq, while BCT-As are operating in Afghanistan. 
In conference with representatives of both the Department of State and National Security Advisor, we were told that the Advise and Assist mission should feel “like wearing a pair of pants that don’t fit.” That is, it should feel uncomfortable and unnatural to a bunch of war-fighters.  We were warned that we would be paving the way for future US/Iraqi relations at the strategic or national level, and should not “win the fight at the checkpoint” but destroy the future national relationship, with the all-important question of “what happens after the final troop withdrawals currently scheduled for no later than December of 2012?”  By this, I mean that we could not let tensions or animosity (or an impression that US forces did not abide by the security agreement) arising from friction between USF and ISF at the unit level sour impressions at the level of the generals and political leadership.  For example, while US forces might be authorized to travel through a particular check point, it doesn’t mean that we prevail every time some misguided Jundee (Iraqi soldier) tries to stop it.
So what does an AAB/BCT-A do?  What does it look like on the ground?  Well, first off, the BCT itself probably does not actually own ground in the traditional sense.  We consider our battlespace to be the ISF units, and our key terrain is the Iraqi leadership.  There are a variety of ways to skin the advisory cat, but all are built around a core of Stability Transition Teams (STT)s that are currently replacing MTTs, SPTTs, BTTs, and every other Training Team that has appeared in Iraq.  Speaking only of my experiences, these STTs are assigned to the organic American line battalions in the BCT for support, and the battalions themselves are in a supporting role to their STTs.  Each STT consists of a pair of field grade officers (MAJ, LTC, COL) that serve as the primary advisors to Iraqi unit leaders.  They may be from a variety of branches, not necessarily Infantry or Armor.  They are augmented by additional Soldiers, NCOs and Officers from the supporting battalions that  serve to provide functional specialties such as fire support, communications, logistics or other traditional support.  Additionally, each STT has a complete line platoon with which they are habitually aligned for escort and security requirements.  The STTs are responsible for facilitating US-supplied enablers to Iraqi operations, such as MEDEVAC, QRF, military working dogs, and other support.  In addition to the relationship between STTs and Iraqi unit leadership, there is a partnered relationship between ISF and USF units (meaning the US Brigade Combat Team’s organic platoons, companies, and battalions)which provide USF support to ISF combat operations if necessary.  Other brigades have chosen to keep their STTs at the brigade level and task them out on an as-needed basis.  Every brigade has been unique.
Over and above the STTs, the BCT staff itself is able to provide additional training support to the ISF units as requested. This training consists of skills that lie largely in the BCT staff, such as specialized intelligence, communications, engineering and communications capabilities.  Additional specialties include the ability to consolidate training teams to support large scale throughput of Iraqi MOSs such as mortar training or training for the Iraqi’s new M1A1 tank fleet.  Because of our variety of skills, we were responsive to the needs of our partnered units and could tailor specific training plans to meet their needs.
What is the way ahead for SFA?  Well, primarily it is a concept that is designed to be employed in a pre-conflict environment, and synchronized with the army’s force generation cycle.  For example, the army could take a BCT undergoing reset after redeployment from OIF/OEF and designate them to be a BCT-A, with the intent to subsequently deploy them to an identified friendly nation that has a need for assistance in training its own military forces.  The US BCT could receive its augmented pool of field grade officers and undergo cultural, language and regionally specific training before deploying to provide training and operational support to a host nation. This BCT could be task-organized to provide the right assistance to the host nation.
Traditionally, what I am describing, is called Foreign Internal Defense, and conducted by Special Forces.  SF, however, is fully committed to other missions at this time, and for the foreseeable future.  That said, though the bugs are not all worked out (primarily a VERY limited availability of field grade officers), SFA is an idea whose time has come.

XbradTC again- The use of regular Army Brigade Combat Teams in the SFA mission is a doctrinal shift away from the Cold War days. In my day, we spent a lot of time making sure US units could work well alongside allied nations. But the key there was alongside. The thought of regular US units being tasked to train or advise other national armies was utterly unheard of. In addition to the talents of the STTs and brigade staff, this new mission is going to require  junior soldiers and NCOs to embrace ever larger skill sets, and place them in a position where they can either greatly cement relations, or potentially do them  great harm. It is a testament to the modern US soldier that they can take on such a mission and succeed.

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by | February 17, 2011 · 10:33 am

Better Runway… Better Service

Craig again.

Back in 2004 I was on a gig supporting … well I can’t recall what they called them back then… but now days it is ISAF.  One mission had me on a team going into some city in west Afghanistan called Herat.  So we loaded up all the commo gear in a C-130 and off we flew.

The landing was a bit rough.  I’m OK with the ducks and dives of the combat approach used.  Actually kind of fun!  Fine with the hard touch down.  But when the pilot had to do a power reverse pitch to help bring that heavy transport to a stop…. well I started anticipating the crunch.

Browsing through the war news today, I noticed some photos taken after a construction project to extend the Herat airport.

110128-F-8733W-368

17-Feb-2011

17-Feb-2011

110217-F-WU507-825

Still looks like a hard landing, though.

[Update by XBradTC]- Friend of the blog Bill Tuttle has spent the last couple years helping to reconstitute the Iraqi Air Force, mostly by training Huey pilots for them. One has to wonder if that’s one of Bill’s pupils in the Hubert in the first pic…

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by | February 16, 2011 · 11:57 am

Supplies from Above

From US CENTCOM’s Flickr collection:
Drifting Toward the Ground

A C-130 Hercules drops supplies to International Security Assistance Forces assigned to Forward Operating Base Sweeney, Zabul Province, Afghanistan, Feb. 7. Winds during the drop gusted up to 20mph. (U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Brian Ferguson)(Released)

Supplies Airborne

Supplies Floating Down

Supplies Arrive

Soft Landing

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by | February 14, 2011 · 6:33 am

Squad and Platoon Combat Drill

If you’ve ever played sports, you’ve run drills in practice. Not surprisingly, the Army uses drills as well. It is impossible for a platoon to prepare for every situation on the battlefield. But a platoon can prepare for the most likely events. One common instance is contact with the enemy while the platoon is moving from one point to another.

We discussed movement formations earlier. The most common formation for a platoon is for the fire teams to be in wedge formation, while the squads and the platoon as a whole is in column.

plt wedge

Not surprisingly, the lead squad is usually the squad that makes the initial contact with the enemy. Often, making contact means “the lead squad is taking small arms fire.” When this happens, the squad combat drill (and the platoon combat drill, concurrently) instantly and without orders begins.

First and foremost is the most natural reaction. The lead fireteam takes cover and starts to return fire. The team leader for this lead team is doing several things at once. He’s making sure his team has taken cover, he’s attempting to locate the enemy and discern their strength, and he’s directing the fire of his team onto the enemy. He’s making sure his automatic rifleman is suppressing any enemy machine guns and his grenadier is either engaging the most threatening targets, or firing smoke to provide concealment as needed. And oh, yeah, he’s getting ready to report to his squad leader.

The squad leader, in the meantime is moving up to the lead team to locate the enemy and determine if the lead team can suppress them. By “suppression” we mean, can they put enough fire on them to keep them from accurately targeting our guys. You don’t necessarily have to hit the bad guys to suppress them. Enough fire to keep their heads down will do the job. Of course, as my first company commander was fond of saying, one round to the head is effective suppression.  If the lead team can suppress the enemy, he can immediately use his second team to move to the enemy flank and assault them to kill or capture them.

Here’s the beautiful thing about tactics- this flanking maneuver, where one element serves as a base of fire to suppress the enemy and another moves to a flank to assault works at every level. Whether it is called a flank attack, a holding attack, or fire and maneuver, it is essentially the only tactic you need to know, from squad level to division level.

If the lead team cannot suppress the enemy, the second team of the lead squad is brought up to add its firepower to the base of fire. While this is happening, the platoon leader and the machine gun team travelling with him moves into position. The platoon leader makes his estimate of the situation, emplaces the machine gun team and has it engage to suppress the enemy, and makes a determination as to whether the lead squad has suppressed the enemy, and if so, can one or both of the following squads make a flank attack. Alternatively, he can bring a second squad (and the other machine gun team) up to add suppressive fires, while sending the third squad to attack from the flank. Normally, the platoon leader will accompany the flanking assault, but he may decide to remain with the base of fire. It is a judgment call.

Right about this time, our platoon leader is a very busy young man. In addition to moving up to take control of the engagement, emplacing the machine gun team, and determining how and where to make his flank attack (or even if he can- he may need to use the entire platoon as a base of fire, and let another of the company’s platoons maneuver to make a flank attack), he’s also on the radio to the company commander telling him where he’s made contact, and what type of contact he’s facing. He’s also busy getting the ball rolling on getting fire support into the fight. This might be in the form of mortar fire from the company’s two 60mm mortars, or it might be artillery support or even getting supporting Apache gunships overhead. He has his Forward Observer with him to help, but it is still a lot for a young man a year or two out of college to handle.

While our young platoon leader is doing this, his platoon sergeant, the most experienced soldier in the platoon, is busy bringing up the second machine gun team, getting the feel for what the situation is, preparing to either take charge of the base of fire, or lead the assault on the enemy flank.

In a well trained platoon, these actions have been practiced dozens of times, and are as familiar and automatic as an NFL team  running a screen pass on second down. This is bread and butter stuff. You simply MUST be able to do these fundamental actions, and you simply MUST have practiced them enough that they are second nature. There is no time to sit back and think what your reactions should be. Once you have a bit of a grip on the situation, THEN you can take a moment to figure out your next steps. But your platoon must have the basics down. I’ve probably walked through the drill a thousand times. Most of the time, it’s just that, a walk-through. After that, increasingly realistic practice builds on the basics. And once you’ve mastered the simple drills such as this, you and your platoon can move on to more complex endeavors (such as doing it at night!).

In the video above, you can see the beginning of the combat drill. The troops are laying suppressive fires on the enemy, and getting fire support rolling. They’re a bit far out to attempt to immediately flank the enemy (and there’s a depressing lack of covered and concealed routes to move for that attack). But they clearly have rehearsed for this moment many a time.

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by | February 13, 2011 · 7:20 pm

Food for thought on lawfare

I’ve given lawfare (that is, the endless discussion of the law of war right in the middle of a fight) quite a bit of thought, but my every attempt to write about it has bogged down. I find it an incredibly frustrating topic. My squad level orientation means the mere mention of lawfare makes my blood pressure spike. But I’m also smart enough to know that in our age of instant communications that a scrupulous attention to the laws of war are an absolute necessity not only from a moral perspective, but also from a political and operational view. The increasing presence of non-state actors on the field of battle are having quite a bit of influence on current thought on the topic. Having said that, Kenneth Anderson has an interesting post at The Volokh Conspiracy about how views on the law of war are evolving. 

Start with technology. The rise of more and more precise targeted killing technology does two things in the legal frame. First, because it reduces collateral damage, naturally civilians become less of an issue and proportionality less of an issue as well. One might reject the claim that in fact collateral damage is reduced and continue to say that this perception is factually incorrect. But without proposing to argue about it here, I’d simply say that the technology is getting more and more precise, and when Panetta says the drone targeted killing technology is the most precise thing in the history of warfare, I think it is basically right and getting more so with new technological developments. That is relative, however — relative to the realistic alternatives, not by comparison to zero. It is certainly far from perfect, so please, human rights monitors, don’t start getting eager (or more eager than you already are) to demand zero collateral damage and impose strict liability, overt or “function.”

We’ve got some big brains reading here from time to time. What say you?

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by | January 20, 2011 · 7:36 pm

Muscatatuck Urban Training Center

The extensive US operations in Iraq, and to a lesser extent Afghanistan, have meant that US forces had to learn to do something they really didn’t want to- fight in urbanized terrain. Fighting in cities is hard, it takes a lot of manpower, it usually costs a lot of casualties, and a lot of civilians tend to get killed. So for many years, the services just kind of pretended that they wouldn’t have to do it. Oh, there were some half-hearted attempts to pretend there was a doctrine in place for it, and that the troops were trained for it. But really? No. Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) got lip service at best.

One of the real challenges of realistic training for MOUT is that there just aren’t a lot of places to train. I mean, if you want to practice tank/mech infantry warfare, you just need a lot of open space. But to train to fight in a city, you need, well, a city! And building those facilities isn’t cheap.

At Ft. Carson, a base home to more than a division of troops, in the 1990s, the sum total of MOUT training facilities was 3 or 4 cinder block two story structures less than the size of a middle class house. Given that Ft. Carson’s troop units next fight would be in downtown Baghdad, it would seem the lack of realistic urban training was a great disservice to our troops.

With that critical shortage of training facilities staring them in the face, and with the urban nature of combat in Iraq becoming more and more apparent every day, the Army in the first few years of the Iraq War sought frantically to find places to train troops for the unique challenges of MOUT.

One innovative approach was to use surplus property. In Indiana, the states former “Development Center” (formerly the Indiana Farm Colony for Feeble Minded Youth) was closed, and it residents placed in community settings*. This surplus facility was then turned over to the Indiana National Guard, and became the Muscatatuck Urban Training Center. The large number and variety of buildings, while not perfect, were a vast improvement over having nothing at all to train with.

While the facility is now run by the Indiana National Guard, it is used by a wide variety of organizations. In addition to military units, police and other civil agencies use its facilities to train for law enforcement and disaster relief operations.

There are other efforts still underway to increase the number and scope of facilities for training troops to fight in urban settings. But this is surely one of the cheaper alternatives around.

*No, the challenged youth of Indiana were not evicted to make way for the callous killers of the military. The policy decision had previously been made to reintegrate the MSDC residents into community settings and close the facility. Only then was the decision made to turn it over to the IARNG.

And this post was made mostly because I really, really found myself enjoying saying “Muscatatuck” over and over again. Try it, you’ll see what I mean.

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by | · 9:41 am

PITA

It’s fairly slow here today. So I was cruising some of the usual sites looking for blog fodder, and came across this pic.

sandbag-castle-01-2011

And what occurred to me was this- in the age of Hesco barriers, there are still a lot of places that have to be fortified with the old fashioned sandbag.

Let me tell you, filling and emplacing that many sandbags is an enormous pain in the ass. Few jobs in the Army are as dull or surprisingly backbreaking as filling and emplacing sandbags. Mind you, it’s all worth it. It just isn’t any fun to do it. So when I saw that mound of bags, my old aches and pains in my back and shoulders twitched just a bit.

When I was working at brigade headquarters, we deployed for training to Hoehenfels once. Among the other fun things we did, we put a sandbag wall around the Tactical Operations Center (TOC). How many sandbags? Oh, several thousand at least. Now, brigade headquarters are long on officers, and short on enlisted. So there were a relative handful of us that were filling and flinging these things.  My boss, LTC Oz, being sensitive to the morale of the troops, decreed that everyone that entered or exited the TOC would henceforth fill and emplace a sandbag- coming and going. It wasn’t much, but it was a nice gesture to let us underlings know that we were not forgotten.

Oddly, he didn’t have many problems getting the staff officers (and the brigade commander, COL Z) to comply. But the staff NCOs seemed to think they were magically exempt from this requirement. Well, the Sergeant Major, CSM McK, finally put an end to that foolishness.

And I think some of my fellow sandbag fillers took just a little too much glee in pointing out the entry requirement to the division commander when he stopped by for a visit. Good sport that he was, the General complied, sorta. His aide, a sharply dressed First Lieutenant got to toss TWO bags on the pile.

Close enough for me.

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by | January 14, 2011 · 8:57 am

The Herd Brings the Heat

The 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 503rd Infantry, one of the infantry battalions of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, produced a motivational video of a tour in Afghanistan. There’s some NSFW language.

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by | December 30, 2010 · 3:58 am

Past, Present and Future of Tactical Radios – Part 9

In the last installment, I introduced the first generations of SINCGARS radios, but left off with mention of the System Improvement Program (SIP) and Advanced SIP (ASIP) generations.  If one considers the PRC-77 based on internal improvements to the PRC-25, then perhaps the SIP and ASIP are analogous evolutions from the original SINCGARS.

After Desert Storm, Army planners realized further battlefield digitization was inevitable.  Through the early 1990s Army Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) began programs to introduce near and long-term solutions to meet the digital requirements.  At the time, the tactical Army relied heavily on an integrated data-voice network from the maneuver brigade up to the theater level.   Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE), at division and corps level used packet switching to pass, what was for its time, high-speed data.  These formed the backbone of the Army’s first Tactical Local Area Network (TACLAN).

The “must have” application for brigades and above in the post-Gulf War was imagery, particularly from the much ballyhooed Joint-STARS.   But planners also recognized the need for more than intelligence products at the foxhole level – particularly friendly forces information, general situational awareness, logistics reporting, and digital supplements to field orders.

The problem was the hardware between brigade and battalion.  Maneuver battalions typically possessed two AN/VRC-97 Mobile Subscriber Radio Telephone (MSRT) tied into the MSE network.  MSRTs were ungainly – sort of a cell phone the size of the old VRC-12 radio.  Battalions often paired MSRTs with an AN/UXC-7 Lightweight Digital Fax, which weighed 55 pounds (“lightweight.” I’m not making this up!).  Clearly not an option for the front line.

Also in limited service was the Enhanced Position Location and Reporting System (EPLRS), providing “friendly forces” tracking using a set of digital radios, both vehicle mounted and backpack.

EPLRS Radio Set

Although not a true combat net radio, but in scope of this discussion, EPLRS offered a 56 kilobyte-per-second (kb/s) network for data traffic (again, state-of-the-art at the time).  With a data cable, an operator with a laptop could send and receive data.  The EPLRS software application displayed friendly forces within the network.  On the down side, the radio didn’t support voice traffic; weighed as much as a SINCGARS; and introduced another radio to configure.  While useful, the EPLRS was about a generations ahead of its operators in my opinion, with a steep learning curve.

CECOM concurrently worked towards the integration of SINCGARS with the MSE and EPLRS networks.  SINCGARS SIP introduced a network interface card (NIC) option.  This gave the radio an IP address (just like the computer you are reading this on) and connected to the TACLAN.  An external InterNetwork Card (INC) performed routing functions between SINCGARS, EPLRS, or MSE networks.  In operation, a SINCGARS on a vehicle mount used an INC to connect to either EPLRS or MSE.  That radio set became the “gateway” for other SINCGARS, even PRC-119s, and computer terminals (imagine a big, fat 1990s era laptop) connected by data cables.  Although the data rate remained at 19 kb/s.  In 1995, CECOM demonstrated this setup as part of “Force XXI,” with a team in the field at Fort Gordon passing an email through SINCGARS to a garrison terminal at Fort Monmouth.   And, no it was not a PowerPoint attachment!

SINCGARS SIP, designated RT-1523C or D, were externally similar to the second ICOM sets.  The SIP also introduced an interface to the standard Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver (PLGR) devices, and allowed the radio to pass its position to other stations in the network, thus making SINCGARS a “poor man’s” EPLRS.  Further, the GPS provided a handy time source to resolve continuing time drift issues.

Keeping with the ever evolving electronic technology, the next upgrade for SINCGARS featured a digital signal processor further reducing the physical size of the radio. Although I’ve never seen it stated in such terms, the ASIP in some regards answered a pressing need (once again) for squad level radios.  Ever since the introduction of frequency hopping radios, the old single channel PRC-126s’ days were numbered.

ASIP SINCGARS (RT-1523E)

The radio, designated RT-1523E, weighed 9 pounds even with battery, handset, and antenna.  Even at half the width, the ASIP fits the older SINCGARS mounts.  Note the large side panel on the photo above, which is the compartment for a BA-5590 battery.

ASIP and SIP SINCGARS

But the “time drift” issue remained.   The official solution involved a new fill device.  In the mid-1990s the Army began introduction of the AN/CYZ-10 ANCD (or “crazy ten”) device to replace the various fill devices (KYK-13 being the most familiar).

The "Crazy Ten" ANCD

The ANCD, with all those buttons and tiny display, carried all five variables (and more), including time, needed for SINCGARS operations.   I’ll be blunt in my assessment – the initial fielding was rushed without proper training and the devices were complex in operation.  The “crazy ten” worked, but I spent many a tense moment trying to figure out what button I’d skipped around COMSEC change over time.

In 2001, the US Army and Marines had the best system of combat net radios in the world, particularly considering the digital capability.  Trouble was, the system was designed around a conventional war to match up with conventional threats.  The asymmetrical wars in Afghanistan and Iraq brought requirements unseen by the original SINCGARS requirements.  The adversary lacked sophisticated jamming and intercept capabilities, rendering some of the radio’s features unnecessary.   Yet, the warfighter needed more support for data traffic than ever imagined.  In a war where routine patrols could become front page news within hours, rapid dissemination of information was paramount.

A senior communications officer once confided that OIF and OEF are “bring your own damned radio” wars.  With the distinction between conventional and special forces blurred, many new radio types arrived in line units. Many “limited procurement” radios found their way into the combat zone.  Commercial “fill in” (or COTS) products abounded.  In the remote areas, regular infantry squads used single channel satellite radios (practically unheard at that echelon before 2001).  Partly addressing the needs, the AN/PRC-117 multi-band radio appeared in significant numbers.

PRC-117 in TACSAT Mode

The PRC-117 offered capability to operate with SINCGARS FH nets and single channel satellite nets.  As seen in the photo above, the set is about the same size and weight of a PRC-119.  And somewhat a glimpse into the future, the PRC-117 is a “software-defined” radio.

In retrospect, while many (including me) have cursed SINCGARS for its complexity, the radios have proven adaptable and reliable.  Over the years, better training programs have resolved the complexity issues somewhat.  The system has served through a transition from “voice-centric” radio nets to a time of “data-centric” computer networks.  For what it is worth, the VRC-12 and PRC-77 family served as the primary US Army radios from 1965 until about 1992 – some 27 years.   SINCGARS took over that role starting 1990 and is still going strong at 20 years with no replacement in sight.  Current plans call for over 400,000 SINCGARS remaining in Army inventories out to 2028.

In the last post in this series, I will summarize 70 some odd years of combat radio development and offer my thoughts about what could and should be done for the future.

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by | December 22, 2010 · 7:39 am

Spotlight: Comms in RC South – Afghanistan

Recently Brigadier General (Promotable) Ben Hodges gave a presentation to the Northern Virginia Armed Forces Communications and Electronics (AFCEA) chapter.  General Hodges has recently returned from a tour as Deputy Commander of Regional Command (RC) South in Afghanistan.  He focused the keynote presentation on the communications and data links used to support the warfighter in RC South:

The presentation dovetails nicely with my discussion of Army tactical communications and developments from World War II to the present.  A brief but interesting look at the current state of communications in theater:

BG(P) Hodges Presentation on RC-South’s Communications (PDF)

A few points I’d like to emphasize.

On the first slide after the cover, General Hodges presented a title with “C5ISR”.  The Army fights with acronyms.  This stands for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Coalition, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.   Yes, coalition in bold.  The school-house teaches there are 4 “c”s.  Warfighting experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has demonstrated the need for a 5th.  The communications and data infrastructure over which the war is fought is indeed a shared resource.  Tactical flexibility, which used to be expressed in kilometers-per-hour or maximum range, also must consider how fast it takes to get an instant message down to the subordinate headquarters, regardless of the uniform or flag.

Plenty of photos of troops operating in Afghan, including MCLIC and APOBS (there’s a topic for you XBrad!).  But note the media presence on slides 9 and 10.  The local media is a component of the battlespace in Afghanistan.  As we learned in Iraq, a bit of good press goes a long way.

Look over the photo of the Company TOC on slide 11.  Situational awareness presented via large screen TV.  Several computers with live data feeds.  And on the left, the old “Fox Mike” – FM radio set.   Sort of a mix of the latest and greatest with the communications equipment from my generation.  Photos on the following slides show more command posts.  The old map boards are still there, and still useful in lots of ways.  But notice number of computer screens, telephone systems, and (you have to look for them) the radio sets.

Side 18 presents a great example of how the modern battlefield is increasingly digitized as we fight an information-centric war.  Biometric data collection.  Twenty-five years ago, we could not even anticipate this need.  Today it is a requirement.

And to support all those computers in the CPs, hand-held biometrics collection points, along with all the other gadgets, the warfighter needs bandwidth on those communication links.  Look at slide 21.  Sort of reminds me of that hockey-stick global warming chart.  Eight month time span, the bandwidth expanded ten-fold.  And I bet if you doubled that today, the commanders on the ground would say it’s still not quite enough.

And what does that increased bandwidth look like on the ground?  Slide 23 – a FOB bristling with SATCOM, line of sight, and FM antennas.

The presentation is a good, but quick, look at the communications required to support operations in the battlespace today.  But trust me only brushing the surface….

Craig.

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by | December 9, 2010 · 9:33 am

XM2010 Sniper Rifle

The long ranges typical of engagements in Afghanistan have caused a renewal of interest in sniping in the Army. During most of the Cold War era, with its focus on mechanized warfare in Western Europe, it was very low priority. After all, snipers are of very limited value against a tank regiment charging across a valley. But in a small unit firefight between light infantry in the hills of Afghanistan, the ability to selectively target and kill insurgents, often hiding among civilians, is a great asset. On problem the Army has had is that the ranges in Afghanistan are often so great that its current crop of sniper rifles struggled to reach that far with any consistent accuracy. The 7.62x51mm NATO round can reach about 800m over level terrain. That’s great. But when the Taliban is way up on a ridgeline 900m away shooting down on your position, you need something with a little more oomph.

I’ve mentioned before that the Army has been looking at upgrading its standard sniper rifle, the M24, up from 7.62mm to the .300Winchester Magnum. See also, here. Well, the new rifle is the XM2010. And it isn’t really so much an upgrade, as a rebuild. When the Army first bought its M24s, they paid just a bit extra to get the receiver in the long format, not the short. This was unnecessary for the 7.62mm, but it did give the Army the option of upgrading the rifles to .300MG.  Finally, that time has come. But the Army isn’t just switching out the bolt and barrel. In fact, according to The Firearms Blog, pretty much the only thing being retained is the receiver itself and the trigger group.

Our British cousins have adopted an even larger round, the .338 Lapua for their sniper rifles. That round is pretty much the gold standard for long distance sniping. But the .300WM is nothing to sneeze at. And by rebuilding the rifle actions already in hand, rather than having to go through the headache of procuring an entirely new system, the Army has been able to field this system relatively quickly. USA Today has an article today about the new system:

The Army is shipping powerful new rifles to its snipers in Afghanistan to kill insurgents who are firing from greater distances and shooting at troops more frequently than in the early years of the war.

The XM2010 sniper rifle can hit a target 3,937 feet away, which is a quarter-mile farther than the current Army sniper rifle shoots.

The added distance is important because insurgents have been shooting down from ridges and mountaintops where gravity helps their bullets travel farther and beyond the range of Army snipers.

“They’re not outgunning us, but they are putting our soldiers in a predicament where 800 meters (2,625 feet) may not be enough,” said Col. Douglas Tamilio, referring to the maximum range of the current M24 sniper rifle.

“Because of the expanse, you can see so far and you can engage so far,” Tamilio said. “You want to give guys the capability to do those things they need to do at those ranges.”

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by | December 7, 2010 · 8:43 am

Multicam in Afghanistan

The Army’s regular combat uniform, the ACU has come in for criticism for not blending in well in the terrain in parts of Afghanistan, so the Army has test fielded several units wearing a variation in the “MutltiCam” camouflage pattern

What do you think?

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by | December 6, 2010 · 7:28 pm

Tanks in the A-stan

Well, the Marines asked for, and received, permission to deploy a company of M1A1 tanks to support their units in Southern Afghanistan. And according the the Army times, the US Army hasn’t totally discounted the idea:

Army Brig. Gen. Frederick Hodges finished a yearlong deployment in November as director of operations for NATO’s Regional Command-South. He said he had not heard discussions of bringing tanks to RC-South, the regional command adjacent to RC-Southwest, which is where the Marines tanks are headed.

“We did not discuss in any detail the use of [U.S. Army] tanks,” Hodges said. However, he didn’t rule it out and said tanks have a proven place in Afghanistan. The Canadian army first sent a tank squadron — about 15 tanks, equivalent to a U.S. Army tank company — in October 2006. The Danish army followed suit and sent a similar-sized unit in 2007.

Army tank companies could deploy within a brigade combat team or be attached to Marine or coalition units, as happened in Iraq. The tanks would then spread out in pairs and provide support to units across the region, said David Johnson, a researcher at the Rand Corp., where he studies tank operations.

Deploying tanks could save soldiers’ lives as they prove to be more effective at pushing back assaults than some other weapon systems. Once an enemy penetrates an artillery gun’s range fan, it is useless, Johnson said. Not so for a tank. “It sure would have been nice to have an M1A2 Abrams tank at the Battle of Wanat or [Combat Outpost] Keating,” he said.

I’ll leave it to Esli, the resident tanker in our little commentariat here, to wax philosophical on where and how tanks can contribute to the fight in Afghanistan. But if the Army does decide to follow the Marines example, I hope they’ll go read what Donn Starry wrote about armor in a COIN environment.

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by | · 9:57 am

RLTW

Rangers Lead The Way.

I’m not a Ranger. When I was in Basic Training at Ft. Benning, I saw the Ranger School students going through the “easy” part of their 61 day course. As bad as I was sucking wind, it pretty quickly became clear to me that those guys were facing a much higher hurdle than I felt like facing just then.

And the Rangers do produce some tough soldiers.

(Sergeant First Class Joe Kapacziewski) joined the Army in 2001, and has served with the 75th Ranger Regiment for his entire military career.
“Being part of the 75th Ranger Regiment means everything to me. I have had the privilege to serve in the Regiment for nine years now and cannot imagine doing any other job in the military. I love waking up every morning and going to work with 600 of my best friends,” he said.

Kapacziewski will deploy to Afghanistan in early 2011 as a Ranger platoon sergeant, a role to which he was recently promoted. While this will be his second deployment as a platoon sergeant, he has previously deployed to the Middle East six times, including three since his amputation (emphasis mine-ed).

“Being a platoon sergeant is the best job I’ve had in the Army and I am thankful my Chain of Command had the confidence in me to put me in this position,” Kapacziewski said. “My goal for this upcoming deployment is rid the world of as many terrorists as possible in the time we are over there. I will lead my fellow Rangers by setting the example in all we do and by being relentless in the pursuit of our enemies.”

Read the whole thing.

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by | December 5, 2010 · 12:14 pm

Some days, the Suck embraces YOU!

PleaseTellMeHowBadYourDayWas

No matter how you slice it, humping a ruck in Afghanistan is just no fun.

From John at The Castle.

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