Tag Archives: army

The Army and Amphibious Warfare- Repost

Here’s a repost of one of the earlier works on the blog, but that might seem fresh to newer readers.

When you mention the words “amphibious warfare” most people think immediately of the US Marines, and rightly so. But during WWII, the Army invested huge resources into the ability to land on a hostile shore and conduct operations.

There are two general types of amphibious operations: ship-to-shore and shore-to-shore. Ship to shore operations are those in which the landing force is transported to the objective in large, ocean going vessels, then landed via small craft onto the shore. Shore to shore operations take place over relatively short distances, and generally the troops are carried in smaller craft, rather than large transports. Obviously, the anticipated objectives will dictate which approach is taken.

In the late 1930s, with war clouds clearly on the horizon, both the Army and the Marines came to the conclusion that they would need to develop a serious amphibious capability, but they reached different conclusions because of very different assumptions about what type  of war they would be fighting.

For 20 years, the Navy had forseen war with Japan in the Pacific. And the cornerstone of the Navy’s strategy to defeat Japan was to defeat the Japanese fleet in a battle, likely somewhere near the Philipines. Since it would be impractical for the fleet to steam all the way from San Diego or Pearl Harbor and fight in those waters, the need for advanced bases was clear. And the Marines understood that as a consequence of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, any islands that could serve as an advance base would almost certainly be held by the Japanese. That meant the Marines had to be ready to travel the huge distances of the Pacific, land on remote islands, and seize relatively small objectives. For the Marines, this was a raison de etre.

The Army faced a different challenge. The Army had no desire to get into the amphibious warfare business. But watching the rise of Nazi German power, the Army leadership was convinced that sooner or later, they’d have to go fight in Western Europe again. And, unlike 1918, they weren’t at all sure the French ports would be available to land the huge armies planned. After the fall of France in June of 1940, the cold realization came that just to get  the Army to the fight would mean sooner or later, landing somewhere in Western Europe, under the guns of the enemy. And not only would the Army have to land there, they would have to build up their forces and simultaneously supply them over the beaches until a suitable port could be seized. Fortunately for the Army, England was still available as an advance base.

The Army didn’t completely ignore the ship to shore model of amphibious warfare, mostly because they couldn’t. When it became apparent that no cross-Channel operation to invade Europe would be possible in 1942 (mostly because of a lack of landing craft) President Roosevelt made the decision that a front in the Atlantic theater would be opened in North Africa. A combined British and American force would be landed in the French occupied territories of North Africa, then drive east to engage the German forces in  Tunisia. Due to the distances involved, this could only be a ship to shore movement. Many forces sailed from England, but a significant portion sailed all the way from ports on the East Coast of the US. Even against only fitful French and German resistance, the invasion fleet lost five large transports. One of the lessons the Army learned was that transports waiting to discharge their troops and cargoes were extremely vulnerable. In response, the Army wanted to make sure as many ships as possible had the ability to beach themselves to unload, minimizing the reliance on small craft such as the Higgins boat, LCVP, and the LCM.

LCM(3) (Landing Craft Mechanized Model 3)

LCM(3) (Landing Craft Mechanized Model 3)

Higgins Boat (Landing Craft Personnel Light)

Higgins Boat (Landing Craft Personnel Light)

LCVP (Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel)

LCVP (Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel)

These craft were carried near the objective by transports, and lowered over the side by booms or davits. That took time, time during which the transports, only 5-10 miles offshore, were vulnerable to submarines, airplanes and even coastal artillery.  While they were fairly good for getting the first units of lightly armed troops ashore, they were less efficient at getting ashore the huge numbers of follow-on troops needed, and importantly, the massive numbers of vehicles the troops would need to break out from any beachhead. Further, they just weren’t capable of bringing ashore the cargoes of supplies, fuel and ammunition the troops would need.  Something bigger was needed. And the first of these bigger craft was known as the LCT, or Landing Craft Tank. An LCM3 could carry one tank, barely. An LCT was a much bigger craft and could carry from 3 to 5 tanks. Five was an optimum number, as that was the number of tanks in a platoon, and keeping tactical units together on a landing greatly assisted in the assualt. As you can see from the picture, the LCT was essentially a self-propelled barge with a bow-ramp.

2lctmk5pageThe LCT could easily sail from England to France, or from Mediterranean ports in North Africa to Sicily and Italy. And while it could carry real numbers of tanks, something even better was in the works- the Landing Ship Tank, or LST. Early in the war, espcially as the Allies were first gearing up  for the invasion of North Africa, the Army (and especially the British) realized they had no way of shipping tanks overseas and landing them across beaches in any numbers. The LCT couldn’t handle the voyage, and loading LCMs over the side of a transport was problematic in anything but a flat calm. Worse, tanks kept getting heavier and heavier, faster than the booms on transport ships could grow to handle them. The idea arose of converting vessels originally built to carry rail cars from Florida to Panama as tank carriers. But while they could drive the tanks on at the embarkation point, the problem of discharging them remained. To unload them, the Army would need to seize a port. Indeed, this limitation was precisley why Casablanca was a target of the invasion. Enter the British. They had built a series of very shallow draft tankers to serve the waters around Venezuala. The reasoned that the design could quickly be adapted to build a large vessel that could safely beach itself, unload tanks held in what had formerly been the holds via a ramp in the bow, and then retract itself from the beach. Unlike an LCT, the LST might be ungainly and slow, but it was a real seagoing vessel.

LST (Landing Ship Tank)

LST (Landing Ship Tank)

While the LST was very valuable in bringing tanks, up to 20 at a time, it turns out the real value was in trucks. The Army in WWII was by far the most mechanized and motorized army in the world. And that meant trucks. Lots of trucks- to move people, supplies, tow guns, you name it. And the LST could carry a lot of trucks, already loaded, both on its tank deck, and on the topsides. And unlike the hassle of unloading a regular transport, all they had to do was drive down a ramp. After making an initial assault, as soon as an LST had discharged its tanks, it would turn around, go back to England (or where ever) and load up on trucks to build up the forces on the beachhead. To say the LST was a success would be a bit of an understatement. The US built roughly 1100 of them during the war for our Navy and the British.

While the LST was great for carrying tanks and trucks, it didn’t do so well at carrying people. One thing the Army really wanted was a small ship that could carry a rifle company from England and land them on the shores of France, non-stop and as a unit. The trick was getting the size just right. It had to be small enough to be built in large numbers, but big enough to cross the Atlantic on its own. It wouldn’t be expected to carry troops across the Atlantic. Those would come across on troopships. But any vessel large enough to do the job would be too large to carry aboard a transport. Pretty soon, the Navy designed and built the Landing Craft Infantry, or LCI. This was a vessel designed almost entirely with the invasion of Normandy in mind. It carried about 200 troops, roughly a reinforced rifle company, for up to 48 hours, which is about the time it took to load and transport them from ports in the Southwest of England and discharge them over the beaches of Normandy.

LCI (Landing Craft Infantry)

LCI (Landing Craft Infantry)

The Army had one other great tool for bringing supplies across the beach. In the days before the LST was available, the only method of getting trucks ashore across the beach was to winch them over the side of  a transport into an LCM. Someone at GM had the bright idea of doing away with the LCM part, and making the truck amphibious. That way, the truck could swim ashore, then drive inland to the supply dumps.  The result was basically a boat hull grafted onto a 2-1/2 ton truck, known as the DUKW, and commonly called a “duck.” Thousands of DUKWs, almost all manned by African American soldiers, brought wave after wave of critical supplies ashore across the beaches of Normandy and at other beaches the Army invaded. Unlike most landing craft, these were bought by, and operated by the Army, not the Navy.

DUKW Amphibious 2-1/2 ton truck

DUKW Amphibious 2-1/2 ton truck

Finally, in the Pacific, when you speak of amphibious warfare, again, you rightly think of the Marines. But in fact, the Army had a huge presence there as well. Indeed, it was always a larger prescence than the Marines. The Army made over 100 amphibious assualts in the Pacific theater, many in the Southwest Pacific in and around New Guinea. In conjunction with the US Seventh Fleet, MacArthur’s forces in the Southwest Pacific became masters at the art of amphibious warfare, striking where the Japanese least expected them, and routinely conducting sweeping flanking movements that left Japanese garrisons cut off and useless. Dan Barbey, the Commander of 7th Fleet became known as “Uncle Dan The Amphibious Man.” All this with a fleet mostly composed of tiny LCTs, a few LSTs and LCIs.

The Army also fought alongside the Marine Corps in some of their most storied battles, such as the invasions of Saipan and Okinawa. Indeed, if the atomic bomb attacks had not lead to the early surrender of Japan, the invasion of the home islands would have been mostly  an Army affair. Largely as a result of the Army’s preocupation with the European theater, these magnificent efforts have received little attention from the public at large.

After WWII, the Army’s focus again turned to Europe and the Cold War. For several reasons, including the vulnerability of shipping to nuclear weapons, amphibious operations fell out of favor with the Army. The Marines of course, continued to maintain that unique capabilty. Currently, the Army has no capability to conduct a landing against opposition. Current doctrine does still provide for limited ability to sustain forces by what is known as LOTS or “Logistics Over The Shore” and for the rapid deployment of troop units to hot spots via Afloat Prepositioning Squadrons. Basically, sets of unit equipment are mainained aboard large ships just days sailing from their possible objectives. If needed, they can sail to a friendly port or harbor, and unload their cargoes to meet up with troops flown in by either commercial aircraft or military transport planes. Alternatively, they can serve as a follow-on force to reinforce a beach seized by Marine amphibious assault.

2 Comments

Filed under armor, army, ARMY TRAINING, ducks, guns, infantry, navy

EFSS- Marine Mortars versus Army Mortars

A couple years ago, URR had a nice post on the Marine Corps shift to the 120mm rifled mortar system known as the Expeditionary Fire Support System. Basically, it is a rifled 120mm mortar, its associated ITV prime mover, and the associated ammunition caisson and its prime mover, another ITV. General Dynamics, the prime contractor for the system, put together a nice little marketing video. Lots of shooty, even some splodey.

There’s a major, major difference between the Marine EFSS and the Army’s own 120mm smoothbore mortar systems. And it’s not really so much the  guns themselves.  It’s the organization of fire support assets.

A Marine Division has three infantry regiments, and an artillery regiment.  The Marines have elected to replace their light 105mm howitzers in the artillery regiment with the EFSS. That means the division’s artillery will lose significant range, but will also gain a much greater ability to land early via vertical envelopment using the MV-22 Osprey, and that the small size and light weight of the EFSS will allow battalions and batteries of fire support to move quickly right behind the supported infantry regiments and battalions. It is a fairly bold shift, but the Marines probably know better than I what their fire support requirements are. One other major impetus for shifting to EFSS is that space on amphibious shipping for artillery is incredibly tight. EFSS has a very small footprint, which makes finding space for it much easier. Or rather, not taking up as much space as a conventional 105mm artillery battery frees up space for other vehicles and equipment the Marines really want to bring along, but previously had no footprint for.

The Army, by contrast, doesn’t have the same shipping and footprint constraints. Further, the Marines have, historically, only operated in division or larger sized formations since World War II. The Army, by contrast, has always had (at least theoretically) the ability to field corps and field armies. And each of those formations had their own artillery to reinforce the  fires of divisional artillery.  For instance, today, each Brigade Combat Team has its own Field Artillery Battalion, to support its maneuver battalions. The division headquarters controlling the BCT might well have a Fires Brigade attached to effectively double the artillery available.  In the Marines, there simply isn’t any artillery above the division level.

In the Army, 120mm mortars belong to the infantry and combined arms* battalion commander, in the form of a mortar platoon organic to each battalion. That is, they are not an artillery weapon, but an infantry weapon, one of many supporting weapons organic to the maneuver unit.

Both the Army and the Marines have smaller mortars, 60mm and 81mm, that are infantry weapons, belonging to the rifle company or the infantry battalion, though how they are distributed differs in detail, if not in effect.

 

*Combined Arms Battalions are the maneuver battalions of Armored Brigade Combat Teams, and consist of a battalion with two tank companies, and two Bradley mechanized infantry companies.

11 Comments

Filed under army, marines

How not to care for your soldiers

Service members are entitled to 30 days of leave per year, accrued at a rate of 2.5 days of leave per calendar month. Leave is an entitlement, not a privilege.* Service members may accrue no more than 60 days of leave. Any leave accrued over 60 days is forfeit at the end of the year.  Informally, any leave over 60 days is termed “use it or lose it.” Most commands closely track the leave accrued by individual members, and strongly encourage those with over 45 days on the books to take leave.

While service members are entitled to take leave, when they take leave is up to the discretion of the unit chain of command. For instance, you aren’t going to get two weeks of ordinary leave authorized right smack in the middle of your unit’s planned rotation to the National Training Center at Ft. Irwin, or right as your aircraft carrier or destroyer is slated to deploy to the Western Pacific.

As a rule of thumb, units returning from a lengthy deployment authorize what is known as “block leave.” Ordinarily, units are only authorized to have a limited percentage of troops not available for duty, around 10%, as I recall. But block leave waives that requirement, and everyone is encouraged to take as much as 30 days of leave. Unit commanders may authorize 30 days of leave, even for those service members with less than 30 days leave accrued, provided they have sufficient time left on their enlistment to accrue the excess leave.  Other types of leave include PCS leave, that is, time off taken in connection with a Permanent Change of Station; maternity leave; convalescent leave, not chargeable against their accrued leave, and terminal leave, taken in conjunction with ones separation from the service.

In the Army, leaves and passes** are requested and authorized via a form known as DA 31. A service members accrued leave is tracked on the Leave and Earnings Statement, or LES, the military equivalent of a pay stub.  In the Army, requests for ordinary leave are (usually) approved at the battalion level, and tracked by the battalion S-1 (Personnel) shop, after approval by the company chain of command. 

Here’s a scenario. Your humble scribe is a Sergeant stationed at Fort Carson, CO.  With a balance of something like 45 days on the books, I decide to go visit the dear old folks in Washington. A quick look at the unit training calendar to ensure no major training rotations or other critical events are coming up, I pick a block of 30 days that should work. I pick a 30 day window that is about a month out.  I chat with my squad leader and platoon sergeant, and see what they think of the dates in mind. I then fill out a DA 31, and attach a photocopy of my latest LES. I turn it in to my company First Sergeant, who in turn has it signed by the company commander. I then hand carry it across the street to the S-1 shop. Within two or three days, S-1 has the paperwork logged. Then, on the day I’m due to depart, I check with the battalion Staff Duty NCO desk, and sign out on leave in the log.  A month later, I sign back in on the log. And go to work the next day. Easy peasy.

Take a look at DA 31.

So, why is it that some unit at Ft. Campbell, KY has decided to take something simple, an entitlement, one of the more important ones, a key factor in individual and unit moral, and make it a trial to be endured simply to request that which one is entitled to?

Leave

I’m sure the commander who issued this puerile policy has his or her reasons. I can generally understand the Privately Owned Vehicle inspection and vehicle registration. Lord knows, the chain of command doesn’t want some young solider setting off driving across country in a car that shouldn’t be on the  road, and doesn’t have valid tags or insurance, driven by a troop with an expired or suspended license.  But one begins to suspect that the commander doesn’t want this to happen not so much out of a deep concern for the well being of his charges, but rather because he wants to cover his own ass in the event something unfortunate should happen. PFC Smith died in a car accident on the way home? Well, here’s the paperwork that shows we mitigated that risk! Can’t blame me!

What the training qualifications have to do with authorizing leave is beyond me. The soldier is entitled to his leave. It’s the commander’s responsibility to ensure he is trained. Those qualifications listed are on the commander’s shoulders, not PFC Smith. If he’s not current, that’s the CO’s fault, not his.

The Army is struggling to keep quality people even as it downsizes. What it really, really doesn’t want to do is brightsize, where the best people get out while the getting is good, leaving behind only those that need instructions to put on their velcro sneakers.

Here’s a hint- 95% of your troops are bright, motivated people. They’re smarter than the national average, and guess what? You have trained them and are willing to take them to war and literally trust them with your life. Why not act like it? Trust them, trust their NCOs. You know who your problem children are. Do they deserve an enhanced level of scrutiny? Of course. There’s the old saying that you’ll always spend 80% of your time on 20% of your people. So why force the good ones to jump through hoops when you know, deep in your heart it is unnecessary, and frankly, insulting.

I cannot tell you how many great soldiers I knew that loved soldiering. Actually getting to do their job, with other great Americans doing theirs. Being challenged to do difficult things under difficult circumstances. And yet these same troops, because they were the competent, mature people the Army supposedly most cherished, were consistently treated as on a par with the lowest common denominator. If the Army wouldn’t unleash them to do great things, they’d unleash themselves from the Army.

We saw the same reaction to infantilization today from a letter from an Airman.

A fair amount of chickenshit in the Army, and the other services, is a matter of the old saw, the right way, the wrong way, and the Army way. There was often a real reason for sometimes seemingly nutty procedures. But simply piling more and more burdens on the back of a troop to cover every possible contingency is the worst sort of leadership. It shows the commander doesn’t trust his troops, his NCOs, or even his own judgment.

 

*with certain very specific exceptions.

**While technically service members who leave an installation after the duty day or are not on duty during the weekend are considered to be in a pass status, a DA 31 approved pass is generally not required, except in unusual circumstances, such as if a member plans to drive an unusual distance from his duty station. Passes, either verbal or on a DA 31, may not exceed 96 hours. That is, you can’t have more than a four day weekend. You have to have at least one complete duty day before you can take another pass. If you want more than four days off, put in for leave.

8 Comments

Filed under ARMY TRAINING

The Marketing People at 5-Hour Energy Should be All Over This!

09b88c6f_2404397f

From the Daily Caller:

The top defense secretary in North Korea was allegedly executed in a hail of anti-aircraft fire, South Korean news outlets say, for falling asleep at a meeting where Kim Jong-un was speaking.

Though there remains some skepticism regarding the event, certainly there seems to be some credence to the possibility that General Hyon Yong-chol was done away with, because we know that the DPRK has the facility for such an ostentatious (and messy) display of brutality.

type87twin25mm_01large

But there is a marketing opportunity here.  The annoying 5-Hour Energy commercials could become quite a bit more compelling.  “Feeling tired?  Falling asleep in a meeting with the boss?  Don’t be blasted into smoking lumps of bone and flesh!  Drink 5-Hour Energy!  Now in pomegranate, berry, grape, and citrus orange!”

Wouldn’t it be irony that staunch Communist KJU was the entrepreneurial inspiration for a Capitalist marketing campaign?    Sure, the FDA has some warnings about 5-Hour Energy Drinks, such as prolonged use causing heart attacks.  But it still has to be less harmful than half a dozen 14.5 slugs to the cranium.

Maybe 5-Hour Energy can pick up the NKPA as a sponsor, to go along with NASCAR and Jim Furyk.  Or maybe not, as acquiring personal wealth is a leading cause of being shot to pieces in North Korea.

4 Comments

Filed under ARMY TRAINING

An Update on CPT Golsteyn

A few months ago we wrote about the curious case of US Army Special Forces Captain Matthew Golsteyn, who had received an interim award of the Silver Star, with a recommendation for upgrade to the Distinguished Service Cross, our second highest award for val0r.  Secretary of the Army McHugh not only declined to upgrade the award, he rescinded the award of the Silver Star.

Now, some months later, the other shoe drops:

“In an interview conducted with the CIA, then-Capt. Golsteyn claimed to have captured and shot and buried a suspected IED bomb maker,” the ArmyTimes said Thursday, citing a newly surfaced Army document. “He further went (on) to comment that he went back out with two others to cremate the body and dispose of the remains.”

The publication reported that the secret document was first published Wednesday by The Intercept website.

The internal Sept. 29, 2014, information paper says an investigation by Army criminal investigators determined Golsteyn “committed the offenses of murder and conspiracy based on the interview provided by the CIA,” the Washington Post said.

The Army’s Criminal Investigation Division conducted an investigation, but was unable to discern any corroborating evidence, such as witnesses or a burial site. Absent that, no criminal proceedings were viable.

If what the internal Army memo says is true (and at this point, we really only have the CIA’s word for it that then CPT Golsteyn made such statements), that would certainly be cause for both the revocation of the award, and the separation board Golsteyn faces next week.

6 Comments

Filed under Afghanistan, army

May 7th, 1864; The Turn South

troops-cheer-grant-463a

Such an occurrence would seem absolutely implausible today, the stuff of trite Hollywood hyperbole.   Yet, it unquestionably happened.  And it is a tribute to the magnificent courage and spirit of men who comprised the Army of the Potomac.

In May of 1864, the war was entering its fourth, and bloodiest, year.  For the previous three, the long-suffering blue-clad soldiers of the Army of the Potomac had suffered from poor leadership and lack of training as they punched and parried with their skilled and elusive foe, Robert E. Lee’s legendary Army of Northern Virginia.   Whatever the shortcomings of the generalship of this Union Army, its soldiers and junior officers had proven time and again to be a match for Lee’s men in the two areas that mattered most:  willingness to endure, and raw courage.   Failures to exploit advantages gained in the Seven Days, at Antietam, and and Gettysburg, rested with the leadership of the Army of the Potomac, not with its soldiers.

But now General Ulysses Grant called the shots.  The aggressive and determined hero of Shiloh and Vicksburg encamped alongside Meade, who still commanded the Army of the Potomac.  In the first week of May, 1864, that army marched into the densely tangled undergrowth of the Wilderness in pursuit of their foes.  Grant, it is said, passed a personal message to Lincoln even as the confused savagery of the Battle of the Wilderness began.  That message said; “Whatever happens, we will not turn back”.

rescuing-wounded-soldiers-from-burning-woods-233

Conf Dead Spotsylvania Cthse

From 5-7 May, the two armies fought a brutal and unrelenting brawl in the dense woods and small clearings of the Wilderness.  Lee, significantly outnumbered, fought the Federal forces, which included Burnside’s IX Corps, to a frustrating standstill.  Union casualties were enormous, nearly 18,000, as the terrain and foliage worked against Grant’s desire to mass overwhelming force anywhere on the field.  Confounded by an enemy that seemed to thwart each maneuver, exhausted from the furious and bloody combat, with dead and wounded strewn everywhere, fires burning, choked with smoke, dust, and the stench of rotting corpses, the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac seemed to be at the end of their tether.

On the afternoon of the 7th, Grant gave the order for the Army of the Potomac and Burnside’s Corps to move after dark.  In the pitch black, along dusty roads jammed with troops, ambulances full of wounded, cannon, supply wagons, and staff officers, the Army moved agonizingly slowly.  Filthy and exhausted, they shuffled onto Orange Plank Road and away from the burning furnace of the Wilderness.  Then, as the lead columns continued east along the road, an absolutely extraordinary thing occurred.  Officers at the scene reported that a palpable murmur arose in the ranks of marching men.  The soldiers knew instinctively that what occurred at the next road intersection would determine the future course of the war.  If the army was ordered to continue east (toward Chancellorsville) or turn left (north), it would be clear that the Army of the Potomac would again disengage from Lee, and the Army of Northern Virginia would be allowed to recover its strength.  If the column instead turned right, to the south along Brock Road, they would be marching toward Richmond.   It would mean Grant, now that he had his claws in Lee, would not let go.

As the columns drew toward the intersection, the orders came for the column to turn right onto Brock Road.  They were heading south, moving toward their enemy.  Grant was going to hold onto Lee and continue the hammer blows that he and his troops knew to be necessary to bring the South to its knees.  In the darkness, the somnambulent men who’d been stumbling along a few minutes earlier exploded with wild and deafening cheers, loud enough to draw fire from Rebel cannon.   Despite all of the suffering and sacrifice of the previous days, and indeed the three years of war, these filthy and exhausted Veterans were cheering, even knowing the grim tasks that lay ahead.  Yet to come would be Spotsylvania Courthouse, and the Bloody Angle, Cold Harbor, the Bermuda Hundred, and Petersburg.   And Appomattox, which the weary men in blue knew all too well would never happen without more bitter hammering at their enemy, and without a man like Grant.  Their bravery and fearful sacrifice in the tangled hell of the Wilderness was not to be squandered.

6 Comments

Filed under ARMY TRAINING

$150,000 in VA Cash for Strippers and Prostitutes?

We should be thankful that it wasn’t money wasted, I spose.  The Detroit News has the story:

Bates, who was released on $10,000 unsecured bond Tuesday, told investigators he spent some of the cash on a stripper named “Ashley” at an Ohio strip club, according to court records. He said he often spent $500 a night on lap dances — and more.

“After visiting the club numerous times, Glenn Alan Bates convinced Ashley to come to his hotel room for sex, for which he paid her,” VA Special Agent Frederick Lane wrote in a court filing.

The hotel trysts were frequent and non-exclusive. Bates said he also met with other strippers and prostitutes, according to court records.

After all the stories of fraud and waste in the VA system these days, perhaps Mr. Bates should be recognized for streamlining the gummint purchasing process and getting at least some value for the tax dollars spent.

“Glenn Alan Bates stated he became addicted to the sexual encounters and he stole cash from the canteen to pay for this addiction,” Lane wrote.

No word on whether treatment for his addiction is gonna be covered by the VA or by Obamacare.

H/T

Brian P

4 Comments

Filed under ARMY TRAINING