Tag Archives: army

by | May 19, 2013 · 8:34 am

‘03A3

It’s the weekly gun thread over at Ace of Spades, written by our buddy Andy. And the Scary Gun of the Week is an early Assault Rifle, the Springfield M1903A3.

gunthread05192013

We have a long affinity for, and association with the ‘03A3.

In the fall of 1982, as we began our sophomore year, as a member of the high school NJROTC, we tried out for, and were accepted onto, the Armed Drill Team.

The Armed Drill Team would compete against other JROTC teams in the area in three phases of competition- In Ranks Inspection, Regulation Drill, and Exhibition Drill. Obviously, the “armed” part meant that the members of the team had to be under arms, and for that, the US Navy had provided our unit with a selection of M1903A3 rifles. But for various reasons, the Navy wasn’t keen on giving out actual honest to goodness weapons (mostly a matter of secure storage). So the weapons had their barrels plugged, and their bolt actions welded shut. Further, the wood stocks had been replaced by a plastic stock, which was much more resistant to breaking when we inevitably dropped the piece.

At about 9.5 pounds, the ‘03A3 was  a pretty hefty piece, but it was also wonderfully balance, and for drill, just about perfect. It may have been surpassed as a weapon of war, but to this day it is still the preferred piece for ceremonial units such as the Army Drill Team, and for color guards both in and out of the service.

It was also quite capable of inflicting some significant trauma. Esli was there when I lost my two front teeth to one. And Esli and Jay were both present when I had one thunk me right on the crown of my skull and leave me dazed and confused. And goodness knows all the times I picked up minor cuts and bruises from one.

Just about the day after graduation, I memory dumped all the nomenclature and other information about the ‘03 (I had to memorize all the M16A1 stuff in its place!).

But when I found myself in college, and again on an armed drill team, I had to relearn all that stuff. And at the college level, the weapons were not demilitarized, but actual functioning weapons. That meant finding secure storage for them. We ended up storing them at the campus police office.

There are quite a few Springfields in civilian hands, and are popular rifles. Very well made, they have a great reputation for reliability and accuracy. And the .30-06 cartridge rightly holds a place as one of the greatest rounds in history.

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by | May 12, 2013 · 5:23 am

The Rifle Squad as the Decisive Force

A year or two ago, in discussing small infantry units, Esli mentioned that the current doctrinal emphasis of the Maneuver Center of Excellence (formerly, the Infantry School) was on making the rifle squad more lethal, more effective, more of an overmatch to the enemy equivalent.

The current US Army 9 man rifle squad* versus an enemy of comparable size has several significant advantages, and yet also faces serious disadvantages.

First, US squads tend to be better educated and better trained in infantry combat, in both the technical and tactical aspects.  They are virtually never without some type of supporting fires on call, from machine gun teams and anti-armor weapons at the squad level, company and battalion level mortar fire, through brigade and higher level artillery, and even close air support.

The soldiers of the rifle squad have body armor, clothing and load bearing equipment that is far better than their opponents. Their food is healthier, and less likely to lead to illness. Their communications are generally better. His night vision devices are almost always far more capable than the enemy’s.

But the US rifle squad also has its problems…

That body armor and load bearing equipment leads to soldiers carrying loads that severely limit the mobility and agility of the squad. These same heavy loads also lead to an increase in sports type injuries.  Rules of engagement often delay or prevent supporting fires from higher echelons from joining the fight in a timely manner. That healthful and nutritious food is heavy, further increasing the soldier’s load, and tying him to a logistical chain. His communications and night vision devices all require large amounts of battery power, all of which has to be manpacked.

As to weapons, frankly small arms are small arms. We can spend the next fifty years debating the relative merits of the M16/M4 family versus the AK family that have spent the last fifty years fighting one another.  But neither weapon so overmatches the other as to be decisive. The same is true for any other weapons found in the rifle squad or the threat squad.

So, today we find ourselves in a situation where a US squad can pretty much hold its own with any similar sized threat. And generally, it will come out better than the enemy.

But that isn’t the goal. The goal, the desire is to be confident that virtually any time a US squad encounters an enemy formation of similar size, the US squad can fix it, fight it, finish it, hunting it down and destroying it. Today, most squad on squad engagements are not decisive- either one or the other force breaks contact and lives to fight another day.

Comes now news that the Army commissioned a study by the National Research Council, who came to the conclusion that the problem is, the squad isn’t well equipped.

Now, in the context I just shared with you, that sounds kinda nuts. One of the primary problems the dismounted infantry squad faces is the crushing burden of carrying the stuff they already have.

But the report does make some sense. The Army has spent untold billions designing network centric warfare capabilities the give commanders unprecedented ability to “see” the battlefield.  A commander can know almost instantly where his forces are, and with support from UAVs and other intel assets, very often where enemy forces are, even before the battle is joined.

But once a squad leaves its vehicles, it is cut off from this network. Its only data stream, if you will, is voice radio. And the “bandwidth” of voice radio is awfully narrow. It is very, very difficult to transmit a clear tactical picture through words alone, especially absent the non-verbal cues humans routinely use in face to face communications.  Even with standardized formats, the limits to how much information can pass from the squad to higher, or from higher down to the squad is very limited.

In the past, we’ve mentioned the possibility of using smart phones on the battlefield to increase the dismount squad’s ability to access data, rather than just voice. And there’s some hope for that. But smart phones aren’t exactly set up to run on Army tactical radio networks. Further, a smart phone is not the most ergonomic way to present information. You know it is foolhardy to text and drive. How much more foolhardy is it to text and shoot? So a more “heads up” method of presenting the information in an intuitive manner will eventually be needed.

And whatever technology comes along, it will have to weigh less than the current state of the art. And not only will it have to weigh less, its batteries will have to weigh much less.

Further, for all the advantages technology may in the future give the squad, it is not without its own burdens, even beyond simple weight. Every piece of equipment calls for maintenance and training, both of which take time. And time available for training is limited. What other training should the squad sacrifice to achieve competency in these new technologies?

Do we sacrifice time spent on marksmanship? Fire and movement? First aid? Weapons maintenance? Map reading? Sexual assault awareness and prevention training? Language and cultural training for upcoming deployments? It isn’t like there isn’t enough on the plate already.

The report also pings Big Army for spending far more money and attention on big ticket acquisition programs than on the bread and butter of everyday stuff used at the squad level.  The Program Executive Officer for Command and Control technologies is a Major General. The PEO for small arms is a Colonel, who, judging by the fact he’s been there for several years, ain’t a “comer” for stars.

So what do we do?  I don’t know. I’m not entirely sure, absent a far greater willingness to take casualties, we can make the rifle squad capable of decisively defeating a threat squad.

And I’m not even sure that should be the goal. The great strength of the Army, and indeed all our services, has long, long been not so much our technology, but our ability to “systemize our systems.”

In an artillery duel, the US doesn’t fight gun against gun. It pits US target acquisition, communications, fire control, guns and ammunition (as well as soldiers, doctrine, and training) against the foe. And no other nation has shown the talent for tying together these elements to effectively produce a whole  far greater than the sum of their parts. I’ve used artillery here as an example, but the general rule applies across the entire armed forces.  The challenge is to continue to understand that technology is a tool that enables this synchronization, and not a substitute for it.

http://img42.imageshack.us/img42/836/53805940489aa77d4f09b.jpg

*Marine rifle squads have thirteen members. Basically, they add an extra fire team to each squad.

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by | May 4, 2013 · 9:54 am

Solder Re-Classes To Cav Just So He Can Recite Lines From ‘Apocalypse Now’ | The Duffel Blog

KILLEEN, TX — The Army’s 1st Cavalry Division has been under fire in recent years, with soldiers claiming their obsession with obsolete uniform items — Stetson cowboy hats and spurs without rowels — make them stand out in addition to being the target of countless jokes from other service members.

More recently, the enormous and expensive patch of the unit has also drawn the ire of lawmakers after a brigade comptroller’s proposal to shrink the size of the emblem drew immediate and devastating reprisals.

But not all soldiers are so critical of the ‘First Team.’ Newly minted Trooper Specialist Ernest Whitman recently completed his change of MOS (Military Occupational Specialty), or re-class as it’s more commonly known, from the infantry into the ‘Cav.

When asked about the reason for his transition, Whitman didn’t hesitate. ”That’s easy bro, Apocalypse Now. Did you see that movie? That fucking bad-ass Stetson hat Robert Duvall was wearing. God I can’t wait to get mine! And those spurs, who wouldn’t want to wear them? I’m gonna pull so much tail it’ll be sick.”

Suddenly, Whitman stood back from the table and shouted, “I love the smell of napalm in the morning! How amazing is that line?”

via Solder Re-Classes To Cav Just So He Can Recite Lines From ‘Apocalypse Now’ | The Duffel Blog.

I was gonna make a crack that the real clue it was satire was the fact that NO Infantryman would ever reclass to Cav.

But then, I remembered, I know someone who did. He clings to his story that his knees were the issue, but I’m not really buying it. It has to be the hat.

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by | May 2, 2013 · 9:04 am

Precision Guidance Kit

Artillery, the King of Battle, has long produced more casualties on the battlefield than any other weapon system. Since World War I, the massive barrages of artillery have been used to suppress, disrupt, delay and destroy enemy formations.  Areas from an acre to several square miles have been pounded into submission.

But until very recently, artillery has been an area weapon. Only last year we wrote with wonder at the revolution made possible by precision guided artillery shells such as the XM892 Excalibur.  In effect, gunners now have a “sniper rifle” with a 20 mile range.

Here’s the Excalibur Wiki.

But the Excalibur ain’t cheap. It is in effect, a gun launched guided missile. And while fewer Excaliburs are needed to prosecute a target than traditional 155mm shells, there are only so many that can be carried in a basic load. Guns still need to carry conventional rounds in their caissons for missions that don’t require precision.

What the Army really wanted was a “bolt on” kit that could be added to a conventional 155mm HE round, much as laser guided bombs and JDAMS are simply guidance kits strapped onto conventional dumb bombs.

ATK Systems has finally fielded such a system. The Precision Guidance Kit is a self contained fuze kit that simply screws into the fuze well of a conventional High Explosive 155mm round. This keeps production costs, shipping costs and training costs down. No special handling for the round is required, and there’s no need to carry additional types of ammunition, just additional fuzes.

Recently, active Army fielding of PGK has begun.  April 16 saw the arrival in Afghanistan of the fielding teams, and deployment with direct support artillery.

Fewer rounds to destroy a target, less collateral damage, better first round accuracy, and a relatively low cost. This is one quiet little program that has delivered.

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by | April 29, 2013 · 9:30 am

Monday Morning Linkage

So, a little birdie passed along this quiz of great commanders of history. I did pretty  well on the Civil War and World War II stuff (and more recent stuff, of course) but wow, do I suck at ancient history.

No, I’m not telling you my score.

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Most armies, if you desert in wartime, you get lined up against a wall and shot. Ours? Not so much. This dirtbag faces a max of five years, and likely will get less than that.

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The Army is starting to look at future helicopter programs. I have to say, using a two-ship technology demonstrator to neck down to one production program of record isn’t exactly giving me a warm fuzzy. Since that was the methodology that brought us the F-35 JSF program.

There’s nothing particularly wrong with using competing technology demonstrators. The problem came when the program treated a technology demonstrator as a prototype for an actual combat aircraft. Neither JSF demonstrator was fundamentally incapable of being developed. Both teams should have been invited to compete for the actual JSF contract. But necking down at the technology demonstrator phase, intended to spare the expense of developing two fighters, left the government with only one design, in effect, a monopoly. And we’ve seen how well that worked out.

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US Navy bound and determined to prove that you don’t need ships to have a navy.

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NTP

th

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TAH has a bunch of stuff on phony soldiers. What I find even more depressing is when a former soldier, one with a perfectly respectable career, feels the need to puff up his credentials. Keith Keeton has a pretty reasonable collection of the usual awards and accomplishments.

So why is he lying his ass off?

I think the bravest thing I ever did in the Army was to take the last donut when the 1SG was reaching for it.

—–

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by | April 25, 2013 · 9:53 am

Bagram Batman

One of the annoyances of being stationed overseas was Armed Forces Networks, the provider of pretty much the only English language television available back in the late 80s/early 90s. It wasn’t so much that the programming was bad and out of date. The problem was, unlike regular commercial television, the “commercials” were in fact public service announcements from the Army reminding you of such weighty matters as “don’t bounce checks at the PX,” and “don’t beat your wife and kids,” and the ever popular “don’t abandon your privately owned vehicle when you rotate back to the states.” All delivered with the charm and panache one expects out of a government run entity.

AFN still runs overseas networks, particularly in fun places like Afghanistan, home to the sprawling Bagram Airbase. And while I’m certain most of the AFN produced content is as lame as it ever was, at least one campaign has shown someone, somewhere, screwed up and let a little humor into the system.

Meet Bagram Batman.

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by | April 10, 2013 · 11:23 am

Now’s not the time for slash and burn

At least, not when it comes to active duty troop levels.

One of my frustrations when frequenting Milblogs with a naval or air centric theme is that in tough budget times, the authors and commentariat are quick to offer up ground forces on the budget alter. “Oh, put the bulk of ground forces in the reserves!”

Well, here’s the thing. In the almost seven decades since the end of World War II, we’ve found ourselves time and again involved in manpower intensive ground combat.

Recently, retired Admiral Gary Roughead and defense analyst Kori Schake published a paper from the Brookings institution recommending that, in effect, all the looming budget cuts in DoD should come from the Army, and that the Navy and Air Force should see their funding levels maintained.

First, thanks guys, for validating the suspicion many of us harbored that AirSea Battle wasn’t a doctrine, but political maneuvering to preserve Navy/Air Force budgets. One can hardly fault a former Chief of Naval Operations for being a tad proprietary when it comes to his service’s budget.*

But to wave your hands and pronounce that henceforth, wars will be high technology affairs with little or no need for manpower intensive operations is to ignore not just the last seven decades of history, but all of history.

Comes now Steve Metz and Douglas Lovelace, arguing that, like it or not, we still need ground troops.

It would be nice if the United States could simply opt out of all messy conflicts, but it cannot. Global connectivity means that conflict in any part of the world has cascading effects. These are most intense in neighboring states or regions as combatants, refugees, money, disorder, crime, and weapons flow back and forth, but in most cases will spread even further. The recent conflict in Libya shows this contagion effect, when there is no sustainable security following the defeat of an enemy regime. In the future, major conflicts anywhere will affect the global and American economies, increasing commodity prices, disrupting the supply of goods and services, and creating uncertainty. U.S. economic growth will depend, in part, on whether the global economy is generally stable or conflict-ridden. This will make it difficult or impossible for the United States to totally avoid major conflicts (although it does not mean the U.S. will intervene militarily in every major conflict). The profusion of global diasporas will also make it politically difficult to ignore major crises or conflicts.

Now, Metz and Lovelace are not unbiased, either. They work for the Army War College at the Strategic Studies Institute.  But they’re quite right that in spite of all our efforts to avoid messy operations on the ground, we seem to always end up there.

I’ll grant that one reason we tend to fight land wars is that in recent history, our naval power has been so overwhelming as to effectively preclude a naval war. And I do fully support the nation keeping a strong, forward naval presence throughout those areas of the world that hold our strategic interest. But the Navy has done poorly at managing the relatively strong support it has received. That’s not to say the Army has done much better, but before the Navy and the Air Force raid the Army’s budget, maybe they ought to consider which branch has born the brunt of the nation’s fighting for the past 70 years.

 

*We’d be a lot more sympathetic if his term as CNO hadn’t been such a goatrope in terms of shipbuilding.

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by | April 7, 2013 · 12:04 pm

BIG! Mortars

We’ve written before about mortars being the infantry commander’s “hip pocket artillery.”* And in our Army, mortars are infantry weapons, separate from the Field Artillery.  Currently, our Army fields 60mm, 81mm, and 120mm mortars.

But that doesn’t mean there aren’t larger mortars.  Israel and several other countries use 160mm mortars. And the current largest mortar in service is the Russian 240mm mortar.

That’s a pretty hefty tube.

It’s odd to see a weapon that has a rotary magazine and power loading and yet the each round has to have its primary and booster charges hand applied. I mean, really? Tying the “cheeses” on with string?

Looks like some guided and rocket assisted shells in there too.

*well, Infantry, Armor and Cavalry- basically each ground maneuver battalion has its own mortars.

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by | · 6:27 am

Why Do We Even Bother With Camouflage?

So, Soldier Systems Daily had an April Fool’s post about the Army ditching camouflage and going back to the simple, green uniform of yesteryear.

Apparently, so industry insiders didn’t notice the date of the post (or even the over the top post itself) and whined a little bit.

But Breach Bang Clear asks the obvious question, why bother with camo?

And really, I have had it in the back of my head that for the most part, it really is stupid to have camo uniforms.

The woodland pattern Battle Dress Uniform was a good, fairly cheap, serviceable uniform. It was based on the OG107 olive drab Vietnam Era jungle fatigues (which was based on the khaki WWII airborne jumpsuit).

But the Army, Marines, heck, even the Air Force and Navy have spent untold millions of dollars crafting camouflage uniforms for their members. And damn near every penny of that is a waste.

I’ll grant, for the sake of argument, that a handful of service members in the infantry and special operations forces, need a camouflage uniform.

But the vast, vast majority of people in the Army (or the Marines for that matter) could be performing their duties, in garrison, or in combat, in a plain, non-camouflage uniform. Obviously, Fobbits don’t really need camouflage.  Nor, really, do tankers, artillerymen, and most other combat support jobs.

The old “pickle suit” would do just fine for most jobs, and cost less to boot.

https://www.easterncostume.com/files/NAMUSA001/fullsize/1.jpg

Heck, it would be nice to be able to see someone’s rank from more than 3” away.

I’ve kind of had a suspicion that with the great increase in the cost of combat uniforms (which will only go up as new technologies are added, such as embedded blood clotting agents), eventually the Army will adopt a field/combat uniform for Infantry, and a garrison/field uniform for all other uses.

Time will tell. But I can say this, camouflage patterns on uniforms are an extremely marginal issue when it comes to the concealment of troops.

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by | March 29, 2013 · 8:18 pm

No Purple Hearts for Ft. Hood Shooting Victims

The Army has formally stated that it does not wish to award the Purple Heart to the victims of a murderous rampage allegedly perpetrated by Army Major Nidal Hasan.

The U.S. Army on Friday formally declined to award Purple Heart medals to the victims of Major Nidal Hasan’s shooting rampage at Fort Hood, saying the move would damage his ability to receive a fair trial.

The Army in a position paper said that awarding the medal to those wounded and posthumously to those killed in the November 2009 attack would ‘set the stage for a formal declaration that Major Hasan is a terrorist’ because the medal is presented to military members who are ‘wounded or killed in any action against an enemy of the United States.’

Hasan, 42, an Army psychiatrist, opened fire on a group of soldiers who were preparing for deployment to Afghanistan, killing 13 and wounding 32 before he was shot and permanently paralyzed by two civilian Fort Hood police officers.

Many people are outraged that brave American soldiers gunned down in their own garrison won’t receive the recognition they would have if they’d been killed or wounded overseas.

But in this, the Army is right.

While I’m a strong proponent for recognizing our soldiers and their sacrifices, I’m an ever stronger proponent of forcing our government to follow the rules when it comes to the rights of anyone accused of a crime, particularly in a death penalty case.

Make no mistake, I’m pretty damn sure Hasan did the shooting, was criminally culpable in doing so, and deserves the ultimate sanction. I’ll shed exactly zero tears when he is eventually tried, convicted, and put to death.

But the process matters. In this case, it’s pretty clear cut. But precedent set here will affect later cases (and in criminal law and the UCMJ, there are always later cases).

If the Army were to award the Purple Heart to the shooting victims, it would be in effect declaring that Hasan was in fact a terrorist. And that would give any defense counsel a day out of law school grounds to move for setting aside any conviction on the basis of undue command influence. The Army and other services make damn sure of the integrity of the court martial process in not allowing commanders to push for a conviction of a soldier unless the court is fully convinced of guilt, regardless of the convening authority’s feelings on the matter.  So the Army isn’t going to give defense an easy option like this.

In addition to the issue of undue command influence, any award of the Purple Heart would almost certainly raise jurisdictional issues. Defense would argue that since the PH  is only awarded to persons injured or killed in combat, then Hasan by rights must be an enemy combatant, and the Army court martial has no jurisdiction to try him. Years and years could be spent trying the case up. Do we want federal courts deciding whether Hasan should be tried by Army court martial or by the military commissions in place at Gitmo for other enemy combatants? Since shipping him to Gitmo would prove to be a practical impossibility politically, where else to try him? Federal court? As I say, the process would take years.

And if defense was really outrageous, the could really make some twisted claims.  If the shooting victims were awarded Purple Hearts for combat, what about Hasan.  Major Hasan was alongside them, and wounded too. Would he not also qualify for the Purple Heart? After all, he was on active duty, and wounded too. Why not also award a Combat Action Badge?

The victims and their families aren’t doing themselves any favors suing the Army, either. Whatever goodwill existed at Big Army went away with the first filing. Big Army wants to take care of its people, but it must take care of Big Army, first. That’s the bureaucratic imperative.

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by | March 28, 2013 · 11:13 pm

A little inside baseball

So, I’m stealing this from a forum I belong to:

52 Lima who’s stationed in fort Gordon GA, ” all grunts are stupid dumbasses that couldn’t score over a 35 on the ASVAB, and are good for nothing but cannon fodder, that don’t make up the backbone of the army, we’re better off without them. “

Yeah….

A little translation. As far as I can tell, 52L isn’t even a current MOS, so I think someone is just yanking some chains.

The ASVAB, Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude Battery, is a battery of tests designed to show, well, aptitude in several areas, in order to judge the likelihood that an enlistee will be successful in training in whatever specialty they enlist for. There are about half a dozen different scores such as General Technical and whatnot. And then there’s the score that counts when you enlist. The “overall” score is from 1 to 99, roughly indicating the percentile one falls into in terms of IQ across the population. It’s a cross between native intelligence and education. The minimum score for enlistment in the Army is 32.

There’s long been a perception that the combat arms, Infantry, Armor, Artillery, Combat Engineer, etc, are jam packed with enlistees who scored in the lower tranches of the ASVAB. A common insult of a not so bright fellow soldier is to call him a CAT IV, for the lowest tranche of the ASVAB.

But here’s the thing. Yes, combat arms, and the Infantry, take their fair share of folks who are not towering intellects. But oddly, there are a ton of people who are incredibly bright, scoring far, far above average, in the 90 percentile and above, who chose the Infantry.

Think about it. A lot of very bright young men go through high school and just aren’t challenged. They live comfortable suburban lives, hear the tales of their elders, play sports maybe, and cruise through high school with little or no effort.  But the summons of the trumpet is strong. They know they’re smart, but do they know if they are men? What more traditional test of manhood is there than war?

Anecdotal evidence (and yes, I know the plural of anecdote is not “data”), when I was a recruiter, applicants with scores from 32-50 that enlisted tended to end up either in Field Artillery, Motor Transport, or other related support fields. Applicants with scores from 50-80 tended to end up in technical fields. With only one exception* can I recall an applicant with a score over 80 not joining the combat arms. He enlisted  as a Blackhawk mechanic, became a crew chief, and enjoyed the heck out of it.

As my Bradley crossed the berm into Iraq at the opening of Desert Storm, the topic of conversation amongst the grunts in back was… Shakespeare.

*Women excepted, of course. The field of choice for very high scoring women was either Military Police, or the medical field technical specialties.

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by | March 2, 2013 · 9:47 am

Chinook

(Repost from 2009)

We’ve covered helicopters here before, such as the Huey, the Blackhawk, the OH-58 Kiowa and of course, Cobra and Apache gunships. Let’s talk about the big boy on the block. The Chinook. Or as it became known almost instantly in the Army, the Shithook. The CH-47 is the Army’s largest helicopter, used to transport critical logistical items, troops and artillery around the battlefield.

ch47

The Chinook has been around for a long time. It’s first flight was in 1961. But the issues surrounding its development deserve a little attention. In the late 1950s, the Army and helicopter designers began to realize that piston engines would never become a very efficient way of powering helicopters. Gas turbines (jet engines that provided power through a driveshaft, rather than thrust) were finally becoming a practical option for military use. With the advent of these new engines, the Army took a long look at what the next generation of helicopters should look like. Just how big should they be? At the same time, the concept of “air assault” or landing troops directly on the battlefied started to form. What was the best way to move troop unit? Should you use a smaller helicopter that could lift a squad? Or would the better bet be to use somewhat larger helicopters that could lift 15-20 men?  Smaller helicopters would cost more in the long run, but losing one helicopter in the assault wouldn’t result in as many casualties. The Army first decided to go with the larger helicopter, of about 20 men. The Vertol Company (later bought by Boeing) provided the Model 107. But the debate in the Army over helicopter size raged on. Some thought that the new UH-1B Huey could be scaled up to carry a full squad. That would handle most air assualt requirements, and still have a relatively cheap helicopter. The Model 107 would be larger than was needed. The other half of the problem was moving artillery and supplies. The Model 107 was just a bit too small for that job. The ideal was to move a 105mm howitzer, its crew, and a load of ammunition all in one lift by one helicopter. Boeing went back to the drawing board. The Model 114 was the result, and was soon bought by the Army as the CH-47 Chinook. And it wasn’t very long before the Chinook found itself in Vietnam, as part of the airmobile 1st Cavalry Division.  With Hueys to conduct the initial assualt, and Chinooks bringing in the follow-on elements and moving artillery, the Army’s pattern of air assault missions was set so soundly that it is relatively unchanged 40-odd years later.

But don’t feel bad for the Model 107. Even though it wasn’t selected by the Army, its development continued. Largely because the Marines didn’t have a lot of space on the Navy’s helicopter carriers, they were forced to go with  a somewhat larger helicopter. And the Model 107 fit the bill perfectly. They bought it as the CH-46 and operate it to this day.

Early Chinooks had engines of about 2,200 horsepower each. This was very quickly upgraded to about 2,600hp each. And improvements didn’t stop there. The rotor blades, rear pylon design, and transmission were all upgraded through the A, B, and C models to improve performance.  In the 1980s, the design was again refreshed, with attention focusing again on more horsepower, but also greatly improved avionics and better reliability, resulting in the CH-47D. Many “D” models were conversions from older models, but there were also quite a few new built airframes. These were delivered up until 2002.  And right about the time the last “D” model was delivered, the work on the latest model moved into high gear.

The newest model, the CH-47F is really an old model. While there will be some newbuild airframes, most will be remanufactured CH-47Ds. And since most of the “D” models were remanufactured earlier models, there will be some airframes well over 30 years old that will be expected to soldier on for another 20. Because of this, a large part of the program will be rebuilding them to make them easier to maintain, reducing vibration, making sure the components don’t have any fatigue issues, and making any issues easier to detect. Improvements in the avionics will include updating the instruments to the latest common “glass cockpit” standard, as well as building in the cabapility of operating in the Force XXI digital environment, which is the Army’s version of a battlefield internet.  Not surprisingly, the Army is going with more powerful engines as well. The latest version of the Chinook engines put out almost 4,900 hp each. The Chinook has gone from a useful load of 7,000 pounds in its early days, to over 21,000 pounds in the “F” modeland the new models are faster. Think about that. How many of us are faster and stronger now that we’re over 40?

By now, you ought to have figured out that the ‘hook is a pretty capable helicopter. Lots of other folks have reached that conclusion as well. Very few other nations have the same air assault capability that we do, but having a few heavy lift helicopters around is handy for them as well. Several other nations, notable Great Britain, the Dutch, and the Japanese have bought various versions of the Chinook. When Great Britain attacked to recapture the Falklands in 1982, they lost several Chinooks aboard the Atlantic Conveyor. Their one remaining Chinook was put to work, doing the job of several helicopters. In one instance, instead of carrying its normal load of 55 troops, the sole Chinook lifted 105 fully loaded troops. There are several tales of Chinooks in the Vietnam war carrying over 100 people (though usually lightly loaded Vietnamese civilians). I’ve been in a Chinook with about 40 other people- I can’t imagine just how crowded it was with over 100.

It wouldn’t be much of a stretch to say that without  the Chinook, the Army in Afghanistan would be crippled. Many of the smaller outposts can only be reached by helicopter. Given the high elevations and hot weather there, Blackhawks, normally very capable birds, struggle to carry a useful load. The Chinook, with its greater power, is able to support these high/hot outposts.

With the new “F’ models just beginning to come into service, we can expect this long serving veteran to serve for as much as 30 more years.

Mind you, we’ve scrimped on discussing the gunship version, or the several special operations versions. But here’s  a last look at the bird for you.

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by | February 26, 2013 · 8:47 pm

John Boyd And The OODA Loop

I was reminded today that Hugh Hewitt still hasn’t returned my biography of John Boyd that I loaned him a decade ago. I’m starting to think it won’t be forthcoming.

John Boyd went from  a brash young fighter pilot, to a tactical thinker who (with others) greatly changed the way the US thought about, and trained, fighter tactics. He also, based on his tactical thought, had a good deal of influence in the decision to design and purchase the F-16, a plane optimized to fight using his E/M(or Energy/Maneuverability) theory of fighter combat.

That alone would have made him a pretty memorable fellow. But building on his tactical thought, he leveraged that to an operational and strategic level theory that has been popular in both military and civilian circles for some time now. His theory became know as the “OODA Loop.”

Boyd posited that we respond to any situation or environment via a process with four elements.

  1. Observe
  2. Orient
  3. Decide
  4. Act

We observe a situation via our senses, or other methods of gathering information. We orient this information this information based on past experiences, culture, analysis, an our heritage. We make a decision based on this orientation, and then act to fulfill the decision.

But the process is not linear, as read above, but rather continuous, with each element generated feedback in the process, hence the term “loop.”

http://xbradtc.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/11_ooda_loop.png?w=500&h=230

Click to greatly embiggenfy.

The goal of consciously using an OODA loop in combat is to speed up the process of making a decision. By running through the cycle faster than an opponent, his previous observations, orientations and decisions are rendered useless by the newest observations (that is, the results of your decisions and actions). By continuously operating inside an opponent’s decision cycle, his level of chaos and confusion is greatly increased, and the validity of his own OODA loop is degraded until such time as it is worthless.

The Army has never specifically, doctrinally endorsed the OODA loop, though virtually every field grade officer is familiar with the concept. In AirLand Battle, the term of art used was “agility” which, rather than a purely physical concept, was very much a mental one, sharing the same goal, the ability to adjust to conditions and make and execute decisions faster than the enemy.

The current Army capstone doctrine no longer lists agility as one of the tenets of warfare, but does list adaptability:

ADAPTABILITY
28. Army leaders accept that no prefabricated solutions to tactical or operational problems exist. Army leaders must adapt their thinking, their formations, and their employment techniques to the specific situation they face. This requires an adaptable mind, a willingness to accept prudent risk in unfamiliar or rapidly changing situations, and an ability to adjust based on continuous assessment. Perhaps equally important, Army leaders seek to deprive the enemy of the ability to adapt by disrupting communications, forcing the enemy to continually react to new U.S. operations, and
denying the enemy an uncontested sanctuary, in space or time, for reflection. Adaptability is essential to seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative based on relevant understanding of the specific situation. For example, Army leaders demonstrate adaptability while adjusting the balance of lethal and nonlethal actions necessary to achieve a position of relative advantage and set conditions for conflict resolution within their area of operations.
29. Adaptation requires an understanding of the operational environment. While impossible to have a perfect understanding, Army leaders make every effort to gain and maintain as thorough an understanding as possible given the time allowed. They also use the Army’s information networks to share their understanding. Understanding a specific situation requires interactive learning—intentionally and repeatedly interacting with the operational environment so to test and refine multiple hypotheses. Army leaders expand
their understanding of potential operational environments through broad education, training, personal study, and collaboration with interagency partners. Rapid learning while in combat depends on life-long education, consistent training, and study habits that leaders had prior to combat.

You don’t have to dig deep in those two paragraphs to find analogs to the four processes of Boyd’s loop.

For a theory first applied to the realm of jet fighter combat, where 90 seconds is an eternity, it actually found its greatest fanbase in the Marine Corps, where he is often credited with helping (along with a great many others) reviving Marine interest in maneuver warfare.

And while the OODA loop is a popular subject among many business managers, they tend to be the of the fad of the moment type presentations. Boyd, on the other hand, was very much a numbers guy. He and two other folks, dubbed the “Fighter Mafia” developed much of the theory while working on the LFX program, that later became the F-16 and eventually spawned the F-18. Of the two other members, one was a fighter pilot and the other was a civilian statistician. Boyd himself was an industrial engineer.  They approached the theory from a systems analysis point of view.

Interestingly, as one of the more influential strategists of the second half of the 20th Century, Boyd never wrote a book on strategy. Rather, he spread his gospel via a series of briefings. These slide decks are a good resource, but sadly, without the context of actually having Boyd brief them, much is lost.

Boyd died in 1997.

A collection of his briefings can be found here.

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by | February 21, 2013 · 12:07 pm

Old Habits Die Hard

On a subReddit thread, the topic was, what subtle habits from your service days have you carried over to your civilian life?

Do you still take your hat off whenever you go indoors? Do you feel nekkid without a hat outdoors.

How many of you wolf down your meal in less time than it takes everyone else to spread their napkin and reach for the salt and pepper?

Civilian readers, what habits tip you off that someone is a vet?

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by | February 18, 2013 · 12:02 pm

Range Time

One of the things about the Army I disliked the most was its ability to take one of life’s more enjoyable activities, shooting, and suck just about every scintilla of pleasure from it.  Endless, repetitive safety briefings, rodding the barrel on the line, clearing again and again, unrealistic scenarios, uncomfortable firing positions (seriously, every range worldwide uses the same uncomfortable gravel- what’s wrong with grass?), rodding off the line, brass and ammo checks.

Life fire maneuver events were marginally better, but still less than they could have been. Sometimes because of range geography, maneuver was severely constrained. Other times, the risk aversion was so high, it led to unrealistic maneuver, reinforcing bad habits, rather than good training.

One of the big risk mitigation techniques back before the current wars was an absolute ban on any kind of fire while standing or moving. While troops did this all the time using blanks or during force on force training, it was utterly verbotten during any sort of live ammunition event.

Of course, that silly restriction has changed as the reality of warfare has led to changes in training.  But because teams often fire while moving, intense training has to take place.  The three big rules of firearms safety don’t go away just because you are headed for combat.

If you have a large enough area, it doesn’t take a lot to devise a useful close combat range, at least for small elements, from individual to team sized.

I find it interesting that the teams are composed of members from all services. I’m not knocking the other services, but defining teams by service would seem to decrease friction, and speed training. But that’s just me.

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by | February 11, 2013 · 5:58 pm

A Medal of Honor, and a sad farewell.

I’ve spent most of my day having fun in the comments of today’s Load HEAT, but I’m fully cognizant that two events took place today, both of which remind us of the honor and courage, and yes, sacrifice that so many of our citizens display.

Former Staff Sergeant Clinton Romesha was presented the Medal of Honor today for his actions during the battle at Combat Outpost Keating.

Saluting Clinton Romesha for embodying the soldier’s creed of never leaving behind a fallen comrade, President Obama on Monday bestowed the Medal of Honor on him for courageously defending a remote American outpost in eastern Afghanistan from a ferocious attack by more than 300 Taliban fighters.

During the daylong attack on Combat Outpost Keating, the president said, Mr. Romesha, a 31-year-old Army staff sergeant, now retired, showed “conspicuous gallantry” in taking out an enemy machine-gun position, calling in airstrikes that killed 30 Taliban fighters, laying down covering fire to allow three soldiers to run to safety, and scrambling through a fusillade of enemy fire to recover the bodies of fallen American soldiers.

His bravery, Mr. Obama said, helped prevent the outpost from being overrun by Taliban fighters. He was wounded in the neck, shoulder and arms by shrapnel after a rocket-propelled grenade hit a generator he was hiding behind. Eight American service members were killed in the October 2009 battle, one of the most intense of the war.

The citation for his award reads as follows:

Staff Sergeant Clinton L. Romesha distinguished himself by acts of gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Section Leader with Bravo Troop, 3d Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, during combat operations against an armed enemy at Combat Outpost Keating, Kamdesh District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan on October 3, 2009. On that morning, Staff Sergeant Romesha and his comrades awakened to an attack by an estimated 300 enemy fighters occupying the high ground on all four sides of the complex, employing concentrated fire from recoilless rifles, rocket propelled grenades, anti-aircraft machine guns, mortars and small arms fire. Staff Sergeant Romesha moved uncovered under intense enemy fire to conduct a reconnaissance of the battlefield and seek reinforcements from the barracks before returning to action with the support of an assistant gunner. Staff Sergeant Romesha took out an enemy machine gun team and, while engaging a second, the generator he was using for cover was struck by a rocket-propelled grenade, inflicting him with shrapnel wounds. Undeterred by his injuries, Staff Sergeant Romesha continued to fight and upon the arrival of another soldier to aid him and the assistant gunner, he again rushed through the exposed avenue to assemble additional soldiers. Staff Sergeant Romesha then mobilized a five-man team and returned to the fight equipped with a sniper rifle. With complete disregard for his own safety, Staff Sergeant Romesha continually exposed himself to heavy enemy fire, as he moved confidently about the battlefield engaging and destroying multiple enemy targets, including three Taliban fighters who had breached the combat outpost’s perimeter. While orchestrating a successful plan to secure and reinforce key points of the battlefield, Staff Sergeant Romesha maintained radio communication with the tactical operations center. As the enemy forces attacked with even greater ferocity, unleashing a barrage of rocket-propelled grenades and recoilless rifle rounds, Staff Sergeant Romesha identified the point of attack and directed air support to destroy over 30 enemy fighters. After receiving reports that seriously injured Soldiers were at a distant battle position, Staff Sergeant Romesha and his team provided covering fire to allow the injured Soldiers to safely reach the aid station. Upon receipt of orders to proceed to the next objective, his team pushed forward 100 meters under overwhelming enemy fire to recover and prevent the enemy fighters from taking the bodies of their fallen comrades. Staff Sergeant Romesha’s heroic actions throughout the day-long battle were critical in suppressing an enemy that had far greater numbers. His extraordinary efforts gave Bravo Troop the opportunity to regroup, reorganize and prepare for the counterattack that allowed the Troop to account for its personnel and secure Combat Outpost Keating. Staff Sergeant Romesha’s discipline and extraordinary heroism above and beyond the call of duty reflect great credit upon himself, Bravo Troop, 3d Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division and the United States Army.

Sadly, today was also a time to mourn the loss of former Navy SEAL Chris Kyle, gunned down by a man he had extended the hand of friendship and brotherhood to.  Thousands turned out to Cowboys Stadium to say farewell to a man many had never met. Would that we could remember all our fallen in such a manner.

Thousands of well-wishers, including dozens of Navy SEALS, descended on Cowboys Stadium in Arlington, Texas, on Monday to remember the life of a famed Navy SEAL sniper killed at a nearby gun range on Feb. 2.

The body of Chris Kyle, author of “American Sniper: The Autobiography of the Most Lethal Sniper in U.S. Military History” — an account of Kyle’s four tours in Iraq, where he said he killed at least 160 enemy combatants — lay in state on the Cowboys’ silver and blue star logo at the 50-yard line, with an American flag draped over his coffin.

The stadium, designed for the fidgety loudness of an NFL game day, instead swallowed the echoes of tributes, scripture readings and country songs dedicated to Kyle, as well as the mournful silences between.

An estimated 7,000 people attended, and Texas Gov. Rick Perry issued a statement that said, in part, “Chris Kyle was the public face of an anonymous breed of American warrior who are handed the hardest missions and assume the largest risks. Chris was among the very best at what he did, and he saved countless American lives in the process. Our state and our nation suffered a profound loss with his passing.”

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by | February 10, 2013 · 11:32 am

227th @ 50!

Outlaw 13, of Threedonia fame, gave us the heads up on this. The 227th Aviation Regiment will be celebrating its 50th anniversary on the 13th. Now, in an army that’s over 230 years old, that may not seem so old. But aviation units, of course, didn’t get started in earnest until the Vietnam War.  But in that war, and subsequent ones, some units, such as the 227th Aviation Regiment, have accumulated histories any unit would be proud of.

Outlaw13, Nick Searcy*, and film maker  Kenn Christenson have collaborated to produce this film celebrating half  a century of service. Enjoy!

*Yes, that Nick Searcy, my close personal friend, Peabody Award Winner, and International Film and Television Star, and host of Acting School with Nick Searcy.

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by | February 8, 2013 · 9:56 am

Troops, vets commemorate last Korean War bayonet charge – Korea – Stripes

Warfare usually means rifles and smart bombs these days. The aging men who attended Thursday’s Korean War commemoration at the Battle of Hill 180 recalled something much more up close: bayonets.

Osan Air Base marked the anniversary of Col. Lewis Millett’s famed charge, better known as the Battle of Bayonet Hill, with a wreath-laying ceremony to honor the nine soldiers who died capturing the hill from communist forces.

The assault by Millett’s Easy Company, 27th Infantry Regiment, was to be the Army’s last known bayonet charge.

via Troops, vets commemorate last Korean War bayonet charge – Korea – Stripes.

When you join the Wolfhounds, among the very first things you are taught is incidents in the history of the regiment, such as COL Millett’s charge.

But I want to take a moment to discuss something else:

What in the sam hell is wrong with this? Really, a field grade officer? The commander of a battalion, looking like Joe Schmo the Rag Man? You couldn’t put on a tunic and a cap?

I sure rather you just ignored it an let it slide into the  mists of time than show up looking like the guy that cleans the grease traps at my local gutbomb grill.

There is a time and a place to make allowances for a tidy uniform. And that’s outside the wire. But in a garrison environment, there is no excuse for looking like this. Have we really slacked up that much?

No wonder SMA is hot and bothered about upping the standards. Maybe CSA needs to light a fire under the officer corps.

 

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by | January 29, 2013 · 3:20 pm

The Perils of a Standing Army

When the Founding Fathers wrote the Constitution, they did so with the memory of the oppression of the British Army fresh in their minds. It may have been the policies of King George III that inflamed their passions, but it was the troops of the Crown that made those policies reality. With the knowledge that a standing army was the primary tool of repression of any government, they took steps to prevent such an occurrence here.

The Constitution names the President the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.  But the power to raise armies and maintain navies* is granted to the Congress. Coupled with the power of the purse in the House of Representatives, this was a check on any standing army with visions of control of the people. To further make this point, Congress was constrained in that no appropriations of funds could be for more than two years for any army. From the ratification of the Constitution through the end of World War II, these restrictions helped ensure that our Army was quite small, forming mostly a core of competent professionals around which a citizen army of the militia could be built. And even since the end of World War II, our Army, while quite expensive, is still, as a percentage of the population, quite small.

The 2nd Amendment, of course, was also a check on standing armies that might seek to usurp the liberties of free men. Likewise, the 3rd Amendment served as as further check. The passage of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 was again a check upon the use of the Army as a tool of repression.

But while our forefathers went to great lengths to protect us from the tyranny of a domestic army as a tool of repression, have we allowed our municipal armies to become the de facto standing armies they guarded against?

When the Constitution was ratified, there was simply no such thing as a municipal police force. Law enforcement, a power of the separate states, was the role of the county sheriff (an elected official) and if needed, the local militia.  It wasn’t until well into the 1800s that the idea of a city police force was even raised.  Not until 1828 would Philadelphia establish our first police department.  While police departments for large cities were rapidly established, rural areas still, for another century, depended solely on the sheriff and his deputies. The establishment of a municipal department in virtually every city, town, hamlet and burg is a fairly recent development. And note, every county still has its sheriff’s department. While some counties in some states may restrict the sheriff primarily to running the county jail, most have their own patrol forces.

While there is no obvious constitutional restriction on states, counties and municipalities forming police departments, there sure are a lot of them.

Wikianswers tells us:

There are as of 2006, 683,396 full time state, city, university and college, metropolitan and non-metropolitan county, and other law enforcement officers in the United States. There are approx. 120,000 full time law enforcement personnel working for the federal government adding up to a total number of 800,000 law enforcement personnel in the U.S.

That’s bigger than the US Army, by a fair amount. And every single policeman is there solely for domestic use.  Theoretically, our 4th, 5th, and 6th Amendment rights protect us from the depredations of any police force. But anyone who has had even the most cursory interaction with law enforcement will know that the deck is stacked in favor of the power of the state (that is, the police) and not the accused.

It’s not so much that people in power, such as police chiefs, sit around plotting ways to usurp power from the people. Like the road to Hell, the path to tyranny is paved with good intentions. Frustrated by incidents of crime, police departments come up with “common sense” solutions such as this:

“[Police are] going to be in SWAT gear and have AR-15s around their neck,” [Police Chief Todd] Stovall said. “If you’re out walking, we’re going to stop you, ask why you’re out walking, check for your ID.”

Stovall said while some people may be offended by the actions of his department, they should not be.

“We’re going to do it to everybody,” he said. “Criminals don’t like being talked to.”

[Paragold Arkansas Mayor Mike] Gaskill backed Stovall’s proposed actions during Thursday’s town hall.

“They may not be doing anything but walking their dog,” he said. “But they’re going to have to prove it.”

[ ... ]

The bolding is mine.

The citizens of America are a free people. Absent probable cause, no officer of any kind has any right to demand anyone identify themselves, nor justify what it is they are doing. The whole point of America is the ability to go about ones business.

Mayor Gaskill and Chief Stovall may well be frustrated by crime in Paragold, AR. But that doesn’t mean the Constitution suddenly can be waived.

If crime is truly an issue in Paragold, perhaps they should follow in the footsteps of a city with a very low crime rate. Say…. Kennesaw, Georgia.

Update: There appears to be some citizens that aren’t thrilled with the department’s plans. But while I was reading the article, this bit popped out to me:

Stovall explained Dec. 14 that while he had not consulted an attorney regarding the patrols, the department was within its right to implement the controversial stop-and-ID policy based on crime statistics and citizen complaints about rising crime in their neighborhoods.

First, rights aren’t based on statistics nor complaints. Those rights cannot be waived by one group of citizens for any other. They are inalienable. Secondly, the police force HAS NO RIGHTS. It has the authority granted to it by the citizens. That authority is conditional on the continued consent of the citizenry.  But again, no group of citizens may grant the authority of any agent of government to usurp the rights of other citizens.

*Naval forces were seen as less likely to be agents of domestic repression, hence the ability to maintain a navy.

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by | January 17, 2013 · 9:07 am

ODS

Twenty two years ago, at about 2am, I was out in the desert of northern Saudi Arabia. We’d seen Coalition fighters and tankers cycling north to patrol stations for weeks. But this night, we saw multitudes of aircraft head north.

After months of fruitless negotiations and pleadings to Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, the US led Coalition forces began a massive aerial onslaught against Iraqi air defense, command and control, infrastructure, and deployed forces. The goal was to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Before ground forces would engage the Iraqi Army, Coalition airpower,  primarily US and British, but with help from others, to be sure, would set conditions for victory.

If airpower didn’t do all it claimed it could do, it was far more effective than in past wars, and learned a great deal about what could be done, and how.

Even as the air war began, ground forces were not yet ready to strike. The reason I was standing outside was my battalion’s Bradley’s had not yet arrived. Our vehicle crews waited at the port to unload and ready them, but us dismounts were already in our assembly area. It would be the 1st of February before our vehicles arrived. And even then, it would be almost another month before we struck.

I’ve said it before, you could not have built a scenario better suited for the heavy divisions of the Army in 1991 to demonstrate AirLand Battle Doctrine. Open spaces, an enemy largely equipped with Warsaw Pact weapons. Little to no involvement of civilian population areas.

More than 20 years after Desert Storm, no near peer is eager to face off with US forces in a fair fight.

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by | January 14, 2013 · 11:33 am

Links of Interest

France’s rescue attempt in Somalia was pretty much a goat rope.  Rescue missions are risky, and have a high failure rate. Failing is one thing. Leaving a man behind? That’s a real black mark on the record.

And President Obama has notified Congress that US aircraft supported the operation. Eh, I’m not gonna get too excited about that. He complied with the War Powers Act mandate to notify Congress. And flying top cover over Somalia is fairly low risk. And believe it or not, France has been a fairly steadfast ally in  a lot of ways. So scratching their back from time to time won’t hurt much.

—–

France is also busy fighting in Mali. France has a long, long history of intervention in brush wars in Africa. When the US intervenes somewhere, there are calls from every corner of the world and from half the US population about having the blessings of the UN. France doesn’t bother with any of that nonsense. If they feel fighting Islamist radicals in Africa is in their best interests, it’s go time.  I’m hearing some rumors of US logistical support for the operations, but nothing firm yet.

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Steeljaw Scribe is getting the message China is sending. Are you?

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Some days just suck harder than others.

http://themellowjihadi.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/A-ground-crew-member-from-Electronic-Attack-Squadron-132-signals-to-an-EA-18G-Growler-as-it-returns-from-a-flight-Jan.-10-during-heavy-snows-at-Naval-Air-Facility-Misawa-Japan..jpg

Via NavyOne.

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I think I’ve found my new favorite band.

D’oh. Video didn’t load first time around.

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by | January 12, 2013 · 10:12 am

Saturday Links of Interest

Japan and China face off in the air.

Tensions continued to escalate between Japan and China over disputed islets in the East China Sea on Thursday, with Japan reportedly sending two F-15s from Naha, Okinawa, after several Chinese military aircraft crossed into its Air defense identification zone (ADIZ). China responded by scrambling two J-10s of its own.

Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force spotted the Chinese aircraft in its ADIZ over the East China Sea at about 12pm on Thursday, Kyodo quoted a senior Defense Ministry official as saying, adding that the Chinese aircraft never entered Japanese airspace. Kyodo said the Chinese aircraft penetrated Japan’s ADIZ on three occasions.

It’s not illegal for China to fly into the Japanese ADIZ. But it is understood that any non-scheduled flight into an ADIZ will trigger an interception. So sending military aircraft into the ADIZ is considered rather rude, and provocative. And sooner or later, it will get ugly. It only takes a moment for something like this to turn into a shooting incident.

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The Navy’s Task Force Uniform spent 5 years and untold millions coming up with the Navy Working Uniform. It’s ugly, expensive, and best of all, highly flammable!

The U.S. Navy’s standard-issue blue digitized camouflage fatigues are highly flammable and will burn ‘robustly until complete consumption,’ a report revealed last month.
The findings show that the digital-print camo, which is made from 50 percent cotton and 50 percent nylon, will drip as it burns, causing potentially hazardous burn injuries.
But the Navy’s top spokesman said that the government organization is aware of the report findings, and added that sailors had asked for a fade-resistant uniform that was also comfortable.

Big Navy’s response is that sailors who will be in direct contact with fire will have appropriate fire resistant clothing. The problem is, aboard ship, every sailor is a firefighter.

When the USS Stark was struck by two Iraqi Exocet missiles, sailors didn’t have time to change out of their dungarees into firefighting clothing. They fought as they were dressed.  The old cotton dungaree pants and blue chambray shirts might not seem very suitable for firefighting, but in fact, with one hose team spraying fog, and another hose team attacking a fire, the 100% cotton clothing provided excellent protection for most flashover situations. I know, I’ve been in a massive pool of burning jet fuel wearing them.  The blended materiel in the NWU not only burns, it melts, clinging to the wearer’s skin, causing horrific pain, and greatly complicating treatment for burns.

NWU- Making the Army’s ACU fiasco look sensible!

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The latest version of the Army’s AH-64 helicopter was developed as the AH-64D Block III. In a move that shows a stunning bit of common sense, the Army finally decided to follow the actual stated policy with regards to Tri-Service aircraft designations and redesignated it the AH-64E.  But just to add to the fun, they also decided that this sub-type of Apache also needs a sub-name. And as usual, they picked a dud. The Guardian. We certainly can’t have a weapon designed to hunt down and kill our foes having an aggressive name, now can we. On Outlaw 13’s Facebook page, he was looking for better names. Given the PC trends of the services, I suggested it should have been named the AH-64E Apache Fluffy Kitten.

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The Army is justifiably proud of its networked combat systems, where every vehicle and most troops have instantaneous access to the battlefield internet. Locations of friendly and enemy forces are plotted in real-time, and shared across the battlefield, providing levels of situational awareness that were simply unimaginable in my time. Orders are transmitted digitally, reports are similarly sent across the ether. Logistics, medical support, maintenance and fire support all are managed through this battlefield network.

But what happens when the network fails? Armed Forced Journal has an article that explores this problem. It seems the article is focused a bit above the Brigade Combat Team level, but the questions apply there as well. Our soldiers have spent a decade using these digital tools to facilitate their operations. Can they still execute the mission without them? One wonders if Esli’s rotation at NTC will see a mission or two where the Force XXI Brigade and Below Command and Control System (FB2C2) will be degraded or denied.

Via Bryan McGrath at Information Dissemination

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Roamy should like this. It’s got both splodey, AND rocket science!

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by | January 9, 2013 · 12:43 pm

Into the Box

So, friend of the Blog Esli is headed to the National Training Center today.  Rotations to NTC were a fixture of life in stateside heavy brigades during the 80s and 90s. The missions might vary a bit from rotation to rotation, but the basic template was the same. Show up, draw equipment and prep for about half a week, spend a week and a half “in the box” fighting against the resident OpFor (Opposing Force), then spend another week and a half doing live fire maneuver on NTC’s massive range complex, then finally spend a few hectic days struggling to turn in equipment before returning to the home station.  The original paradigm for NTC was very much a reflection of the times. The mission sets very closely matched the mission of stateside heavy units to deploy to Germany, draw pre-positioned sets of equipment, and roll into battle with the Warsaw Pact.

NTC has long been the capstone maneuver exercise for brigade sized elements. To be honest, at the combat arms squad sized level, troops didn’t really get much out of it. But for battalion and brigade staffs, it was an all to rare opportunity to actually put into play the techniques of planning and executing combined arms operations. For the logistical and supporting elements of the parent division, it was often the only chance in a training cycle they had to actually conduct their missions under actual field conditions. 

The cost of moving 5000 or so soldiers, and putting them in the field for almost a month is quite high. So the Army, from Day One, strove to get as much value from the training opportunity as possible. Stealing ideas from TOPGUN and RED FLAG, they fielded a dedicated aggressor force (the aforementioned OpFor).

Further, most home station training is evaluated by that units own chain of command, with umpires and evaluators coming from sister units, but ultimately graded by that brigade’s parent division. Yes, a commander has a responsibility to evaluate the training of his subordinate units. But an outside “reality check” is also a good idea. So the NTC has a cadre know as the O/C’s, or Observer/Controllers. Every element of the brigade down to the platoon has an O/C assigned. Each O/C has successfully performed the role which he is evaluation. *

Another aspect of NTC is that the whole thing is wired for sound. And video! Long before the Army even thought of networking vehicles into an internet environment with tools like Blue Force Tracker and FB2C2, every combat vehicle “in the box” at NTC was tracked, most of the movement was videotaped, and key radio networks were recorded.

After every mission, came the AAR or After Action Review. Going out and doing a mission has training value. But the AAR was where the real lessons learned came from.  Each unit would gather with their O/C, and review what it was that was supposed to happen, and then what really happened. And because the whole mission had been recorded, trying to BS your way past your shortcomings and failures was virtually impossible.

You:“I never got the order to move to the flank!”

O/C: “Let’s roll tape!”

Tape: “Move to the flank, roger!”

You: **facepalm**

The goal isn’t to make you look stupid (though it often does) but rather to show weak spots and trends that need improvement. Occasionally, you’ll even see what you do well.

NTC also strives to sow stress and confusion. Combat is stressful and confusing, and NTC has long tried to emulate that as much as possible. The deck is almost always stacked against the visiting team. If you do well on your first missions, they’ll just make later ones harder. The yardstick isn’t so much how many times you defeat the OpFor, but how well you demonstrate the ability to plan and conduct operations under the stress of battle.

NTC isn’t static. The demise of the Warsaw pact saw changes in the way NTC structured rotations (eventually, anyway) making the threat scenario better reflect the geopolitical reality. And during the war in Iraq, as Heavy Brigade Combat Teams rotated into an insurgency torn country, the traditional model was set aside and the BCTs were faced with missions that reflected as closely as possible the operations and threats they would actually face on the ground. Iraqi villages and roadside bombs, meetings with local nationals and supporting host-nation security forces were the order of the day.

But heavy BCTs aren’t being used in Afghanistan, and the Army needs the capability to face any threat, be it an insurgency or a near-peer mechanized maneuver force. Accordingly, recent rotations, including Esli’s current one, will return to a more force-on-force paradigm, while still including the lessons learned from a decade of war.

 

*At the platoon level, the O/C is usually a Sergeant First Class with successful experience as a platoon sergeant, rather than an officer. After all, an SFC with 15-20 years in the Army is likely to be a better judge of tactical competence than a Lieutenant with 18-20 months of experience as  a platoon leader.

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by | December 29, 2012 · 5:01 am

The XC-142

Longtime readers know I’m not at all a fan of the Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey program. But most of my objections to the program center on its costs, not on the aircraft itself. Personally, I think it is a pretty neat bird. And I enjoy watching them fly by en route from MCAS Miramar to 29 Palms. But every time someone tells me how revolutionary it is, I feel a strong urge to remind them that it is hardly new concept.

Almost from the first time helicopters flew, engineers started tinkering with ways to combine the speed characteristics of an airplane with the vertical take off and landing of a helicopter. After all, the rotors that lift a helicopter look an awful lot like the propellers that move planes forward. Was there a way to use one set of blades for both jobs? Taking off and landing a propeller driven plane from a tail sitting position was tried, but was soon found to be impractical, mostly because the pilot would have to fly looking over his shoulder.

Pretty soon, the concept of rotating either the entire wing, or just the rotors, from the vertical to the horizontal was tested. A variety of test aircraft were designed, built and tested throughout the 1950s. Most were little more than test-beds to explore the concept of a convertible plane.

By 1959, enough experience had been gained with tilt-rotor and tilt-wing test beds that the DoD actually began to consider designing a plane that could eventually enter service. After a couple more years of effort, the Tri-Service Assault Transport Program began in 1961, with the Navy as the lead agency for DoD. Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV) in partnership with the  Hiller and Ryan companies, was awarded a contract to design and build a prototype tilt-wing transport that would have better range and speed than existing helicopters. 

The resulting aircraft, the XC-142A would be the closest a convertiplane would come to entering service until the MV-22 joined squadron service with the Marines 40 years later.

One interesting administrative note, the XC-142A was numbered in the regular tri-service designation system under the conventional transport series, and not in the convertible aircraft series. It really should have had a designation of XCV-XXX. One can only guess, but perhaps the program managers felt the XC-142A was so much more likely to be bought in numbers than previous aircraft, that it should not share a series of what had heretofore been strictly test beds. And, rather annoyingly for your author, the XC-142A does not appear to have even been given a nickname or popular name.

On a conventional helicopter, each blade of the rotor is independently articulated. That is, it changes its angle of attack, or pitch, continuously throughout its rotation around the hub, and does so independently from the other blades. At any given time, each blade of a rotor is at a different pitch. Conventional propellers, even though they have variable pitch, do not do this. Instead, all blades of a conventional propeller change pitch simultaneously, and maintain that pitch setting throughout their journey around the hub. Helicopter rotors use this articulation to tilt the rotor disc forward or backward or side to side to provide thrust in the desired direction of flight, in addition to providing the lift to keep the helicopter in the air. But this articulation is also rather complex. That’s why when you look at the hub of a helicopter rotor, there’s all sorts of fiddly bits.

Previous convertible planes had suffered from excessive vibration and complexity, and LTV was at pains to avoid this. And so they came up with a pretty simple solution.  By vastly overpowering the aircraft with four T64 turboprops, and using conventional propellers only slightly larger than normal, they had more than enough lifting force to meet the requirements. What was needed was a way of controlling the aircraft in hovering flight without adding the complexity of full articulation to the props.  Since the entire wing rotated, the ailerons, normally used to control roll, could be used instead to control yaw in hovering flight. The airflow from the propellers would be sufficient to make the ailerons effective. Roll control in the hover would be provided by differential clutching of the outboard propellers. Pitch control in the hover would be by means of a small horizontal rotor at the very tail of the aircraft. In conventional flight modes, conventional control surfaces would be used.

One additional layer of complexity (and thus weight and cost and maintenance) that could not be avoided was crosslinking all four engines to a common drive shaft.  Imagine the XC-142A in a hover. Should one of the engines fail, particularly an outboard engine, the loss of lift on one side would cause an uncontrollable roll and loss of the aircraft. The answer was to have all four engines driving a common shaft, so even if a quarter of the total power was lost, the thrust would still be delivered symmetrically.

Aside from the whole tilt-wing thing, the XC-142 was a fairly conventional transport design. A boxy fuselage with a split ramp at the rear, with tricycle landing gear, with main mounts retracting into blisters along the fuselage side. In fact, because its propellers weren’t too large, it could take off and land conventionally with no tilt to the wing at all.

This was a very ambitious program. Remember, when the contracts were signed, the UH-1, CH-46, and CH-47 were just being accepted for service.

http://www.voughtaircraft.com/heritage/1532_034.jpg

Right click, open in new tab to greatly embiggenfy.

Five aircraft were built, and put through their paces.

http://www.aerofiles.com/LTV-XC142.jpg

The aircraft actually flew quite well, and its performance met the required specifications. But several things conspired to keep the XC-142 as a historical curiosity, and not a long serving warhorse.

First, the cross-linked driveshaft was troublesome. It produced excessive vibration (like virtually all its predecessors) and was less than wholly reliable. Problems with the shafting would lead to hard landings and damaged aircraft. And excessive vibration in a testing environment could only be seen as a harbinger of frequent failure in any future service environment.

Secondly, the utility of what would inevitably be an expensive aircraft was questioned. An XC-142 might lift 30 troops 100 miles twice as fast as a helicopter, but if it cost more than twice as much to buy and operate, buying two helicopters suddenly looks a lot more appealing.

Third, just as the XC-142 began to fly, the US was becoming ever more deeply involved in Vietnam, and the bulk of defense spending was going to fund that war and the machines needed right then, not some time in the future.

One by one, the each of the services in the Tri-Service program dropped out. The remaining aircraft were transferred to NASA, who used them for testing until 1970, when the last survivor was transferred to the Air Force Museum.

It’s odd that I couldn’t find a single decent video of the TC-4C, a plane with almost 30 years of service, but was instantly able to find quite a bit of good footage of this also-ran.

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Thanks to Jason Camlic, who inspired this post via a post of his on Facebook. I can’t figure a good way to link traffic to him, but he’s always a great source of ideas and interesting tidbits from the world of aviation.

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by | December 27, 2012 · 9:49 pm

In an effort to bump up traffic, let’s talk Army Chow!

I can cook. I just can’t cook very well. I mean, it’s certainly edible, as long as we’re talking about making pork chops, or grilling a chicken breast. My primary concerns when cooking are ease of prep, speed, and ease of cleanup. I mean, I’m usually just cooking for one. And as a smoker, my taste buds went AWOL years ago.  And my cookbook may not be the best.

Some of my friends take their food just a little more seriously. 

And then there is Army chow. I’ve written several times about MREs and T-rats and other elements of the Army’s Field Feeding System. Most of the emphasis on the research being these field rations has been on food preservation technologies.  But there’s also a surprising amount of research on the nutritional side of the equation as well, extending back to the days of the Revolution, and ongoing even today.

Craig might find this long research paper on the diets of soldier’s in the Civil War interesting. (.pdf warning)

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