Tag Archives: navy

Links and Stuff

Israeli air raid on Hezbollah weapons in Syria?

Hardly surprising. The IAF has a long history of strikes against high value targets in neighboring countries. And even some countries way the heck and gone away.

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Some folks are starting to realize that the GOFO ranks might be just a touch bloated.

The Navy is the focus of the article, but they’re hardly the only sinners here.

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http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-HeZ7nHopmNw/UYTehFjVSAI/AAAAAAAALvM/Du9sohSjvUY/s1600/PDM+4+(6).jpg

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As far as I can tell, the LA Fire Department’s S-70 Firehawks are the only civil registered Sikorsky Hawk type helicopters in the US.

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Almost time for the Kentucky Derby. Guess who is a favorite among veterans?

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We poked fun at the Navy’s pink helicopters yesterday, but here’s a pic of one using a Bambi Bucket to help fight the wildfires ravaging Ventura County.

https://fbcdn-sphotos-d-a.akamaihd.net/hphotos-ak-ash4/485628_464931560253002_1083070265_n.jpg

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We’ve seen a lot of press about Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea and western Pacific. But they’re also being a tad un-neighborly toward India.

If this was a Pakistani incursion, India would be shooting already.

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Have some Sox:

photo

Sox

sooooon

And have a great weekend!

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Filed under army, ARMY TRAINING, Around the web, navy

I expect to see this picture at CDR Salamander’s next DivThu.

Actually, the pink paintjobs are hi-viz markings temporarily applied so these MH-60s can work as fire fighting aircraft against the brush fires raging near Naval Base Ventura County Point Mugu.

But still…. couldn’t they find some orange paint?

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Bronco at PAX

So, after Congress shut down the Navy’s plan to lease and operate four A-29B Super Tucanos in Afghanistan, it looks like the Navy has decided to try another tack.

Several OV-10 Broncos are still operational outside the DoD. Now comes word that the Navy has snagged one that NASA has been using and is apparently going to retrofit it to a combat capable role.

I’m stealing some info from a forum for veterans of VAL-4, the Navy squadron that operated the Bronco in Vietnam.

[redacted by XBrad] had the privilege of attending the first public showing of the updated OV-10G+ being operated by the Nay’s RCU-1, as a “Black Pony.” They are preparing a second airplane for light attack, battle field management and communications roles or as the unit calls it; “Find-Fix-Finish.” The airplanes are flown by Navy pilots with Marne WSO’s in the back seat. The ground crews include both Navy and Air Force personnel. This is not a Boeing project, it is a Navy program. The attached pictures and video were taken at NAS PAX river on March 22nd.

  If all goes well, this airplane will be joined by a second one. Both airplanes came from NASA and pervious to that were used by the State Department as spray airplanes. Before that, they belonged to the Marine Corps. If everything works out right, both airplanes will be here in Fort Worth for BroncoFest May 3 to 5, 2013.

  At present this project is proof of concept and is only funded through October. After that is anybody’s guess.

  You will notice there are no sponsons on the airplane. Those will be added soon. The normal configuration for the missions will be centerline and with external fuel and four seven shot pods for laser guided 2,75″ rockets.

Bronco image002 image003 image004 image005 image006 image007 image008 image009 image010

Funded through October means to the end of the current fiscal year. We’ll see what the FY14 budget has. I presume the impetus for this is coming from the special operations side of the house more than the NavAir side, and the fact that is as far along as it is says SPECWAR finds it pretty important. It wouldn’t suprise me a bit if they got money for next year, and maybe even another couple aircraft. There’s still quite a few Broncos out at the Boneyard.

And while they’ll eventually add the sponsons, I wouldn’t be surprised if they just forego installing the M60D guns in them. Mostly they’ll want the sponsons for holding the rocket pods.

As a long time fan of the OV-10, I’m as giddy as a schoolgirl. Why the heck didn’t we do this a decade ago?

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Filed under Afghanistan, Around the web, navy, planes

Information Dissemination: Strength in Numbers: The Remarkable Potential of (really) Small Combatants

I’ll have to  go back after finishing today’s taskings, and read this in detail and give it some thought. I’m not convinced that a small craft approach is what we need in the Western Pacific, but I have long believed that such an approach would be fruitful in certain waters, specifically the Persian Gulf, and possibly off the Horn of Africa. And of course, the Caribbean and Mediterranean Seas.

You are a tactical commander tasked with a mission to seek out and destroy one of the enemy’s premier capital ships in his home waters. You have two potential striking forces at your disposal: a world class surface combatant of your own with a 99% probability of mission success (Ps = 0.99) or a squadron of eight independently operating, missile carrying small combatants – each with a chance of successfully completing the mission no better than a coin flip (Ps = 0.5). Do you go with the almost sure thing and choose to send in your large combatant? As it turns out, the squadron of small combatants has an even higher overall Ps. But let’s assume now that you’ve advanced to operational commander. You might have more concerns than just overall Ps. What are the defensive and logistical requirements for each option? How much fleet investment am I risking with each option? What will it cost to replace the asset(s) if it is lost? What capability does the striking force have after successful enemy action (i.e. resilience)? An analysis of these factors, intentionally designed to disadvantage the small combatants, actually comes out overwhelmingly in their favor over the large combatant. The results verify what naval strategists and tacticians have long known: for certain offensive missions, an independently operating group of even marginally capable platforms can outperform a single large combatant at lower cost and less risk to the mission.

Put on your thinking caps, and let me hear your thoughts. You groundpounders might think of it in terms of armor versus light infantry in open versus close terrain.

via Information Dissemination: Strength in Numbers: The Remarkable Potential of (really) Small Combatants.

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Filed under navy

Now’s not the time for slash and burn

At least, not when it comes to active duty troop levels.

One of my frustrations when frequenting Milblogs with a naval or air centric theme is that in tough budget times, the authors and commentariat are quick to offer up ground forces on the budget alter. “Oh, put the bulk of ground forces in the reserves!”

Well, here’s the thing. In the almost seven decades since the end of World War II, we’ve found ourselves time and again involved in manpower intensive ground combat.

Recently, retired Admiral Gary Roughead and defense analyst Kori Schake published a paper from the Brookings institution recommending that, in effect, all the looming budget cuts in DoD should come from the Army, and that the Navy and Air Force should see their funding levels maintained.

First, thanks guys, for validating the suspicion many of us harbored that AirSea Battle wasn’t a doctrine, but political maneuvering to preserve Navy/Air Force budgets. One can hardly fault a former Chief of Naval Operations for being a tad proprietary when it comes to his service’s budget.*

But to wave your hands and pronounce that henceforth, wars will be high technology affairs with little or no need for manpower intensive operations is to ignore not just the last seven decades of history, but all of history.

Comes now Steve Metz and Douglas Lovelace, arguing that, like it or not, we still need ground troops.

It would be nice if the United States could simply opt out of all messy conflicts, but it cannot. Global connectivity means that conflict in any part of the world has cascading effects. These are most intense in neighboring states or regions as combatants, refugees, money, disorder, crime, and weapons flow back and forth, but in most cases will spread even further. The recent conflict in Libya shows this contagion effect, when there is no sustainable security following the defeat of an enemy regime. In the future, major conflicts anywhere will affect the global and American economies, increasing commodity prices, disrupting the supply of goods and services, and creating uncertainty. U.S. economic growth will depend, in part, on whether the global economy is generally stable or conflict-ridden. This will make it difficult or impossible for the United States to totally avoid major conflicts (although it does not mean the U.S. will intervene militarily in every major conflict). The profusion of global diasporas will also make it politically difficult to ignore major crises or conflicts.

Now, Metz and Lovelace are not unbiased, either. They work for the Army War College at the Strategic Studies Institute.  But they’re quite right that in spite of all our efforts to avoid messy operations on the ground, we seem to always end up there.

I’ll grant that one reason we tend to fight land wars is that in recent history, our naval power has been so overwhelming as to effectively preclude a naval war. And I do fully support the nation keeping a strong, forward naval presence throughout those areas of the world that hold our strategic interest. But the Navy has done poorly at managing the relatively strong support it has received. That’s not to say the Army has done much better, but before the Navy and the Air Force raid the Army’s budget, maybe they ought to consider which branch has born the brunt of the nation’s fighting for the past 70 years.

 

*We’d be a lot more sympathetic if his term as CNO hadn’t been such a goatrope in terms of shipbuilding.

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Filed under Air Force, army, history, navy, Politics, war

Freedom Experiences Two More Power Outages

The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS-1) USS Freedom’s first overseas deployment to Southeast Asia has been marred by two more power outages, the U.S. Navy says.

The most recent two this week — including one March 21 — brings the outage total to three, all during the ship’s transit from Pearl Harbor to Guam en route to Singapore, says U.S. Pacific Fleet spokesman Darryn James.

The outage problems appear to be similar to those the ship suffered during a deployment in the Atlantic when the vessel was first pressed into Navy service, a source intimately familiar with Freedom operations says.

The first Pacific outage, as the Aviation Week Intelligence Network (AWIN) reported, occurred March 16 (AWIN First, March 20). That outage lasted between 10 and 12 min., says Vice Adm. Richard Hunt, director of Navy staff and head of the special LCS Council of service admirals convened to make the Freedom’s deployment and the overall LCS program a success.

The power loss may have been due to water getting into the exhaust system of one of the ship’s diesel engine generators, or SSDGs, possibly creating a pressure difference, Hunt told AWIN March 20 during an exclusive interview about the program.

via Freedom Experiences Two More Power Outages.

In the time it’s taken to lay down, build, launch, commission and this deploy ship, the Navy built, commissioned, and fought 175 Fletcher class, 58 Sumner class, and 99 Gearing class destroyers (not to mention the hundreds of Destroyer Escorts), finished the war, and put most of them into mothballs.

But the Freedom, far from being a warship, despite flying its commissioning pennant for nigh on five years, still can’t make it across the pond without significant engineering casualties. Sounds like it’s trying out not for the US Navy, but Carnival Cruise Lines.

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Is the Supercarrier Dead?

So, is the supercarrier dead? Jerry Hendrix wrote a thought provoking piece titled “At What Cost A Carrier?” Normally, we think Hendrix is pretty sharp, but this piece was not up to his usual standards. First, comparing the roughly $7bn cost of the last in class CVN-77, to the first in class CVN-78 (roughly $14 bn) is a bit misleading. The last in class benefits from the entire learning curve of a production run. The first in class always suffers cost issues because of the same learning curve issues. Further, as much as $5bn of the cost of the new class is in non-recurring research and development costs. So while the cost of the next-gen carrier is still rather appalling, it’s not terribly out of line with recent trends in comparable shipbuilding.

So let’s take a look at some of the alternatives the Wired article I linked explores.

1. Using the new America class or a derivative as baby carriers.

First, the America class are not baby carriers. They are amphibious warships. Sure, they look a lot like carriers, and have better ability to operate larger numbers of AV-8B or F-35B jets than the existing LHD class big deck amphibs. But they are still amphibious warfare ships, designed to carry and land the hear of a Marine Expeditionary Unit, the Battalion Landing Team, and host the majority of its Air Combat Element (ACE), a reinforced medium helicopter unit.

The biggest drawback of using an LHD/LHA as a carrier is the fact that it cannot operate either the E-2 Hawkeye, or the EF-18G. One of the key lessons of the Falklands War was that while carrier airpower can be decisive, operating carriers without airborne early warning and electronic warfare in range of shore based air is fraught with risk.

LHD/LHA are also quite a bit slower than carriers. That reduces their mobility quite a bit. One of the key strengths of carriers in the power projection role is their ability to close with a coast, launch strikes, and retire before the enemy can mount a coherent counterstrike. But you have to move pretty quick to do that. Even a relatively modest decrease in speed has a significant negative effect on that ability. That reduced speed also makes an LHD/LHA quite a bit more vulnerable to submarine attack.

Further, all of the vulnerabilities that supposedly make the modern supercarrier obsolete are there in any LHD/LHA, only magnified.

2. The “everything’s a carrier” approach.

Not a bad idea, to some extent.

That is, between helicopters and UAVs, more and more ships are capable of deploying at least some form of their own, organic air support.  UAVs obviously extend the sensor envelope for ships. And helicopters not only extend the sensor envelope, but often give much greater reach to the ships weapons, either by carrying their own, or providing much better targeting for ship launched weapons.

But the fantasy that unmanned combat air vehicles can replace the manned strike aircraft is just that- fantasy. For at least the next generation, manned aircraft will continue to be the only viable option.

As for converting merchant hulls to carrier like roles, that too faces severe handicaps. Virtually every challenge an LHD/LHA faces, so to any converted merchantman. Worse, not being built to warship standards, they are far less capable of withstanding battle damage or fire.

The linked article notes for the cost of a carrier, you could buy several smaller ships, but that doesn’t necessarily mean you’d be buying equal effectiveness for your money, nor does it even mean the results would be cheaper in the long run.  Don’t forget, the big cost in operating a ship isn’t fuel, but manpower. And the manpower for several smaller ships would likely be greater than one supercarrier.

3. Submarine Strike

Yes, the converted Ohio class SSGNs are handy. And adding a few more tubes to later flight Virginia class SSNs is probably a good idea. But that’s hardly a substitute for airpower. First, right now, the only viable weapon is the Tomahawk cruise missile. While it is a good weapon, it is both slow, and only very modestly stealthy. It is quite vulnerable to air defense. It also has a rather paltry 1000lb warhead, far too small to hold at risk any number of critical targets in almost any campaign.

Worse, it has only the most limited utility against any target that isn’t a fixed installation. Latest versions can be retargeted in flight, but requires a data-link with an airborne assets. Which implies you can be flying over enemy territory. Which raises the question, if you can fly over territory long enough and far enough to retarget a Tomahawk, why not just use that aircraft as a strike platform anyway?

Submarine launched cruise missile attacks also suffer from “shallow magazines.”  An Ohio SSGN with full magazines only carries 154 missiles. That sounds like a lot (and at roughly a million dollars a pop, it’s a lot of money) but in terms of warheads on foreheads, that’s a day’s work for a carrier.  And the carrier can launch several days of strikes before having to retire to rearm.  Whereas a carrier can rearm at sea, an SSGN has to return to a friendly port to reload.  Such lack of sustained firepower is why URR refers to the SSGN as able to deliver a “strike”, rather than “fires.”

Since Billy Mitchell first bombed captured German warships in Chesapeake Bay, people have been sounding the death knell of the carrier. And yet, it continues to prove itself again and again as not only a viable weapon of war, but a crucial tool of warfighting and diplomacy.

That’s not to say Naval Aviation doesn’t face challenges. The short striking range of today’s air wing, the astonishing cost of the F-35C program (and limited capabilities it provides) and the short-sighted decision to jettison dedicated tanker, ASW and long range strike (as opposed to strike-fighter) assets have lead to the construction of ever more capable carriers, with arguably ever diminishing capability in the main battery of the carrier, its air wing.

If carriers are such obsolete and vulnerable warships, why are so many other countries striving today to build their own carrier capbability?

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Filed under helicopters, navy, Politics

Is the Navy finally taking a second look at its insane LCS policy?

Interesting news from Defense News about the future of the surface Navy.

A recommended re-evaluation of the next flights of LCSs — beyond the 24 ships now delivered, under construction, on order or with contract options — is only part of a classified memo, “Vision for the 2025 Surface Fleet,” submitted late last year by the head of Naval Surface Forces, Vice Adm. Tom Copeman, to Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jon Greenert. The Navy’s current plans call for building 52 littoral combat ships, so if the service opted to go in a different direction it would essentially cut the LCS program of record in half.

VADM Copeman, in effect the senior Surface Warfare Officer, has a slew of good ideas.

The entirety of the LCS program is deeply flawed, right from the conception that the Navy really, really needed a ship that was virtually unarmed, yet could sprint at 45-50 knots speed, and yet be large enough (~3000 tons) to self deploy world wide. That mismatch of capabilities drove hull shape choices, power plant choices, limitations on construction standards (which directly influences both damage control ability, and useful ship lifetimes), sensor and weapons suite capability, and multi-role function.

Having chosen a flawed concept, the Navy double down on its insanity. The original idea of prototyping two competing designs, each with different hull forms, combat suites, manufacturing and support efforts and power plants, all pretty much never used before, had a lot to recommend it. The idea was that one or two of each competing design would be built, deployed, tested, and then the design best suited for the Navy would be put into serial production, and the other design shelved.

The problem was, both designs were so awful that the initial ship in each class has been complete for years now, and only this month has one of them even been able to finally depart on its first deployment. No real information on the abilities and liabilities of either design been accumulated.

But the Navy is desperately short on ships, a condition that is only getting worse.  So the idea of downselecting to one program was tossed out, and both ships were ordered into production. One suspects a good deal of corporate rentseeking was at work here. Both design teams have spread around contracts to numerous congressional districts with powerful representatives, making it far more difficult to cancel either program. And if the Navy had chose just one design, the almost inevitable contract protest would have tied the Navy in knots for years, with cases winding their way through the courts, at immense expense to the taxpayer, and no benefit to the Navy.

So here we are, with the Navy already contracted for 24 of a planned 52 LCS ships (a dozen of each of the competing designs). VADM Copeman’s document is the first to see the light of day from Big Navy that even raises the possibility that maybe the LCS isn’t what the Navy needs. I’m rather surprised he hasn’t been hung from the yardarm yet.

Is upgunning one of the designs the right way to go? I  don’t know. I suspect it isn’t, but it may be quicker than any alternative, which has a merit of its own. Drawing out a shipbuilding program over more years is rarely a way of saving money or improving the product.  Personally, I’d probably rather see a “half a Burke” platform, with the powerplant cut in half, a smaller missile battery, and a lightweight SPY-1F/SPY-1K combat system. But the temptation to gold plate such a platform would be almost unbearable, and you’d quickly wind up simply buying more of the regular DDG-51 Burke’s, which, since the whole point is to find a low cost, low end ship, would defeat the purpose.

As to the Flight III Burke, with its Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) to replace the current SPY-1D/Aegis combat system, VADM Copeman is leery of pushing the Burke platform to such fine growth margins. That’s a fair concern. But personally, I’d like to see a short run of Flt III ships shake out the AMDR before we take the next logical step of building a newer, more powerful plant and hull.  Built a little, test a lot, learn a lot.

Whatever differences of opinion I may have with VADM Copeman, I certainly am glad to see someone with some rational thought applied to the composition of the surface fleet, and the Navy’s shipbuilding program.

{Update}- Of course, CDR Salamander had his take up first, and more comprehensively.

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Filed under navy, stupid

One Year

It’s been one year.

ORPO1 shot me a message warning that an F-21 was down. I immediately said the infantry prayer:

“Oh, shit.”

Alas, it was true. Carroll “Lex” LeFon, Captain, US Navy, Retired, had been killed providing adversary services to his beloved TOPGUN at Naval Air Station Fallon.  The next morning, I wrote this post.

The loss of any man is a tragedy to someone. His family and friends, of course. And God knows, Lex’s family has felt pain and loss.

But Carroll LeFon had started a little blog a while back. Just a few sea stories, and tales of the naval service. And that little blog grew.  More and more sea stories, to be sure. And occasionally, a glimpse into his life. We followed as he was promoted from Commander to Captain, as his son graduated from college, was commissioned in the Navy, and earned his own Wings of Gold.

We followed Lex into retirement, and from thence into the cube farm. We watched him yearn to fly again, and seek solace by signing up with a local flying club, relearning the art of light planes, after a career in heavy metal.

Eventually, the opportunity arose to fly the F-21 Kfir to support the Navy, via a private contractor. Oh, the joy we shared with him! A pretty plane, an important mission, and few aviators better suited to it.

And we were with him every step of the way, loyal readers of his blog. Most of us visited Neptunus Lex daily before even checking our email, and checked in again at days end, in case something interesting had been posted. And unlike virtually every other blog out there, the comment section could be spirited, and yet still civil.

In the days after his death, hundreds of blogs and websites made note of his passing.  I’d  run out of pixels trying to list them all. Suffice to say, the Secretary of the Navy does not note the passing of most retired Captains.

The insight into the Navy, Naval Aviation, and America’s warriors that Lex gave so many Americans was a service that the Navy’s PR shop has tried, at great expense, to do, and yet never done as well as a simple blogger.  His service to his Navy and nation in blogging was great.

I feel an emptiness every day with him gone. He’s still at the top of my bookmarks.  And I know that I wrote better after reading him. His writing, when he first started blogging, was good. But as time went on, it became better and better. After a few years, his prose, his pacing, his vocabulary, and his singular ability to draw a complete mental picture for the reader were unsurpassed anywhere on the internet.  Only a man of great compassion and empathy could write that well.

I’ve several “favorite” Lex posts. Some funny, others tragic.Almost all insightful.

But my personal favorite is this one.

Tonight, I’ll be sipping a Guinness, For Strength! and a Jameson, For Courage.

God Bless you, Lex.

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First Operational P-8A Squadron Prepares for Deployment; Fleet Transition Continues

Five years ago, in the midst of managing fatigue-life issues with our P-3 fleet, we developed a plan to transition the fleet to the P-8A Poseidon beginning in spring 2012. I’m pleased to report today that P-8 transition is well underway at Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Fla., in accordance with the plan we laid out.

With the hard work and support of our fleet, the Naval Air Systems Command, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and industry team, the Navy accepted the first six low-rate, initial-production P-8s on or ahead of schedule, with the last LRIP Lot 1 aircraft delivered on Jan. 31. Furthermore, Boeing is on contract to deliver seven additional LRIP Lot II aircraft over the next year.

Our Fleet Replacement Squadron, VP-30, commenced “training the trainers” in April 2012, and our first fleet squadron, Patrol Squadron 16 (VP-16), began P-8 Fleet Introduction Training in July 2012 after returning from a deployment. VP-16 aircrews and maintenance personnel successfully completed P-8 transition on schedule and the squadron was certified “Safe-for-Flight” to operate P-8s from its home port last month. The squadron is training to build advanced combat readiness in its P-8s in preparation for deploying to the Western Pacific with six P-8s in December.

via First Operational P-8A Squadron Prepares for Deployment; Fleet Transition Continues.

None too soon. Read the whole thing to see the parlous state of the P-3 fleet. And if you read my piece on the Falklands, you’ll know just how devastating the lack of patrol aircraft was to the Argentinians.

The P-8 has been a remarkably smooth program compared to so many others. Why? Because it was extremely tightly focused, and the trend to gold plating/multi-missioning was held in check. NavAir wanted a P-3 replacement, and wanted it to be as cheap as possible. They held the line on that, and got what they asked for.

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Filed under ARMY TRAINING

Mine Warfare- Part II

The first post focused on surface laid, contact fused naval mines.

If only it were that simple. Beginning in the interwar period between World War I and World War II, both the method of delivery, and fusing options for naval mines underwent a revolution that vastly complicated the defense against naval mines.

Let’s take a quick look at delivery options first.  Of course, there’s the traditional surface laid mine, delivered over the stern of a minelayer. Variations include other warships with rails installed, or the Mine Planters of the Army, or using almost any other vessel available to drop a couple over the side.

But stealth in the delivery of mines can be a powerful tool.  Submarines were an attractive option for delivering mines in enemy waters. Both specialized minelaying subs, and specialized mines to be launched from conventional submarine torpedo tubes were developed. While the specialized submarine minelayer has passed into history, the submarine launched mine is still very much with us.

The other major method of mine delivery, and eventually the all time champ in terms of volume, was the airplane.  Airplanes couldn’t carry very many mines compared to a ship, of course, but you could buy a lot more planes than ships for a given amount of money. And over the course of the time it would take a ship to load mines, steam to the target, drop the mines, and return,  planes could make quite a few sorties. Medium and heavy bombers were quite well suited for dropping mines.

The problem with moored contact mines was that a ship had to, well, make contact.  That limited the depths at which they could be laid, increased the weight of the mine (as the anchor for the mine was quite heavy), and reduced the likelihood of any one mine damaging a ship. If only there was some way to allow mines to trigger without direct contact.

As it turns out, weaponeers eventually designed several mines that responded to the influence of passing vessels to detonate.  These influence mines used three primary methods.

Since the mine didn’t have to have contact to detonate, it need not be moored, and instead could be allowed to sink to the bottom of shallow waters.  This also allowed for an under the keel gas bubble jet attack, which is devastating to almost any ship.  Even if the target ship wasn’t directly overhead, shock, blast and whipping action from a nearby explosion could cause serious damage.

First, the magnetic mine. Steel hulled ships very slightly alter the magnetic field of the waters they transit. Just as a magnet swings a compass needle, this flux in the local magnetic field could be used to trigger a mine.

The second major type of influence mine was the passive acoustic mine. Hydrophones on the mine would listen for the sound of an approaching ship’s propellers. When the sound reached a threshold, the mine would detonate.

The third type was the hydrostatic, or water pressure displacement fused mine. The local change in water pressure caused by a ship’s hull moving through the water was used as the triggering method.

Bottom laid influence mines were particularly well suited for delivery by bombers, and during the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe made strenuous efforts to frequently mine the Thames River estuary, and other major shipping ports of England.  The British were first somewhat flummoxed by the new mines, but after a missed drop left one ashore, they quickly devised sweeping countermeasures against them.

 

German World War II magnetic mine that landed ...

German World War II magnetic mine that landed on the ground instead of the water. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

 

German magnetic mine accidentally dropped ashore in England.

File:Dwi wellington front.jpg

British Vickers Wellington bomber modified with magnetic mine exploder.

As always in warfare, advances in offence are met by advances in defense. And vice versa. As means of sweeping each type of influence mine evolved, so did means of making mines harder to sweep. Fuse functions were modified with “counters” so that, say, the first magnetic field to pass through the trigger mechanism would be ignored. Or maybe the first dozen. Only after a certain number of magnetic fields had influenced the trigger would the mine actually detonate. That meant that suspected minefields would have to be swept multiple times, and even then, there was no real way to assure that all mines had been swept.

Simply telling a mine to wait for a period of time, say 30 days, to activate would complicate sweeping.

Combining multiple influence fuses would also make mines less susceptible to countermeasures.

The British extensively mined waters in the North Sea and the Bay of Biscay to frustrate German shipping and U-boats.

The most effective mining campaign of the war was probably Operation Starvation, the use of B-29s to mine crucial Japanese shipping routes near the end of the war.  The Army Air Force was loathe to use its B-29s for anything other than strategic bombing of land targets, but did dedicate one bomb group to the mission.  For the loss of 15 bombers over the course of 6 months, and dropping only 12,000 mines, the campaign sank or damaged 670 vessels totaling about one and a quarter million tons of shipping. More importantly, it virtually paralyzed the already decimated Japanese merchant service.

The US would not again use aerial delivered mines until 1967, when A-6A Intruders of VA-35 mined the Red River in Vietnam, and more famously, in 1972, Navy and Marine jets from various squadrons laid the first of what eventually totaled over 11,000 mines in Haiphong and other Vietnamese ports. *

The initial mines were purpose built aerial delivered mines. But magazine space on ships is very limited, and aerial mines are bulky, complex weapons. Eventually, the Navy switched to the Destructor family of modular mine systems.

The Mk82 and Mk84 bombs were modular, in that they could use a variety of tail fin assemblies, and nose and tail fuse assemblies. The bright idea was suggested that using the Mk15 Snakeye high drag tail kit and a specialized fuse would allow any Mk82 or Mk84 to be used as an aerial delivered naval mine. Accordingly, the Mk36 Destructor series mines were invented.  No modification to the delivery aircraft were needed, and the ballistics were identical to regular Snakeye bombs, so little extra training was needed. And since the bombs were already the mainstay of the ships magazines, and fuses took up little space, a plentiful supply could be kept on hand.

After the Destructor series of fuses were compromised by their use in North Vietnam, the Quickstrike series was fielded. Externally almost indistinguishable from the Destructor series, they have served for the last 30 years or so.  But the general purpose bomb casing is roughly half steel and half explosive by weight. Fragmentation is great for a bomb, but fairly useless for a mine. Accordingly, the current US air delivered mine, the Mk65 Quickstrike, uses the fuse assemblies, but has a traditional bulky mine body maximizing the explosive content.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/images/mk65.jpg

Quickstrike family of mines.

Submarines are still quite capable of delivering mines as well. Most sub delivered mines are 21” in diameter, to be place by ejecting them from a sub’s torpedo tubes. They tend to be roughly half the length of a torpedo, so for every torpedo offloaded, a sub can carry two mines.

Other sub delivered mines include the Mk67 SLMM or Submarine Launched Mobile Mine. A converted Mk37 torpedo, it is launched like a normal torpedo, navigates from the launch point to its designated target area, then sinks to the bottom, to lie in wait. This standoff allows a sub to mine waters such as river estuaries that the sub might ordinarily be able to attack.

*As part of the Paris Accords that ended US involvement in Vietnam, we also went in and swept all those mines.

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A Medal of Honor, and a sad farewell.

I’ve spent most of my day having fun in the comments of today’s Load HEAT, but I’m fully cognizant that two events took place today, both of which remind us of the honor and courage, and yes, sacrifice that so many of our citizens display.

Former Staff Sergeant Clinton Romesha was presented the Medal of Honor today for his actions during the battle at Combat Outpost Keating.

Saluting Clinton Romesha for embodying the soldier’s creed of never leaving behind a fallen comrade, President Obama on Monday bestowed the Medal of Honor on him for courageously defending a remote American outpost in eastern Afghanistan from a ferocious attack by more than 300 Taliban fighters.

During the daylong attack on Combat Outpost Keating, the president said, Mr. Romesha, a 31-year-old Army staff sergeant, now retired, showed “conspicuous gallantry” in taking out an enemy machine-gun position, calling in airstrikes that killed 30 Taliban fighters, laying down covering fire to allow three soldiers to run to safety, and scrambling through a fusillade of enemy fire to recover the bodies of fallen American soldiers.

His bravery, Mr. Obama said, helped prevent the outpost from being overrun by Taliban fighters. He was wounded in the neck, shoulder and arms by shrapnel after a rocket-propelled grenade hit a generator he was hiding behind. Eight American service members were killed in the October 2009 battle, one of the most intense of the war.

The citation for his award reads as follows:

Staff Sergeant Clinton L. Romesha distinguished himself by acts of gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Section Leader with Bravo Troop, 3d Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, during combat operations against an armed enemy at Combat Outpost Keating, Kamdesh District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan on October 3, 2009. On that morning, Staff Sergeant Romesha and his comrades awakened to an attack by an estimated 300 enemy fighters occupying the high ground on all four sides of the complex, employing concentrated fire from recoilless rifles, rocket propelled grenades, anti-aircraft machine guns, mortars and small arms fire. Staff Sergeant Romesha moved uncovered under intense enemy fire to conduct a reconnaissance of the battlefield and seek reinforcements from the barracks before returning to action with the support of an assistant gunner. Staff Sergeant Romesha took out an enemy machine gun team and, while engaging a second, the generator he was using for cover was struck by a rocket-propelled grenade, inflicting him with shrapnel wounds. Undeterred by his injuries, Staff Sergeant Romesha continued to fight and upon the arrival of another soldier to aid him and the assistant gunner, he again rushed through the exposed avenue to assemble additional soldiers. Staff Sergeant Romesha then mobilized a five-man team and returned to the fight equipped with a sniper rifle. With complete disregard for his own safety, Staff Sergeant Romesha continually exposed himself to heavy enemy fire, as he moved confidently about the battlefield engaging and destroying multiple enemy targets, including three Taliban fighters who had breached the combat outpost’s perimeter. While orchestrating a successful plan to secure and reinforce key points of the battlefield, Staff Sergeant Romesha maintained radio communication with the tactical operations center. As the enemy forces attacked with even greater ferocity, unleashing a barrage of rocket-propelled grenades and recoilless rifle rounds, Staff Sergeant Romesha identified the point of attack and directed air support to destroy over 30 enemy fighters. After receiving reports that seriously injured Soldiers were at a distant battle position, Staff Sergeant Romesha and his team provided covering fire to allow the injured Soldiers to safely reach the aid station. Upon receipt of orders to proceed to the next objective, his team pushed forward 100 meters under overwhelming enemy fire to recover and prevent the enemy fighters from taking the bodies of their fallen comrades. Staff Sergeant Romesha’s heroic actions throughout the day-long battle were critical in suppressing an enemy that had far greater numbers. His extraordinary efforts gave Bravo Troop the opportunity to regroup, reorganize and prepare for the counterattack that allowed the Troop to account for its personnel and secure Combat Outpost Keating. Staff Sergeant Romesha’s discipline and extraordinary heroism above and beyond the call of duty reflect great credit upon himself, Bravo Troop, 3d Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division and the United States Army.

Sadly, today was also a time to mourn the loss of former Navy SEAL Chris Kyle, gunned down by a man he had extended the hand of friendship and brotherhood to.  Thousands turned out to Cowboys Stadium to say farewell to a man many had never met. Would that we could remember all our fallen in such a manner.

Thousands of well-wishers, including dozens of Navy SEALS, descended on Cowboys Stadium in Arlington, Texas, on Monday to remember the life of a famed Navy SEAL sniper killed at a nearby gun range on Feb. 2.

The body of Chris Kyle, author of “American Sniper: The Autobiography of the Most Lethal Sniper in U.S. Military History” — an account of Kyle’s four tours in Iraq, where he said he killed at least 160 enemy combatants — lay in state on the Cowboys’ silver and blue star logo at the 50-yard line, with an American flag draped over his coffin.

The stadium, designed for the fidgety loudness of an NFL game day, instead swallowed the echoes of tributes, scripture readings and country songs dedicated to Kyle, as well as the mournful silences between.

An estimated 7,000 people attended, and Texas Gov. Rick Perry issued a statement that said, in part, “Chris Kyle was the public face of an anonymous breed of American warrior who are handed the hardest missions and assume the largest risks. Chris was among the very best at what he did, and he saved countless American lives in the process. Our state and our nation suffered a profound loss with his passing.”

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Zumwalt

So, Elizzar asked in the comments from yesterday’s links post:

what about the zumwalt class, do you think they should be axed now (i do)?

I’m actually far less critical of the DDG-1000 USS Zumwalt than I am of the Littoral Combat Ship program.

The DDG-1000 is expensive. Let’s be honest and admit it, the cost is stupendous.  But there are some major differences between this program and LCS.

For one thing, LCS is actually two, TWO programs in one. Two ships, completely different designs, combat systems, training programs, maintenance and training pipelines, you name it. Even if either iteration of LCS was all that and a bag of chips, the dual track nature of the program is still terribly wasteful, duplicating costs while providing no discernable benefit.

I find it interesting that LCS started kinda sorta as a research project and has evolved into a full blown production program. DDG-1000 started as a full blown production program, but has since been scaled back to something akin to a long term research program.

Both the LCS and the DDG-1000 programs use a lot of new, untested technologies. But whereas the LCS program sometimes seems to have been a case where new ideas were tossed in just because, in the DDG-1000 program, the new technologies were inserted to fulfill specific requirements.  Whether those choices were right and proper is certainly debatable, but there was at least a thought process involved.

For you non-naval types, let’s take a brief look at the Zumwalt.

SHIP_DDG-1000_Critical_Tech_Status_2006_lg

Click to embiggenfy

While the DDG-1000 is classified as a Destroyer, it is far larger than any previous destroyer in the world, and larger than many cruisers. The radical tumblehome hull form was adopted for stealth characteristics. Same thing with the weird looking composite deckhouse. It’s made of composites sandwiched around balsa wood.

The new Multifunction Radar (MFR) and Dual Band Radar DBR) were designed to operate more effectively in the littorals, which have a huge amount of radar clutter.

The Integrated Power System means the main powerplant no longer drives the screw shafts, but is a large electrical generation plant. Electric motors drive the screws. That adds costs and complexity to the design, but also has some benefits. With the incredible proliferation of electronics aboard warships, older designs can become power critical, with Ships Service Turbine Generators unable to provide the margin needed. By integrating the entire plant, the ship will have plenty of generation capacity. It also provides some level of graceful degradation in a damage control sense. Any part of the generation system can power either shaft.

The Total Ship Computing Environment is  a reflection 0f the fact that the last series of Destroyers, the DDG-51 class, was designed before the personal computer revolution. Yes, ships did have computers, especially for applications such as NTDS, but the idea of virtually everything being networked was far, far in the future.

The Peripheral Vertical Launch System addresses a weakness of the current Mk41 VLS. As a single unit, if any  part of the Mk41 is damaged, the whole system is likely unavailable, cutting a ship’s firepower in half or more. And should a Mk41 explode, being on the centerline, there’s a goodly chance it would break the ship’s keel, and lead to the loss of the ship. The Mk57 PVLS uses several modules mounted away from the ship’s centerline. The loss of any one would be bad, but not catastrophic. Similarly, an explosion in one would vent outboard, and while would be very bad, would be far less likely to lead to the loss of the ship.

The 155mm Advanced Gun System is a recognition that the 5”/62 gun on major US warships is really not much of a weapon when it comes to supporting Marine maneuver on the ground.

All of these innovations are expensive. But the history of warship design suggests strongly that many of them will become the normal technique for shipbuilding in coming generations.  Will some be mere historical curiosities? Likely, yes. But many more will likely be normal.

Further, where the LCS program bought a hull and propulsion system, and then tried to design innovative technologies alongside, the DDG-1K has developed and tested prototypes of most of the technologies before ever cutting ship steel. There have certainly been technical issues with some of the components, but it’s a lot easier to fix a design before you install it on a ship.

The stupendous budget for DDG-1000 has mostly been in the research and development of the underlying innovations. Yes, the ship itself is painfully expensive, but not by the orders of magnitude you might think looking at the raw budget numbers.  And the lessons learned developing the technologies is corporate knowledge that will stay with the Navy.

Programmatically,  the program has been almost a poster child for effective program management when compared to the utter “dumpster fire” that LCS has been.

So while I’m not a huge fan of DDG-1000, and think quite a few of the underlying assumptions behind the program are flawed, I’m not terribly keen to see it cancelled. I think as the three ships enter the fleet and become something akin to operational testbeds, they’ll serve as interesting and useful think tanks to advance naval science.

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Mine Warfare

We wrote a little earlier about the controlled minefields operated and maintained by the Coast Artillery of the Army as a harbor defense weapon. But of course, most mine warfare at sea was a matter for the Navy.

Most of what I wrote in that earlier piece focused on what we tend to think of when we think of naval mines, that is, the floating contact mine. To be sure, that is still a viable form of mine warfare, but it is only one of several.

The floating contact mine was kinda sorta invented during our own Revolutionary War,  by David Bushnell, the same inventive mind that first fought submarine warfare with his submersible The Turtle.  While neither effort was successful, both were certainly portents for the future of warfare.

The moored floating contact mine as we know it came into use in the late 19th Century, but wasn’t generally accepted as a viable weapon until the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, where it enjoyed fair success.

A moored contact mine is quite simple. From the earliest versions to those in use today, they have changed little. A hollow steel shape, often a sphere, is filled with explosives and an electrical detonator circuit. The contact horns on the mine are a soft metal, such as lead, that is easily crushed. Inside each horn is an ampoule containing battery acid.  Crushing the horn by contact with a ship crushes the ampoule, and the acid flows into an lead acid battery, generates current, and sets off the detonator. The resulting blast in such close contact to a vessel is usually sufficient to hole the ship, and often enough to sink it.

While you could (and some people did) just let these mines loose to bob around in the open sea, generally, the mine was moored to an anchor on the seabed. The anchor was usually a simple block of concrete or other heavy materiel.  Now, much of the ocean is thousands of feet deep. It would be impractical to have a mile or two of cable to moor each mine. But there are many areas of the ocean that are only a few hundred feet deep. And coincidentally, because these areas tend to be near natural chokepoints or significant ports and harbors, that happens to be where most of the world’s shipping passes through. For instance, if you want to shut off German shipping, you have to mine the North Sea. It tends to be shallow enough to be practical to do so. From the German point of view, most of the English Channel. or say, the Thames estuary, is likewise shallow enough to profitably mine. So far, so good. But there are still challenges.

Ideally, a moored mine will not float on the surface, but rather just below it. First, this conceals the minefield. Second, blowing holes below the waterline, or even better, directly under the keel, of a target ship is preferred. But most ships don’t draw more than 10’ to 20’ of draft. So when planning a minefield, the length of the moored mine mooring cable has to be preplanned and cut to just the right length for the specific waters to be mined.

Moored mines were fairly heavy weapons, between a couple hundred pounds of explosives, the steel casing, and the anchor. And it takes a goodly few to lay a serious minefield. And since any attempt at laying a minefield in an enemy’s home waters was likely to provoke a response, early minelayers were fairly large, fast vessels, sometimes cruisers, sometimes converted passenger liners.  In later years, particularly just before World War II, several navies, including our own, designed purpose built minelayers.  Many destroyers were also converted to minelaying duties.

These moored contact mines were (and still are) effective weapons, but they had their drawbacks. First, because a ship had to physically contact them, a minefield had to be sowed fairly thickly to be effective. Second, the impracticality of mooring them in deeper waters limited the areas they could be used in. But on the eve of the US entry into World War I, the US came up with a very nasty little improvement. A steel hulled ship moving through salt water is already just about half a battery. So the mine designers simply put the other half of the battery in the mine. All that was needed was a simple copper wire to close the circuit, and the firing chain would be activated.

The K-pistol on the US Mark 6 mine used a floating copper wire to initiate the explosive chain.

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WAMUS_mk6_firing_sketch_pic.jpg

And it turns out, there was a bit of an added bonus.  You would think the most deadly place for a mine to detonate would be directly against the keel of a ship. But as it turns out, the most effective location is directly under the keel, but not in contact, rather, a little deeper. The initial blast would tend to crack the keel, but the follow on bubble jet effect would almost certainly shatter any remaining structural strength.

That blast is from a Mk48 torpedo, but the principle is the same. And the K-pistol just happened to perfectly position mines for such an attack. It was so effective, the Mk6 was in service at least until 1979.

So far, we’ve only discussed surface laid contact mines. We’ll talk about some other types in later installments.

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Littoral Combat Ships- How not to buy ships

Lots of LCS news going around the last couple days. First, Undersecretary of the Navy Bob Work released a summary of the development of the program in a Naval War College report:

CDR Salamander takes his usual poke at the bear.

I don’t think one can hang this on Rumsfeld if that is part of this angle; I don’t think it is, but it can be read as such. So, in a word; no.
LCS was and is a product of senior leadership from Admirals Clark, Mullen, and especially Roughead. Without their full-throated advocacy and willing smoke screens, LCS would not have survived – for good or bad.
I enjoy this next bit as, for those who missed it, it catches perfectly the “we are smarter than everyone who came before … all is new, and don’t question by beautiful vision…” vibe that resonated throughout the Chain of Command at the time[,]

And I think he’s right. Go read his whole post, and the comments, especially the one  comment about the perils of thinking outside the box.

A fundamental conceptual flaw in the modern construct of “transformation” is its emptiness. Any idiot can “think out of the box,” as many idiots tend to be serial practitioners. But, to achieve useful out-of-box thoughts, one has to thoroughly understand ones “box” in the first place. Historically transformation thinkers, like Mahon, were professionals who had deeply studied, practiced and achieved high levels of expertise. They tend to have thoroughly decomposed and analyzed their profession and craft though broader lenses, so that possibilities were understood in context with real world constraints…

Galrahn at Information Dissemination has a scalding piece on just what  a dogs breakfast the development of the LCS program has been.

The OPNAV Report put together by Rear Admiral Samuel Perez was completed early last year and is so brutally honest about the Littoral Combat Ship the Navy can’t even release a declassified version for public consumption because it would, legitimately, be too embarrassing and likely damage the non-existent credibility of the LCS program. The OPNAV Report was exactly what the Navy asked for, an honest assessment of what is needed to fix the Littoral Combat Ship, and it turned out that honesty was also brutally ugly. God bless Rear Admiral Perez for doing a wonderful job that legitimately may actually save the Littoral Combat Ship program. Noteworthy, Rear Admiral Perez got promoted for his good work before he was sent off to the State Department where his career will likely end and no one will ever hear from him for the rest of his career. I’d love to be wrong on that last point, but historically when a Flag Officer gets sent to the State Department, it is like the Russians sending a General to command a remote barracks in Siberia.

Much to my surprise, even as he writes such a devastating post, he still comes to the conclusion that LCS is the way forward. It ain’t, but that’s an argument for another day.

USS Freedom LCS-1

There has been both a historical model for development of ships for the Navy, (cue QM’s rally cry for the return of the General Board) and a current programmatic program, under the DoD 5000 series regulations, for program management.

Prior to the advent of Robert McNamara as SecDef, for the most part, each service pursued its own procurement strategies. If the Army wanted a tank, it designed a tank (or contracted someone to do it for them). The Air Force didn’t feel the need to consult the Army or the Navy when laying out the specifications for a new bomber.  And of course, the Navy thought it best knew what characteristics any new ship should have.

McNamara is famous for forcing the services to find commonality across platforms with checkered success. Nudging the Air Force to buy the F-4 Phantom and the A-7 Corsair worked out pretty well. But trying to cram two entirely different mission sets into the TFX led to the F-111 fiasco.

But more than just forcing the services to cooperate on particular platforms, he effectively rescinded service authority to manage weapons systems procurement. If the Air Force wanted to buy a new plane, it had to justify to the Office of SecDef (OSD) the role and mission of the plane, and explain why that role and mission should be an Air Force role. For a notional example, should the Air Force have bought the A-10 as a close air support platform, or would that money have been better spent on tube and rocket artillery or other weapons for the Army?  The point being, before any major procurement program began, the services had to explain what role or mission they needed to fulfill, what were the best alternatives to fulfilling that role, what was the best platform needed to fulfill that role, and explain how they intended to do so.  Oversight from OSD was there to provide some rationality, and to avoid duplication of effort, and theoretically impose some joint interoperability at the same time. Over the years, this process has been codified into law.

While this leads to a good deal of bureaucratic complexity, it’s not an unalloyed evil, either. The process tends to keep some semblance of rationality in the process. Benchmarks for capability and cost can be reasonably forecast and thus provide feedback on the health of the program.

Sadly, in the case of the Littoral Combat Ship, all this went out the window. Read the embedded article by Under Secretary Work, and you’ll see that the LCS outside the mainstream process took place with little outside “red teaming” of the concept.  Originally the LCS concept was sold as almost a technology demonstrator. It was, as such, a very high risk program. Virtually every part of the program was untried. New hull forms, construction standards and techniques, new combat systems, new manning and deployment concepts, new “mission modules” that are being developed concurrently (every one of which appears to be in utter disarray).  And yet, somehow, a technology demonstration program suddenly became the centerpiece of the next generation of small(ish) surface combatants.

At the same time, the US Navy is facing block obsolescence of several platforms. The FFG-7 OHP frigates are tired and due for replacement. The Navy’s small (and shrinking) fleet of mine countermeasure ships is increasingly unable to support the needs of the fleet. The small number of Navy PC class ships, designed to support special operations forces, are worn out, and overworked.  And so the LCS, which were sold as a new concept in fleet operations, evolved into the replacement for these ships. And it isn’t even a jack of all trades, let alone master of none. It’s more like the 3 of clubs.

CDR Salamander above says not to lay the blame at Rumsfeld’s feet. Well, to be honest, I do, for once, “Blame Bush!”  With the Bush Administration focused on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, he and Rumsfeld paid scant attention to the Navy’s shipbuilding program. They gave a generous amount to the Navy’s Shipbuilding Construction and Repair budget, and pretty much left the Navy up to its own devices after that. Little strategic guidance about what fleet numbers, composition, roles, and missions should be. Even less oversight was given to ship characteristics.  With little oversight from the normal DoD 5000 process, successive senior uniformed leadership, particularly CNOs, had excessive influence on the development of the LCS program, and were able to shout down complaints and concerns from other folks, particularly the end users of the eventual LCS ships.

Galrahn wants to look forward with the LCS program. And to some extent, yeah, the Navy better figure out what they’ll do with LCS, because like it or not, it’s coming.

But we also need to look back to see how this mess happened to avoid repeating the mistaken process that brought the Navy to this point.

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Air Search Radar

Before I delve into the Aegis system, I want to talk a little about air search radar. You’ll need a bit of fundamental understanding of it to understand why Aegis was a leap forward from its predecessors.

Radar stands for Radio Detection and Ranging. The radar set sends a pulse of radio frequency energy out, stops transmitting, and waits for any return signal. After a given time, whether any signals have returned or not, it transmits again.  When pulses are reflected back, by measuring the time elapsed from transmission, and dividing by 2, and knowing the speed of light, the range can be determined. Knowing what direction the antenna was pointing at when the pulse was transmitted gives the bearing.

These pulses are very short, and the “pulse repetition frequency” may be as high as several thousand per second. Note, this frequency is how many times a second the radar transmits. It is not the frequency of the radar energy transmitted.

We’ve all seen countless war movies or airline disaster movies where the tense radar operator is hunched over a scope watching for blips on the screen.  That round top-down scope is what is known as a PPI, or Plan Position Indicator. Generally, such a radar is what is known as 2D, or Two Dimensional. That is, it indicated the range and bearing from the radar. But in air search, knowing the altitude of the target is also critical.

Early 2D radars used a  parabolic antenna. The antenna itself is not the transmitting element. Rather, the RF energy from the transmitter is fed through a waveguide. This waveguide is a hollow steel tube that channels the energy to a feedhorn. The feedhorn is positioned shortly in front of the antenna and directed toward the antenna.  By shaping the parabolic antenna, the actual shape of the radar beam could be managed. Upon leaving the feedhorn, the RF energy would be reflected off the face of the antenna, and out toward the target. Energy reflected from the target would strike the antenna, and if you remember your high school math (I don’t!) be reflected to the feedhorn, where it would go back down the waveguide, to the amplifiers and receivers and eventually converted to display on the PPI.

The radar beam, known as a lobe, on these 2D radars is very narrow in azimuth. But it is very wide in elevation, so that targets at both low and high altitude can be detected.

So we’ve managed to determine the range and bearing of a target. But how to determine its altitude?

Well, the first radars to address this were known as height-finders. They were basically the same radar and antenna mounted perpendicular to the 2D set.  Pointed along the line of bearing determined by the 2D set, the heightfinder antenna would nod up and down, while projecting a lobe that was wide in azimuth, but very fine in elevation. By measuring the elevation angle, and the range to the target, the ship could, with a little help from Pythagoras, determine the altitude of the target.

There were two problems with heightfinders. First, the heavy antenna mounted high on a ship already near its load limits was bad for the ship stability. Many ships in the fleet simply couldn’t carry such a burden. Second, it was a slow process to slew the heightfinder to the correct bearing, and determine the target altitude. With the ever increasing speeds of aircraft in the 1940s and 1950s, that meant there would be very little reaction time available to any ship. And if there were multiple raids inbound, the ship could well be overwhelmed with targets, what is now called a saturation attack. There had to be a better way.

As electronics improved, and understanding of RF energy likewise improved, and further improvements in signal processing arrived on scene, radar engineers learned they could project a pencil beam radar, on thin both in azimuth and elevation, directly from a waveguide, without reflecting it off a parabolic dish. A sizeable antenna would still be needed to receive the reflected signal, but a fairly precise lobe could be sent. By stacking a series of these waveguide emitters vertically, a series of lobes that scanned sequentially from bottom to top could be sent. Each lobe in this stack had its own frequency. Rather than running several different waveguides through the mast and up to a rotating antenna, instead, a single waveguide was used, but the emitting portion was called a slotted waveguide. Simply put, the RF energy is sent out of very precise slots cut into the antenna. But the slots are of varying sizes. Since slot size is critical to propagation of the signal, only the RF energy of the proper frequency for a desired lobe will propagate, and only through the desired slot. Each slot is also aligned to send its lobe at a specific elevation angle. Thus, a single waveguide is all that is needed.

These slotted waveguide radars could quickly determine not only the range and bearing to a target, but also provided altitude information. While not as precise as a heightfinder, it was sufficient to either control friendly interceptors, or cue onboard fire control radars to the target. These radars are said to be 3D radars, and are sometimes described as scanning mechanically in bearing, and electronically in elevation.  The first 3D radar in US service was the SPS-39, quickly replaced by the SPS-52 and SPS-48. Oddly, of the two, the SPS-52 was the smaller, less powerful and less capable radar, designed to fit on smaller warships such as frigates. It has since been retired from US service. The SPS-48, on the other hand, was designed for larger ships, such as cruisers and aircraft carriers. It has evolved over the last 40 years, with improvements to the transmitter for power and reliability, and in the signal processors to reduce the noise to signal ratio.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/systems/images/an-sps48-a.jpg

Some radars, rather than using the slotted waveguide, use the similar stacked lobe concept to provide 3D coverage, but use a phase modulation method to control the elevation of a given lobe of a vertical scan.

These 3D radars are still very useful, and for most jobs, quite sufficient. Indeed, in certain applications, they still outperform their successors. But one problem with them is that the antenna rotates rather slowly. For instance, the SPS-48G(V) rotates at either 7.5 rpm or 15rpm. This gives a “refresh rate” of either 8 or 4 seconds. A lot can happen in 4 seconds.

We’ll take a look to the solution to that problem in our post in Aegis.

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The Names have been changed to protect LT Rusty’s true identity.

After months of high-profile deliberation, a US Navy spokesperson has confirmed that the military organization is prepared to issue a public apology to Lieutenant Junior Grade Jeffrey Hurst for wasting the first two years of his professional life.

“We obviously made a big mistake not recognizing Lieutenant Hurst’s potential sooner,” the spokesperson said in a phone interview. “He deserved much better than the assignment he got, and we all feel just awful.”

24-year-old Hurst, who graduated from Auburn University with a degree in English and commissioned through the school’s Naval ROTC program, made waves last July when he updated his Facebook status to read, “Accelerate your life my ass… this job SUX!” The post was liked by six of Hurst’s friends and received three comments, making it an unmitigated public relations disaster for the Navy.

At the time of the calamitous post, Hurst was serving aboard the frigate USS NICHOLAS as the Electrical Officer, which was reportedly not his first choice duty or even his second. The Navy has since relocated him to a holding facility for dissatisfied service members, where he is waited on hand and foot by government servants and allowed to play video games whenever he wants.

“After two years of injustice, I’m glad the Navy is finally taking me seriously,” said Hurst from a massaging recliner in his 600 sq. ft. living quarters. “The scars will remain, but let my experience be a boon to all other service members who aren’t getting exactly what they want either.”

via Navy To Apologize To Junior Officer For Shitty First Tour | The Duffel Blog.

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Did the Chinese test their “carrier killer” missile in the Gobi desert?

From Business Insider’s Military and Defense blog comes a report that they did just that.

China’s PLA “sunk” a U.S. aircraft carrier during a war game in remote China using its DF-21D “Carrier Killer” missile, reports Taiwan paper Want China Times.

The China Times is a 63 year old Taiwanese paper slightly slanted toward unification, but with a solid reputation and accurate reporting.

The Times report originates with a Google Earth image published at SAORBOATS Argentinian internet forum.

The photo shows two big craters on a 600 foot platform deep in China’s Gobi desert that Chinese military testers used to simulate the flight deck of an aircraft carrier.

There has been talk of the DF-21 for years with estimates of its range, threat, and theater changing implications, but this could be the first known test of the rocket.

DF-21D Carrier Test

Maybe they did, maybe they didn’t. Who knows?

The challenges any designer faces making an anti-ship ballistic missile are not trivial. First, you have to find the carrier. That’s not always easy. Eventually, yes, the carrier will likely disclose its position. But the first datum that a carrier is on station is likely to be Tomahawk and SEAD strikes against your homeland.  Second, just finding a carrier isn’t localizing to the point of a firing solution.  That doesn’t even begin to take into account any active countermeasures the carrier group may use. And oh, yeah, carriers move. Quite a bit. So not only must your ASBM maneuver, it will likely need a mid-course guidance update.  Maybe. If not, it has to have a seeker that can detect and discriminate targets from long range so it can begin its terminal maneuvers early.

Then there are the active countermeasures. If the missile uses a radar guidance, sooner or later, we’ll learn to jam that system. If it uses infrared, we can jam that as well.

But the most likely active countermeasure is the accompanying escorts. Today, the Navy already fields a number of Aegis cruisers and destroyers fully capable of detecting, localizing, targeting, engaging and destroying medium range ballistic missiles. In fact, since the missile would be approaching the carrier group, that reduces the crossing angle of the shot, and makes it easier and gives multiple shots at a given target.

Given the already fielded anti-ballistic missile capability of our Navy, we are not terribly concerned with the DF-21D. In fact, one wonders why the Chinese would even pursue such an expensive capability, when there are other approaches far more likely to yield success. The obvious approach is the use of submarines. Our surface based Anti-Submarine Warfare capability and training have been shamefully ignored for years, as the capability of diesel electric subs worldwide has improved. Even more “asymetrical” would be an even more primitive weapon, the humble naval mine. The Chinese could lay defensive minefields in areas around their shores to deny us free use of those waters. And if they were really smart, they could use offensive minefields against the ports and harbors that forward deployed carriers depend on. A carrier may be able to spend months at sea, but it still relies on logistics ships to provide it with jet fuel, ammunition, spare parts, and food. This combat logistics train shuttles from friendly ports to the carrier group and back. Deny the navy its logistics, and you’ve denied the Navy itself. And it would only take a handful of mines in any of a number of important ports to effectively shut down operations in the Western Pacific.

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Thursday Links of Interest

There’s some good stuff on the web today that I’m just not gonna have the time to get around to writing about.

From Small Wars Journal, A Future For Armor In An Era Of Persistent Conflict.

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At USNI, CDR Sal has some thoughts on the Royal Navy vs. the Japanese Navy Maritime Self Defense Force.

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Only magicians should use coin tricks.

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The reason Democrats have a reputation for cutting and running in wartime is they have a habit of cutting and running in wartime.

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USS Freedom, LCS-1, may finally deploy. She’s only about a quarter way through her life expectancy.

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It’s Thursday Random at Hookers&Booze. (a bit NSFW, but a lot funneh)

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Not So “Super” Carriers

So, at the deactivation of the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) the Secretary of the Navy announded that the third ship of the Gerald R. Ford class of carriers will also be named Enterprise. Good news. And there are any number of former US carriers that have names that resound through the history of the fleet. Ranger, Constellation, Hornet, Yorktown, and Lexington all have proud heritages.

But not every carrier has a lineage like that. Many of the escort carriers of World War II served in relative obscurity. And then there were the two carriers that are the subject of this post.

If I told you the US Navy once had a carrier fleet on the Great Lakes, would you think I was nuts?

Carrier aviation was important and growing more so even before the attack on Pearl Harbor. After the attack the growth of naval aviation could only be described as explosive.  The losses of trained aviators in early campaigns and the expansion of the carrier fleet meant trained aviators were critically needed. A fleet that would grow to over 90 fleet, light fleet*, and escort carriers would require thousands of naval aviators.

Flight school for these aviators was, for the most part, similar to that of pilots of the Army Air Forces. But the key thing distinguishing Naval Aviators from mere pilots was their ability to take off from, and more critically, land aboard a carrier at sea.  The problem was, what carriers there were didn’t have time to train fledgling birdmen. They were already locked in battle with the Imperial Japanese Navy, and fighting for their lives. Losses of carriers at Coral Sea, Midway and the Solomon Islands meant that new construction carriers just entering the fleet couldn’t be tasked to training aviators, but instead had to be deployed overseas almost as soon as their paint was dry. Something had to be done, however, to provide those new carriers with aircrew to turn them from transports to fighting warships.

To be sure, as each new carrier was commissioned, it too its “turn in the barrel” serving as a platform for carrier qualification. This helped qualify aviators, but it also helped train each ship’s flight deck crew in its duties. But still, the backlog of aviators needing qualification would grow. Further, using fleet and escort carriers for this job meant they needed heavy escort, particularly in the waters of the Atlantic, where German U-Boats were taking a heavy toll on coastal shipping. No sub skipper in the world would pass at a chance to sink a carrier.

Very early in the war, the idea of a dedicated training carrier on Lake Michigan surfaced. And this idea had a lot going for it. First, the chances of a U-Boat attack on the lake were zero**. Secondly, any such ship would almost by definition have to be a conversion from an existing merchantman. But since it would be strictly a training carrier, other than providing a flight deck and arresting gear, almost no other carrier specific modifications, such as a hangar deck, ammunition magazines, aviation fuel supply, radars, or extensive ready room facilities would be needed. Operating daily from Navy Pier in Chicago, such a ship would be able to leave most functions to the shore side establishment. Navy planes would fly from NAS Glenview (near Chicago) out over the lake, practice landings and takeoffs, and then fly home to NAS Glenview at the end of the day.

Most of the existing merchant ships on the Great Lakes were either desperately needed to support the war effort, or were pressed into service on the open ocean. But the Navy found two ships ill suited for either of those tasks and hence available. Both were coal fired, side-paddlewheeled ships.

The Seeandbee had been built in 1913 to provide passage between Cleveland and Buffalo.

SS Seeandbee before conversion to a training carrier.

In March of 1942, the Navy bought the Seeandbee, began the conversion process by razing her to the main deck and adding a flight deck. By January, 1943, she had been converted, renamed the USS Wolverine (IX-64) and was operating out of Chicago.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/4b/USS_Wolverine_%28IX-64%29_Lake_Michigan_1943.jpg/800px-USS_Wolverine_%28IX-64%29_Lake_Michigan_1943.jpg

USS Wolverine (IX-64) on Lake Michigan, circa 1944.

The other training carrier began life as as the SS Greater Buffalo, providing overnight service between Buffalo and Detroit.

http://wnyheritagepress.org/photos_week_2005/greater_buffalo/postcard.jpg

SS Greater Buffalo, as built.

Built in 1924, she was acquired by the Navy a few months after the Seeandbee. During her conversion, she was named  and commissioned as USS Sable (IX-81). Unlike the Douglas Fir plank flight deck of Wolverine (and all other US carriers of the time) she was given a steel flight deck. Sable entered service on Lake Michigan in 1943 as well.

File:USS Sable (IX-81).jpg

USS Sable (IX-81) underway on Lake Michigan.

During the course of World War II, these two ships qualified almost 18,000 Naval Aviators, an astonishing number given their short careers. Future President of the United States, George H.W. Bush qualified aboard the USS Sable.

Both ships had top speeds of 18 knots. But when landing aboard a carrier, the ideal was to have 30 knots of wind across the deck. As long as there was a breeze of 12 knots or more to steam into, there was no problem. But if winds were calm, operations aboard the ships, especially by heavier aircraft such as the TBM or SB2C, could be problematic. And given the neophyte nature of the aviators landing aboard, it’s hardly surprising that accidents happened quite often. Somewhere in the neighborhood of 130 aircraft found their way to the bottom of Lake Michigan during the war. Many others suffered varying degrees of damage while landing aboard. But operating from Lake Michigan was far more benign than the open sea, so while there were deaths, the total loss of life was a quite small. 

Spending the war shoveling coal on a converted steamer might not have the elan of a destroyerman, nor the dash of a cruiser or battleship sailor, but apparently, spending almost every night in port, with liberty in downtown Chicago was pretty popular with most of the crew.  Today, Navy Pier is a major tourist attraction in downtown Chicago.

As soon as the war ended, the need for aviators fell, and thus the need for the Wolverine and Sable. By 1947, both ships had been decommissioned, struck from the Naval Register, and disposed of.

As for the 130 or so airplanes that sank to the bottom of the lake, that’s something of an ongoing story. These days, restoring warbirds to either museum display or flight is a big business. As it turns out, the cold fresh water of Lake Michigan provided for good preservation of airplanes that sank.  But the Navy has long held that they still retain title to those planes, and forbids salvage of them. In recent years, however, the Navy has begun to allow limited salvage of some aircraft, while still claiming title, provided the recovered aircraft are restored and place on display in areas open to the general public.  One such salvaged example is an F4F-3 of the type used by CDR Butch O’Hare. It’s displayed at O’Hare Airport, which was named in his honor.

Friend of the blog Jason Camlic passed along a couple of fascinating links. A&T Recovery specializes in salvage operations in the Great Lakes. Over the last thirty years, A&T has worked with the National Naval Aviation Museum to recover lost aircraft from the lake. Click on through to visit their very informative site and see some great pictures of the Wolverine and Sable conducting operations, as well as some neat information on their other discoveries.

Similarly, Jason passed along this link to the Pritzker Military Library’s presentation on the freshwater carriers and the lost aircraft of Lake Michigan.

*Light fleet carriers were nine ships laid down as light cruisers, but converted on the ways into aircraft carriers. They were very much compromise designs, smaller than regular fleet carriers, and with correspondingly smaller airgroups. But they were available, had speed enough to keep up with the fleet, and a compromise carrier beats the heck out of no carrier at all.

**Well, actually, there was one German U-Boat in the Great Lakes, and I’m not talking about U-505.

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Falklands v2.0- The Current Game

Tensions between Great Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands are rising again. If it seems to you that Argentina is again using the issue of the sovereignty of the islands as a sop to the population and a distraction from domestic concerns, you’re not alone.  In the aftermath of the first Falklands war, the semi-socialist junta was deposed and a reasonably democratic government installed. Sadly, the gains made were lost when Argentina again embraced a socialist model, currently led by the government of Christina Kirchner. And again, shortcomings in what should be a vibrant economy are blamed on the ills of colonialism and the European powers.

It’s likely that most of this is for domestic consumption. And likely, Argentina will take some actions short of open conflict to further demonstrate its vitality to its domestic constituents.  But it is always possible that Argentina will again make assumptions about Great Britain’s resolve or courses of action that lead to battle.

Options short of war will likely include operations to isolate the Falklands from outside sources of support and commerce. Simply prohibiting direct flights and shipping from Argentina to the Falklands has a deleterious effect on the islands’ economy. Bringing diplomatic pressure on other South American nations to likewise prohibit such direct communications would have even more drastic effect.  There’s little in the islands that anyone really needs. But there is much from the outside world the islands can ill afford to do without.  Simply accessing modern health care is a great challenge for the native islanders. Great Britain, will, of course, support the transportation of critical trade with the islands, either via airlift or sealift. And Britain is not without its own influence to pressure other states to not join a prohibition on direct flights and shipping.  Argentina’s goal in such a scenario isn’t to actually seal off the Falklands, but rather to render it such a net economic loss for the Empire to maintain commercial communication with the islands that domestic British support for the Falklands erodes and leads to a diplomatic capitulation.  It’s not a bad strategy, but I’m fairly certain that Britain, which has willingly absorbed the costs of defense of the islands for thirty years, even during the last decade where they have grudgingly supported extensive operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Betting on the British to fold in the face of a challenge has a poor history of success.

Currently, the primary economic product of the Falklands are agricultural products, primarily wool. Of course, there have been reports of deposits of gas and oil reserves. The presence of exploitable energy reserves would make the area of far more consequence. And should Britain attempt to confirm or exploit such reserves, it is highly likely that Argentina will emulate the Chinese pattern of harassment and interference with civilian shipping, either via maritime patrol vessels or even warships. Again, the point here isn’t to start a war, but raise the price of Britain’s demonstration of sovereignty to a point where the public no longer supports it.  Probably even more importantly, the Kirchner administration can point to these actions to their domestic audience as proof of “standing up” to the colonialist Empire.

Further actions by Argentina include attempts to delegitimize the forthcoming referendum on sovereignty  in the eyes on of the world community, and attempt to bring further international pressure through the UN and other transnational organizations to nudge Britain toward relinquishing its title to the islands.

While Britain has publicly stated they will resort to force of arms to retain the islands, neither side is in a terrible hurry at this point to get into another shooting war. But what happens if that changes? We’ll take a look at that in the next segment.

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BattleAxe

The Navy has its first female Carrier Air Wing commander. And the writer at the local paper is smart enough to catch on that the call sign of CAG of ComCarWing Three is (and has been for at least 40 years) Battleaxe.

Capt. Sara Joyner laughed when she realized that as the first female fighter pilot to command a carrier air wing, she would answer to the call sign “Battle Axe.”

“If you look up the word ‘battle-axe,’ it is a slightly overbearing and domineering woman,” Joyner told reporters Friday after assuming command of Carrier Air Wing 3 – nicknamed “Battle Axe” – during a ceremony at Oceana Naval Air Station. “I found that humorous.”

It’s also rather refreshing to see that she doesn’t try to make the occasion a big Diversity Industry celebration.

“I don’t think that it needs to be said; it’s out there. My hope is to be as good as the best of the best CAGs that I’ve had,” Joyner said, referring to the Navy’s acronym for the commander of an air group. “It doesn’t matter what you look like; it matters how you do the job.”

Successful command of a carrier air wing, along with her previous successful command of a strike fighter squadron, doesn’t guarantee an Admiral’s flag in her future, but in Naval Aviation, it is one of two well worn paths to the stars, the other being successful squadron command, followed by the nuclear power pipeline and eventual carrier command.

Good luck to Captain Joyner and CVW-3.

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The XC-142

Longtime readers know I’m not at all a fan of the Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey program. But most of my objections to the program center on its costs, not on the aircraft itself. Personally, I think it is a pretty neat bird. And I enjoy watching them fly by en route from MCAS Miramar to 29 Palms. But every time someone tells me how revolutionary it is, I feel a strong urge to remind them that it is hardly new concept.

Almost from the first time helicopters flew, engineers started tinkering with ways to combine the speed characteristics of an airplane with the vertical take off and landing of a helicopter. After all, the rotors that lift a helicopter look an awful lot like the propellers that move planes forward. Was there a way to use one set of blades for both jobs? Taking off and landing a propeller driven plane from a tail sitting position was tried, but was soon found to be impractical, mostly because the pilot would have to fly looking over his shoulder.

Pretty soon, the concept of rotating either the entire wing, or just the rotors, from the vertical to the horizontal was tested. A variety of test aircraft were designed, built and tested throughout the 1950s. Most were little more than test-beds to explore the concept of a convertible plane.

By 1959, enough experience had been gained with tilt-rotor and tilt-wing test beds that the DoD actually began to consider designing a plane that could eventually enter service. After a couple more years of effort, the Tri-Service Assault Transport Program began in 1961, with the Navy as the lead agency for DoD. Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV) in partnership with the  Hiller and Ryan companies, was awarded a contract to design and build a prototype tilt-wing transport that would have better range and speed than existing helicopters. 

The resulting aircraft, the XC-142A would be the closest a convertiplane would come to entering service until the MV-22 joined squadron service with the Marines 40 years later.

One interesting administrative note, the XC-142A was numbered in the regular tri-service designation system under the conventional transport series, and not in the convertible aircraft series. It really should have had a designation of XCV-XXX. One can only guess, but perhaps the program managers felt the XC-142A was so much more likely to be bought in numbers than previous aircraft, that it should not share a series of what had heretofore been strictly test beds. And, rather annoyingly for your author, the XC-142A does not appear to have even been given a nickname or popular name.

On a conventional helicopter, each blade of the rotor is independently articulated. That is, it changes its angle of attack, or pitch, continuously throughout its rotation around the hub, and does so independently from the other blades. At any given time, each blade of a rotor is at a different pitch. Conventional propellers, even though they have variable pitch, do not do this. Instead, all blades of a conventional propeller change pitch simultaneously, and maintain that pitch setting throughout their journey around the hub. Helicopter rotors use this articulation to tilt the rotor disc forward or backward or side to side to provide thrust in the desired direction of flight, in addition to providing the lift to keep the helicopter in the air. But this articulation is also rather complex. That’s why when you look at the hub of a helicopter rotor, there’s all sorts of fiddly bits.

Previous convertible planes had suffered from excessive vibration and complexity, and LTV was at pains to avoid this. And so they came up with a pretty simple solution.  By vastly overpowering the aircraft with four T64 turboprops, and using conventional propellers only slightly larger than normal, they had more than enough lifting force to meet the requirements. What was needed was a way of controlling the aircraft in hovering flight without adding the complexity of full articulation to the props.  Since the entire wing rotated, the ailerons, normally used to control roll, could be used instead to control yaw in hovering flight. The airflow from the propellers would be sufficient to make the ailerons effective. Roll control in the hover would be provided by differential clutching of the outboard propellers. Pitch control in the hover would be by means of a small horizontal rotor at the very tail of the aircraft. In conventional flight modes, conventional control surfaces would be used.

One additional layer of complexity (and thus weight and cost and maintenance) that could not be avoided was crosslinking all four engines to a common drive shaft.  Imagine the XC-142A in a hover. Should one of the engines fail, particularly an outboard engine, the loss of lift on one side would cause an uncontrollable roll and loss of the aircraft. The answer was to have all four engines driving a common shaft, so even if a quarter of the total power was lost, the thrust would still be delivered symmetrically.

Aside from the whole tilt-wing thing, the XC-142 was a fairly conventional transport design. A boxy fuselage with a split ramp at the rear, with tricycle landing gear, with main mounts retracting into blisters along the fuselage side. In fact, because its propellers weren’t too large, it could take off and land conventionally with no tilt to the wing at all.

This was a very ambitious program. Remember, when the contracts were signed, the UH-1, CH-46, and CH-47 were just being accepted for service.

http://www.voughtaircraft.com/heritage/1532_034.jpg

Right click, open in new tab to greatly embiggenfy.

Five aircraft were built, and put through their paces.

http://www.aerofiles.com/LTV-XC142.jpg

The aircraft actually flew quite well, and its performance met the required specifications. But several things conspired to keep the XC-142 as a historical curiosity, and not a long serving warhorse.

First, the cross-linked driveshaft was troublesome. It produced excessive vibration (like virtually all its predecessors) and was less than wholly reliable. Problems with the shafting would lead to hard landings and damaged aircraft. And excessive vibration in a testing environment could only be seen as a harbinger of frequent failure in any future service environment.

Secondly, the utility of what would inevitably be an expensive aircraft was questioned. An XC-142 might lift 30 troops 100 miles twice as fast as a helicopter, but if it cost more than twice as much to buy and operate, buying two helicopters suddenly looks a lot more appealing.

Third, just as the XC-142 began to fly, the US was becoming ever more deeply involved in Vietnam, and the bulk of defense spending was going to fund that war and the machines needed right then, not some time in the future.

One by one, the each of the services in the Tri-Service program dropped out. The remaining aircraft were transferred to NASA, who used them for testing until 1970, when the last survivor was transferred to the Air Force Museum.

It’s odd that I couldn’t find a single decent video of the TC-4C, a plane with almost 30 years of service, but was instantly able to find quite a bit of good footage of this also-ran.

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Thanks to Jason Camlic, who inspired this post via a post of his on Facebook. I can’t figure a good way to link traffic to him, but he’s always a great source of ideas and interesting tidbits from the world of aviation.

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The “Tic”

As the magnificent Grumman A-6A Intruder was accepted for service with the Navy and Marine Corps as the premiere all-weather/night attack aircraft, the Navy began to prepare to transition aviators from older platforms to this state of the art jet.

The first squadron to be equipped with any new type aircraft is always the Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS). For historical reasons, the FRS is commonly referred to as the RAG, from the old World War II era “Replacement Air Groups”* The FRS is the “schoolhouse” for any given type of aircraft, responsible for transitioning squadrons from older aircraft into the new type, training maintainers, and eventually ensuring a steady stream of trained aircrew to fleet squadrons.  Aviators graduate from flight school knowing how to fly. The FRS teaches them how to fight.  Attack Squadron 42 (VA-42) (.pdf) was the first of eventually three FRS Intruder squadrons.

While the Navy had long operated multi-place tactical aircraft, the highly complex nature of the Intruder meant its two man crew shared far more of the workload than in previous aircraft. The Bombardier/Navigator (B/N) wasn’t just nice to have, but the very key to exploiting the heart of the Intruder, the Digital Attack Navigation Equipment (DIANE), the complex of radars and computers that gave the Intruder its all weather capability. At about this time, non-pilot flying officers were just transitioning from the designation as Naval Aviation Observers to Naval Flight Officers (NFO).  No longer second-class citizens in the Naval Aviation hierarchy, NFOs would be equal partners, eventually becoming eligible for squadron command, carrier command, higher rank.**

Training a Naval Aviator to fly the A-6 posed no new challenges. An instructor pilot could simply occupy the B/N’s seat, and offer instruction. But training an NFO in the A-6 was a little harder. Instructor pilots were poorly suited to training B/N’s on DIANE, and in any event, were a little too busy flying the plane to offer meaningful instruction. And Instructor B/N’s weren’t pilots, so they couldn’t fly the plane.  And until student B/N’s had achieved a certain basic proficiency with the complex navigation and attack systems, it was unwise to pair them with a student A-6 pilot to begin actual crew training.

So the training of student B/N’s became something of a chokepoint in the FRS pipeline. What was needed was a way to provide them with hands-on training on the actual equipment, under the instruction of a competent B/N instructor, while airborne, but without having to put them up in an Intruder.

At the same time, Grumman had just started producing one of the very first purpose built “executive transports,” the Gulfstream. The Gulfstream was a twin-turboprop powered low wing transport that could offer luxury seating for 8 or a commuter passenger layout for up to 28. 

Grumman and the Navy grafted the nose of an A-6 onto the Gulfstream, and added additional Bombardier/Navigator instrument panels in the back, and the TC-4C Academe was born.

http://www.airpixbycaz.co.uk/bv11-155728.jpg

http://www.intruderassociation.org/images/tc4c.jpg

Right click to greatly embiggenfy.

The first of an eventual total of nine TC-4C aircraft was delivered in January 1968 to VA-42. The great B/N bottleneck was no more. And while the TC-4C was officially name Academe, it was almost always referred to as the “Tic.”

With the exception of one tragic accident that killed 12, the Tic had a good reputation as easy to fly and maintain, and a highly effective training tool for the Intruder community. Each of the three Intruder FRS, VA-42 for East Coast Navy squadrons, VA-128 for West Coast Navy squadrons, and VMAT-202 for Marine Intruder squadrons, would operate three TC-4C.

As the Intruder was modified and developed from the A-6A to the A-6E TRAM, the Tics were modified to match the capabilities of the Intruder. The Tic remained in service until 1995, when the retirement of the A-6 rendered it surplus.

The Gulfstream family, of course, would go on to become the jet-powered, swept wing business jet of the rich and famous, and just about the ultimate status symbol.

 

*Similarly, the commander of a Carrier Air Wing (CVW) is still popularly called the “CAG” from “Carrier Air Group.”

**Which makes sense. If the next Nimitz or King is denied a worthwhile career just because he doesn’t have 20/20 vision, the Navy is just shooting itself in the foot. And in a lot of communities, such as the E-2 and EA-6B, arguably, the pilot is just there to drive the bus, while the NFOs in back get on with the real work.

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From TFX to Turkeys

In honor of the 42 anniversary of the first flight of the F-14, SteeljawScribe linked his three part series on the TFX programmatic disaster that lead to the Turkey. It’s a great read. Grab a cuppa, and settle in.

Part I

Part II

Part III

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