We sometimes forget that for all our 12 years of the Global War on Terror, Russia has been fighting off and on since 1979. And Ivan has never been particularly solicitous about the welfare of his riflemen.
This video is long. 50 minutes long. And it is in Russian. I neither speak nor read Russian, so it’s hard to be sure, but I’d guess that most of the footage is from various campaigns against separatists in Chechnya. Some is obviously captured footage from the rebels, but most of it seems to be simply the same type of footage that American troops would take.
Be advised, there are parts that are very graphic.
Almost every day, we get hits from people looking for information on Rocket Propelled Grenades, or RPGs (well, we get hits for RPG, maybe they’re looking for Role Playing Games?).
We’ve discussed briefly the evolution of handheld anti-tank weapons in US service, and we’ve talked about some of the challenges light armor faces in defeating RPGs. What we haven’t really discussed is the RPGs themselves.
The Russian experience with handheld anti-tank weapons up through WWII was much like our own. But after the war, where our Army progressed toward a disposable weapon that every troop could carry, they persisted with a reusable weapon employed by a two man team of gunner and ammo bearer. The first iteration of these post-war RPGs was the RPG-2, which was also known as the B-40. It was an incredibly simple weapon- pretty much just a tube with a trigger.
The round itself was an 82mm HEAT warhead. The rocket motor burned completely before the round even left the tube. It then coasted to the target.
The problem was, this meant the weapon had a very short effective range, only 150m for a stationary target, and less than 100m for a moving target.
The Soviets addressed this shortcoming in their next production model, the RPG-7.
Entering service with the Soviets in 1961, the RPG-7 was an evolution of the RPG-2 concept. It had a somewhat more refined launcher, to include optical sights. It also had a two-stage motor, with a first stage that boosted the grenade out of the launcher, then a sustainer motor that drove it to the target. This gave it a much better effective range, though it was still better to keep the range as short as possible. The warhead was significantly larger as well, being 105mm in diameter (the effective penetration of a HEAT warhead is a function of its diameter; generally, penetration is 6x the diameter of the warhead).
The RPG-7, in many different variants, has been produced or used by many nations (there’s even a US company that makes it!) and has been used in virtually all wars and insurgencies since its introduction. It is still in use in the Soviet Army, and is still in production. And of course, it has frequently been used against US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. And it is in use by our allies in the Iraqi Army and the Afghan National Army. It is pretty much ubiquitous.
As we mentioned in an earlier post, the RPG-7 is hard pressed to defeat a Bradley or an Abrams, and are hardly a sure thing against a Stryker. But against a Humvee, they are a very dangerous threat. You just can’t armor up a Humvee enough to defeat one.
Nor have the Russians been content to rest on their laurels. While an updated RPG-7 with various warheads is still the standard Russian hand-held anti-tank weapon, they’ve continued development of newer, more potent PRGs. They’ve adopted the RPG-18 and its successors, which is a disposable weapon based very closely on the US M72 LAW. They’ve also deployed the RPG-29, a reusable weapon with updated warheads to defeat modern armor. Hezbollah used the RPG-29 to great effect against Israeli armor in the 2006 war.
The latest in the RPG family is the RPG-32, which is designed with an export market in mind. It has been selected for service by Brazil, Jordan, Mexico and Argentina.
Sure looks that way. Go over to Information Dissemination and read this post. Here’s a taste:
The low capacity narrow roads leading from Russia into Georgia (one into Abkhazia and another leading into South Ossetia) create immense logistical problems in rapidly deploying large military contingents into Georgia if Moscow opts for a “humanitarian intervention” to bring about “regime change.” The insertion of a sizable marine force with heavy weapons was used last August to bypass the clogged up overland routes and this could prove important again. The Russian military knew beforehand the exact timing of its pre-arranged invasion and fully controlled the pre-war armed provocations by the South Ossetian forces, whereas in the present crisis the situation is much more volatile.
Just about anybody who’s spent any time thinking about fighting understands the almost inate desire to seek the high ground. High ground gives you better lines of sight on the battlefield, and if you are defending, your enemy must attack uphill. If you are attacking, you get the momentum of going downhill. So it is no surprise that as aviation came into being, it was seen as the ultimate in high ground. And while eventually, the Air Force came to be the service with the claim to the majority of that slice of the battlefield, the Army became an enthusiastic supporter of using aviation for observation.
In WWII, the Army used Piper Cubs for spotting artillery fire. And pretty quickly, the “grasshoppers” learned that they could also do a fair amount of reconnaisance while over enemy lines. The pilots and observers became very good at locating troops hiding in woods. In the immediate post-war years, the early piston powered helicopters soon began to replace most of the light aircraft the Army used for observation. These worked pretty well, but being piston powered, had some real shortcomings. First, they lacked power. Later models used more powerful engines, but the increase in horsepower was offset by the increase in engine weight and increased fuel consumption. Secondly, they used high octane gas. That made them pretty flammable. And the piston engines needed a lot of maintanence. With the introduction of lightweight, powerful gas turbines, the Army launched a competition to buy a new light observation helicopter.
The competition opened in 1960. Twelve firms entered the competition. Bell Helicopter’s entry was the YOH-4, known inside the company as the Model 206. It lost. The stated reason was that it was underpowered. The real reason was probably this:
YOH-4
It was just too ugly.
Hughes Helicopters eventually won the competition with the OH-6 Cayuse.
OH-6A
Now, the Army was very happy with the OH-6. It was fast, durable, didn’t need much maintanence, could carry a pilot, an observer and still have power to fit some light armament onboard. With the war in Vietnam heating up, the demand for observation helicopters skyrocketed. “Loaches”, as they quickly came to be called, were scouring the countryside, finding trails, bunkers, troops and calling in artillery, directing troops on the ground, and working hand in hand with attack helicopters to pin down and destroy the elusive Viet Cong and NVA.
The problem was, Hughes aircraft couldn’t crank out enough production helicopters in time for the Army. So the Army reopened the competition. Bell hadn’t even come in second place in the original competition. That went to the Hiller OH-5. But for the second tranche buy of Light Observation Helicopters, Bell reworked their original aircraft into what became known at the Model 206B. The Army liked it, and bought it as the OH-58A Kiowa.
Again, the Army was very happy. The new helicopter was light, easy to use, and very effective. That it was cheaper than the OH-6 didn’t hurt much either. And the civilian version, the 206B was a commercial success as well. For years, just about every news helicopter in America was a 206B. In fact, it is still in production. The OH-58A fought alongside the OH-6 throughout the second half of the Vietnam war. Not until after the war did the Army decide to settle on one helicopter for the role, choosing the Kiowa, and slowly relegating the OH-6 to the Reserves.
After the Vietnam War, the Army turned its attention again to the massive Soviet Armies facing NATO in Western Europe. We’ve talked before about the role attack aviation would have under AirLand Battle Doctrine in resisting the Soviet’s echelon attack. But one of the problems was always going to be finding the second and third echelons for aviation (both Army and Air Force) to attack. The Defense Department pumped billions of dollars into various programs to facilitate this. One thing the Army really needed to be able to do was find them at night. The boom in electronics in the 1970s based on transistorization led to among other things, Forward Looking InfraRed technology. It soon became feasible to mount sensors on helicopters that could penetrate the dark and fog. We tend to take it for granted now, but at the time, this was utterly revolutionary. Never before had helicopters been able to fight so effectively at night. And to see for any distance using anything other than flares was almost magic. And while mounting laser beams on a shark’s head might be impractical, mounting a laser next to a thermal FLIR sight is pretty doable.
By combining the thermal sensor and laser with a new transmission, a more powerful engine and a 4-blade main rotor, the Army updated the Kiowa into the OH-58D. And they stuck the sensors in a stabilized ball turret on top of the rotor. That let them hide behind a ridge or woodline and still peek over the top.
And again, the Army was very happy. The D-model Kiowa could spot enemy formations, call artillery fire upon them, it could use its laser to illuminate targets for Hellfire missiles fired from Apache helicopters and even laser guided artillery rounds. A typical scenario might have a US heavy division fighting the first echelon of Soviet Motor Rifle divisions, while Kiowas ranged 20-30 kilometers behind enemy lines looking for the assembly areas of the second echelon tank divisions. It was up to the tank and infantry battalions of the US division to hold the line against the first echelon. But as soon as the Kiowas spotted the second echelon, the division’s MLRS battery and possibly the Corps’ MLRS battalion would begin attacking the second echelon to attrit them and delay them until the US division was set to take them on.
But it wasn’t until the Navy had some problems with the Iranians that the Army started mounting weapons on them. During the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranians had a nasty habit of putting sea mines in the Persian Gulf. Not having a huge navy, they mostly laid the mines from a variety of small civilian craft. And they did it at night. A quick run out from port, toss a couple over the side, and run back in. This was causing a great deal of havoc, since a huge chunk of the world’s energy supplies run through the Gulf. The Navy was already escorting tankers through the gulf. And they had long operated helicopters from destroyers and frigates. But their helicopters weren’t equipped to find small craft at night and sink them. They were mostly designed to find submarines hiding under the surface. The answer was to quietly base some Kiowa’s aboard a handful of Navy ships. And since the Kiowa already had a laser target designator, hanging a couple Hellfire missiles on them wasn’t a great challenge. It didn’t take long for the Iranians to notice their mining sorties suddenly got dangerous. And it sure didn’t take the Army long to notice how handy it was to have the Kiowa armed and ready to take on targets they might find. Pretty soon the decision was made to arm all the OH-58Ds. The result is the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior. The armament is flexible. You can mount Hellfire missiles, 70mm rocket pods or .50cal machine gun pods on the pylons.
Kiowa Warriors are currently deployed in Iraq where they spend a lot of time doing what Kiowas have always done- keeping an eye out for the bad guys.
We aren’t the first folks to fight in Afghanistan. There’s a pretty good chance we won’t be the last. The Soviet Union’s invasion in 1979 led to nine years of fruitlessly struggling to dominate the country. In the end, their failure in Afghanistan may well have led to or accelerated the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The Russians have a very long history of operating submarines, having started in 1905. They have also long had problems operating submarines. The US has lost two nuclear subs, both back in the 1960s. I’ve lost count of how many the Russians have lost. The most recent loss was the Kursk, which took 118 sailors with it.
Now comes news that the Russians have had another accident on board a sub. They didn’t lose the boat, but they did lose 20 people. Apparently the fire suppression system discharged unintentionally. When this happens, the freon displaces the oxygen in a compartment. Without oxygen, the fire can’t burn. But people in the compartment can’t breath, either. On US subs, this hazard is mitigated by having air masks and hookups to breathable air. I don’t know how the Russian navy approaches the problem, but they have historically been far more willing to suffer the loss of sailors to accident then our own.
It’s been a while since we looked at the situation in Georgia. Now’s a good time for a review. EU Observer has an update for us that we found courtesy of the Instapundit.
Things are better for Georgia than I would have expected. Truth be told, I was somewhat surprised that Russia didn’t press their advantage and overrun the capital. I would have. They had already forfeited any international goodwill, but there would be no real response from the West in terms of shooting. But for whatever reasons, the Russians held off from invading all of Georgia proper, and while they hoped to topple the government, decided to let that slide.
Now, the EU is doing a surprisingly good job of pushing the Russians back. Since Russia has recognized the independence of South Ossettia and Abkahzia they will balk at leaving them. We’ll see how that goes. I’m just surprised they haven’t kept outposts in Georgia proper.
UPDATE: I tend to agree with MikeD’s analysis below in the comments:
My personal belief is that they stopped at the bridges to Tbilisi because they would have taken much heavier casualties than they were prepared to. Sure they WOULD have taken the city, but they would have paid heavily for it in blood, and Putin would not have wanted the loss of face involved in that. Kicking over an anthill should not cost you a foot. Yeah, you won, but you look stupid now.
Furthermore, holding Tbilisi is great… but the government would have just moved into the southern mountains, and suddenly the Russians are fighting Afghanistan all over again. Plus, at that point, there’s no “peacekeeping” pretense anymore, you’re a conquerer.
Once we had US troops on the ground with “humanitarian aid”, Putin was sunk. He COULD have pushed on at that point, but if he hurt one hair on the chinny-chin-chin of one of our airmen, that’s pretty much an act of war. And contrary to what a lot of folks were saying, Putin’s not really crazy. Evil? Sure. But not crazy.
But the point here is the strategic importance of time. If the Russians had pressed as far and as fast as possible with the intention of deposing the government, I think they could have taken Tiblisi before the Georgian government could evacuate and set up a guerrilla war in the south. But while the Russians were prepped to go into Ossettia and Abkazia, they had no real operational plan past that. It is kind of nice to see that the US isn’t the only ones who have trouble planning past the first push…
I’m seeing a lot of folks asking why the US doesn’t use Stealth bombers or cruise missiles to take out the Roki Tunnel. Simple answer? Too late. That ship has sailed.
The Roki tunnel goes from North Ossettia to South Ossettia and is the only real road connection between them. The thinking goes that if the tunnel were closed, the Russian forces would be cut off from supply and reinforcement.
Indeed, it looks like the Georgians plan was to sieze the tunnel and prevent the Russians from using it. If they had, things might have gone differently. But the Russians were more than prepared for the Georgians. They secured the tunnel before the Georgians could get there. Taking out the tunnel with airpower is virtually impossible without precision guided munitions and thus beyond Georgia’s capability.
So why wouldn’t it make sense to do so now? Because the Russians aren’t foolish enough to stick their necks in the noose. A quick glance at the map below will shed some light.
The map is a few days old and the positions of the forces has changed a little. But notice the large part of western Georgia occupied by the Russians. Also notice that Gori is occupied by Russia, despite their assurances that they are pulling out. The main East-West road in Georgia runs through Gori. And it ends up in Poti which is also under Russian control. Alternatively, there are good roads leading to Abkazia and Russia itself in the northwest. While the map shows Georgian units between Poti and Gori, these are not very significant and the terrain is not very suitable for the defense.
In effect, the Russians have secured a second supply line, running from the Black Sea to the heart of Georgia. That’s why the Russians invaded on the Black Sea coast. Any attempt now to destroy the Roki tunnel would be fruitless.
I was trying to get a post together on this, but Kat over at The Castle has done a better job than I was going to do, so just go read her.
The Russians are advancing on Tiblisi while claiming to be observing a cease fire. It appears the Georgians are refusing combat under terms not favorable to them. The Russians are advancing, claiming that they are securing military depots for safety’s sake. Currently, there are reports that they are only a few miles from Tiblisi. While the Georgian army is in no shape to stop this, these gains will be hard to pry from the Russians at the negotiation table. Or the Russians may just decide to advance and seize Tiblisi.
The profusion of journalists on the battlefield makes it easier to get information in real time about conflicts today. But that comes at a price. We have heard many complaints that US forces target journalists in Iraq. So how come they never have videotape?
The video refers to a Russian soldier, but I’m thinking this was an Ossettian “militiaman”, based on the beard. Still, it was right in front of a convoy of Russian vehicles. Seems maybe the Russians aren’t as committed to the rights of noncombatants as some would like. Will Code Pink be picketing them?
I find it interesting that mere days after the Russians began their attack on Georgia, a treaty between Poland and the US that had been stalled is suddenly signed. This treaty actually goes farther than what had been discussed before. Where earlier versions of the treaty were about installing a missile shield in Poland, this one includes mutual defense provisions beyond that of NATO membership.
Between this treaty, Secretary Rice travelling to Tiblisi, and the leaders of the Baltic states travelling there as well, and the humanitarian assistance arriving, the Russians risk widening a conflict they saw as limited and easy to win. Georgia may well end up surviving this, albeit in a terrible strategic position with Russia in the disputed regions.
Maybe, maybe not. But for a great look at some of the considerations of terrain and maneuver they would face, head over to The Castle and see what Kat has to say. She’s got some great maps and a pretty clear explanation of how that terrain affects the choices for the Russians.
While the Russians claim to have agreed to a cease-fire, they haven’t actaully, you know, ceased firing. Russian forces are in or around Gori and today CNN is showing tape of Russian forces in the Georgian port city of Poti. And while the Russians appear to be able to gain territory, are they achieving their strategic objectives?
Remember, in strategy, merely gaining ground is not the goal. Even gaining ALL the ground is not the goal. The goal is to impose your political will on your oponent. So what are the Russian goals. We see them as threefold:
Depose the current government of Georgia and install one friendly (or submissive) to Moscow.
Discourage other former states of the USSR from aligning themselves with the west.
Show the west as too weak to assist former USSR states.
So how are the Russians doing? The end state is unclear, but my feeling is that the longer this goes on, the less the Russians will gain. Currently Saakashvili is holding rallies with huge numbers of Georgians in attendance. Furthermore, the Presidents of Poland and the Baltic states have all traveled to Tblisi to express support for Georgia. And our President has announced humanitarian assistance to Georgia, to be delivered by the US Air Force and the US Navy. Based on these indicators, it would appear that the Russians have not met their strategic goals, in spite of tactical success on the battlefield.
The humanitarian efforts by the US are interesting. The Russians will likely not dare to interfere with them for fear of widening a conflict that they had planned to be short and relatively painless. They cannot attack airfields or ports that the US is using for fear of causing US casualties during a humanitarian mission. Even the Russians have to give lip service to public opinion. The non-trivial risk of starting a shooting war with US forces is not what they were looking for.
Further, this humanitarian presence makes it less likely that Russia will continue its attack during this putative cease fire. If the Georgians can maintain some territorial integrity over the coming days and weeks, the Russian presence in Georgia will draw more criticism and sanctions from the west. They can hardly continue to claim to be protecting their “peacekeepers” in Ossettia and Abkazia by invading Georgia.
It appears Georgia has been trading space for time. This is a very old tactic and it just may work this time. The Russians were prepared for considerable criticism for their aggression, even building a considerable maskirovka to justify it. But the longer the conflict goes on, the higher the political price they will pay.
As we see it, Russia has very few days left to conquer Georgia before that price becomes too high. But they may well be able to conquer Georgia in those few days.
For some of the folks who have been stopping by to see the news on the war in Georgia, I thought I might give a little background on the main weapons being used there.
Tanks: Both sides are using various versions of the T-72 series tanks. The T-72 is a 30 year old design that still has some life left in it. You will notice that it is much smaller than a US M-1 tank. The design philosophy behind this tank stressed small size to make hitting it less likely. It also has a three man crew, with a driver, gunner and a tank commander. US tanks have a fourth crewmember, a loader. In the T-72, there is a mechanical autoloader instead. I’ve been inside a T-72 and it is SMALL. I’m not that big a guy, but I couldn’t even get the hatch closed over my head. Once inside, most of the controls are actaully pretty similar to what American tankers are used to. I’m not a tanker and I could figure most of them out pretty quickly.
The T-72 has an impressive 125mm main gun that fires both HEAT and kinetic energy rounds. For more information on HEAT and KE rounds, go here.
The boxes you see mounted on the outside of these tanks are Explosive Reactive Armor or ERA. These boxes contain explosives that detonate outwards when the tank is struck by a HEAT round. The explosion deform the jet of hot gasses that the HEAT round forms and prevent it from penetrating the tanks main armor. We don’t use it much because the M-1 doesn’t need it. Bradley’s can be equipped with it. Strykers use “slat” armor instead. There’s a picture of a Stryker with slat armor at the link above.
In addition to the main gun, the T-72 has a coaxially mounted 7.62mm machine gun and is usually seen with a 12.7mm machine gun at the commanders position.
BMPs: Both sides are using the BMP-2. The original BMP debuted in 1967. After the US fielded the Bradley Fighting Vehicle in response, the Soviets updated the BMP with a 30mm autocannon designed to destroy Bradleys and provide suppressive fires against antitank missile teams and helicopters. It also carries a 7.62mm coaxially mounted machine gun and carries an AT-4 Spigot antitank missile on the roof.
As you can see in the youtube below, this is a fairly sprightly vehicle. Again, it is much more cramped than its US counterpart.
You’ll notice four heads sticking up from the vehicle. That’s the driver, gunner, BMP commander and the guy right behind the driver is the squad leader for the dismount soldiers in back. The second half of the video shows a proposed improvement to the BMP-2 that neither side appears to be using in this conflict.
BTRs: Under the Soviet organizational model, only about a third of infantry units are equipped with BMPs. The other 2/3 are equipped with BTRs, the most common being the BTR-80.
The BTR-80 is roughly analogous to the US M113 armored personnel carrier. It is simply a way of transporting a rifle squad to the battle with some armor protection. The small turret on the roof carries a 14.5mm machine gun that can be used to suppress infantry, antitank missile teams or provide limited antiaircraft fire. Again, they are incredibly cramped compared to US vehicles.
Most of these vehicles are simple and rugged. They do their job quite well and can be operated with minimal training. In the hands of a well trained force, they can be formidable opponents. Just because the US has made short work of enemies equipped with Soviet made equipment, don’t scoff at the quality of their work. Remeber, these are the same folks who brought us the most popular rifle of all time: the AK-47.
As of this morning, the Soviets Russians have announced a cease fire and claim they have halted attacks on Georgia. Georgia disputes this, claiming the Russians have continued air and artillery attacks on Georgian territory. The current lines are unclear. I have not been able to verify if Russian forces have withdrawn from undisputed Georgian territory, but it looks that way. Russia seems somewhat surprised by the ferocity of the Georgian defense. Rather than standing to fight on ground unfavorable to them, the Georgians have withdrawn to maintain their army intact (if quite bloodied) and to enable them to continue to resist. The Russians appear to have decided that they have secured about all the strategic gain they can at small cost and that further attacks would not be worthwhile.
Rather than be drawn into a protracted campaign in which the Georgians use guerrilla tactics, the Russians will likely consolidate their gains in the disputed territories, effectively absorbing them. They will likely also continue to press for the removal of pro-western President Saakashvili. The head of NATO, however expressed support for Georgia to continue on the path to membership.
Information Dissemination is also reporting that the Russians appear to be maintaining a de facto blockade of the port of Poti.
The Times is reporting the Russian forces have seized the Georgian town of Gori. Gori is outside the disputed regions that Russia is supposedly “protecting.” I had initially thought the Russians would confine themselves to air and naval attacks on Georgia proper, but it appears I was wrong. Will Russia occupy all of Georgia? We’ll see. As I mentioned, Gori is only about 15 miles from Tskhinvali, and from there it is only about 40 miles to the capital, Tblisi. It looks as though Russia may decide to solve this dispute once and for all. Gori sits on the main east-west highway in Georgia, so in effect, the Russians have cut Georgia in two. This does not bode well for Georgia.
UPDATE: Not only have the Russians attacked south from Ossettia, they have attacked from the western region of Abkahzia and seized Georgian towns and bases in western Georgia. Georgia, faced with a two front conflict is at the mercy of Russia. Pleas to the UN will not influence Russia in the least. They have a veto on the Security Council, so there will be no resolution condemning Russia.
While I haven’t posted anything on this war yet, rest assured I’m paying attention. There are several problems getting good grip on events, however. There are conflicting stories from both sides over the timeline and events transpiring so far. Not surprisingly, both Russia and Georgia are attempting to control media coverage to produce favorable press. Deciding which parts of the coverage are true is difficult.
A little background. Georgia is one of the many smaller states that broke away when the Soviet Union collapsed. Falling under the nominal control of Georgia were two regions, South Ossettia and Abkahzia. Both regions were ethnically different from the Georgians. The Russians have long supported separatist movements in both regions, extending Russian passports to any residents who wanted them. They also encouraged these separatists to use violence in the furtherance of their goals, then stepped in with Russian troops as peacekeepers in both regions as a solution to the violence. Separatists in South Ossettia continued attacks on Georgian troops under the cover of these Russian peacekeepers. Georgia, which has been strongly aligned with the west since its independence, decided to attack the capital of South Ossettia, Tskhinvali, hoping the opening of the Olympics would distract world attention. Their operational security was poor. The Russians were clearly prepared, and by the end of the first day, large Russian units had crossed into South Ossettia and began pounding Georgian units. Georgia’s plan had been to secure Tskhinvali and block the only road into the area before Russian units could reach the area. They failed largely as a result of their lack of surprise. Knowing full well that the Georgian attack was coming, the Russians were able to inject their forces into the region and secure their lines of communications into the area (by lines of communication, we mean supply routes, not phone lines and such). The Russians also felt no compunction about confining the conflict to South Ossettia. They used artillery and airpower against Georgian positions inside Georgia and attacked the airfields the tiny Georgian air force could use.
The Russians also moved to open a second front, by mobilizing the Abkahzian separatists and moving troops into Abkahzia and engaging the Georgian’s tiny navy in the Black Sea.
Georgia has clearly bitten off more than it can chew. They have withdrawn from South Ossettia and are defending the town of Gori. Their entire navy consisted of two missile boats, one of which has been sunk by the Russians as of Sunday. There are unconfirmed reports that the Russian have sunk two vessels.
This graphic shows just how small the area is. The line from Tskhinvali to Gori is only 17 miles. It is about another 30 or so to the capital of Georgia, Tblisi.
This second image is a wider view of the top, showing the position of Georgia on the Black Sea. Abkahzia is in the Northwest corner of Georgia.
And I stole this map from the excellent Information Dissemination, who has been all over this conflict. While he has a naval slant towards this, he also has great links to the war as a whole.
One of the big problems the Georgians face is that they have a tiny army, only about 26,000 strong. And 2000 of those troops are in Iraq fighting alongside us there. The Georgian government has asked the US to move those troops back to Georgia. Here’s a graphic showing the size of the Georgian forces and the size of the Russian forces:
While the Russians obviously haven’t put their whole army into this fight, they have much larger reserves to move to the battle. Once the Georgians deploy their army, that’s it. That’s all they have. And it would be a mistake to think that the Russian forces are the same ones who fared so badly in the first Chechyan war. These are the soldiers who won the second Chechyan war. They are far better trained, and thanks to Russian petrodollars, are far better equipped. The Georgian forces, while using Soviet equipment, are stuck using older, less effective versions.
The Georgians have pretty much been defeated in South Ossettia. The question becomes, what next. Will the Russians attempt to overrun Georgia itself? Probably not. While they have the forces to do so, it is not likely their intention. They can achieve their goals without doing so. Will they instigate a fight in Abkahzai? Quite possibly. If they do, there isn’t a whole lot the Georgians can do about it.
So what are the Russian goals? Russia has long seen the Georgian alignment with the West as a major thorn in their side. By undertaking this limited operation, they have weakened Georgia without any real risk of intervention by the Western nations. DrewM over at Ace’s tells us that one political goal is the removal of Georgia’s pro-western President, Mikheil Saakashvili.
In addition, the Russians have sent a message to a lot of other small nations that once fell under their sway. First, play ball with Russia, or you too might suddenly find yourself with a “separatist movement.” Second, they have demonstrated that they are willing to use naked force to achieve their goals, and world opinion be damned. Third, those small nations have been put on notice that the West, in the form of NATO and the EU will not lift a finger to help them.
UPDATE: Of course, Castle Argghhh! has a great post on this topic. Be sure to check out this map from the comments.
This site is in no way affiliated with the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, the Department of the Air Force, the National Guard Bureau or NASA and nothing said herein should be considered to have any official sanction by those (or any other) agencies.
The opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not represent those of any other person or entity.
Craig Swain
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